Decisions for War, 1914–1917

by Richard F. Hamilton, Holger H. Herwig

Focusing on the choices made by coteries, this study examines the perplexing question of why World War I happened. In each case, the decision to enter the war was made by a handful of individuals--monarchs, ministers, military people, party leaders, ambassadors, and a few others. In each case also, separate and distinct agendas are seen, with considerations differing from one nation to the next. The leadership of Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are explored, as well as that of the major powers involved--Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, and Great Britain,

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military History, World War I

284 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Colin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very well-structured and well argued account of the decision-making processes, taken country by country, as to how each went to war during WW1. Along the way, the book addresses the various theories about how the conflict happened e.g. the inadvertence argument advanced by Lloyd George and others - and concludes that No - the war happened through a premeditated series of decisions by a small coterie in the states concerned. And that those decisions - at least in respect of the major players - were essentially defensive in nature. Meaning that they took those decisions to either halt a perceived decline in power and status or to counter a serious threat to their nations.

I find this view convincing, although I don't think it necessarily contradicts the "Sleepwalker" thesis of Christopher Clark - which incidentally postdates this book.

The book also helpfully looks at the decisions taken by the USA in 1917 as well as those by a lesser ranked nations such as Bulgaria, Italy, Greece and Turkey - albeit that the USA and Turkey played a significant role in the war once they were involved.

Overall, a very valuable and informative contribution to this massive subject.

[Heather C · Rating 4 out of 5]

Decisions for War, 1914-1917 by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig is a book that I found to be extremely valuable to my understanding of the complex and varied reasons for the belligerents in World War I to decide to enter the fray. The topic is one that many authors have set out to cover in their books as there is a lot of interest in why the war occurred. Hamilton and Herwig set out to present their material in a different way from those other books out there that analyze this topic. Whereas many authors look at the socio-political reasons for war, or discuss the entry into war as a progressive slide, the authors here very clearly theorize that World War I was a direct result of careful decision making and deliberate actions toward war by a small group of decision makers within all of the major powers in the war.

Regarding their thesis, I found Hamilton and Herwig well supported their thesis and through their writing achieved what they set out to prove in their work. There was no question as to what their thesis was; they clearly delineated it in the earliest chapters and proceeded to further support it in each subsequent belligerent’s chapter. In the introduction to each country’s chapter, they enumerated the individual factors that related to their thesis, reminding the reader in each chapter of how they would support their goals. For example, one of the most direct statements supporting their thesis of deliberate war actions occurs at the introduction to the “Austria-Hungary” chapter, “Austria-Hungary’s leaders were the first to opt for war, and they did so with plan and foresight…their action was not inadvertent, it was no accident, or, to use the most frequent cliché, this was no ‘slide into war.’ In short, the timing and the pace of the July Crisis were set in Vienna” (pg 47). They remained focused on their point throughout the work and at no point did I lose sight of their main idea, which has occurred in others non-fiction books I have read. As much as supporting their own thesis, Hamilton and Herwig also chipped away at the thesis of other authors who wrote on the same topic and provided reasoning as to why these other interpretations left a lot of holes in the story of the origins of World War I. As I have not read very widely on this subject I appreciated the introduction of other theories behind the decisions to go to war as this helped to round out my understanding of other theories out there, without having to have read all of the other books.

With regard to my experience reading Decisions for War, 1914-1917, I found this book to be very well laid out with a logical progression and easy to follow. The authors provide background to the period just prior to the war in one concise chapter to give the reader enough information to proceed with their discussion. Then each of the major powers has their own chapter which focuses on that country’s individual situation surrounding their entry into war – providing important personages and how that group of people reached their decision to partake in the war. Following the major powers are chapters on the later entering belligerents, whose reasons for war were very different from the major powers. Focusing on each country in this way allowed me to get into the mindset of that particular country and see the situation from their perspective, rather than from the grand scheme of an outsider. I think this approach was effective in helping the authors to clearly stick to their thesis as well as to achieve their thesis. I believe that to look at something from the big picture tends to lean the resulting analysis toward a sociological rationale as you are more likely to look for trends amongst the group, rather than the individual level where you can really dig into things.

The only section of this book that I think would have benefited from being tightened up a little bit is the final chapter, “On the Origins of the Catastrophe”. I understand that the purpose of this chapter was to take what the authors compiled during each of the preceding individual country’s chapters and bring them together into the culminating analysis of their thesis, and this is what they did. While I understand the purpose, the execution left the text feeling redundant to me. There was again an analysis of the major powers and the minor powers and their respective power players. This may have worked well as an actual conclusion if they had wrapped it up there; however, they proceeded to introduce some newer analysis following this rehashing which felt like a reopening of the topic again instead of bringing it to a close. Further, when the authors did bring the book to a close, it was rather abrupt and on a seemingly new area of analysis that they had not discussed before – how World War I was a precursor to World War II. This aspect came seemingly out of left field for me. While it makes sense to draw some conclusions on the effect of World War I on the next great war, it would have made more sense to introduce this issue earlier on or at least allude to the fact that it would be being discussed at some point. These last few paragraphs which conclude the book left me more confused than complete. If the authors wanted to tie into World War II it would have made sense to also draw some parallels throughout the chapters on the individual countries to lead into their concluding section.

My reading experience with this book was very enjoyable and I learned quite a bit about the decision-makers and their rationales for war as promised by the authors in the title and at the outset of the book. I appreciated the easy flow of the narrative and how it did not appear to become mired down anywhere. Each chapter had a deliberate purpose in the greater whole and by the end of the book I felt that each of the important participants in the war had been well represented within the pages of this book.

This review was previously posted at The Maiden's Court blog and was a personal purchase for a Masters class.

[Andreas · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book is organized in the order the involved countries decided to go to war, starting with Austria-Hungary and ending with the United States. It breaks down who was involved in the decision making and shows that neither the euphoria of the masses nor the duties of the alliances were the true reason for their decisions. The reasons ranged from stopping the self- perceived decline of the country, to better now than later, to preventing Germany from becoming the sole power on the continent and many others. It further shows how the greater powers dragged smaller countries into this enormous struggle on basis of promises that mostly weren't kept after the war or were the seed for the coming of the Second World War. It furthermore shows that the reason for the Great War cannot be understood without the knowledge of the prior conflicts like the Balkan Wars, Russian-Japanese war, Italy's annexation of later Libya to name just a few.

[David Spruce · Rating 5 out of 5]

A proper history book that addresses the causes of the war in a scholarly manner. That doesn't mean it is dry as the prose is as lively as the arguments convincing. A tonic for fiction like 'The Sleepwalkers'.

[Megan Perry · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is was a very good read. I recommend for anyone who wants to learn about the Frist World War. It is broken down into an easy to read format. It is a short history with a thesis that each country only had a handful of people that made the decision about going to war or not.

[Sam · Rating 4 out of 5]

read for class, but engaging considering its just europeans fucking shit up. more person driven, but clearly organized. i liked it tbh

[Kristy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read it for a class but really liked it. Not overly academic in language, it was a fast and interesting read.

[Jay · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a outstanding book for anyone who wishes to know the real reasons why Europe went to war in 1914. Hamilton and Herwig focus on the decisions made by small "coteries" from each country and fully explain how it was these decisions that led to war and not the oft-cited other causes like the bogus "slide into war" theory. I really enjoyed this book. It was an easy read, yet I learned a great deal about WWI and the cast of characters that made it happen. What I like most about this book is that it provides the reader with a window into the hearts and minds of the decision makers and what influenced their decisions. This is a great book for both the student of history and the casual reader. Highly recommended.

[Howard Anders · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is essentially an abridgement of the authors' 2003 work on the same subject, done to summarize their views on the origins of World War One for undergraduate students. The authors contend that the decision for war 1914-1917, for each of the major powers was made by small coteries of men in each country, or by a single person advised by such a coterie. Much of their case is presented in the first chapter of the book, in which the authors analyze previously developed theories on the origins of World War One, and compare and contrast them to their own. Subsequent chapters test their thesis, country by country. The book is exceptionally well organized, and far more readable than the average academic tome.

[Mark Singer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fascinating look at the origins of World War I that examines the decision making process of the powers: who, what, where, when and why. The main emphasis is a detailed look at the small group of men in each nation who made these choices. Furthermore, it attempts to refute previous arguments based on alliance systems, nationalism, social Darwinism, imperialism, militarism, the press, domestic sources, and the "inevitable slide into war" theory. The book is an bridged version of "The Origins of World War I" as edited by the same authors, and I will now look for that book.
[Edited}
Just as informative now that I re-read it on the 100th anniversary of the build up to the Great War.

[Frederick · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good explanation as to how The Great War was entered to by very rational and thought-out decisions and not "blundered into". Some high-stakes risks and lots of argument and advisement went on and it was not an easy decision for anyone except Austria-Hungary who thought they were just getting a third Balkan War. You will enjoy this book as it is very well-written and concise. You may not agree with the authors' conclusions but you will see very clearly how they came to them.

[Jur · Rating 4 out of 5]

Focus on the political decision making process in crisis rather than geopolitics or military planning.

[Tom · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very good overview of why each nation went to war. Extremely dry reading, and moves by so fast as to be forgettable.