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Decisions for War, 1914–1917
Focusing on the choices made by coteries, this study examines the perplexing question of why World War I happened. In each case, the decision to enter the war was made by a handful of individuals--monarchs, ministers, military people, party leaders, ambassadors, and a few others. In each case also, separate and distinct agendas are seen, with considerations differing from one nation to the next. The leadership of Japan, the Ottoman Empire, Italy, the Balkans, and the United States are explored, as well as that of the major powers involved--Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, and Great Britain,
284 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2004
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
February 25, 2026
Decisions for War, 1914–1917 by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig offers a comprehensive examination of the political, social, and strategic calculations that led each major power into the First World War. Rather than retelling the familiar narrative of battles, alliances, and diplomatic crises, the authors shift the focus to the individuals and institutions responsible for making the critical choices between 1914 and 1917. By organizing the study nation by nation, they allow the reader to see how different political systems—constitutional monarchies, parliamentary governments, and autocratic empires—processed information, debated options, and ultimately committed themselves to war.
First off, I liked the first chapter where they define what they mean by a world war. I always think it is beneficial when authors define the key terms they are going to use in a work. This often provides clarity but more importantly helps address some of the presuppositions that so many of us bring to words and topics. It is also important to acknowledge that our perceptions are different from those who were contemporaneous to events. World War Two dominates so much thinking about the past, that not only does the First Word War get over shadowed but many of the war before than as well. Plus, giving a number to the World Wars gives a false sense of the scope of previous wars. That is why I really like the listing of eight wars that fit their definition of world wars. I think this is helpful in giving context for the decision makers before the war began. A global conflict was not in itself something that was new and could even contribute to why they did not fear the results of the conflict as much as they should have, having seen Europe survived global conflicts before.
At first, I was sceptical of going back to 1815 for a review of the wars and conflicts. Of course, I always think context is important, that is a key point in why we studying history, but many of the shifts in alignment and the industrial revolution had all change the balance of power so much as to make some of that period unimportant. Yet my scepticism was overcome by their discussion of the Concert of Europe. I have heard that term before in relation to the Congress of Vienna , but did not fully appreciate that it was an informal diplomatic concept for the dealing of issue in Europe.
I appreciated the point they made about the contrasting goals of each entrant into the war. The major powers at the start of the war were basically all working to protect their current position against the perceived threats. The is in contrast with the war amins of many of the lesser powers that joined the war. This complicated any protentional peace, as each new combatant brough additional war aims, sometimes even contradictory. No new side made a decisive impact until the United States, and in each addition, they simply prolonged the war and forced each side to seek a victory. I was glad Hamilton and Herwig addressed the myth of German “grab for world power” as this is still commonly believed. It seems that was entente propaganda that was used to sell the war to their people and was carried over into propaganda used in the United States. I remember being taught that as a kid in school, and the idea was reenforced by all those who fought in World War two, which was a very different war.
I found the country-by-country breakdown interesting, though at times somewhat repetitive. Throughout their summation of each kingdom’s leadership, I sensed a consistent undercurrent of criticism from Hamilton and Herwig: the autocratic powers are portrayed as overly aggressive, while the republican governments appear hesitant and reactive. The implication seems to be that a more democratic or transparent decision-making process might have produced a different outcome. I am not entirely persuaded by that assumption. Even in more democratic states, the authority to declare war was typically concentrated in the hands of a relatively small circle of decision-makers, many of whom were not directly engaged in foreign affairs or military planning. The idea that democracy inherently prevents war strikes me as overly simplistic. While there is a theory that democracies do not initiate wars of aggression, many conflicts emerge not from open acts of conquest but from perceived threats and fears of future danger. Austria, for example, was clearly the aggressor in its push for war against Serbia, yet it justified its actions on the grounds of Serbian involvement in the assassination. The language of defence and necessity often frames decisions that, in practice, escalate into wider wars. Greater transparency might have influenced the rhetoric or slowed the rush to war, but it would not necessarily have altered the underlying perceptions of threat that drove the crisis forward.
The problem I have with Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis is their implication that, because these leaders were not compelled to make these choices, they were therefore fully free to choose otherwise. In working back through the time period preceding the war, I thought they would more appreciate the context in which the leaders of each power found themselves. Their entire critique seems to be in response to David Lloyd George’s “slide” into war theory. Granted, his revisionism seems to try to absolve many people of the responsivity for the war, but instead I think Hamilton and Herwig made a mistake in not giving more power to the events and decisions that preceded the war. So many of the events that proceeded the June assassination limited the decisions that seemed reasonable or viable to the leaders of each country. Could Russia really survive the loss of prestige after they failed to opposed the annexation of Bosnia, or could Britian really not support France when they believed a Germany dominated Europe would lead to their economic or diplomatic isolation?
Although Hamilton and Herwig do a good job of highlighting developments in the century preceding the war, they seem to underestimate the inertia created by the events leading up to 1914. This, I think, explains why the language of “sliding” into war is so often used when discussing the outbreak of the Great War. The term does not imply that the war happened by accident or that it was not decided by individuals. Rather, it acknowledges that a long series of decisions—many not intended to cause conflict—led to a moment in 1914 when war became almost inevitable.
While I learned some things, and I think Hamilton and Herwig did some very detailed research, I did not enjoy the book. I think Hamilton and Herwig have a hard time not make judgments based upon modern biases about the benefits of transparency. Moreover, they are benefiting from hindsight, they know that these events turn into war, and give little credence to these same decisions makers who made decisions during the Moroccan crisis and the Bosnia annexations that did not lead to war.
First off, I liked the first chapter where they define what they mean by a world war. I always think it is beneficial when authors define the key terms they are going to use in a work. This often provides clarity but more importantly helps address some of the presuppositions that so many of us bring to words and topics. It is also important to acknowledge that our perceptions are different from those who were contemporaneous to events. World War Two dominates so much thinking about the past, that not only does the First Word War get over shadowed but many of the war before than as well. Plus, giving a number to the World Wars gives a false sense of the scope of previous wars. That is why I really like the listing of eight wars that fit their definition of world wars. I think this is helpful in giving context for the decision makers before the war began. A global conflict was not in itself something that was new and could even contribute to why they did not fear the results of the conflict as much as they should have, having seen Europe survived global conflicts before.
At first, I was sceptical of going back to 1815 for a review of the wars and conflicts. Of course, I always think context is important, that is a key point in why we studying history, but many of the shifts in alignment and the industrial revolution had all change the balance of power so much as to make some of that period unimportant. Yet my scepticism was overcome by their discussion of the Concert of Europe. I have heard that term before in relation to the Congress of Vienna , but did not fully appreciate that it was an informal diplomatic concept for the dealing of issue in Europe.
I appreciated the point they made about the contrasting goals of each entrant into the war. The major powers at the start of the war were basically all working to protect their current position against the perceived threats. The is in contrast with the war amins of many of the lesser powers that joined the war. This complicated any protentional peace, as each new combatant brough additional war aims, sometimes even contradictory. No new side made a decisive impact until the United States, and in each addition, they simply prolonged the war and forced each side to seek a victory. I was glad Hamilton and Herwig addressed the myth of German “grab for world power” as this is still commonly believed. It seems that was entente propaganda that was used to sell the war to their people and was carried over into propaganda used in the United States. I remember being taught that as a kid in school, and the idea was reenforced by all those who fought in World War two, which was a very different war.
I found the country-by-country breakdown interesting, though at times somewhat repetitive. Throughout their summation of each kingdom’s leadership, I sensed a consistent undercurrent of criticism from Hamilton and Herwig: the autocratic powers are portrayed as overly aggressive, while the republican governments appear hesitant and reactive. The implication seems to be that a more democratic or transparent decision-making process might have produced a different outcome. I am not entirely persuaded by that assumption. Even in more democratic states, the authority to declare war was typically concentrated in the hands of a relatively small circle of decision-makers, many of whom were not directly engaged in foreign affairs or military planning. The idea that democracy inherently prevents war strikes me as overly simplistic. While there is a theory that democracies do not initiate wars of aggression, many conflicts emerge not from open acts of conquest but from perceived threats and fears of future danger. Austria, for example, was clearly the aggressor in its push for war against Serbia, yet it justified its actions on the grounds of Serbian involvement in the assassination. The language of defence and necessity often frames decisions that, in practice, escalate into wider wars. Greater transparency might have influenced the rhetoric or slowed the rush to war, but it would not necessarily have altered the underlying perceptions of threat that drove the crisis forward.
The problem I have with Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis is their implication that, because these leaders were not compelled to make these choices, they were therefore fully free to choose otherwise. In working back through the time period preceding the war, I thought they would more appreciate the context in which the leaders of each power found themselves. Their entire critique seems to be in response to David Lloyd George’s “slide” into war theory. Granted, his revisionism seems to try to absolve many people of the responsivity for the war, but instead I think Hamilton and Herwig made a mistake in not giving more power to the events and decisions that preceded the war. So many of the events that proceeded the June assassination limited the decisions that seemed reasonable or viable to the leaders of each country. Could Russia really survive the loss of prestige after they failed to opposed the annexation of Bosnia, or could Britian really not support France when they believed a Germany dominated Europe would lead to their economic or diplomatic isolation?
Although Hamilton and Herwig do a good job of highlighting developments in the century preceding the war, they seem to underestimate the inertia created by the events leading up to 1914. This, I think, explains why the language of “sliding” into war is so often used when discussing the outbreak of the Great War. The term does not imply that the war happened by accident or that it was not decided by individuals. Rather, it acknowledges that a long series of decisions—many not intended to cause conflict—led to a moment in 1914 when war became almost inevitable.
While I learned some things, and I think Hamilton and Herwig did some very detailed research, I did not enjoy the book. I think Hamilton and Herwig have a hard time not make judgments based upon modern biases about the benefits of transparency. Moreover, they are benefiting from hindsight, they know that these events turn into war, and give little credence to these same decisions makers who made decisions during the Moroccan crisis and the Bosnia annexations that did not lead to war.
September 27, 2017
This is a very well-structured and well argued account of the decision-making processes, taken country by country, as to how each went to war during WW1. Along the way, the book addresses the various theories about how the conflict happened e.g. the inadvertence argument advanced by Lloyd George and others - and concludes that No - the war happened through a premeditated series of decisions by a small coterie in the states concerned. And that those decisions - at least in respect of the major players - were essentially defensive in nature. Meaning that they took those decisions to either halt a perceived decline in power and status or to counter a serious threat to their nations.
I find this view convincing, although I don't think it necessarily contradicts the "Sleepwalker" thesis of Christopher Clark - which incidentally postdates this book.
The book also helpfully looks at the decisions taken by the USA in 1917 as well as those by a lesser ranked nations such as Bulgaria, Italy, Greece and Turkey - albeit that the USA and Turkey played a significant role in the war once they were involved.
Overall, a very valuable and informative contribution to this massive subject.
I find this view convincing, although I don't think it necessarily contradicts the "Sleepwalker" thesis of Christopher Clark - which incidentally postdates this book.
The book also helpfully looks at the decisions taken by the USA in 1917 as well as those by a lesser ranked nations such as Bulgaria, Italy, Greece and Turkey - albeit that the USA and Turkey played a significant role in the war once they were involved.
Overall, a very valuable and informative contribution to this massive subject.
September 1, 2015
Decisions for War, 1914-1917 by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig is a book that I found to be extremely valuable to my understanding of the complex and varied reasons for the belligerents in World War I to decide to enter the fray. The topic is one that many authors have set out to cover in their books as there is a lot of interest in why the war occurred. Hamilton and Herwig set out to present their material in a different way from those other books out there that analyze this topic. Whereas many authors look at the socio-political reasons for war, or discuss the entry into war as a progressive slide, the authors here very clearly theorize that World War I was a direct result of careful decision making and deliberate actions toward war by a small group of decision makers within all of the major powers in the war.
Regarding their thesis, I found Hamilton and Herwig well supported their thesis and through their writing achieved what they set out to prove in their work. There was no question as to what their thesis was; they clearly delineated it in the earliest chapters and proceeded to further support it in each subsequent belligerent’s chapter. In the introduction to each country’s chapter, they enumerated the individual factors that related to their thesis, reminding the reader in each chapter of how they would support their goals. For example, one of the most direct statements supporting their thesis of deliberate war actions occurs at the introduction to the “Austria-Hungary” chapter, “Austria-Hungary’s leaders were the first to opt for war, and they did so with plan and foresight…their action was not inadvertent, it was no accident, or, to use the most frequent cliché, this was no ‘slide into war.’ In short, the timing and the pace of the July Crisis were set in Vienna” (pg 47). They remained focused on their point throughout the work and at no point did I lose sight of their main idea, which has occurred in others non-fiction books I have read. As much as supporting their own thesis, Hamilton and Herwig also chipped away at the thesis of other authors who wrote on the same topic and provided reasoning as to why these other interpretations left a lot of holes in the story of the origins of World War I. As I have not read very widely on this subject I appreciated the introduction of other theories behind the decisions to go to war as this helped to round out my understanding of other theories out there, without having to have read all of the other books.
With regard to my experience reading Decisions for War, 1914-1917, I found this book to be very well laid out with a logical progression and easy to follow. The authors provide background to the period just prior to the war in one concise chapter to give the reader enough information to proceed with their discussion. Then each of the major powers has their own chapter which focuses on that country’s individual situation surrounding their entry into war – providing important personages and how that group of people reached their decision to partake in the war. Following the major powers are chapters on the later entering belligerents, whose reasons for war were very different from the major powers. Focusing on each country in this way allowed me to get into the mindset of that particular country and see the situation from their perspective, rather than from the grand scheme of an outsider. I think this approach was effective in helping the authors to clearly stick to their thesis as well as to achieve their thesis. I believe that to look at something from the big picture tends to lean the resulting analysis toward a sociological rationale as you are more likely to look for trends amongst the group, rather than the individual level where you can really dig into things.
The only section of this book that I think would have benefited from being tightened up a little bit is the final chapter, “On the Origins of the Catastrophe”. I understand that the purpose of this chapter was to take what the authors compiled during each of the preceding individual country’s chapters and bring them together into the culminating analysis of their thesis, and this is what they did. While I understand the purpose, the execution left the text feeling redundant to me. There was again an analysis of the major powers and the minor powers and their respective power players. This may have worked well as an actual conclusion if they had wrapped it up there; however, they proceeded to introduce some newer analysis following this rehashing which felt like a reopening of the topic again instead of bringing it to a close. Further, when the authors did bring the book to a close, it was rather abrupt and on a seemingly new area of analysis that they had not discussed before – how World War I was a precursor to World War II. This aspect came seemingly out of left field for me. While it makes sense to draw some conclusions on the effect of World War I on the next great war, it would have made more sense to introduce this issue earlier on or at least allude to the fact that it would be being discussed at some point. These last few paragraphs which conclude the book left me more confused than complete. If the authors wanted to tie into World War II it would have made sense to also draw some parallels throughout the chapters on the individual countries to lead into their concluding section.
My reading experience with this book was very enjoyable and I learned quite a bit about the decision-makers and their rationales for war as promised by the authors in the title and at the outset of the book. I appreciated the easy flow of the narrative and how it did not appear to become mired down anywhere. Each chapter had a deliberate purpose in the greater whole and by the end of the book I felt that each of the important participants in the war had been well represented within the pages of this book.
This review was previously posted at The Maiden's Court blog and was a personal purchase for a Masters class.
Regarding their thesis, I found Hamilton and Herwig well supported their thesis and through their writing achieved what they set out to prove in their work. There was no question as to what their thesis was; they clearly delineated it in the earliest chapters and proceeded to further support it in each subsequent belligerent’s chapter. In the introduction to each country’s chapter, they enumerated the individual factors that related to their thesis, reminding the reader in each chapter of how they would support their goals. For example, one of the most direct statements supporting their thesis of deliberate war actions occurs at the introduction to the “Austria-Hungary” chapter, “Austria-Hungary’s leaders were the first to opt for war, and they did so with plan and foresight…their action was not inadvertent, it was no accident, or, to use the most frequent cliché, this was no ‘slide into war.’ In short, the timing and the pace of the July Crisis were set in Vienna” (pg 47). They remained focused on their point throughout the work and at no point did I lose sight of their main idea, which has occurred in others non-fiction books I have read. As much as supporting their own thesis, Hamilton and Herwig also chipped away at the thesis of other authors who wrote on the same topic and provided reasoning as to why these other interpretations left a lot of holes in the story of the origins of World War I. As I have not read very widely on this subject I appreciated the introduction of other theories behind the decisions to go to war as this helped to round out my understanding of other theories out there, without having to have read all of the other books.
With regard to my experience reading Decisions for War, 1914-1917, I found this book to be very well laid out with a logical progression and easy to follow. The authors provide background to the period just prior to the war in one concise chapter to give the reader enough information to proceed with their discussion. Then each of the major powers has their own chapter which focuses on that country’s individual situation surrounding their entry into war – providing important personages and how that group of people reached their decision to partake in the war. Following the major powers are chapters on the later entering belligerents, whose reasons for war were very different from the major powers. Focusing on each country in this way allowed me to get into the mindset of that particular country and see the situation from their perspective, rather than from the grand scheme of an outsider. I think this approach was effective in helping the authors to clearly stick to their thesis as well as to achieve their thesis. I believe that to look at something from the big picture tends to lean the resulting analysis toward a sociological rationale as you are more likely to look for trends amongst the group, rather than the individual level where you can really dig into things.
The only section of this book that I think would have benefited from being tightened up a little bit is the final chapter, “On the Origins of the Catastrophe”. I understand that the purpose of this chapter was to take what the authors compiled during each of the preceding individual country’s chapters and bring them together into the culminating analysis of their thesis, and this is what they did. While I understand the purpose, the execution left the text feeling redundant to me. There was again an analysis of the major powers and the minor powers and their respective power players. This may have worked well as an actual conclusion if they had wrapped it up there; however, they proceeded to introduce some newer analysis following this rehashing which felt like a reopening of the topic again instead of bringing it to a close. Further, when the authors did bring the book to a close, it was rather abrupt and on a seemingly new area of analysis that they had not discussed before – how World War I was a precursor to World War II. This aspect came seemingly out of left field for me. While it makes sense to draw some conclusions on the effect of World War I on the next great war, it would have made more sense to introduce this issue earlier on or at least allude to the fact that it would be being discussed at some point. These last few paragraphs which conclude the book left me more confused than complete. If the authors wanted to tie into World War II it would have made sense to also draw some parallels throughout the chapters on the individual countries to lead into their concluding section.
My reading experience with this book was very enjoyable and I learned quite a bit about the decision-makers and their rationales for war as promised by the authors in the title and at the outset of the book. I appreciated the easy flow of the narrative and how it did not appear to become mired down anywhere. Each chapter had a deliberate purpose in the greater whole and by the end of the book I felt that each of the important participants in the war had been well represented within the pages of this book.
This review was previously posted at The Maiden's Court blog and was a personal purchase for a Masters class.
November 3, 2020
The book is organized in the order the involved countries decided to go to war, starting with Austria-Hungary and ending with the United States. It breaks down who was involved in the decision making and shows that neither the euphoria of the masses nor the duties of the alliances were the true reason for their decisions. The reasons ranged from stopping the self- perceived decline of the country, to better now than later, to preventing Germany from becoming the sole power on the continent and many others. It further shows how the greater powers dragged smaller countries into this enormous struggle on basis of promises that mostly weren't kept after the war or were the seed for the coming of the Second World War. It furthermore shows that the reason for the Great War cannot be understood without the knowledge of the prior conflicts like the Balkan Wars, Russian-Japanese war, Italy's annexation of later Libya to name just a few.
November 15, 2017
A proper history book that addresses the causes of the war in a scholarly manner. That doesn't mean it is dry as the prose is as lively as the arguments convincing. A tonic for fiction like 'The Sleepwalkers'.
May 3, 2020
This book is was a very good read. I recommend for anyone who wants to learn about the Frist World War. It is broken down into an easy to read format. It is a short history with a thesis that each country only had a handful of people that made the decision about going to war or not.
February 18, 2018
read for class, but engaging considering its just europeans fucking shit up. more person driven, but clearly organized. i liked it tbh
December 24, 2018
Read it for a class but really liked it. Not overly academic in language, it was a fast and interesting read.
September 4, 2013
This is a outstanding book for anyone who wishes to know the real reasons why Europe went to war in 1914. Hamilton and Herwig focus on the decisions made by small "coteries" from each country and fully explain how it was these decisions that led to war and not the oft-cited other causes like the bogus "slide into war" theory. I really enjoyed this book. It was an easy read, yet I learned a great deal about WWI and the cast of characters that made it happen. What I like most about this book is that it provides the reader with a window into the hearts and minds of the decision makers and what influenced their decisions. This is a great book for both the student of history and the casual reader. Highly recommended.
April 8, 2015
This is essentially an abridgement of the authors' 2003 work on the same subject, done to summarize their views on the origins of World War One for undergraduate students. The authors contend that the decision for war 1914-1917, for each of the major powers was made by small coteries of men in each country, or by a single person advised by such a coterie. Much of their case is presented in the first chapter of the book, in which the authors analyze previously developed theories on the origins of World War One, and compare and contrast them to their own. Subsequent chapters test their thesis, country by country. The book is exceptionally well organized, and far more readable than the average academic tome.
July 22, 2014
Fascinating look at the origins of World War I that examines the decision making process of the powers: who, what, where, when and why. The main emphasis is a detailed look at the small group of men in each nation who made these choices. Furthermore, it attempts to refute previous arguments based on alliance systems, nationalism, social Darwinism, imperialism, militarism, the press, domestic sources, and the "inevitable slide into war" theory. The book is an bridged version of "The Origins of World War I" as edited by the same authors, and I will now look for that book.
[Edited}
Just as informative now that I re-read it on the 100th anniversary of the build up to the Great War.
[Edited}
Just as informative now that I re-read it on the 100th anniversary of the build up to the Great War.
October 31, 2016
Very good explanation as to how The Great War was entered to by very rational and thought-out decisions and not "blundered into". Some high-stakes risks and lots of argument and advisement went on and it was not an easy decision for anyone except Austria-Hungary who thought they were just getting a third Balkan War. You will enjoy this book as it is very well-written and concise. You may not agree with the authors' conclusions but you will see very clearly how they came to them.
August 28, 2019
Focus on the political decision making process in crisis rather than geopolitics or military planning.
December 13, 2014
Very good overview of why each nation went to war. Extremely dry reading, and moves by so fast as to be forgettable.
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews