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Osprey Campaign #246
Borodino 1812: Napoleon’s great gamble
The battle of Borodino was one of the greatest encounters in European history, and one of the largest and most sanguinary in the Napoleonic Wars. Following the breakdown of relations between Russia and France, Napoleon assembled a vast Grande Armée drawn from the many states within the French sphere of influence. They crossed the river Neimen and entered Russian territory in June 1812 with the aim of inflicting a sharp defeat on the Tsar's forces and bringing the Russians back into line. In a bloody battle of head-on attacks and desperate counter-attacks in the village of Borodino on 7 September 1812, both sides lost about a third of their men, with the Russians forced to withdraw and abandon Moscow to the French. However, the Grande Armée was harassed by Russian troops all the way back and was destroyed by the retreat. The greatest army Napoleon had ever commanded was reduced to a shadow of frozen, starving fugitives. This title will cover the events of Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign of 1812 in its entirety, with the set-piece battle of Borodino proving the focal point of the book.
227 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2012
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43 people want to read
About the author
Philip J. Haythornthwaite
105 books18 followersPhilip J. Haythornthwaite (born 1951) is an internationally respected and prolific author and historical consultant specializing in military history, uniforms and equipment. Whilst his main area of research is the Napoleonic Wars, his impressive list of publications covers a much wider range of periods from the English Civil War until WWI.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
December 29, 2023
the haunted past
⚔️ This is the campaign of Napoleon that Tolstoy famously wrote about in War and Peace and it’s the reason Tchaikovsky gave us The 1812 Overture. Yet this slim volume gives us a truer glimpse of this battle and the retreat of Napoleon’s Grand Armeé than Tolstoy or Tchaikovsky. You can talk about glory if you’re of that frame of mind. But Borodino is about death.
The French lost approximately 370,000 lives and the Russians 150,000. Hundreds of thousands of horses died. A number of the French brought their families with them so that wives and children also lost their lives. The author describes the battle well. But he does not cringe from giving us a picture of the cost of war, a cost that every generation on earth has paid over and over again if their nations choose to fight, whether to attack or defend.
⚔️ Very well-written. Very important. War has come to this region yet again, the names of rivers and places are all the same, but I do not think that anyone in 1812 or WW2 would have expected Russia and Ukraine to be each other’s fierce enemies in 2022. History does have a way of returning to the places it has haunted in the past.
⚔️ This is the campaign of Napoleon that Tolstoy famously wrote about in War and Peace and it’s the reason Tchaikovsky gave us The 1812 Overture. Yet this slim volume gives us a truer glimpse of this battle and the retreat of Napoleon’s Grand Armeé than Tolstoy or Tchaikovsky. You can talk about glory if you’re of that frame of mind. But Borodino is about death.
The French lost approximately 370,000 lives and the Russians 150,000. Hundreds of thousands of horses died. A number of the French brought their families with them so that wives and children also lost their lives. The author describes the battle well. But he does not cringe from giving us a picture of the cost of war, a cost that every generation on earth has paid over and over again if their nations choose to fight, whether to attack or defend.
⚔️ Very well-written. Very important. War has come to this region yet again, the names of rivers and places are all the same, but I do not think that anyone in 1812 or WW2 would have expected Russia and Ukraine to be each other’s fierce enemies in 2022. History does have a way of returning to the places it has haunted in the past.
May 15, 2023
Trust Hainthornhwaite to deliver quality on Napoleonic warfare, except the aftermath with Moscow and the Berezina shouldn't take up 15 pages and the large numbers of regiments involved keep the experience of battle at a distance, forcing the reader close to Napoleon's own HQ view.
July 19, 2013
This is one of the Osprey series, "Campaigns." The feature case study here is Napoleon's invasion of Russia, with the bloody battle of Borodino as the focal point of this slender volume. The volume is 93 pages long--and covers a great deal of territory. That, of course, means that there is only so much that can be covered. Within that limitation, though, the work does a solid job.
The volume follows a standard template for the "Campaign" series. A bit of context opens the work, then a chronology. Following that, an analysis of key commanders. Here, that would include, on the French side, Murat, Davout, Ney, and others. Given the scale of Napoleon's forces, he had to delegate considerable authority to his subordinates. Some performed better than others. Just so, the Russian side. With time, the crust General Katuzov became the field commander. While he had his flaws, he was pretty steady during the campaign while he was involved. Among the subordinate officers, the redoubtable Bagration (who was mortally wounded), Barclay de Tolly (up and down), and Platov.
Next the plans of both sides are outlined. Napoleon understood the challenges facing him--the immensity of Russia, the need to move quickly, and so on. The book then traces the movements that preceded the battle. Maps are modestly helpful--but they are not always so very clear. Then, the rendering of Borodino. There is enough detail to get a sense of the struggle here. There is also a sense that Napoleon was not at his peak as a commander of an army at battle.
The book also discusses what happened after the battle--the French barren occupation of Moscow, the disastrous retreat from Moscow, with the vast bulk of Napoleon's army disappearing.
All in all, a useful volume. . . .
The volume follows a standard template for the "Campaign" series. A bit of context opens the work, then a chronology. Following that, an analysis of key commanders. Here, that would include, on the French side, Murat, Davout, Ney, and others. Given the scale of Napoleon's forces, he had to delegate considerable authority to his subordinates. Some performed better than others. Just so, the Russian side. With time, the crust General Katuzov became the field commander. While he had his flaws, he was pretty steady during the campaign while he was involved. Among the subordinate officers, the redoubtable Bagration (who was mortally wounded), Barclay de Tolly (up and down), and Platov.
Next the plans of both sides are outlined. Napoleon understood the challenges facing him--the immensity of Russia, the need to move quickly, and so on. The book then traces the movements that preceded the battle. Maps are modestly helpful--but they are not always so very clear. Then, the rendering of Borodino. There is enough detail to get a sense of the struggle here. There is also a sense that Napoleon was not at his peak as a commander of an army at battle.
The book also discusses what happened after the battle--the French barren occupation of Moscow, the disastrous retreat from Moscow, with the vast bulk of Napoleon's army disappearing.
All in all, a useful volume. . . .
January 21, 2022
Borodino was tactically dull, a slugging match, but distinguished by the casualties, some 70,000 lost in one day. Only Waterloo, with around 65,000 losses in one day, is comparable (although worse by percentage of those present). The famous commanders were at their worst, both sick and immobile. With Napoleon that immobility was a choice. With Kutuzov, his incompetence was par for the course. He is among the most overrated generals of the era.
The text here is solid enough, well written and supported by good maps and illustrations. Yet, there could have been more. A decent portion of the text is a rushed overview of Napoleon's capture of Moscow and retreat to Poland. This really needed its own title. It could still get it, but it would have been better if planned out, which would have given Haythornthwaite more space for Borodino or at least the lead up, including Smolensk.
The text here is solid enough, well written and supported by good maps and illustrations. Yet, there could have been more. A decent portion of the text is a rushed overview of Napoleon's capture of Moscow and retreat to Poland. This really needed its own title. It could still get it, but it would have been better if planned out, which would have given Haythornthwaite more space for Borodino or at least the lead up, including Smolensk.
April 28, 2024
On More than just the Campaign of Borodino - Both a Weakness and Strength
Any review of this book would have to start out by pointing out, for those who are not familiar with Osprey Publishing's “campaign” series books, the limitations of that format. These books are relatively short, at 96 pages, plus they consist of quite a bit of illustration of one type or another (i.e., 3-D topographical maps of battle areas, contemporaneous paintings of major figures of battle and battle scenes, etc.).Hence, in terms of actual text, it comes down, very crudely to about 60% of those 96 pages. Hence if one is looking for an academic opus on the battle, books in this series are not recommended. They are more geared to those seeking a cliff-notes style introduction that can get the reader up to speed in about an hour and a half to two hours.
A second point that needs to be made, for those who are familiar with this series, is that this book differs quite a bit from other •campaign• series books. It does so in the way that most books in this series concentrate on the actual battle itself with little on the situation before or after the battle. This book, in contrast, seems to contain more on the pre and post battle situations. There is much more on these in this book than other books in the campaign series.
Hence both the good and bad. The reader learns quite a bit here on the lead up to the battle and the great retreat from Moscow but, on the other hand, learns much less about the battle than other books in this series on other battles. This is a particular problem due to the relatively short length of the book, one in which every word must be made to count. If a reader is particularly interested in the former (i.e., pre and post battle narrative) than an emphasis on the battle itself, the book would be highly recommended but if vice versa would be the situation then the opposite would be the case. For readers interested in the former, the book would rate as a four star but for those interested in the latter, a Three star only.
As a result of the emphasis on the pre and post battle narratives, important aspects of the battle itself are left undiscussed. The most important of these involve the question of whether or not this battle could have actually served the very important Napoleonic goal of bringing about the destruction of the Russian army, critical in bringing Russia to heel. This is not to say that this is the only weakness of the book. Others include a lack of analysis of lower-level analysis of officers below the highest levels (unfortunately typical of most Osprey books in this series) as well as a comparative analysis of the relative state of both side's armies vis-a-vis each other (something that most •campaign• books tend to be good at).
Any review of this book would have to start out by pointing out, for those who are not familiar with Osprey Publishing's “campaign” series books, the limitations of that format. These books are relatively short, at 96 pages, plus they consist of quite a bit of illustration of one type or another (i.e., 3-D topographical maps of battle areas, contemporaneous paintings of major figures of battle and battle scenes, etc.).Hence, in terms of actual text, it comes down, very crudely to about 60% of those 96 pages. Hence if one is looking for an academic opus on the battle, books in this series are not recommended. They are more geared to those seeking a cliff-notes style introduction that can get the reader up to speed in about an hour and a half to two hours.
A second point that needs to be made, for those who are familiar with this series, is that this book differs quite a bit from other •campaign• series books. It does so in the way that most books in this series concentrate on the actual battle itself with little on the situation before or after the battle. This book, in contrast, seems to contain more on the pre and post battle situations. There is much more on these in this book than other books in the campaign series.
Hence both the good and bad. The reader learns quite a bit here on the lead up to the battle and the great retreat from Moscow but, on the other hand, learns much less about the battle than other books in this series on other battles. This is a particular problem due to the relatively short length of the book, one in which every word must be made to count. If a reader is particularly interested in the former (i.e., pre and post battle narrative) than an emphasis on the battle itself, the book would be highly recommended but if vice versa would be the situation then the opposite would be the case. For readers interested in the former, the book would rate as a four star but for those interested in the latter, a Three star only.
As a result of the emphasis on the pre and post battle narratives, important aspects of the battle itself are left undiscussed. The most important of these involve the question of whether or not this battle could have actually served the very important Napoleonic goal of bringing about the destruction of the Russian army, critical in bringing Russia to heel. This is not to say that this is the only weakness of the book. Others include a lack of analysis of lower-level analysis of officers below the highest levels (unfortunately typical of most Osprey books in this series) as well as a comparative analysis of the relative state of both side's armies vis-a-vis each other (something that most •campaign• books tend to be good at).
January 28, 2019
To give five stars to this book does not mean it is a masterpiece at the level of “War and Peace”, but that it is a worthy companion to Tolstoy’s book. I could probably say the same about this book that I have said about other Haythornwaite’s volumes. While being very good, the Russian’s deserve more. Contrarily to his “Man-at-arms” books though, this one, brief as it might be, feels complete. Compared some WWII “Campaign” volumes I have read, “Borodino 1812” is truly a book about the Russian campaign, and not merely one focused on the eponymous battle. While it might be a shame that actions such as the crossing of the Berezina do not have their own volume, this book is a phenomenal overview of “the other war of 1812”, from Niemen to the fire of Moscow and back. The three plates included are beautiful, if such thing can be said of men butchering each other, and the contemporary (or almost contemporary) illustrations are great. A good number of them are in color, and even the black and white ones have a quality higher than other Osprey volumes. The first of the 3D maps is just alright though. Since Borodino was a battle where the frontal assault was more important than the flanking, a lot of the action was condensed in the center, which happens to be right between pages. Maybe smaller 1 page maps would have been better, but these are fine nevertheless. If you liked “War and Peace”, or are thinking about reading it, and Chandler’s “The Campaigns of Napoleon” daunts you, grab this book. Expensive as it might be, you would not be disappointed.
February 19, 2017
This lavishly illustrated account covers the entire Patriotic War of 1812 in a well-balanced narrative and analysis.
September 8, 2022
Butchery, pure butchery.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews