Although I was only required to read certain parts of this book for graduate school, and thus did not read it in whole, I found what I did read to be thought-provoking. Here is a summary of the sections that I read in the book:
Religious Experience and Apologetics
When beginning their talk on religious experiences, the authors of the book Philosophy of Religion, C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Meanis, make a distinction between the religious dimension of experience, and special experiences that are religious. They make this distinction because certain religious convictions can act as the lens through which people view their experiences (which is different than actually having a religious experience). A simplistic definition of a religious experience is given when the authors describe it as an, “awareness of the divine.” In this book, the authors chose to concentrate their focus on theistic-type experiences. The authors described two models for understanding experience; the representational model and the model of direct realism. The representational model can best be described with the following illustration: “When a person sees a tree, what he really sees is not the actual tree but a set of images or sensations produced by his brain as a result of the appropriate sensory input. The subjective image then serves as a representation of the actual tree in the physical world.” On the other hand, the direct realism view claims that, “in cases of genuine perceptual experience, a person is directly aware of what she sees or hears.” Moving past these two models, the authors bring up the fact that many people claim to hear God speaking to them through a friend or a song, in which case the individual believes that they are experiencing God in and through something else that is experienced. The principle of credulity would lend credence to their claim, as well as other claims, though, because this principle is motivated by the assumption that experiences are normally genuine. Therefore, if someone has an experience in which it appears that God is present, then it is reasonable to believe that God really is present (unless this person’s senses are believed to be unreliable).
Miracles
The authors classify miracles under the category of a, “special act of God.” The authors do not, however, feel that miracles can universally be categorized as a “sign,” because it is entirely possible that many miracles go unnoticed by humanity. The authors spend a good deal of time stating and rebutting David Hume’s views on this subject based on his well-known work, Of Miracles. The authors write that, “It seems rash, therefore, for philosophers or others to claim dogmatically that miracles cannot happen. Miracles seem possible at least, and it also seems possible for there to be compelling evidence for their occurrence – evidence of the ordinary historical kind.” In their conclusion to their discussion on this topic, they brought up a point which I am inclined to agree with. They wrote that one’s belief or unbelief in miracles will be heavily shaped by their view of the likelihood of God’s existence, and their view of God’s nature and purposes.
The Problem of Evil
The authors state, and I agree, that the most often mentioned objection to the existence of God is something that has come to be known as the Problem of Evil. The Problem of Evil is the idea that a good being would eliminate any evil from the world as far as it is able to, yet we still see evil in the world. Because we are able to observe that there is evil in the world, God must not exist. The authors separate the evil in the world into two categories: moral evil (such as rape, murder, and social injustice) and natural evil (such as natural disasters and diseases). In essence, this argument is saying that, “the existence of evil constitutes a proof that God does not exist…the occurrence of evil and the existence of God are logically incompatible: it is a contradiction to claim both that a perfectly good, all-knowing, all-powerful being exists and that evil exists.” Other philosophers concede that an all good, all-knowing, all-powerful God could have reasons to allow for the existence of evil, however while it is possible, it is unlikely or improbable. Christians (and theists alike) tend to give one of two responses. One response, a theodicy, attempts to explain the reason why God may allow evil in the world. Another response, simply called a defense, explains that God does have reasons for allowing evil, but we do not and cannot know these reasons. The basis for these types of arguments is called a second-order good, or a, “good that logically requires the existence…of some evil in order to be realized.” Also, one could use the argument that humans have free will and could choose evil for themselves to show that a good God may not always eliminate evil, and also that an omnipotent being may not always eliminate all evil so as to avoid the loss of a greater good.
Rather than saying that the existence of evil proves that God does not exist, a new form of the argument for the Problem of Evil has developed in recent years which attacks head on the argument for the “greater good.” This is called the evidential argument, and it states that, “the existence of evil – and, more specifically, the kinds and quantity of evil that we actually find in the world – constitutes powerful evidence against God’s existence…the evil that we find renders it unlikely that God exists, and thus it provides us with good reason for not believing in God.” This argument, however, assumes that the existence of evil is pointless, and a believer could rebut this argument with the idea that not all evil is pointless. In the end, it seems that the best argument against the Problem of Evil is the idea that the human mind cannot comprehend God, and that his ways are higher than our ways (Isaiah 55:8-9). Although evil’s existence in the world seems like a problem to mankind, those who put their trust in God have faith that there is a purpose for the evil.
Personal Faith
The authors state it well when they say that it is ultimately our faith which guides our judgments about religious questions. Because partial obedience is, in fact, disobedience, the authors propose that true faith requires the believer to commit fully to the belief system (and not just partially). As a whole, one’s personal religious belief must become one’s way of life.
When talking about an individual’s faith, the author rightly point out that everyone has a faith in something; “everyone has deep-rooted assumptions, convictions and attitudes that color what counts as evidence for him and how that evidence is interpreted.” Ultimately, the authors conclude that faith is, in essence, all of the following: “the assumptions, convictions and attitudes which the believer brings to a consideration of the evidence for and against religious truth…the commitment that is, in some cases, the outcome of this reflection…the subjective preferences of people generally, and…the specific kind of commitment which is involved in being a Christian.”