On September 11, 2001, Osama Bin Laden (OBL) pulled off a horrendous act of terrorism on the US, killing 2977 people. An angry United States went after him and his Al-Qaeda cohorts to exact revenge, killing OBL on May 2, 2011. Osama, his large family and his close associates were on the run all those ten years. They evaded the drones, the satellites, the CIA, the many special forces and hit squads looking for the bounty money on Osama’s head. However, there was little public knowledge of the details of OBL’s exile after 2001. We didn’t know how he survived in the face of formidable odds, what consumed his living hours and who provided cover for him and his family. This book by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark fills in those ten years through extraordinary research and investigation. Unlike most accounts, this book presents Osama Bin Laden’s last ten years from the perspective of the people who were with him. They comprise his family members, his spiritual leader, and other close Al-Qaeda associates. It presents an Arab view of Al-Qaeda from its Middle-eastern and North African members. It is a gripping account and a landmark achievement of investigative journalism.
The book chronicles events related to Osama in Pakistan and events related to his family and other Al-Qaeda members who sought refuge in Iran. On the day 9/11 happened, Osama Bin Laden was in his mountain hideout in Afghanistan, impatient to watch the impending disaster live on his television. As luck would have it, the satellite transmission failed, forcing him to listen to it on the radio. His rejoicing was short-lived as retaliatory US strikes almost killed him in Kandahar in October 2001. Osama escaped to the Tora Bora mountains on the Pakistani border and then reached Karachi via Peshawar. But Karachi made him feel insecure, as it was a large, exposed city. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the architect of 9/11, steps in and appoints Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed to take care of Osama and be his all-important courier. Ibrahim takes Osama and his young wife Amal and baby-daughter Safiyah to the remote village of Kutkey in northern Pakistan. But the CIA nabs KSM in 2003 with the help of Pakistan, forcing Osama to flee from Kutkey to Kohat in the tribal lands of NW Pakistan. Even this refuge felt insecure to Osama. He needed a lasting solution. The shadowy elements in Pakistan’s Inter-Services-Intelligence’s (ISI) S-wing swing into action and build a house for him in the military town of Abbotabad. Osama and his family move there in late 2004 and Ibrahim’s brother Abrar joins them. Over the next years, more wives and children join Osama, expanding his entourage and inviting scrutiny of the community. All this commotion makes his courier Ibrahim nervous and fearful. He wants out of the whole affair and gives an ultimatum to Osama in late 2010 asking him to move out of Abbotabad within months. In February 2011, Osama’s wife Khairiah joins him from Iran. The US Navy Seals assassinate Osama, Ibrahim, and his brother Abrar soon after.
During the same period, two of Osama’s wives, their children, Osama’s spiritual adviser, Mahfouz Ibn El-Walid, and other senior Al-Qaeda members, escape to Iran. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, called the Quds Force, provide cover and support for them in return for Al-Qaeda to not attack Shia interests of Iran. Iran’s civilian government, led by the moderate Md. Khatami and military officer General Qasem Soleimani see good political capital hosting Al-Qaeda. Khatami approaches the US for a trade-off. Soleimani uses senior Al-Qaeda leaders like Saif-Al-Adel and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to advance Iranian interests in Iraq and Syria. Khatami’s overtures fail. In 2010, Iran allows Osama’s wives and children to leave for Pakistan and join Osama in Abbotabad.
The pre-eminent question in the OBL episode has been the complicity of Pakistan in protecting Osama. The world found that Osama had lived for seven years in a house inside a Pakistani Garrison town. It led most people to conclude that the Pakistan government and its Deep State were in collusion with Osama Bin Laden and protected him. However, the authors doubt the Pakistani government or its Army or even the ISI was aware of Osama hiding in Abbotabad. Instead, they point the finger at Hameed Gul. He was the director-general of the ISI from 1987 to 89 and had since retired. He organized Osama’s hideout and protected him through his control and connections in the notorious S-wing of the ISI. Other key figures who knew how to get in touch with Osama were Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Hafeez Saeed and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen’s Fazlur Rehman Khalil. The authors do not believe that Generals Pervez Musharraf or Pervez Kayani of the Army and General Shuja Pasha of the ISI were aware of Osama’s presence in Abbotabad. Having read the book, I could accept Musharraf may not have been aware of Osama’s hideout. The authors say that Musharraf was keen on making money, trading Al-Qaeda suspects for dollars. He would not have passed up the $25 million bounty on Osama’s head. I would rather assume the other Pakistani generals might have suspected what was happening in Abbotabad, but felt better not to investigate. It gives them the benefit of deniability in case Osama was hiding in Abbotabad. Such tactics are consistent with Pakistan’s brilliant manoeuvres in handling the US and its allies in Afghanistan. They wore them out over twenty years and got the Taliban back in power.
The Iranian role is even more fascinating. In the years between 2001 and 2011, the media seldom focused on Iran in relation to Al-Qaeda or 9/11. The accepted wisdom was Iran wouldn’t care for Al-Qaeda because it is a Sunni organization and hostile to Iran’s Shia Islam. But geo-politics makes strange bedfellows. Both Iran and Al-Qaeda were savvy enough to recognize temporary interests in common. The Iranian government made a tantalizing proposal to the US in 2002. It offered to hand over Osama Bin Laden’s family and the senior Al-Qaeda military council who were in their custody. In return, they wanted the US to ease sanctions and restore relations. But rabid hard-liners like Dick Cheney in the Bush administration shot this golden opportunity down. After the US invaded Iraq in 2003, the Pentagon fretted about persistent Al-Qaeda activity in Iraq. Ryan Crocker and Zalmay Khalilzad of the US approached Iran again on its offer. Iran agreed but wanted the leaders of an obscure anti-Iranian, Iraq-based cult, called Mujahideen-e-Khalq, to be handed over to them. The hawkish Bush administration not only rejected the request but called Iran ‘the axis of evil.’ It put paid to the overtures from Iran. Had more sense prevailed in Washington, the US could well have claimed ‘mission accomplished’ with the Al-Qaeda military council and a major part of Osama’s family in their custody. It could then have tried to force Osama to give himself up, as he was quite a family-man. Instead, the US continued the war for seventeen more years. It cost a trillion dollars and a horrendous human toll. Harvard University’s Kennedy School reports the military death toll as 2448 American service members, 66000 Afghan military / police, 1144 other allied service, including NATO, and 51191 Taliban / other fighters. The non-military death toll was 47245 Afghan civilians, 444 Aid workers, and 72 journalists. The US lost the war, and the Taliban returned to power. Even the most patriotic American would agree it was an exorbitant cost to kill one terrorist, however important he may be.
The book throws some beguiling light on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. When Osama proposed his plan for a massive attack on the US, both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders opposed it. Osama’s spiritual adviser wanted Al-Qaeda to be only an inspiration for jihad without soiling hands in bloodshed. Members of the Al-Qaeda Shura also opposed Osama’s idea. Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Omar, did not want Osama engaging in any acts of violence against America from the Afghan soil. The Taliban was keen only on securing its rule of Afghanistan as an Islamic Emirate under the Sharia Law. It was not interested in exporting terrorism in the region. However, we remember the Taliban had members of the Haqqani family in power. This group is indebted to the ISI and engages in terrorism against India and the US on ISI’s behalf. Islamic terrorism has been a complex phenomenon. The Obama administration claimed victory over Al-Qaeda in 2021, saying the US has severely degraded them. This book shows nothing can be farther from the truth. Killing hundreds of terrorists does not kill an idea that inspires many in the Islamic world. As Osama’s spiritual adviser said, Al-Qaeda is an idea, however folkloric we may think it is. So long as it inspires people in the Islamic world, killing of individual terrorists would only be a footnote in the West’s battle against it.
The authors detail one shameful consequence of pursuing OBL and Saddam Hussein. It is the US resorting to torture in places like Bagram, Abu Ghraib, Poland and Guantanamo Bay. The book has disturbing and graphic descriptions of the brutal torture of Abu Zubaydah at the hands of US personnel. Abu Zubaydah had nothing to do with 9/11 and was not part of Al-Qaeda’s acts of terror. The authors dismiss the movie ‘Zero Dark Thirty’, which suggests that much intelligence about Osama’s location came from the torture of Al-Qaeda suspects. On torture, another author, Jane Mayer, says in her book that an audit of 517 Guantanamo Bay detainees showed that only 8% of them could have been Al-Qaeda associates. Fifty-five percent did not engage in any hostile act against the United States at all. The rest got slapped with charges of dubious wrongdoing, including attempting to flee US bombs. The US did not pay the $25 million bounty to anyone saying it was electronic surveillance that exposed Osama’s location. This tallies with Osama’s family members’ belief that the Iranians likely implanted a tracking device in the body of Osama’s wife Khairiah, before letting her join Osama in February 2011. The US killed Osama two months later.
Osama Bin Laden appears a medieval demagogue in the media, which is perhaps accurate. But his wives present a more elevating picture. Osama’s first wife, Najwa, was his first cousin. Najwa is from the cosmopolitan seaside town of Latakia in Syria, where women wore bikinis. Though Osama forced her to wear a chador and the niqab, she wore lipstick and designer clothes underneath. She never wanted to become a jihadi bride. Rather, she wished for a peaceful world. She bore him eleven children. Her fourth son, Omar, rejected his father’s obsession with war and violence. Prior to 9/11, Omar convinced Najwa to return to Syria with him and his two youngest siblings. Osama had three more wives, Khairiah, Seham and Amal, in that order. Khairiah and Seham believed in Osama’s jihad. `Khairiah was seven years older than Osama and bore him a son. She is a child psychologist by profession. Seham claimed direct lineage from the Prophet Mohammed. She holds a Ph.D. and worked as a teacher before marrying Osama. She bore him four children. Amal was his youngest wife, marrying him as a Yemeni teenager, and bore him one child at the time of 9/11. She wanted to be martyred with him but the Navy Seals didn’t kill her.
The book is a spellbinding tale of the post-9/11 saga of Osama Bin Laden and, by far, the most authoritative account of his exile and demise.