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To Save the Phenomena: An Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo
Duhem's 1908 essay questions the relation between physical theory and metaphysics and, more specifically, between astronomy and physics–an issue still of importance today. He critiques the answers given by Greek thought, Arabic science, medieval Christian scholasticism, and, finally, the astronomers of the Renaissance.
152 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1908
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About the author
Pierre Duhem
123 books18 followersPierre Maurice Marie Duhem (French: [pjɛʁ moʁis maʁi dy.ɛm] was a French physicist, mathematician, historian and philosopher of science. He is best known for his work on chemical thermodynamics, for his philosophical writings on the indeterminacy of experimental criteria, and for his historical research into the science of the European Middle Ages. As a scientist, Duhem also contributed to hydrodynamics and to the theory of elasticity.
Duhem's views on the philosophy of science are explicated in his 1906 work The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. In this work, he opposed Newton's statement that the Principia's law of universal mutual gravitation was deduced from 'phenomena', including Kepler's second and third laws. Newton's claims in this regard had already been attacked by critical proof-analyses of the German logician Leibniz and then most famously by Immanuel Kant, following Hume's logical critique of induction. But the novelty of Duhem's work was his proposal that Newton's theory of universal mutual gravity flatly contradicted Kepler's Laws of planetary motion because the interplanetary mutual gravitational perturbations caused deviations from Keplerian orbits. Since no proposition can be validly logically deduced from any it contradicts, according to Duhem, Newton must not have logically deduced his law of gravitation directly from Kepler's Laws.
Duhem's name is given to the under-determination or Duhem–Quine thesis, which holds that for any given set of observations there is an innumerable large number of explanations. It is, in essence, the same as Hume's critique of induction: all three variants point to the fact that empirical evidence cannot force the choice of a theory or its revision. Possible alternatives to induction are Duhem's instrumentalism and Popper's thesis that we learn from falsification.
As popular as the Duhem–Quine thesis may be in the philosophy of science, in reality, Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine stated very different theses. Pierre Duhem believed that experimental theory in physics is fundamentally different from fields like physiology and certain branches of chemistry. Also, Duhem's conception of the theoretical group has its limits, since not all concepts are connected to each other logically. He did not include at all a priori disciplines such as logic and mathematics within these theoretical groups in physics which can be tested experimentally. Quine, on the other hand, conceived this theoretical group as a unit of a whole human knowledge. To Quine, even mathematics and logic must be revised in light of recalcitrant experience, a thesis that Duhem never held.
A quote of Duhem on physics:
A theory of physics is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which have for their aim to represent as simply, as completely and as exactly as possible, a group of experimental laws.
Duhem's views on the philosophy of science are explicated in his 1906 work The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. In this work, he opposed Newton's statement that the Principia's law of universal mutual gravitation was deduced from 'phenomena', including Kepler's second and third laws. Newton's claims in this regard had already been attacked by critical proof-analyses of the German logician Leibniz and then most famously by Immanuel Kant, following Hume's logical critique of induction. But the novelty of Duhem's work was his proposal that Newton's theory of universal mutual gravity flatly contradicted Kepler's Laws of planetary motion because the interplanetary mutual gravitational perturbations caused deviations from Keplerian orbits. Since no proposition can be validly logically deduced from any it contradicts, according to Duhem, Newton must not have logically deduced his law of gravitation directly from Kepler's Laws.
Duhem's name is given to the under-determination or Duhem–Quine thesis, which holds that for any given set of observations there is an innumerable large number of explanations. It is, in essence, the same as Hume's critique of induction: all three variants point to the fact that empirical evidence cannot force the choice of a theory or its revision. Possible alternatives to induction are Duhem's instrumentalism and Popper's thesis that we learn from falsification.
As popular as the Duhem–Quine thesis may be in the philosophy of science, in reality, Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine stated very different theses. Pierre Duhem believed that experimental theory in physics is fundamentally different from fields like physiology and certain branches of chemistry. Also, Duhem's conception of the theoretical group has its limits, since not all concepts are connected to each other logically. He did not include at all a priori disciplines such as logic and mathematics within these theoretical groups in physics which can be tested experimentally. Quine, on the other hand, conceived this theoretical group as a unit of a whole human knowledge. To Quine, even mathematics and logic must be revised in light of recalcitrant experience, a thesis that Duhem never held.
A quote of Duhem on physics:
A theory of physics is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which have for their aim to represent as simply, as completely and as exactly as possible, a group of experimental laws.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
October 23, 2025
An extremly useful work, although the conclusion is not entirely correct.
May 4, 2016
Ένα εξαιρετικά ενδιαφέρον δοκίμιο για την έννοια της φυσικής θεωρίας από τον Πλάτωνα έως τον Γαλιλαίο. Ωστόσο για να παρακολουθήσει ο αναγνώστης τη σκέψη του Duhem θα πρέπει να έχει κάποιες γνώσεις πάνω στο θέμα που πραγματεύεται και αυτό έρχεται σε αντίθεση με την γενικότερη ιδέα πως αυτό το βιβλίο απευθύνεται στο ευρύτερο κοινό. Συγκεκριμένα, ο αναγνώστης πρέπει να γνωρίζει την ορολογία που χρησιμοποιείται και βεβαίως τις κοσμολογικές θεωρίες που αντιστοιχούν σε αυτήν.
October 25, 2020
“Epicycles”, as an epithet in science, means a theory which offers a minor increment in knowledge and minimal insight. In the vulgar history of science, epicycles are one of the undesirable properties of pre-Renaissance astronomy which gradually piled up until Galileo had the courage and intelligence to say that the emperor had no clothes.
“To save the phenomena” means to predict astronomical movements and events which, the author says, was the main concern of many astronomers. And the Ptolemaic framework met that need even though, as many astronomers were well aware, the lack of a supporting physical theory was a limitation. Citing Plato and Aristotle, Duhem calls the approach exemplified by Ptolemy the “method of the astronomer” and the method based on mechanistic theories “the method of the physicist”. The trouble was that, before Kepler, Galileo and Newton, the latter method wasn’t capable of making good predictions.
Overall, the book explains the development of astronomy as far as Galileo, giving credit to those who had different objectives and based their arguments on different premises.
“To save the phenomena” means to predict astronomical movements and events which, the author says, was the main concern of many astronomers. And the Ptolemaic framework met that need even though, as many astronomers were well aware, the lack of a supporting physical theory was a limitation. Citing Plato and Aristotle, Duhem calls the approach exemplified by Ptolemy the “method of the astronomer” and the method based on mechanistic theories “the method of the physicist”. The trouble was that, before Kepler, Galileo and Newton, the latter method wasn’t capable of making good predictions.
Overall, the book explains the development of astronomy as far as Galileo, giving credit to those who had different objectives and based their arguments on different premises.
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May 7, 2023Entiendo los planteamientos que propone pero sus desarrollos me dejan tan afuera, pierdo toda pista o idea que expresa, no sé que pensar, Koyre es comprensible tanto técnico como histórico, Duhem es profundo y metódico ni en el aspecto historico soy capaz de seguirlo y en lo técnico ni pista deja, tal vez este ensayo es demasiado concreto y necesite leer sus 10 tomos sobre cosmologia y física para entender sus ideas, triste que no haya tradición alguna de esos tomos :/.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews