It is only fitting that the events described in this excellent book are becoming more widely known, both in Ireland and further afield. The siege of Jadotville in September 1961 is one of the finest feats of arms in the hundred-year history of the Irish Defence Forces, and it is scandalous that Commandant (i.e. Major) Patrick Quinlan and his men only received the recognition they deserved when some 50 years had passed.
The book begins with a timely reminder of the prominent role played by Irish troops in peacekeeping, not least in the Congo crisis in the 1960s. In part, this is due to Ireland being a Western European nation that doesn't carry any imperial baggage. In the case of the Congo, Irish interest was increased by the appointment of a former Chief of Staff to the Irish Defence Forces to command the UN forces: "In January 1961, Lt Gen Sean McKeown was appointed Force Commander to ONUC...McKeown was seen as a popular choice by all the nations serving in ONUC. The smaller states were happy to see an officer from a state with a non-colonial background in the position, and the larger western states were happy to serve under an officer of a similar cultural background who could speak their language, both literally and operationally. The net result was a huge boost for Irish Army morale, which only increased applications from Irish servicemen to be part of the Congo operation."
Although the Irish Defence Forces were relatively few in number (the army numbering only 7000 troops in 1960), a significant commitment was made to provide troops for peacekeeping in the Congo. This was a shot in the arm for many of the men serving at the time, who described the army as "run down, lacked financing and direction and its mission was not clearly defined. Duties consisted of ceremonial training and Aid to the Civil Power, as the IRA border campaign was beginning at the time...there was a distinct lack of adventure in the army at this time." Initially, a single battalion of 700 men and ultimately six battalions would serve in the Congo with no shortage of volunteers.
In Katanga province, the UN peacekeepers found a confused and ambiguous operational environment (as many UN peacekeepers have since), and the Irish contingent was no exception. A Company of the 25th Battalion was ordered into Jadotville, ostensibly to protect the local settlers from indigenous Congolese. It quickly became clear that the need for this protection was highly questionable, and Jadotville itself was relatively isolated. Road transport was bottlenecked over a single bridge, and the accommodation provided for the UN troops was chosen based on how many men it could hold rather than on whether it would be defensible. As Power comments, "To even the most militarily illiterate reader, it was obvious that Jadotville would be a difficult place to reach if under concentrated attack. One might also ask why it was a good idea to send troops there to protect the locals, if the UN seemed to be so unpopular with them."
None of this would have mattered if Jadotville was a quiet billet, but unfortunately, that was also not to be the case. The Katangan political leadership had recruited a large number of foreign mercenaries, as well as some Belgian military advisers, to train and lead their local gendarmerie. This meant that, "while the Irish public still cultivated notions of their troops going out to fight savage but primitive tribesmen, the newly arrived troops of the 35th Battalion were facing into action with a well- led light infantry force." And so, the stage for the siege was set as Power concludes, "things were far from perfect as regards the deployment of A Company. The reason for their deployment was muddled, complex and, above all, political. They were poorly equipped from the start, and facing a badly outlined task which had been beyond a previous larger force. Still, the order was given and, in the finest traditions of the Irish soldier, the troops looked to their front, swung up their arms and marched off to get on with the job."
As regards the Irish troops themselves, Power introduces us to several prominent characters. Commandant Quinlan looms large throughout the narrative and was a tactically adept and able professional infantry officer. On arriving at Jadotville with A Company, he had them dig in - something that previous troops stationed there had failed to do: "his foresight was to save his men's lives. As well as ordering his men to dig trenches after they arrived, he ordered that all available receptacles be filled with fresh water, even though he was expecting reinforcements by the end of the day. These actions were to mean the difference between life and death." Even with that, the position at Jadotville was far from ideal.
Once hostilities erupted on the 13th of September 1961, Quinlan and his men found themselves fighting a classic company-in-defence action but without the heavy support weapons and equipment generally necessary to such a task. This was largely because no one in the UN was expecting A Company to end up in a pitched battle with well-armed and well-led troops. Over the ensuing five days, A Company was attacked by a mixed force of 3000 - 5000 troops, generally in waves of several hundred at a time. Lacking motorised transport, the Irish troops were unable to attempt a breakout, and several attempts to break the siege failed because of Jadotville's remote location. Eventually, out of ammunition and facing annihilation, Quinlan and his men surrendered and were eventually repatriated.
Because of the political and strategic errors evident in the deployment of A Company to Jadotville, and because of the misplaced shame attached to the units surrender, the events of Jadotville were largely ignored: "The biggest mistake the Army has made since this was to consider it a blot on their copy book and quietly to hope the incident would go away. If it was a blot on anybody's copybook, it was ultimately the UN's, because of its organisation and strategy in implementing operations in the Congo." Quinlan never served overseas again and died in 1997. Tragically, it was only in the early 2000s that an official inquiry cleared Quinlan and his men of allegations of soldierly misconduct and restored their reputations. Further belated recognition has come in more recent years, as the Irish government awarded the first Presidential Unit Citation in the history of the state to A Company in 2016.
Declan Power has written a riveting account of the actions of Quinlan and his men, and of the background to UN involvement in the Congo. It stands as a tribute to their service, albeit one that is long overdue.
‘Those that I fight I do not hate, those that I guard I do not love’ ~ W.B. Yeats