Crossing the Potomac River into Maryland, Robert E. Lee might well have thought of Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon – passing a point of no return. As Caesar knew that taking his army into Italy proper would mark a new phase in Rome’s civil war, so Lee knew that, leading his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia onto Union soil, he could no longer claim to be simply defending his country from invasion: he was now an invader himself. The Maryland Campaign that had its bloody climax at the Battle of Antietam was truly one of the pivotal moments not just of Civil War history, but of American history generally – and James McPherson tells the story well and conveys its significance skillfully in Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom.
Long before publishing Antietam: Crossroads of Freedom in 2002, McPherson, of Princeton University, had long since established himself as the pre-eminent Civil War historian of this generation. His 1988 book Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, a Pulitzer Prize winner and bestseller, was quickly embraced as the single-volume history of the Civil War. McPherson, whose earlier books included several works on African Americans’ contributions to the Union cause, also won praise for the manner in which he has consistently called attention to slavery as the true cause of the Civil War; his work provides a welcome anodyne to “Lost Cause” and neo-Confederate approaches to the war and its legacy.
In an introductory essay titled “Death in September,” McPherson provides a grim reminder of just how bloody a day Antietam was: “The 6,300 to 6,500 Union and Confederate soldiers killed and mortally wounded near the Maryland village of Sharpsburg on September 17, 1862, were more than twice the number of fatalities suffered in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001” (p. 3). After citing the testimony of a number of veterans who attest that they lived through many battles but never experienced anything quite like Antietam, McPherson proceeds to a quick and succinct consideration of the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam.
Doing so, however, requires a bit of backstory. Any discussion of this phase of Civil War history will inevitably involve attention to the mercurial character of Union General George B. McClellan. He was a great organizer – after the disastrous Union defeat at the July 1861 Battle of Bull Run or Battle of Manassas, he had re-formed the defeated Union forces as the Army of the Potomac, and had restored their morale in the process – but he seemed singularly irresolute in his actual exercise of battlefield command. He could forge the sword, but he seemed unable to wield it.
McClellan was also afflicted with an unfortunate tendency to step outside his military responsibilities and dabble in politics; he despised President Abraham Lincoln, and expressed freely his opinion that Union victory in the Civil War should leave the institution of slavery untouched. Moreover, McClellan sought to promote officers he saw as friends, and to act against officers that he thought might favor Lincoln and/or abolition.
Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that, while the Army of the Potomac suffered one reverse after another in the Seven Days’ battles around Richmond, “the poison” of party politics and army politics “had seeped deeper into the Army of the Potomac” (p. 53). President Lincoln, meanwhile, had drafted a preliminary proclamation emancipating all enslaved people in areas then in rebellion against the United States of America; but he knew that he could not issue the proclamation unless and until McClellan’s army gained some sort of victory over Lee’s army.
Meanwhile, none of the difficulties of a personality like McClellan’s marred the relationship between Robert E. Lee and his president, Jefferson Davis. After fighting and defeating the Union army of General John Pope in a second battle at Manassas/Bull Run, Lee outlined to Davis his reasons for a proposed Confederate invasion of Maryland.
The possible benefits of such an invasion, from Lee’s point of view, were many: relieving ravaged Virginia of the pressures of war, while securing fresh supplies from bounteous Maryland; gaining new recruits from Maryland, and possibly encouraging that border state to secede and join the Confederacy; depressing Union morale by taking the war into the North, with possible effects on upcoming congressional elections; gaining, through a victory on Northern soil, European recognition of the Confederacy, and perhaps European intervention on the Confederacy’s behalf.
Davis assented to Lee’s proposal, and the die was cast. McPherson captures well the drama of that moment of invasion orchestrated by Lee:
Great events…awaited the outcome of Lee’s decision to cross the Potomac: victory or defeat; foreign intervention; Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation; Northern elections; the very willingness of the Northern people to keep fighting for the Union….Destiny awaited those tired, ragged, shoeless, hungry but confident Rebel soldiers on the far side of the Potomac as they forded the river singing “Maryland, My Maryland”: the destiny of the Confederacy, of slavery, of the United States itself as one nation, indivisible. (p. 95)
This brief book (just 156 pages, not counting notes, bibliographic essay, and acknowledgements) describes and summarizes the Battle of Antietam well – McClellan’s inefficient deployment of superior forces, Lee’s high-risk gambles in the face of heavy odds – but does not go into extreme detail regarding the tactical elements of the battle. Readers who are in search of exhaustive accounts of tactical decisions, and of the consequences of those decisions at the corps, division, brigade, and regimental level, might do better to seek out works like James Murfin’s The Gleam of Bayonets (1965), or Stephen Sears’s Landscape Turned Red (1983), or John Michael Priest’s Antietam: The Soldiers’ Battle (1989).
McPherson’s core interest, rather, is in how Antietam was, in his reading, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War (the book’s cover subtitle). In his conclusion, McPherson states clearly why he feels that the bloody and incomplete Union victory at Antietam, in terms of its political and diplomatic consequences, was the most crucial single engagement of the Civil War:
The victory at Antietam could have been more decisive….But Union armies had stymied the supreme Confederate efforts. Foreign powers backed away from intervention and recognition, and never again came so close to considering them. Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation. Northern voters chastised but did not overthrow the Republican party, which forged ahead with its program to preserve the Union and give it a new birth of freedom. Here indeed was a pivotal moment. (p. 155)
For McPherson, these factors make Antietam more crucial, more decisive, than other vital turning points of the Civil War such as Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Atlanta. Coming as I do from Maryland, I have always considered Antietam the most important battle of the American Civil War; and it is good to have exalted company like McPherson’s in that regard.
Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam is well-illustrated with photographs and engravings, and the campaign and battle maps are particularly clear and helpful. For the reader who wants a quick, informative introduction to the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam – one that never loses sight of the vital human-rights issues that underlay the entire Civil War -- Crossroads of Freedom is more than suitable.