Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus.

by Carl Schmitt

German

Genres: Politics, Philosophy, Nonfiction, Germany, History, Political Science, Theory

89 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1923

About the author

Carl Schmitt's early career as an academic lawyer falls into the last years of the Wilhelmine Empire. (See for Schmitt's life and career: Bendersky 1983; Balakrishnan 2000; Mehring 2009.) But Schmitt wrote his most influential works, as a young professor of constitutional law in Bonn and later in Berlin, during the Weimar-period: Political Theology, presenting Schmitt's theory of sovereignty, appeared in 1922, to be followed in 1923 by The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, which attacked the legitimacy of parliamentary government. In 1927, Schmitt published the first version of his most famous work, The Concept of the Political, defending the view that all true politics is based on the distinction between friend and enemy. The culmination of Schmitt's work in the Weimar period, and arguably his greatest achievement, is the 1928 Constitutional Theory which systematically applied Schmitt's political theory to the interpretation of the Weimar constitution. During the political and constitutional crisis of the later Weimar Republic Schmitt published Legality and Legitimacy, a clear-sighted analysis of the breakdown of parliamentary government Germany, as well as The Guardian of the Constitution, which argued that the president as the head of the executive, and not a constitutional court, ought to be recognized as the guardian of the constitution. In these works from the later Weimar period, Schmitt's declared aim to defend the Weimar constitution is at times barely distinguishable from a call for constitutional revision towards a more authoritarian political framework (Dyzenhaus 1997, 70–85; Kennedy 2004, 154–78).

Though Schmitt had not been a supporter of National Socialism before Hitler came to power, he sided with the Nazis after 1933. Schmitt quickly obtained an influential position in the legal profession and came to be perceived as the ‘Crown Jurist’ of National Socialism. (Rüthers 1990; Mehring 2009, 304–436) He devoted himself, with undue enthusiasm, to such tasks as the defence of Hitler's extra-judicial killings of political opponents (PB 227–32) and the purging of German jurisprudence of Jewish influence (Gross 2007; Mehring 2009, 358–80). But Schmitt was ousted from his position of power within legal academia in 1936, after infighting with academic competitors who viewed Schmitt as a turncoat who had converted to Nazism only to advance his career. There is considerable debate about the causes of Schmitt's willingness to associate himself with the Nazis. Some authors point to Schmitt's strong ambition and his opportunistic character but deny ideological affinity (Bendersky 1983, 195–242; Schwab 1989). But a strong case has been made that Schmitt's anti-liberal jurisprudence, as well as his fervent anti-semitism, disposed him to support the Nazi regime (Dyzenhaus 1997, 85–101; Scheuerman 1999). Throughout the later Nazi period, Schmitt's work focused on questions of international law. The immediate motivation for this turn seems to have been the aim to justify Nazi-expansionism. But Schmitt was interested in the wider question of the foundations of international law, and he was convinced that the turn towards liberal cosmopolitanism in 20th century international law would undermine the conditions of stable and legitimate international legal order. Schmitt's theoretical work on the foundations of international law culminated in The Nomos of the Earth, written in the early 1940's, but not published before 1950. Due to his support for and involvement with the Nazi dictatorship, the obstinately unrepentant Schmitt was not allowed to return to an academic job after 1945 (Mehring 2009, 438–63). But he nevertheless remained an important figure in West Germany's conservative intellectual scene to his death in 1985 (van Laak 2002) and enjoyed a considerable degree of clandestine influence elsewhere (Scheuerman 1999, 183–251; Müller 2003).

Unsurprisingly, the significance and value of Schmitt's works

Reviews

[Mirza Sultan-Galiev · Rating 4 out of 5]

As usual with Schmitt, a well argued and interesting text.
Also as usual, (and perhaps to be expected from a right wing Catholic), the analysis
is carried out on a completely idealistic level, that of the "self-moving" history of ideas alone.
His assertion that Marx's fanatical pursuit of the "critique of political economy" was motivated by a need to show that the
bourgeoisie as a social phenomena was fully comprehensible and thus outmoded in a Hegelian sense, strikes me as dubious to say the least and indicative of what was probably a very shallow grasp of the relevant writings on Schmitt’s part.

When it comes to his examination of irrational myth, he makes a connection in terms of intellectual lineage between Proudhon and Bakunin to Mussolini through the mediation of Sorel.
The family relation of fascism with both elements of anarchism and the broader scene of non-Marxist socialism and syndicalism is indisputable, and has been covered in depth by Sternhell, however to concentrate as Schmitt does in thus text upon classical anarchist thought as an anti-rational negation of the Enlightenment is incredibly
one sided and misleading.
The culture of pre WW1 anarchism was permeated by a naïve faith in science, progress and reason quite comparable to that of liberal positivism, everyone from union organizers to individualist expropriators finding common ground in the redemptive power of reason.
His description of democracy is vivid and appropriately cynical, however he stumbles when it comes to the assumption of a necessary contradiction between democracy and parliamentary bourgeoisie liberalism, failing to see that the homogonous social body he postulates as requisite for democracy is in fact provided by liberalism’s world of commodity producing citizens nominally equal in the sphere of exchange ( with the revolutionary proletariat as perhaps the “worst” heterogeneous element of them all).

[Tim Lundquist · Rating 5 out of 5]

I will admit - I enjoy reading Schmitt. He hates everyone, and has an appropriately pessimistic view of political institutions and our calcified system of parliament.

[Mehmet]

Ezber bozan bir kitap.

[Charles Haywood · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ah, Carl Schmitt, Carl Schmitt! No man like him exists today. Political philosophy in our time is, and for many decades past has been, largely the domain of intellectual pygmies and outright morons; the age of gold has degenerated into the age of brass, or of plastic with yellow paint. Schmitt is dead, but his work is not, and this, one of his series of books published during the early Weimar period in Germany, illuminates much of our own present condition. That’s not to say The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy is an easy read. Like much of Schmitt’s writing, it is somewhat elliptical, alternating great insight with moments of “where are we going with this?” But the payoff is worth the effort.

This is the only translation in English, done in 1985, of the 1926 (second) edition of Schmitt’s Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, first published in 1923. The word “crisis” does not appear in the original German title; rather, the term used is roughly “spiritual-historical situation,” in the non-religious sense of “spiritual,” for which there is no equivalent English word (but there is in Hungarian, lelki, as my mother never tires of reminding me). Moreover, it’s a bit strange that the German word for “parliamentarianism” was translated as “parliamentary democracy,” given that Schmitt spends a good portion of the book distinguishing parliamentarianism and democracy.

To be sure Schmitt saw fatal problems, if not yet precisely a crisis, in the foundation of the German parliamentary system. Schmitt does mention a crisis of parliamentarianism within the text, but he means that not in the sense of an existential crisis of the nation (although famously much of Schmitt’s political thought revolved around what a sovereign might do, legitimately or not, in such a crisis) but in the sense of unbridgeable contradictions having surfaced in what was once thought to be a clearly-defined system. He says the same of both democracy and the modern liberal state, which is why one of his aims is to explore alternatives to played-out systems of the time. Whether he saw a crisis in his day or not, it is certain Schmitt would be horrified, but not surprised, at the utter degradation of today’s politics. But the wreckage of liberal democracy we see all around us is merely the inevitable end state of the contradictions and debilities Schmitt analyzes in this book.

It is hard for us to recapture the degree to which the Western European ruling classes in the early twentieth century worshipped the parliamentary system, and had faith that the end of political organization had arrived, just needing a little polishing here and adjustment there. After a century of struggle against monarchy and aristocracy, it seemed to most elites as if history had evolved to a modern system that truly represented the nation (though there were more than a few dissenters, mostly outside the elites, some of whom Schmitt covers in this book). Schmitt is famous in part because he broke that spell, and soundly spanked parliamentarianism, in its then-existent form, as outdated and inadequate for the challenges facing Germany. Parliamentarianism was an integral manifestation of liberalism, however, so Schmitt’s criticism went deeper than mere political form, or the mechanisms of political decision making. Schmitt thereby heralded both the looming troubles of the decades immediately following this work, and the troubles that have resurfaced after the end of the Cold War.

The translator, Ellen Kennedy, offers an excellent and lengthy Introduction. The edition she translates begins with a Preface, in which Schmitt responds to criticism of the first edition by one Richard Thoma, a law professor, who accused Schmitt of crypto-papism and a lust for dictatorship, which are pretty much the stock attacks on Schmitt to this day (although his Catholicism assumed less importance in his later thought than it had occupied in his earliest works). Despite Thoma’s attack, this book is in fact a turn away from the focus on dictatorship and the imposition of good government by a sovereign above the people, found in three earlier books (Political Romanticism; The Dictator; and Political Theology), towards a more favorable view of popular sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Preface, putatively a response to Thoma, actually most clearly pulls together the threads of Schmitt’s claim in the rest of the book that parliamentarianism is contradictory to democracy, and should be re-read after the book in order to grasp the practical realities of Schmitt’s theoretical analysis.

Schmitt’s original Introduction outlines his project. He notes that since the inception of the parliamentary system, it has been intermittently criticized, despite its general acceptance. Some criticism comes from those who would restore the absolutism of monarchy. More importantly, in the world of the Germany of 1923 (almost all of Schmitt’s focus is Germany, occasionally touching on France, but mostly for theory, not practice), were criticisms from those on the Left who desired some form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and those on the Right who desired some form of corporatism. Although he acknowledges many and varied currents criticizing parliamentary theory and, even more, practice, Schmitt’s purpose is not to himself critique the parliamentary system, even if that’s the effect of much of what he says. He rather wants to “find the ultimate core of the institution of modern parliament,” which he regards as being very different from its original conception and practice. “[T]he institution itself has lost its moral and intellectual foundation and only remains standing through sheer mechanical perseverance as an empty apparatus.” To understand why this is, Schmitt tells us, we must clearly define and distinguish parliamentarianism and related concepts, “such as democracy, liberalism, individualism, and rationalism.” He wants to “shift away from tactical and technical questions to intellectual principles and a starting point that does not once again lead to a dead end.” He wants to offer a positive way forward, by examining the system and alternatives, not merely carp about problems in the politics of his society.

Taking the bull by the horns, the first chapter tackles democracy. Legitimacy is associated, Schmitt says, with democracy, and legitimacy at the time Schmitt wrote meant recognizing the people’s right to self-determination. Popular sovereignty had been the wave of the nineteenth century, it “appeared to have the self-evidence of an irresistible advancing and expanding force.” It seemed allied to “liberalism and freedom”—but was not, because democracy is only an organizational form without content. Only by linking democracy with another concept, such as social or economic relationships, or a national will, or national homogeneity, does democracy acquire content, and even then the content can be wholly inconsistent from place to place, depending on the characteristics and heterogeneity of the population. (In fact, in the Preface, Schmitt denies that a more than nominally heterogenous polity, to the extent it extends the franchise across different groups in society, can be a democracy at all, something modern America is proving him correct about. Schmitt’s focus in other works on the inherency of enmity in any polity also suggests democracy is never workable, as does his point that political equality of all, which he regards as “irresponsible stupidity, leading to the worst chaos, and therefore to even worse injustice,” is “a liberal, not a democratic, idea,” but those are topics for another day.)

What then are the core realities of democracy? First, the actual will of each citizen, however he votes, is the same as the result obtained through majority vote. Failure to vote with the majority merely shows a voter has mistaken the general will. There is therefore “an identity between law and the people’s will.” Second, “all democratic arguments rest logically on a series of identities,” including “the identity of governed and governing . . . the identity of the people with their representatives . . . and finally an identity of the quantitative (the numerical majority or unanimity) with the qualitative (the justice of the laws).”

Of course, these identities are theoretical and never fully realized in practice, and the single most significant problem for theorists of democracy is that the will of the people as expressed may be deceived or malformed, in which case it is the minority which actually represents the will of the people. Thus democratic methods can be used to defeat or destroy democracy itself (Schmitt gives the example of newly-enfranchised women voters who commonly voted for authoritarian government), and if a theorist with power believes that democracy has, in itself, “self-sufficient value,” this cannot be permitted. This problem was identified since the Levellers of 1649, who as a result wanted to restrict power and voting to the “well-affected.” The “solution” usually adopted is that the people must be educated to know their true will, and such education will be conducted, if necessary, by a dictatorship, one that nonetheless remains democratic, because the will of the people is still the exclusive criterion of what is democratic, and the will of the people is thereby being correctly revealed. This is the key identity, that of democracy with the real will of the people, and the aim of every modern political power of every stripe, from royalists to Bolsheviks (with the exception of Italian Fascism, Schmitt notes) is to achieve that identity with itself. The ongoing problem of democracy is that it is impossible to disprove this “Jacobin argument” that the minority is qualitatively the legitimate representative of the will of the people if they have not yet been adequately informed and educated.

Next, of the principles of parliamentarianism—what are its “ultimate intellectual foundations”? Crucially, parliamentarianism is not democracy; it is not popular sovereignty in its pure form, and does not contain the core realities, the identities, Schmitt identifies in democracy. Schmitt notes that a representative of a parliamentary system is not, or should not be, a direct representative; he more than once cites Article 21 of the Weimar constitution, “members are representatives of the whole people; they are only responsible to their own consciences and not bound by any instructions.” (Although Schmitt does not mention it, not infrequently you hear this view ascribed to Edmund Burke, in his speech to the electors of Bristol, but according to Schmitt, this is the very essence of parliamentarianism, and nothing new.) Counterposed to this is not only the sometimes-found idea that representatives should, in fact, reflect the desires of constituents, but also the party system, which constrains parliamentarians from making individuated decisions.

What justifies the parliamentary system? The oldest, and once standard, justification for parliamentary rule is expediency—if a polity contains many people, an “elected committee of responsible people” can make decisions for the whole. This appears democratic, an extension of an assembly on the village green, but it is not, for “If for practical and technical reasons the representatives of the people can decide instead of the people themselves, then certainly a single trusted representative could also decide in the name of the same people. Without ceasing to be democratic, the argument would justify an antiparliamentary Caesarism.” So it would.

Then what is the justification for parliamentary rule? Schmitt identifies the modern “liberal rationalist” justification as the “dynamic-dialectic, that is, in a process of confrontation of differences and opinions, from which the real political will results. The essence of parliament is therefore public deliberation of argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion, parley, and all this without taking democracy into account.” This is merely an extension of the broader liberal idea that the free market, competition, “will produce harmony,” and that truth is “a mere function of the eternal competition of opinion.” Such competition manifests in two principles which are, at root, contradictory—the paramount importance of openness, particularly of the press, allowing public opinion to surface and compete, and the division of powers, another type of competition, but one that thwarts the democratic will, because parliament, the fruit of openness, as a result only has legislative, not plenary, power. In Western thought, division of powers has become synonymous with constitutionalism (and dictatorship is a suspension of the division of powers), yet this is actually a retrenchment from Enlightenment rationalism, which posited the general will as the touchstone of proper governmental authority.

This contradiction exists because the division of powers is inherent in the intellectual distinction between legislation and executive action. Schmitt repeats his famous formulation, the first sentence of Political Theology, “Sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception”; the division of powers is a pushback against this reality. Law, the absolute norm, is distinct from authority, the active application of the law. Seeking context for these abstractions, Schmitt surveys a wide range of thinkers, from Aristotle to James Madison, noting that the closer a system came to true Enlightenment rationalism, the more this key distinction was denied and the more parliament, the legislative power, became unitarily supreme. But to the extent the executive has power, openness and discussion do not determine its actions; here the idea of rationalism based on openness reaches its limit.

For decades, Schmitt says, openness and discussion “seemed to be essential and indispensable. What was to be secured through the balance guaranteed by openness and discussion was nothing less than truth and justice itself.” Society was to achieve “discussion in place of force.” In practice, however, “the reality of parliamentary and party political life and public convictions are today far removed from such beliefs.” Parliament is a facade; all real work is done in committees or in parties, far from public view and public discussion; thus parliament “is losing its rationale.” “Small and exclusive committees of parties or of party coalitions make their decisions behind closed doors, and what representatives of the big capitalist interest groups agree to in the smallest committees is more important for the fate of millions of people, perhaps, than any political decision.” To the extent public opinion, or the sovereignty of the people, is valued, society is worse off than under “the cabinet politics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” Equally corrosively for the theoretical principles of parliamentarianism, modern mass action techniques, such as radio, have “made argumentative public discussion an empty formality.” “There are certainly not many people today who want to renounce the old liberal freedoms, particularly freedom of speech and the press. But on the European continent there are not many more who believe that these freedoms still exist where they could actually endanger the real holders of power.” Zing. (It’s certainly no better today. Nobody would say that any modern Western system is one revolving around rational discourse. To enunciate the idea is to refute it.) “[P]arliament, as it developed in the nineteenth century, has also lost its previous foundation and its meaning.” Thus, by implication, parliament has a crisis of legitimacy for, after all, any number of other forms of government could allow the same type of system, forms that did not falsely claim to implement popular sovereignty—such as, let’s say, Mussolini’s corporatism.

So what does that mean? What can replace the empty shell of parliamentarianism? Rather than talk of Mussolini, Schmitt turns to two great currents of his age that both claimed to represent the general will: Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism. Schmitt never mentions it, but none of this analysis in the second half of the book was abstract in the years leading up to 1923; great currents rocked the German scene, of which these two held pride of place, with violent Communist rebellion and general strikes in many big cities, all capped by hyperinflation and the destruction of much of the German middle class. Mussolini had marched on Rome in 1922. Thus, Schmitt knew perfectly well that his bloodless analysis had real world implications and consequences, and these real-world events no doubt dictated the choice of what he would analyze.

He first examines Marxism . . . . [Review completes as first comment.]

[Cemre]

Parlamenter Demokrasinin Krizi, 20. yüzyılda demokrasi ve parlamentarizmin anlamı üzerine bilindik iddialardan farklı savlara yer veren bir kitap. Yine de kitap boyunca Schmitt'in "Hitler'in filozofları"ndan biri olduğu zihnimin bir köşesindeydi.

Kendime kısa notlar olması için, Schmitt, liberalizm ile demokrasinin aynı anlama gelmediğini, diktatörlüğün demokrasinin zıttı olmadığını, demokratik bir diktatörlüğün de var olabileceğini, 19. yüzyılda demokrasinin adeta bir "moda" haline geldiğini, ilericilikle eş anlamda sayıldığını; fakat bunun aslında böyle olmadığını ifade etmiştir. Ayrıca Schmitt'e göre parlamentarizm, aleniyet ve müzakereyi şart koşmaktadır; fakat siyasî partilerin ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte kararlar "kapalı kapılar ardında" yapılan pazarlıklarla alınmaya başlamıştır. Bu da parlamentolarının işlevlerini kaybetmelerine neden olmuştur.

[Reed Schwartz]

read as interview prep for a job in the current administration

[Gijs Huppertz · Rating 4 out of 5]

Deze review betreft dit boek en het begrip politiek.

https://ongeduld.com/2022/01/21/carl-...

De houdbaarheid van de democratie evenals de opkomst van identiteitspolitiek en steeds verdere polarisatie op een gehele reeks onderwerpen motiveerde mij de werken te lezen van een denker met een zekere alternatieve opinie dan doorgaans gewoonlijk is. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was een Duitse politiek filosoof van de vorige eeuw, en een van de meest controversiële. Waarom? Openlijk uitte hij zijn steun voor het Nationaal Socialisme en met de machtsovername van Hitler week Schmitt er niet voor uit om juridisch de beweging te steunen evenals Joodse wetenschappers uit zijn werk te schrappen. Desondanks denk ik dat Schmitt waardevol is om te lezen om verschillende redenen, zijn kritiek op Liberalisme, de kritiek op de democratie en meest belangrijk van al, zijn vriend-vijand concept binnen de politiek.

Eerst wil ik enige context geven voordat we duiken in Schmitt zijn kritiek op Liberalisme. Waar leefde Schmitt? In wat voor tijd? Wat kan zijn ideeën beïnvloed hebben? Schmitt studeerde af in 1910, enkele jaren voor de eerste wereldoorlog startte. Over zijn vroege volwassen jaren zag Schmitt het keizerrijk Duitsland in oorlog vervallen met Frankrijk, England en Rusland, om zelf in 1916 de wapens op te pakken en de loopgraven in te duiken. Na de eerste wereldoorlog kwam Schmitt in een van de meest turbulente tijd van Duitsland terecht, het interbellum met de Weimar Republiek. Met het aftreden van de Duitse keizer probeerde men in Duitsland een democratische parlementaire republiek te creëren. Aan de grondslag hiervan lag een zeer democratische en liberale constitutie, maar deze verandering ging gepaard met veel problemen. Duitsland bevond zich in een zwakke positie met veel ontevreden burgers na de oorlog. Veteranen keerde terug van het front, vele families waren uiteengevallen door sterfte en tegelijkertijd kwam het communisme op in Rusland dat zijn invloed uitte in Duitsland. Dit alles zorgde voor een gevaarlijke cocktail van ideologieën, gefrustreerde burgers en vele volkstemmers die van mening waren dat zij de weg voorwaarts predikten. Deze periode verliep dan ook vrij bloedig met momenten van politieke knokploegen op de straten en politici die het leven niet zeker waren door politieke tegenstanders.

Dit is de tijd waarin Schmitt zich bevond, ervaringen op deed en schreef [1]. Wat vond Schmitt van het Liberalisme dat uiteindelijk de basis van de Weimar constitutie vormde? Het korte antwoord is, niet positief. In zijn gebonden essaybundel Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur start Schmitt met een uiteenzetting van de eerste fout die men heeft begaan, de combinatie van parlementairsisme, democratie en het Liberalisme. Schmitt probeert deze te ontleden om de tegenstellingen bloot te geven. Het parlementairisme dat streefde naar discussie[2] en openbaarheid is geïnfiltreerd door de massademocratie. Schmitt beschrijft dat als volgt, “De situatie van het parlementarisme is op dit moment daarom zo kritisch, omdat de ontwikkeling van de moderne massa democratie de op argumenten gebaseerde publieke discussie tot een

[1] Wellicht is het opvallend om te zien dat zowel Schmitt als Hobbes (een van zijn inspiratiebronnen) schreven over een sterke staat terwijl zij leefde in tijden van onstabiliteit en bloedvergiet.
[2] Discussie ziet Schmitt niet als de huidige vorm van uitwisseling van ideeën, maar als een strijd. Hier zal later op terug gekomen worden. Men moet de discussie benaderen als een uitwisseling van argumenten, waarbij een partij uiteindelijk de ander zal overwinnen.

lege formaliteit heeft gemaakt.”[1]. Buiten de discussie die is weggevallen benoemt Schmitt dat de massa tegenwoordig beïnvloed wordt door propaganda waarmee wordt ingespeeld op de directe belangen en lusten. Dit ontneemt de effectiviteit van het parlement. Met deze ontwikkeling vervalt de ‘waarheid’ of ‘juistheid’ van de argumenten en valt men terug op het simpelweg behalen van een meerderheid. Maar het Liberalisme dan, vraag je je af. Het Liberalisme heeft volgens Schmitt deze massademocratie geïntroduceerd met de gedachten van de gelijkheid van de mens. Dit is volgens Schmitt geen democratische gedachten, maar een Liberale.

Hier komt een van Schmitts zijn meest omstreden ideeën op. Schmitt stelt dat democratie niet gegrond is in de gelijkheid van de mensheid. De democratie volgens Schmitt, is iets dat homogeniteit benodigd van zijn burgers. Kortom, de democratie benodigd een bepaalde eis die het aan de burger stelt dat de bevolking homogeen maakt. Dit kan een bepaald soort burgerschap zijn zoals ze bezaten in de Romeinse tijd, maar dit kan ook etniciteit zijn[2]. Om Schmitt zijn gedachten helder te maken:

Het parlementarisme werkt niet, want het is beïnvloed door massademocratie dat geen waarde meer hecht aan juistheid, waarheid en discussie, maar draait om het winnen van een meerderheid.
De democratie werkt niet, want ze benodigd homogeniteit en dat kan het Liberalisme haar niet geven, omdat het uitgaat van een gelijkheidsprincipe.
Het Liberalisme werkt niet, want het kan nergens voor staan.

Laat mij dit laatste punt verder toelichten. We moeten even een sprong maken in Schmitts denken. In zijn boek “Het Begrip Politiek” breidt Schmitt zijn concept vriend-vijandschap verder uit. Schmitt is van de fundamentele veronderstelling dat er een ‘waarheid’ of ‘juistheid’ in de politiek is, dit drijft zijn gedachten over de politiek dan ook. Schmitt stelt dat de discussie zoals die in het parlement gevoerd behoorde te worden, draaide om overtuiging niet om compromissen, wat Schmitt uiteindelijk concludeert is dat politiek draait om vrienden en vijanden. Schmitt benoemt het als volgt, “Vijand is dus niet de concurrent of de tegenstander in het algemeen. Vijand is ook niet de tegenstander die men privé en vol antipathie gevoelens haat. Vijand is enkel een collectiviteit die ‘minstens eventueel’- dat wil zeggen op grond van een reële mogelijkheid-, strijdend tegenover een andere collectiviteit komt te staan.” [3] . Zoals te lezen is oorlog een zekere optie binnen dit vijandschap en is dit volgens Schmitt ‘maar’ het uiterste van vijandschap. Vriend- en vijandschap vormt dus de het menselijk handelen binnen de politiek. Volgens Schmitt vormde de staat in eerste instantie de vormende eenheid achter deze binaire distinctie. Het Liberalisme heeft de staat echter zijn kracht ontnomen, sterker nog, de staat is nu in dienst van het liberale individu en doet niets anders dan het delegeren van problemen binnen de

[1] Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur, bladzijden 37.
[2] Hier is wellicht Schmitt zijn antisemitisme te herleiden evenals zijn inmenging met de Nationaal Socialistische Duitse Arbeiders Partij.
[3] Het Begrip Politiek, bladzijden 39 en 40.

maatschappij, waarbij alle conflicten terugkomen op de verantwoording van het individu. Dit laat allereerst een machtsvacuüm open binnen de samenleving. Als de staat geen orde geeft aan de vriend-vijand distinctie, dan kan een andere partij dit opvullen. Verder heeft de staat volgens Schmitt als enige het recht om zijn burgers te vragen te sterven voor de collectiviteit, echter zal niemand dit verrichten in een liberale samenleving gezien er geen spraken is van een cohesieve collectiviteit. Het ergste is dan nog wel dat het Liberalisme, het vrije individu en het kapitalisme in elkaar verwikkeld, want wat heeft het Liberalisme gedaan, het heeft probeerde de politiek vanuit de ethiek te binden en aan het economische ondergeschikt te maken. Kortom, binnen de politiek draait het nu, zoals eerder benoemd, om het winnen van zielen voor een meerderheid. Dit zou doormiddel van rationaliteit en discussie gedaan kunnen worden, maar Schmitt herleidt dat dit gemakkelijker gaat door het gebruik van financiële middelen zoals omkoping en propaganda.

Schmitt stelt uiteindelijk dat het Liberalisme niet succesvol is geweest in het uitbannen van de vriend-vijandschap distinctie, want stelt Schmitt, er is geen enkele democratie die geen vreemde, vijand of ongewenste kent. We gebruiken alleen andere terminologie, we kennen geen ‘oorlog’, maar ‘sancties’, ‘internationale politie’, ‘vrede vaststellen’ of ‘het beschermen van verdragen’. Schmitt waarschuwt ons verder voor het ontkennen van het vijandbeginsel, want benoemt hij, de Franse edel kende geen vijandschap en verheerlijkte het bestaan van het Franse platteland evenals de Russische prinsen de boer als christelijk ideaal zagen en beide werden overrompeld door revolutie[1].
Ondanks zijn scherpe uiteenzetting is het Liberalisme nog steeds dominant evenals de ontkenning van vijandschap en Schmitt waarschuwt ons aan het eind van het essay hiervoor, “Een leven dat niets anders dan dood meer tegenover zich heeft, is geen leven meer maar onmacht en hulpeloosheid. Wie geen andere vijand meer kent dan de dood en in zijn vijand niets dan een lege mechaniek ziet, staat dichter bij de dood dan bij het leven.”[2]. De uiteindelijke uitweg voor Schmitt was een sterke leider die de eenheid van de politiek weer kon vormen en de binnenlandse strijd ontnam. Een leider die homogeniteit bracht, op een verschrikkelijke wijze en een leider die zich verzette tegen het Liberalisme en streed voor de collectiviteit. Volgens Schmitt was Hitler niemand anders dan de democratische vertolking van het volk dat uiteindelijk zijn rechtmatige plek opeiste om de Duitse fragmenten bij een te houden.

Persoonlijk denk ik dat Schmitt zijn kritiek op het Liberalisme nog steeds vlijmscherp is. De constante compromissen waar Nederland om bekend staat, zonder harde discussies, de zogenaamde polderpolitiek. Het doorschuifluik van verantwoordelijkheid in het Nederlandse parlement. Zelfs de identiteitspolitiek die voortkomt uit het gebrekkige staatsvormende kracht valt te verklaren vanuit Schmitts denkwijze en ik sluit mij er deels bij aan. Het is ook een beeld van de mensheid dat aansluit op modernere kennis op psychologisch en sociologisch vlak en waar ik mij kan vinden. Het ziet het denken van de mens in termen van binaire distincties

[1] Schmitt is dan ook verbazingwekkend positief over Marx en Engels, omdat hij de distinctie tussen het proletariaat en de bourgeoisie ziet als een van de meest succesvolle vriend-vijand splitsingen.
[2] Het Begrip Politiek, bladzijden 110.

(tegenstellingen zoals koud en warm, goed en kwaad of schoonheid en walging), en dit zit geïntegreerd in hoe de mens zich opstelt in de wereld en vormt een groot deel van ons referentiekader. Hier past vriend-vijand perfect bij en niet ver gezocht. De mens is nu eenmaal geneigd te denken in heuristieken[1]. Buiten dat is binnen de sociale psychologie het concept van in- en outgroups steeds concreter gevormd. Dit komt neer op het vormen van een groep die bepaald eigenschappen deelt (zoals hobby’s of interesses, maar dit kan ook een etniciteit of religie zijn). Bij het vormen van deze groep kan een bepaalde identificatie ontstaan met de in-group en over tijd kan zelfs een out-group ontstaan, de groep die tegenover de in-group staat. Dit kan gepaard gaan met daadwerkelijk nadelige effecten zoals het minder geneigd zijn de ander te helpen of vijandige gevoelens[2]. Zo is Schmitt zijn beeld zeer realistisch.

Als we geheel eerlijk zijn richting de politieke theorie van Schmitt dan behoren we ook te erkennen dat zelfs de West-Europese landen zoals Nederland inderdaad nog steeds naar een vijandbeeld handelen. Al houden wij ons het beeld van het tolerante land voor, kunnen wij zien dat ook Nederland nog handelt vanuit vijandschap principes, alhoewel wij geneigd zijn de pacifistische termen te gebruiken als sancties en het beschermen van verdragen[3]. Ik ben echter wel van mening dat het polariserende beeld dat hij schept, een zogenaamde conflicttheorie, geen gezonde theorie is voor een maatschappij. Ja er moet kritisch gekeken worden naar onderliggende problematiek en ja er moet verbaal gestreden worden om ‘juistheid’ te herleiden. Echter is een theorie van constante strijd in mijn optiek een theorie die tekortdoet aan het empathische en liefdevolle aspect van de mens evenals de lange traditie van coöperatie die tirannie en dictatorschap heeft overleefd.

Helaas moet ik toch erkennen dat ik bang ben dat in tijden van verveling, onrust en instabiliteit men zal overstappen van deze coöperatie naar vriend-vijandschap en hoewel dit in de politiek (als in directe discussies) naar mijn inzien productief is, is dit een gevaarlijk fenomeen wanneer dit overslaat naar de bredere volksbewegingen die, antiparlementair, aan de hand van volkstemmers, invulling geven aan vijandschap.

[1] Heuristieken zijn mentale short-cuts die zorgen voor het nemen van snelle beslissingen. Dit kan ten goede komen in momenten waarbij snelle beslissingen van groot belang zijn, maar kan ook mentale luiheid veroorzaken wanneer dit toegepast word bij alledaagse beslissingen.
[2] Een van de meest concrete voorbeelden hiervan zijn voetbalsupporters.
[3] Men kan zelfs beargumenteren dat wij indirecte vijanden voorhouden die wij niet met de terminologie vijand benoemen, maar wel zo benaderen. Zo kan je bijvoorbeeld de vluchtelingen zien als een groep die geen vijand is, maar wel zo wordt behandeld.

[Nick · Rating 4 out of 5]

The two money quotes from the preface:

“The belief in parliamentarianism, in a government by discussion, belongs to the realm of liberalism. It does not belong to democracy. Both, liberalism and democracy, must be distinguished from each other in order to recognize the heterogeneous structure that constitutes modern mass democracy.”

“Every genuine democracy is based on the principle that not only are equals treated equally, but also, with inevitable consequence, that the unequal are not treated equally. Therefore, democracy necessarily requires first homogeneity and second, if necessary, the elimination or destruction of heterogeneity.”

Schmitt distinguishes democracy which is the homogenous will of a people expressed by a majority and parliamentarism which is liberalism applied to government, defined by 1) decision by discussion and 2) public deliberation. More specifically parliamentarism works by representation, the many represented by a few who act on their behalf but according to their own judgement. Liberalism is an individualistic ideology based in universal humanism whereas democratic equality is homogenous and only meaningful if exclusionary toward outsiders which references Schmitt’s concept of the political as essentially antagonistic. Thus democracy is compatible with illiberalism and undemocratic treatment of outsiders historically via slavery and imperialism, or revolutionary terror towards aristocrats, counterrevolutionaries etc.

Parliamentarianism was formulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by Burke, Bentham, Guizot, JS Mill from English example first in response to absolute monarchy in league with democracy then a means of guiding public opinion under the theory of competitive elitism of Weber, Schumpeter, Lippmann but in both cases an attempt to limit sovereignty which was intended for an aristocratic society where suffrage was restricted to property owners and developed concessions from monarchs but over time universal suffrage was grafted onto with the advent of mass industrial society. Like liberalism parliament is premised on competition of ideas and individual decision making but itself depends on a consensus of liberal assumptions and only applicable to legislative not executive activity where Machiavellian realpolitik remains, the subject of Taming the Prince by Harvey Mansfield Jr. However the advent of political parties and large organized interests have rendered legislative bodies and deliberation subordinate which increasingly is a private negotiation between powerful interests rather than a meaningful public debate of ideas.

In opposition to liberal democracy Schmitt proposes that democracy need not take the parliamentary form but historically has been Caesarist (exercised by a dictatorial executive) and in his day by both mass revolutionary movements like bolshevism and reactionary authoritarian movements like fascism even if they sometimes equivocated the meaning of democracy in their opposition to liberalism. The People’s Republic of China constitution to this day refers to itself in Mao’s words as the ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’. Schmitt considers Rousseau to be a genuine democrat in his conception of the general will despite the title of his work Du Contrat Social where the people are a unified homogenous body which does not alienate sovereignty. Schmitt provides his famous definition of the sovereign as he who decides on the exception derived from absolutists Bodin and Hobbes as opposed to the rationalistic conception of the ‘rule of laws not men’ devoid of will and has in its prerogative all which conduces to salus populi suprema lex (good of the people is the highest law). Schmitt also references his work on political theology which in democracy is vox populi vox dei (the voice of the people is the voice of god) which can always be exercised by those who claim to act as the true will of the people in opposition to institutional constraints or even people’s own expressed will.

Schmitt’s work remains relevant a century later given the rise of populism in reaction to the problems of liberal democracy which was thought to be the final form of government but found itself increasingly unstable even in relatively developed stable countries given the hegemony of the managerial class and moneyed interests. Liberals have often argued populism is not truly democratic but wiser liberals such as Yascha Mounk have recognized populism is in fact democratic just not liberal or parliamentary but in the end the problem of parliamentary government has been that legislatures and public deliberation are not actually in control of policy but unelected bureaucracy, judiciary and special interests outside the state. Schmitt was an anti-liberal although one need not be to appreciate his insights into the tensions between liberalism and democracy and recognition of hegemony and antagonism in politics. I am not hostile as Schmitt was to liberalism although the parliamentary form is really appropriate for an English aristocratic society under monarchy and is not the form representative government took in the United States being based on separation of powers and supermajority.

Realistic proposals for direct democracy in modern society are essentially plebiscitary, by means of popular referendum recall and initiative, participatory by way of sortition where ordinary people actually serve in government randomly, and presidentialist in a Caesarist unitary executive. More contemporary radical democrats include Alain de Benoist on the right and Mike Gravel on the left, but constitutionalism as supermajoritarianism in the work of Calhoun and Buchanan can be understood as a form of republicanism that respects individual/minority rights and institutions as outside regular legislation and safeguarded by agonistic voice, veto, and exit which was the plan of the United States via federal representation and separation of powers amendable by supermajority of the people and states.

I have another theory of constitutional government from the examples of Roosevelt and Nixon more fit for the managerial age, executive led interest group pluralism. Rather than seek homogeneity or consensus a unitary executive can appeal to diverse groups by transactional means over party loyalty. The bureaucracy depends on personal loyalty to the president’s agenda to short circuit the political process. Can ensure a populist doesn’t just accede to insider demands.

[Oliver · Rating 4 out of 5]

A scathing, lucid interrogation into the fundamental presuppositions behind parliamentarianism.

It speaks volumes that the left has found so much to value here, even in spite of Schmitt’s completely opposing political agenda. It’s not hard to see why what’s ultimately a rather damning assessment of liberalism in practice resonates with Marxists, especially towards the end where Schmitt adapts Sorelian concepts of myth to reveal how parliament’s facade of rationally open discussion, the pursuit of the most applicable truth via a sort of Hegelian ‘dynamic-dialectic’, has in turn fostered this palpable desire for an ‘irrationalist’ transformation of society.

To this end, his characterisation of Marxist philosophy is quite fascinating, if not a little dodgy at points, especially as concerns the dictatorship of the proletariat. Plenty of value to glean from this text, even if seems to imply that Fascism and Bolshevism are somehow equally dangerous ideologies.

History has been rather frank about this mistake.

[Kbrtrn · Rating 5 out of 5]

Carl Schmitt- Kanunilik ve Mesruiyet çevirisinden sonra hukukçular çeviri yapmasın noktasına gelmiştim ki imdada Emre Zeybekoğlu'nun Carl Schmit- Parlamenter Demokrasinin Krizi çevirisi yetişti((: Kitap ince gibi görünsede epey bilgi barındırıyordu içinde; Hegel'den Marx'a, Sorel'den Proudhon'a kadar.. Yalnız Schmitt'in mevzuyu sosyalizmden alıp milliyetçiliğe bağlaması olağanüstüydü. Fikirlerine katılmasam da adam zeki yapacak bir şey yok((:

[Nick Sliwka · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tatsächlich relativ lesenswert, mit „Der Begriff des Politischen” vielleicht noch das am stärksten auch unter Linken zu rezipierende Werk. Die Argumentationsebene changiert jedoch auf eine etwas seltsame Weise, besonders im zweiten Teil zum Marxismus. Gerade dieser hätte eine eigene, ausführlichere Betrachtung rechtfertigt.

[Elyssa · Rating 3 out of 5]

erg goed boek maar heb er 2 sterren afgehaald omdat Schmitt een nazi was. laatste deel over het marxisme voelde ook niet heel sterk

[Mickey Dubs · Rating 3 out of 5]

Liberals: DESTROYED.

[Kerem · Rating 5 out of 5]

"The situation of parliamentarism is critical today because the development of modern mass democracy has made argumentative public discussion an empty formality.... Parties do not face each other today discussing opinions but as social or economic power groups calculating their mutual interests and opportunities for power."

The book has too many gems to list here. The introduction details the context behind Schmitt's book, in particular how his focus was on the German liberal constitution and its problematic aspects. The preface to second edition, which is essentially a thorough response by Schmitt to Thoma's critique, is worth reading twice. Schmitt has a blunt style of writing, and overall he's a pessimist, not expecting anything from the parliamentary democracy of the time, but a lot of his valuable observations carry weight in today's systems as well. The book has four parts, the first two focusing on the parliamentarism and the latter two critiquing Marxism and dictatorships such as Mussolini's fascism. The appendix has Thoma's critique, which is fairly weak in comparison to Schmitt's arguments. I'd recommend reading the preface to second edition afterwards again, I found it valuable.

The book is thin but heavy, and not for light-hearted reader. Drawing many arguments from Hobbes, Marx, Tocqueville, Rousseau, Burke, Montesquieu, Mill, and others, Schmitt builds his argument solidly. If you are into politics or political theory, this is a great read for you.

[High Sparrow David · Rating 2 out of 5]

Carl Schmitts Demokratieverständnis beruht auf dem Identitätsprinzip von Rousseau. Also der Auflösung des Gegensatzes von Herrschern und Beherrschten. Besteht eine homogene Bevölkerung, könne diese auch durch nur einen Führer regiert werden. Das Parlament wiederum sei nicht identitätsstiftend, sondern ein Instrument, welches die Bevölkerung künstlich spaltet, letztlich nur den Machtinteressen einzelner Interessengruppen dienlich ist und die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates einschränkt. Schmitt verklärt die Diktatur daher zur „wahren“ Demokratie.

Schmitt bleibt jedoch die Antwort auf die Frage schuldig, wie in einem System ohne Herrschaftskontrolle und Machtteilung; Machtmissbrauch und Unterdrückung der Bevölkerung gewährleistet werden können. Die Schrecken des NS-Systems zeigen, wie ein solches System tatsächlich funktioniert. Bevölkerung und Institutionen wurden entsprechend der Vorstellungen des Führers gleichgeschaltet, Andersdenkende wurden verfolgt und umgebracht. Wer eine konstruktive, demokratisch gesinnte Parlamentarismuskritik lesen möchte, sollte sich daher lieber bei Habermas oder anderen bedienen, als bei Carl Schmitt.

[Hartley]

"If for practical and technical reasons the representatives of the people can decide instead of the people themselves, then certainly a single trusted representative could also decide in the name of the same people.? Without ceasing to be democratic, the argument would justify an antiparliamentary Caesarism."

"The crucial distinction always remains whether the law is a general rational principke or a measure, a concrete decree, an order."

I feel as though this wasn't the ideal entrance into Carl Schmitt's philosophy but that is not to say I didn't take away anything from this reading. I found many aspects of Schmitt's argument illuminating and persuasive, while some others lacked the vitality and explosiveness I'd expected from a 20th century critique of liberal democracy. At any rate, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt parses out the differences in liberalism and democracy to demonstrate that the Weimar Constitution pulls from both traditions. Further, he argues that the parliament as an organ designed so that debate may illuminate the truth is a sham, that the parliament is in fact only the antechamber to the true chambers of power as represented by secretive committees and the wills of party bosses.
What is the purpose of parliamentary government? Assuming that democracy can and has taken many forms, what is the advantage of this particular form? Schmitt argues, citing Locke and other bourgeois philosophers, that it came into existence out of the belief that truth and the Common Will are best revealed through discussion. The problem is that this doesn't fully resolve the problem of determining the Will of the People, as Schmitt states "The minority might express the true will of the people. The people can be deceived, and one has long been familiar with the techniques of propaganda and the manipulation of public opinion." Here is the problem with vanguardism and political revolutionary education. Faced with popular opposition to democracy, what does the democrat do?
Parliamentarism is defined here as being composed of and supported by several ideas or principles: openness, balance of powers, a specific concept of law and legislation, a limiting of parliament to legislation, and the inherent value of discussion. Openness appears as the "wonder cure" to the secrecy and corruption of absolutist government. It represents both transparency and the power of public opinion and freedom of speech as government correctives. That being said, public opinion is capable of being felt in other types of government systems, as "in every system of Enlightened despotism, public opinion plays the role of absolute corrective." The balance of powers is a critical aspect of the system, as is evidenced by a proclamation in the Declaration of the Rights of Man: "Any society in which the separation of powers and rights is not guaranteed has no constitution." Owing to this theory, popular dictatorship is seen as both undemocratic and inherently unconstitutional. The chambers must be balanced against each other and as much as possible within each chamber. The parliament balances as the legislative arm of a government and is itself balanced, being bicameral and likely bisected within both chambers by a party system.
The concept of law is law governed and guided by reason and not desire or passion. Thus, a perfect law is as eternal as reason or truth. The laws passed by the parliamentary method have a "logically different character from that of commands that are only based on authority" owing to the fact that they have been debated over by a popular assembly. The assembly is limited to legislation and kept distinct form the executive branch where difference of opinion is less useful. The parliament is rational but the executive, inaccessible to rational discussion, is "irrational." The legislative is intellectual and the executive is active. The contradiction here for Schmitt is that the "dialectic-dynamic process of discussion can certainly be applied to the legislative but scarcely to the executive." The executive balances but is itself unbalanced. It hardly needs to be said, relating to his last point, that parliamentary discussion is a farce and that few if any minds are changed on the debating floor.
Following this section, Schmitt analyzes dictatorship in Marxist thought and thus Hegelianism as well. I found this section uninteresting, perhaps because I'm already familiar with the Marxist dialectic and the science of class struggle and so on. It also feels fairly disjointed from the previous sections.
In his final section on Irrationalist Theories of the Direct Use of Force, Schmitt surveys anarchist and syndicalist theories of power. With this, he argues that "the theory of myth is the most powerful symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of parliamentary thought" for Sorel's Myth relies on a total opposition that itself stands in opposition to the more accomodating parliamentarism. Syndicalism, socialism, and anarchism each represent a threat to discussion itself, as well as to the idea that parliamentarism is the only viable system of government.

[John Smith · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant analysis of the indecisive nature of legislative bodies.

[Tomek Germis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Parlement, Democratie, Dictatuur van Carl Smith is een gedegen en diepgravende studie die de fundamenten van politieke systemen onderzoekt, met bijzondere aandacht voor de relatie tussen parlementaire democratieën en dictaturen. Smith biedt een gedetailleerde analyse van de manieren waarop parlementaire systemen functioneren en de dynamieken die kunnen leiden tot de opkomst van autoritaire regimes. Zijn werk is een verkenning van de evolutie van democratische en dictatorialle structuren, waarbij historische voorbeelden en politieke theorieën uitgebreid aan bod komen.

Inhoud en thema’s

Het boek is opgebouwd rond de contrasten tussen parlementaire democratieën en dictaturen, waarbij Smith niet alleen de theorieën achter deze systemen onderzoekt, maar ook de praktijk van hoe ze zich in verschillende landen hebben ontwikkeld. Hij maakt gebruik van een breed scala aan politieke theorieën en literatuur om de lezer inzicht te geven in hoe parlementaire democratieën werken, de mechanismen die hen in stand houden en de kwetsbaarheden die hen kunnen omverwerpen.

Een van de belangrijkste elementen van Smith’s analyse is de kritiek op de vermenging van parlementaire structuren met populisme en autoritarisme, wat het politieke landschap van de 20e eeuw heeft gevormd. Hij onderzoekt hoe de democratische instellingen die in veel landen de norm waren, soms kwetsbaar kunnen zijn voor erosie door autoritaire leiders die de democratische processen misbruiken om hun eigen macht te consolideren.

De Weimarrepubliek

Smith wijst regelmatig naar de Weimarrepubliek als een centraal voorbeeld van hoe een parlementaire democratie kan ontsporen en uiteindelijk kan leiden tot een dictatuur. De Weimarrepubliek, opgericht na de Eerste Wereldoorlog in Duitsland, wordt vaak gepresenteerd als een van de meest dramatische voorbeelden van het falen van parlementaire democratieën. Smith gebruikt de opkomst van Adolf Hitler en de Nazi-partij als een illustratie van hoe een democratische structuur kan worden ondermijnd door een combinatie van economische crises, politieke instabiliteit en het falen van politieke elites om effectief te reageren op de opkomst van extremisme.

De Weimarrepubliek was een voorbeeld van een land dat, ondanks zijn formele parlementaire democratie, niet in staat was om de fundamenten van de democratische instellingen te beschermen tegen de opkomst van autoritarisme. Smith benadrukt dat de constitutionele en institutionele zwaktes van de Weimarrepubliek – zoals het gebruik van artikel 48 van de Weimar-Grondwet, waarmee de president noodbevoegdheden kreeg – een sleutelrol speelden in de ondergang van de democratie.

Smith stelt dat de economische chaos van de jaren 1920 en de daaropvolgende grote depressie, in combinatie met de onvrede van het Duitse volk over de Versailles-overeenkomst en het gebrek aan vertrouwen in de politieke klasse, een vruchtbare bodem creëerden voor autoritaire krachten om op te komen. De Weimarrepubliek, volgens Smith, laat zien hoe de democratische instellingen van een land niet vanzelfsprekend zijn, maar afhankelijk zijn van de sterkte van de politieke cultuur, de bereidheid van politieke elites om democratische normen te handhaven, en de steun van de bevolking voor het politieke systeem.

[Facufigueroa_ · Rating 5 out of 5]

Este libro debería ser considerado uno de los más importantes de Schmitt e injustamente no lo es por la poca valorización hacia la derecha de ese tiempo que criticaba al parlamentarismo como a la izquierda que también lo hacía. En esta obra de uno de los pensadores políticos más grandes del siglo XX se propone analizar cómo el parlamentarismo como un sistema y régimen de gobierno cae en la contradicción de intentar conciliar democracia y liberalismo que terminan siendo contraproducente por el sencillo hecho de que Schmitt justifica la democracia desde la perspectiva de pufendorf y Rousseau que consideraban el orden democrático como el conjunto homogéneo y unilateral de las opiniones de los sujetos políticos que están llamados a participar de las acciones públicas. Esta homogeneidad le sirve a Schmitt para criticar al liberalismo como pensamiento moral y económico que sustenta sus bases sobre la idea de un orden heterogéneo y donde, ante todo, se representa una libertad individualista y separada del orden homogéneo de la sociedad. El parlamentarismo sería entonces contraproducente al sistema democrático porque su base partidaria reside en la heterogeneidad y en la asimetría entre los intereses de los representantes y representados siendo así justificable el “Staad Total” del “concepto de lo político” y de la “teología política” donde el estado se reconoce en la totalidad de la sociedad politizando las esferas públicas y privadas del orden social posibilitando un orden homogéneo habiendo abolido todo normativismo y aplicado todo monopolio de la decisión del soberano.

[Joey · Rating 4 out of 5]

I recommend skipping the introduction and prefaces, or read them after reading the main text. They’re too deep in the weeds on his contemporaries and historical context.

As for the text itself, it is alarmingly prescient. Problems he diagnoses with parliamentary democracy in interwar Germany ring shockingly familiar to me, a voter in the United States. He describes a legislative institution which purports to be a house of rational debate and decision making, a representative of the people. Yet discussion and decisions are almost entirely made behind closed doors in private committees and within the parties—which conspire with an ostensibly free press to manufacture public opinion.

Where the legitimacy of parliamentary party politics has withered away, two powerful alternatives appear: fascism or socialism. In Russia, the dictatorship of the proletariate. In Italy, a fascist dictatorship. Two drastically different systems with completely opposite aims.

All that to say: parliamentary democracy is not doing so well. Ask anyone, and they’ll agree. What now?

[Elliot · Rating 5 out of 5]

An old read log here but been thinking about and returning to this work in conjunction with Schmitt's Political Theology. I've said what I think about Schmitt in that review. I think this is a fascinating and important text in political theory, even if I find it ultimately entirely unpersuasive (in fact I wrote a grad school paper on this work in connection with Lenin!). What it does challenge the contemporary reader to do however is methodically think through what the foundations of democracy and representation truly are.

[Zach Brumaire]

the most unsatisfactory part of the book was Schmitt's assumptions regarding the concept of democratic homogeneity, which he takes from Rousseau more or less as given.

the preface to the second edition clarified a lot.

his identification of the opposition between mass democracy and liberalism seemed to me to be basically correct.


I've been mostly using The Storygraph this year, so I have a few readings to add to Goodreads when I have time.

[Micah · Rating 4 out of 5]

"It is essential that liberalism be understood as a consistent, comprehensive metaphysical system."

It seems odd that Schmitt gives his book a framework emphasizing the enormous importance of ideas in political systems and history, but concludes that the ascendant phenomenon of the time (1920s) is a polytheism of irrationalist myths, almost a kind of non-idea, even though he gives credit to anarchists and fascists for theorizing it. In any case, there are many sharp constructions here.

[Mehmed Gokcel · Rating 3 out of 5]

An undoubtably very interesting historical document to understand the political crisis in 1920s Germany. Further, Carl Schmitt skilfully criticises the rationalism of 'western' liberal ideals and exposes the faults and inconsistencies of parliamentary democracy.

[Will Schumer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Say what you will about Schmitt, the man understood the issue with parliamentarianism. Perhaps, however, his ultimate solution was wrong. Read for an understanding of the authoritarian critique of democracy.

[Bee · Rating 2 out of 5]

Schmitt was a central fascist political theorist. He makes legitimate points about the failures of liberal democracy, and perhaps that's why fascism was so captivating to Europe in the early 20th century; but his solutions are easy to tear down with class-based analysis.

[Dr. Anil Dominic Batti · Rating 5 out of 5]

~ AUFWIEGLERISCH – GNADENLOS – PROFUND ~

Wie viele andere Schriften Carl Schmitts, hat man es auch in diesem Falle mit einer heterodoxen Lektüre zu tun:

Das erste Kapitel befaßt sich mit »den maßgebenden Identitätsvorstellungen«, d.h. den regulativen Idealen »des demokratischen Denkens«, und macht es deutlich, daß der Abstand zwischen dem Ideale und der praktischen Umsetzung desselben manchmal viel zu groß wird, denn Demokratie beruht im Grunde auf einer unauflösbaren Antinomie:

»Unter den drei Staatsformen ist die der Demokratie im eigentlichen Verstand des Worts nothwendig ein Despotism, weil sie eine exekutive Gewalt gründet, da alle über und allenfalls auch wider Einen (der also nicht mit einstimmt), mithin Alle, die doch nicht Alle sind, beschließen; welches ein Widerspruch des allgemeinen Willens mit sich selbst und mit der Freiheit ist.« (Kant, I., AA 8:352)

Wie kann man ungeachtet dieser Antinomie von »Alle{n}, die doch nicht Alle sind« einen Universalkonsens herstellen? Eine solche Leistung erfordert eine Art von intellektueller Akrobatik, die nicht jeden überzeugen wird, z.B. die Behauptung »daß der Wille der überstimmten Minderheit in Wahrheit mit dem Willen der Mehrheit identisch ist«, d.h. die überstimmte Minderheit hat sich nur bezüglich des »Inhalt{s} des Generalwillens geirrt«. Letztendlich kann man anhand dieser »Jakobinerlogik {sogar} die Herrschaft der Minderheit über die Mehrheit rechtfertigen und zwar gerade unter Berufung auf die Demokratie.«

Im nachfolgenden Kapitel werden die Defizite des parlamentarischen Systems hervorgehoben: (i) In der Triade von (a) dem Volke, (b) den gewählten Mitgliedern des Parlaments und (c) der Regierung besteht ein strukturelles Mißverhältnis, da (b) jederzeit die theoretische Möglichkeit zusteht (c) absetzen zu können, während (a) von diesem Prozesse ausgeschlossen ist, entsprechend der Feststellung Rousseaus, daß das Volk nur während der Wahl frei sei, wonach die Souveränität des Volkes dem Parlamente preisgegeben werde. (ii) Der Gleichgewichtsgedanke, der für die Gewaltenteilung als konstitutiv-real behauptet wird, ist eher als eine Theodizee, die von einer providentiellen Aufhebung aller Privationen und Kontradiktionen ausgeht, zu verstehen. (iii) Das parlamentarische System ist vergleichbar mit einem Marktplatz des unaufhörlichen Wettbewerbs, der zum Fortbestehen des Gleichgewichts einen wesentlichen Beitrag leisten soll, aber genau dieses Streben nach Balance und die damit verbundene »Ablehnung des Gedankens, daß die Fülle der Staatsgewalt sich an einem Punkte sammeln dürfe, {konstituiert} in der Tat einen {eklatanten} Gegensatz zu der demokratischen Identitätsvorstellung.«

Genau die Konzentration »der Staatsgewalt an einem Punkte« ist Gegenstand des dritten Kapitels: in einem marxistischen Kontext werden die Interessen des Proletariats mit dem Generalwillen schlechthin gleichgesetzt; der Wille des Volkes kommt diktatorisch zur Geltung, wodurch die Kompatibilität von Demokratie und Diktatur manifest wird. Der orthodoxe Marxismus lehnt im Namen der Demokratie den Parlamentarismus ab; der Parlamentarismus stellt eine Scheindemokratie, die nichts mit einem authentischen Volkswillen zu tun hat, dar: »was in den Staaten westeuropäischer Kultur heute an Demokratie herrscht, ist für sie nur ein Betrug der ökonomischen Herrschaft des Kapitals über Presse und Parteien, d.h. der Betrug eines falsch gebildeten Volkswillens«.

Im allerletzten Kapitel beschäftigt sich der Autor mit »irrationalistische{n} Theorien unmittelbarer Gewaltanwendung«; Schlüsselworte in dieser Hinsicht sind Mythus, Dezisionismus und Vitalismus: »Kriegerische, revolutionäre Begeisterung und die Erwartung ungeheurer Katastrophen gehören zur Intensität des Lebens und bewegen die Geschichte. Aber der Schwung muß aus den Massen selbst kommen; Ideologen und Intellektuelle können ihn nicht erfinden. {…} Jede rationalistische Deutung würde die Unmittelbarkeit des Lebens fälschen.« Auch Demokratien, die sich an den angelsächsischen Tradition des Liberalismus festhalten, instrumentalisieren Mythen der Freiheit, heroische Selbstaufopferung, und Gleichberechtigung zwecks sozialer Kohäsion, obwohl diese Mythen aus einer Zeit stammen als ein polemischer Liberalismus der obsoleten feudalen Ordnung gegenüberstand. Unter bestimmten Umständen könnten diese veralteten Mythen von den modernen Demokratien wiederbelebt werden.

Carl Schmitt stellt korrekt fest, »daß die eigentliche {politische} Tätigkeit« in einer liberalen Demokratie »nicht in den öffentlichen Verhandlungen des Plenums, sondern in Ausschüssen und nicht einmal notwendig in parlamentarischen Ausschüssen sich abspielt und wesentliche Entscheidungen in geheimen Sitzungen der Fraktionsführer oder gar in außerparlamentarischen Kommitees fallen, sodaß eine Verschiebung und Aufhebung jeder Verantwortlichkeit eintritt und auf diese Weise das ganze parlamentarische System schließlich nur eine schlechte Fassade vor der Herrschaft von Parteien und wirtschaftlichen Interessenten ist.«

Dieses Werk stellt einen vernichtenden Angriff auf den Parlamentarismus dar und ist somit als eine subversive Leistung par excellence einzustufen.

[Hasan Çakan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Çeviriden mi yoksa yazarın dilinden mi bilemem ama bazı bölümlerde metnin içine bir türlü giremedim. O nedenle de anlamakta güçlük çektim. İleride tekrar okumak gerek.

[Oolalaa · Rating 3 out of 5]

9/20

[Zelai Xu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Charmingly dangerous or dangerously charming?