Truer Liberty: Simone Weil and Marxism

by Lawrence A. Blum, Victor J. Seidler

Shows how Simone Weil developed a penetrating critique of Marxism and a powerful political philosophy which serves as an alternative to liberalism and Marxism.

Genres: Politics, Philosophy

368 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1989

Reviews

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Could do with another editing pass at both line and chapter level, but although I think it could be sharper and less repetitive, this is a very useful book. It tackles many aspects of Weil's philosophy and political thought, not just her relationship to Marx and Marxism, though it does a good job of this, too.

A small but notable weakness of the book is its use of 'feminism' without clarification or analysis. WHAT feminism, WHICH feminists, how does this relate more specifically to Weil, etc? The authors would never dream of saying 'Marxism' without clarifying, indeed they are concerned throughout to relate and compare Weil's thinking to DIFFERENT strands of Marxism and do quite a lot of background to allow the reader to appreciate and contextualise these differences. The references to feminism were especially egregious to me when they were not only in passing but would have led to quite a different take on the aspect of Weil's thought under analysis. The bit that really bothered me was towards the end of Chapter 6, 'Work', where they quote Weil mentioning the 'inarticulate' 'cry of hope' of a 'young girl who is forced into a brothel' and claim that here 'Weil can perhaps be thought of as preparing the ground for a feminist philosophy.' The danger of claiming that some kinds of vulnerable people cannot think or speak for themselves, and the way that this can become a mechanism of control, seems to me an important blind spot in Weil. If the authors had thought about feminist uses of, responses to and critiques of 'sex trafficking', they would have had a chance to see this played out in a way that Weil's basically metaphorical reference does not develop - and the question of which feminist philosophies claim that some people are voiceless, and who is able to speak for them (and how), would be highly relevant.

A similar point could be made for the book's loose and undifferentiated use of 'liberalism', which I think especially becomes a problem in the final chapter.