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The University Center for Human Values Series
چندفرهنگگرایی
A new edition of the highly acclaimed book Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition," this paperback brings together an even wider range of leading philosophers and social scientists to probe the political controversy surrounding multiculturalism. Charles Taylor's initial inquiry, which considers whether the institutions of liberal democratic government make room--or should make room--for recognizing the worth of distinctive cultural traditions, remains the centerpiece of this discussion. It is now joined by Jürgen Habermas's extensive essay on the issues of recognition and the democratic constitutional state and by K. Anthony Appiah's commentary on the tensions between personal and collective identities, such as those shaped by religion, gender, ethnicity, race, and sexuality, and on the dangerous tendency of multicultural politics to gloss over such tensions. These contributions are joined by those of other well-known thinkers, who further relate the demand for recognition to issues of multicultural education, feminism, and cultural separatism.
Praise for the previous edition:
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First published January 1, 1992
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About the author
Charles Margrave Taylor
151 books661 followersLibrarian Note: There is more than one author in the Goodreads database with this name. This profile may contain books from multiple authors of this name.
Other authors with this name:
Charles Taylor
Charles Taylor, Journalist, Film critic
Charles Margrave Taylor CC GOQ FBA FRSC is a Canadian philosopher, and professor emeritus at McGill University. He is best known for his contributions to political philosophy, the philosophy of social science, history of philosophy and intellectual history. This work has earned him the prestigious Kyoto Prize, the Templeton Prize, the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy, and the John W. Kluge Prize, in addition to widespread esteem among philosophers. (Source: Wikipedia)
Other authors with this name:
Charles Taylor
Charles Taylor, Journalist, Film critic
Charles Margrave Taylor CC GOQ FBA FRSC is a Canadian philosopher, and professor emeritus at McGill University. He is best known for his contributions to political philosophy, the philosophy of social science, history of philosophy and intellectual history. This work has earned him the prestigious Kyoto Prize, the Templeton Prize, the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy, and the John W. Kluge Prize, in addition to widespread esteem among philosophers. (Source: Wikipedia)
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January 10, 2025Australia likes to consider itself one of the world’s most successful multicultural societies – but this has been challenged, and not only by how poorly we treat our Aboriginal peoples or the horrors of our asylum seeker policies, but also in the wonderful book – the must read book – White Nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society by Ghassan Hage. This book doesn’t really give a definition of multiculturalism – which, if you think about it, seems a bit odd. All the same, it has lots to say on the topic, not least that it is a fraught concept.
The problem is that we all like to think that we live in a meritocracy – something the author doesn’t really challenge – and that therefore what a multicultural society ought to do is be ‘colour blind’ and treat everyone as essentially equal. From this premise we can then find better grounds to judge people than their colour of their skin or their gender or their sexuality. All of which sounds really nice in theory, but I’m not sure it works very well in practice. He provides a longish discussion on how Québec sought to ensure the continuation of its French traditions and the problems this presented to a very un-French Canada. And this in the context of whether or not special treatment should be set aside for a minority of the population, even if they do want to retain their distinct cultural identity.
He also discusses at length Saul Bellow’s comment (which he may not have ever made) that "When Zulus produce a Tolstoy we will read him." That is, that some cultures simply have not produced works of art that are of the same worth as those of other cultures and that this is somehow objectively the case. He argues against what he calls neo-Nietzschean ideas (of Foucault or Derrida) that say that such judgements are always based on power and arbitrary standards that elevate western culture at the expense of all other cultures. Bellow is wrong in the sense that if we are going to judge the worth of any literature on the basis of whether or not a nation has produced a Tolstoy – then only Russia is going to come out of that looking good. Unless you are then going to compare Tolstoy to Shakespeare or Homer or Proust or Yukio Mishima. Such comparisons quickly become boring and you end up writing books like Harold Bloom.
Look, I have some sympathy with the idea that that is great writing and crap writing, and I do find the absolute subjectivist stance of the neo-Nietzscheans a bit hard to take – all the same, I have virtually zero sympathy with the idea that there is some kind of perfectly fixable hierarchy of literary worth and that all works of art can be placed in order in this schema.
To return to the central argument here – to what extent should a pluralist society viewing itself as a multiculturalism one premised on merit make exceptions for certain cultures? I can’t help thinking this is the wrong question. First of all, merit is too often, as Bourdieu makes clear, related to symbolic violence and what he referred to as the ‘cultural arbitrary’. We see this cultural arbitrary change over time – but it is still used as a means to assert distinction and a kind of loathing for the cultural other. The other problem I have with all of this is that what gets called multiculturalism rarely ends up really being all that multi. That is, too often it is about tolerance for lesser cultures until they do what they can (and they never do enough) to assimilate to the ‘higher’ culture of ours.
This book is based around Taylor’s essay and then a series of responses to it. In one, a gay, black man discusses the issues he has faced in not feeling recognised by society. You know, I don’t know that recognition is nearly enough. My problem is that our societies are essentially power structures that have been normalised to the extent that (again, as Bourdieu would say) the symbolic violence that keeps certain people on the top and others at the bottom are presented as simply a natural working out of social merit. If the only way Zulus will be accepted in our society is when they produce a Tolstoy – then the obligation isn’t on the Zulu, but on us to provide the means for such a writer to be brought to the fore. The whole notion seems ludicrous to me – do you know how many Tolstoys Russia produced? ONE – that’s it. If he had choked on a peanut at five they wouldn’t even have produced that one either. To judge the worth of an entire nation on one person seems equally racist to me as thinking all black people look alike. It reminds me of a cartoon Michael Leunig did after Cathy Friedman won the 400 metres at the Sydney Olympics. It showed two middle aged white people watching the TV and saying, “See, if they put in the effort, they can be just as good as us.”
Whenever I go to a new place I bizarrely seem to end up eating at a Vietnamese restaurant. I can’t tell you why – but during the week I went down to Warrnambool for a few days and on the first night went to a restaurant with the most amusing name – the Pho KN (say it fast). I also did much the same when I went to Hamburg, but only because I was so surprised there was a Vietnamese restaurant there. After I had eaten I bumped into a friend and we walked up and down through the restaurants looking for somewhere where he could get a schnitzel. Amusingly, he couldn’t find one anywhere. Multiculturalism is too often limited to food. But a mixture of cultures is much more interesting than that. We waste such a precious resource when we do not open ourselves to the diversity of life choices in front of us represented in the cultures around us. Not just in the foods we can eat, but in the variety of experiences that can be brought together to tackle the problems all of us face. Assimilation is boring – not just because some people will never be allowed to fully assimilate – but also because same is boring and forcing people to all be the same is not just tragic, but also dull. When I rule the world the Québec situation will never be allowed to happen. This is because I will be providing additional resources to ensure people can find full expression of their cultural traditions. That is, as the name implies, real multiculturalism. I want to learn from Zulus and from Finns and from Aboriginals. Maybe I could do with learning a bit less from Americans – but I certainly wouldn’t ban them in the way I would ban their nuclear submarines. I don’t want ethnic ghettoes and I don’t want a melting pot – I want cultures slamming up against each other and to watch the sparks fly. I want people to be proud of their heritage, but to also experiment with other heritages too. I’m boringly straight, but I’ve laughed and cried with homosexual men and women and my life has been richer for that. Like I said, I think this book is sort of based on the wrong premise – that ultimately, diversity is its own reward and that we should be doing everything in our power to nurture and enhance the diversity of multiculturalism. The other option – the option of assimilation – diminishes all of us.
The problem is that we all like to think that we live in a meritocracy – something the author doesn’t really challenge – and that therefore what a multicultural society ought to do is be ‘colour blind’ and treat everyone as essentially equal. From this premise we can then find better grounds to judge people than their colour of their skin or their gender or their sexuality. All of which sounds really nice in theory, but I’m not sure it works very well in practice. He provides a longish discussion on how Québec sought to ensure the continuation of its French traditions and the problems this presented to a very un-French Canada. And this in the context of whether or not special treatment should be set aside for a minority of the population, even if they do want to retain their distinct cultural identity.
He also discusses at length Saul Bellow’s comment (which he may not have ever made) that "When Zulus produce a Tolstoy we will read him." That is, that some cultures simply have not produced works of art that are of the same worth as those of other cultures and that this is somehow objectively the case. He argues against what he calls neo-Nietzschean ideas (of Foucault or Derrida) that say that such judgements are always based on power and arbitrary standards that elevate western culture at the expense of all other cultures. Bellow is wrong in the sense that if we are going to judge the worth of any literature on the basis of whether or not a nation has produced a Tolstoy – then only Russia is going to come out of that looking good. Unless you are then going to compare Tolstoy to Shakespeare or Homer or Proust or Yukio Mishima. Such comparisons quickly become boring and you end up writing books like Harold Bloom.
Look, I have some sympathy with the idea that that is great writing and crap writing, and I do find the absolute subjectivist stance of the neo-Nietzscheans a bit hard to take – all the same, I have virtually zero sympathy with the idea that there is some kind of perfectly fixable hierarchy of literary worth and that all works of art can be placed in order in this schema.
To return to the central argument here – to what extent should a pluralist society viewing itself as a multiculturalism one premised on merit make exceptions for certain cultures? I can’t help thinking this is the wrong question. First of all, merit is too often, as Bourdieu makes clear, related to symbolic violence and what he referred to as the ‘cultural arbitrary’. We see this cultural arbitrary change over time – but it is still used as a means to assert distinction and a kind of loathing for the cultural other. The other problem I have with all of this is that what gets called multiculturalism rarely ends up really being all that multi. That is, too often it is about tolerance for lesser cultures until they do what they can (and they never do enough) to assimilate to the ‘higher’ culture of ours.
This book is based around Taylor’s essay and then a series of responses to it. In one, a gay, black man discusses the issues he has faced in not feeling recognised by society. You know, I don’t know that recognition is nearly enough. My problem is that our societies are essentially power structures that have been normalised to the extent that (again, as Bourdieu would say) the symbolic violence that keeps certain people on the top and others at the bottom are presented as simply a natural working out of social merit. If the only way Zulus will be accepted in our society is when they produce a Tolstoy – then the obligation isn’t on the Zulu, but on us to provide the means for such a writer to be brought to the fore. The whole notion seems ludicrous to me – do you know how many Tolstoys Russia produced? ONE – that’s it. If he had choked on a peanut at five they wouldn’t even have produced that one either. To judge the worth of an entire nation on one person seems equally racist to me as thinking all black people look alike. It reminds me of a cartoon Michael Leunig did after Cathy Friedman won the 400 metres at the Sydney Olympics. It showed two middle aged white people watching the TV and saying, “See, if they put in the effort, they can be just as good as us.”
Whenever I go to a new place I bizarrely seem to end up eating at a Vietnamese restaurant. I can’t tell you why – but during the week I went down to Warrnambool for a few days and on the first night went to a restaurant with the most amusing name – the Pho KN (say it fast). I also did much the same when I went to Hamburg, but only because I was so surprised there was a Vietnamese restaurant there. After I had eaten I bumped into a friend and we walked up and down through the restaurants looking for somewhere where he could get a schnitzel. Amusingly, he couldn’t find one anywhere. Multiculturalism is too often limited to food. But a mixture of cultures is much more interesting than that. We waste such a precious resource when we do not open ourselves to the diversity of life choices in front of us represented in the cultures around us. Not just in the foods we can eat, but in the variety of experiences that can be brought together to tackle the problems all of us face. Assimilation is boring – not just because some people will never be allowed to fully assimilate – but also because same is boring and forcing people to all be the same is not just tragic, but also dull. When I rule the world the Québec situation will never be allowed to happen. This is because I will be providing additional resources to ensure people can find full expression of their cultural traditions. That is, as the name implies, real multiculturalism. I want to learn from Zulus and from Finns and from Aboriginals. Maybe I could do with learning a bit less from Americans – but I certainly wouldn’t ban them in the way I would ban their nuclear submarines. I don’t want ethnic ghettoes and I don’t want a melting pot – I want cultures slamming up against each other and to watch the sparks fly. I want people to be proud of their heritage, but to also experiment with other heritages too. I’m boringly straight, but I’ve laughed and cried with homosexual men and women and my life has been richer for that. Like I said, I think this book is sort of based on the wrong premise – that ultimately, diversity is its own reward and that we should be doing everything in our power to nurture and enhance the diversity of multiculturalism. The other option – the option of assimilation – diminishes all of us.
April 12, 2014
Taylor provides an interesting discussion on the importance of attempting to recognize difference between cultures instead of simply tolerating difference without seeking to recognize their value. While a culture may seek to be recognized equally in a society in order to decrease discrimination, this demand may in fact be perceived as the act of seeking legitimation from the historically oppressive majority through their preconceived criterion of value. The need to be legitimated by another by their standards may thus be perceived as a continuation of the initial power struggle between the historical oppressor and historically oppressed hence providing no Real value to the oppressed.
This perception draws away from the initial intention of earning real respect rather than being tolerated on the basis of law and simultaneously brings up the question of whether acceptance of cultural value by the majority is the solution to the difficulties of multicultural coexistence.
All in all, I enjoyed his discussion on the topic as he is thorough and presents arguments and counterarguments. Unfortunately, the topic of toleration itself is one that presents a high degree of subjectivity.
This perception draws away from the initial intention of earning real respect rather than being tolerated on the basis of law and simultaneously brings up the question of whether acceptance of cultural value by the majority is the solution to the difficulties of multicultural coexistence.
All in all, I enjoyed his discussion on the topic as he is thorough and presents arguments and counterarguments. Unfortunately, the topic of toleration itself is one that presents a high degree of subjectivity.
January 8, 2019
این کتاب کجای جغرافیای علوم انسانی ایستاده است؟
مفهوم «به رسمیت شناخته شدن»[1] یکی از ده ها مفهومی است که در فلسفه آلمانی شکل گرفته است. ظاهرا نخستین بار توسط فیشته طرح شده و به وضوح توسط هگل در سه دوره بسط یافته است: در نوشته های دوران ینا، در پدیدارشناسی روح و سرانجام در عناصر فلسفه حق
امروزه، این مفهوم، مفهومی کلیدی در فلسفه سیاسی، به ویژه برای فیلسوفان سیاسی هگلی مشرب و به ویژه برای نظریه انتقادی است. شاید هیچ کس به اندازه اکسل هونت، نماینده نسل سوم مکتب فرانکفورت یا نظریه انتقادی این مفهوم را کانون اندیشه های خود نکرده باشد. ولی این مفهوم برای طرفداران «جماعت گرایی»[2] هم بسیار مهم است، زیرا مفهوم هویت برای آنها بسیار کلیدی است و برسمیت شناخته شدن، با مسئله «امکانِ داشتن هویتی اصیل» گره خورده و برای آنها اهمیت یافته است. کتاب حاضر در اصل مباحثه ای میان معروف ترین فیلسوف جماعت گرا (تیلور) و معروف ترین فیلسوف نظریه انتقادی (هابرماس) است
کتاب حاصل گفت و گوهایی پسینی بر سر مقاله مفصل تیلور، با نام «سیاست برسمیت شناختن» است. تیلور فیلسوف هگلی و چهره شاخص جریانی است که آنها را جماعت گرا مینامند. یکی از مهمترین مناقشات این جریان، مخالفت با لیبرالهای کلاسیک است که بهترین حالت دولت سیاسی را دولتی بی اعتنا به تفاوت های فرهنگی میدانند که با هر مفهومی از خوب قابل جمع است و تنها با تحقق حقوق اولیه، خود را تا حد امکان از باقی حوزه ها بیرون میکشد. این نظریه را دوورکین لیبرالیسمِ روندمحور[3] مینامد و رالز لیبرالیسم سیاسی یا دولت بی طرف
جالب اینجاست که فیلسوفان نظریه انتقادی هم منتقد جدی نظریه های لیبرالیستی هستند، اما در زمینه های مختلف با دیگر رقبای لیبرالیسم اختلاف نظر دارند. یکی از آن اختلاف نظرها بر سر همین مفهوم دولت بی طرف است. تیلور در پی آن است تا نشان دهد سیاست لیبرالیستیِ روندمحور برای دغدغه های چندفرهنگی که عبارتند از اصالت فرد در تعیین هویت خود و بقای فرهنگ های اقلیتی کارآمد نیست، اما هابرماس معتقد است آرمان این نوع لیبرالیسم که تحقق حقوق فردی است برای آنچه تیلور انتظار دارد کافی است؛ هرچند نحوه اجرایی شدن آن درست نیست
خلاصه ای گزینشی از کتاب
تیلور در کتاب خود دو نوع سیاست را که در پی برآوردن مطالبه شهروندان مدرن برای به رسمیت شناخته شدن هستند معرفی میکند: یکی سیاست کرامت برابر[4] که جای مفهوم سلسله مراتبی شرافت[5] را گرفته؛ و یکی سیاست تفاوت
هر دوی این نظریات به روسو برمیگردند و هر دو در پی تبیین امری جهان شمول و برابر برای همه شهروندانند. سیاست کرامت برابر میخواهد همه انسان ها را برخوردار از کرامت بداند، چیزی که در نظامهای گذشته نبود. برخی با اعطای لقبب پادشاهی مثل لرد، لیدی، سِر، امین الممالک، سید و خیلی القاب دیگر ارج و قرب اجتماعی می یافتند که باقی شهروندان نسبت به آن درجه دو بودند. سیاست کرامتِ برابر با حذف این مفهومِ اعطا شونده به دنبال برابری همه شهروندان است. اما سیاست تفاوت به دنبال جهان شمولی این است که هر کس متفاوت باشد، اما این تفاوت کماکان آنها را درجه یک یا درجه دو نسازد، بلکه بتوانند هویت خود را به هر نحو که میخواهند بسازند و فشاری بخاطر تفاوتهای فرهنگی روی آنها نباشد. تیلور معتقد است سیاست کرامت برابر که امروزه در کشورهایی مانند امریکا و کانادا سیطره یافته است نه تنها به تفاوت ها بی اعتناست، بلکه به نحوی فشاری «همگون کننده»[6] به اقلیت ها وارد میکند که به تدریج همه آنها را فرهنگ غالب یکسان می سازد. از نظر او سیاست تفاوت است دقیقا در مقابل سیاست کرامت قرار دارد زیرا نه تنها تفاوت ها را به رسمیت می شناسد، بلکه برای ترویج آنها تلاش میکند
سه حاشیه بر مقاله تیلور چاپ شده است که به ترتیب متعلق به سوزان ولف، استیون راکفلر و مایکل والزر (دیگر فیلسوف جماعت گرا) است
سپس نوبت به مقاله مفصل هابرماس میرسد که با تبیین فلسفی نظریه حقوق برابر، به عنوان مشروعیت بخش همه دولت های مبتنی بر قانون اساسی، سعی میکند نشان دهد که تحقق حقوق برابر نه تنها برای برسمیت شناختن تفاوت های فرهنگی کافی است، بلکه هر آنچه بیش از آن اعمال شود، یعنی آنچه تیلور سیاست تفاوت میخواند، منجر به نوعی رواج مداخله در حوزه خصوصی و خودمختاری مردم میشود و به نحوی به سیاست های تبعیض آمیز ختم میشود. از نظر هابرماس، دولت ها در قبال حذف فرهنگ ها هیچ وظیفه ای بیش از آنکه حقوق کلی برابر به افراد بدهند ندارند. فرهنگ ها در جهان مدرن اگر خود را به روز نکنند محکوم به فنا هستند و خود باید برای بقای خود به عرصه عمومی آمده و تلاش کنند
درباره ترجمه
ترجمه متن مشکلات زیادی داشت. به ویژه در زمینه معادل گذاری
گذشته از اینکه برسمیت شناختن و برسمیت شناخته شدن را شناسایی و بازشناسی ترجمه کرده بودند که بدخوانی های زیادی پیش می آورد. خودمختاری خصوصی و عمومی [7] را نیز که با توجه به دو واژه حوزه خصوصی و عمومی هابرماس بسیار آشناست، خودمختاری شخصی و جمعی قرار داده بودند که معنایی کاملا نادرست می رساند. زیرا از نظر هابرماس خودمختاری اساسا جمعی [8] و بیناسوبژکتیو است و به این معنی خودمختاری شخصی اصلا مفهومی نادرست است
این دست اشتباهات متاسفانه در متن کم نبود که دقت ترجمه را بسیار غیرقابل اعتماد کرده بود
توضیحات
[1] recognition
این واژه معانی زیادی درخود دارد: بازشناسی، بجا آوردن، به رسمیت شناختن و به رسمیت شناخته شدن
ولی در این بستر، معنای آن همان دو معنای «به رسمیت شناختن» و «به رسمیت شناخته شدن» است و عجیب است که مترجمین از معادل عجیب شناسایی در بافت فلسفه سیاسی استفاده کرده اند. مثلا وقتی بحث بر سر «مبارزه برای ریکاگنیشن» است، به نظر شما باید آن را مبارزه برای شناسایی نامید یا مبارزه برای برسمیت شناخته شدن؟
[2] Communitarianism
[3] proceduralist liberalism
[4] equal dignity
[5] honor
[6] homogenizing
[7] private and public
[8] collective
مفهوم «به رسمیت شناخته شدن»[1] یکی از ده ها مفهومی است که در فلسفه آلمانی شکل گرفته است. ظاهرا نخستین بار توسط فیشته طرح شده و به وضوح توسط هگل در سه دوره بسط یافته است: در نوشته های دوران ینا، در پدیدارشناسی روح و سرانجام در عناصر فلسفه حق
امروزه، این مفهوم، مفهومی کلیدی در فلسفه سیاسی، به ویژه برای فیلسوفان سیاسی هگلی مشرب و به ویژه برای نظریه انتقادی است. شاید هیچ کس به اندازه اکسل هونت، نماینده نسل سوم مکتب فرانکفورت یا نظریه انتقادی این مفهوم را کانون اندیشه های خود نکرده باشد. ولی این مفهوم برای طرفداران «جماعت گرایی»[2] هم بسیار مهم است، زیرا مفهوم هویت برای آنها بسیار کلیدی است و برسمیت شناخته شدن، با مسئله «امکانِ داشتن هویتی اصیل» گره خورده و برای آنها اهمیت یافته است. کتاب حاضر در اصل مباحثه ای میان معروف ترین فیلسوف جماعت گرا (تیلور) و معروف ترین فیلسوف نظریه انتقادی (هابرماس) است
کتاب حاصل گفت و گوهایی پسینی بر سر مقاله مفصل تیلور، با نام «سیاست برسمیت شناختن» است. تیلور فیلسوف هگلی و چهره شاخص جریانی است که آنها را جماعت گرا مینامند. یکی از مهمترین مناقشات این جریان، مخالفت با لیبرالهای کلاسیک است که بهترین حالت دولت سیاسی را دولتی بی اعتنا به تفاوت های فرهنگی میدانند که با هر مفهومی از خوب قابل جمع است و تنها با تحقق حقوق اولیه، خود را تا حد امکان از باقی حوزه ها بیرون میکشد. این نظریه را دوورکین لیبرالیسمِ روندمحور[3] مینامد و رالز لیبرالیسم سیاسی یا دولت بی طرف
جالب اینجاست که فیلسوفان نظریه انتقادی هم منتقد جدی نظریه های لیبرالیستی هستند، اما در زمینه های مختلف با دیگر رقبای لیبرالیسم اختلاف نظر دارند. یکی از آن اختلاف نظرها بر سر همین مفهوم دولت بی طرف است. تیلور در پی آن است تا نشان دهد سیاست لیبرالیستیِ روندمحور برای دغدغه های چندفرهنگی که عبارتند از اصالت فرد در تعیین هویت خود و بقای فرهنگ های اقلیتی کارآمد نیست، اما هابرماس معتقد است آرمان این نوع لیبرالیسم که تحقق حقوق فردی است برای آنچه تیلور انتظار دارد کافی است؛ هرچند نحوه اجرایی شدن آن درست نیست
خلاصه ای گزینشی از کتاب
تیلور در کتاب خود دو نوع سیاست را که در پی برآوردن مطالبه شهروندان مدرن برای به رسمیت شناخته شدن هستند معرفی میکند: یکی سیاست کرامت برابر[4] که جای مفهوم سلسله مراتبی شرافت[5] را گرفته؛ و یکی سیاست تفاوت
هر دوی این نظریات به روسو برمیگردند و هر دو در پی تبیین امری جهان شمول و برابر برای همه شهروندانند. سیاست کرامت برابر میخواهد همه انسان ها را برخوردار از کرامت بداند، چیزی که در نظامهای گذشته نبود. برخی با اعطای لقبب پادشاهی مثل لرد، لیدی، سِر، امین الممالک، سید و خیلی القاب دیگر ارج و قرب اجتماعی می یافتند که باقی شهروندان نسبت به آن درجه دو بودند. سیاست کرامتِ برابر با حذف این مفهومِ اعطا شونده به دنبال برابری همه شهروندان است. اما سیاست تفاوت به دنبال جهان شمولی این است که هر کس متفاوت باشد، اما این تفاوت کماکان آنها را درجه یک یا درجه دو نسازد، بلکه بتوانند هویت خود را به هر نحو که میخواهند بسازند و فشاری بخاطر تفاوتهای فرهنگی روی آنها نباشد. تیلور معتقد است سیاست کرامت برابر که امروزه در کشورهایی مانند امریکا و کانادا سیطره یافته است نه تنها به تفاوت ها بی اعتناست، بلکه به نحوی فشاری «همگون کننده»[6] به اقلیت ها وارد میکند که به تدریج همه آنها را فرهنگ غالب یکسان می سازد. از نظر او سیاست تفاوت است دقیقا در مقابل سیاست کرامت قرار دارد زیرا نه تنها تفاوت ها را به رسمیت می شناسد، بلکه برای ترویج آنها تلاش میکند
سه حاشیه بر مقاله تیلور چاپ شده است که به ترتیب متعلق به سوزان ولف، استیون راکفلر و مایکل والزر (دیگر فیلسوف جماعت گرا) است
سپس نوبت به مقاله مفصل هابرماس میرسد که با تبیین فلسفی نظریه حقوق برابر، به عنوان مشروعیت بخش همه دولت های مبتنی بر قانون اساسی، سعی میکند نشان دهد که تحقق حقوق برابر نه تنها برای برسمیت شناختن تفاوت های فرهنگی کافی است، بلکه هر آنچه بیش از آن اعمال شود، یعنی آنچه تیلور سیاست تفاوت میخواند، منجر به نوعی رواج مداخله در حوزه خصوصی و خودمختاری مردم میشود و به نحوی به سیاست های تبعیض آمیز ختم میشود. از نظر هابرماس، دولت ها در قبال حذف فرهنگ ها هیچ وظیفه ای بیش از آنکه حقوق کلی برابر به افراد بدهند ندارند. فرهنگ ها در جهان مدرن اگر خود را به روز نکنند محکوم به فنا هستند و خود باید برای بقای خود به عرصه عمومی آمده و تلاش کنند
درباره ترجمه
ترجمه متن مشکلات زیادی داشت. به ویژه در زمینه معادل گذاری
گذشته از اینکه برسمیت شناختن و برسمیت شناخته شدن را شناسایی و بازشناسی ترجمه کرده بودند که بدخوانی های زیادی پیش می آورد. خودمختاری خصوصی و عمومی [7] را نیز که با توجه به دو واژه حوزه خصوصی و عمومی هابرماس بسیار آشناست، خودمختاری شخصی و جمعی قرار داده بودند که معنایی کاملا نادرست می رساند. زیرا از نظر هابرماس خودمختاری اساسا جمعی [8] و بیناسوبژکتیو است و به این معنی خودمختاری شخصی اصلا مفهومی نادرست است
این دست اشتباهات متاسفانه در متن کم نبود که دقت ترجمه را بسیار غیرقابل اعتماد کرده بود
توضیحات
[1] recognition
این واژه معانی زیادی درخود دارد: بازشناسی، بجا آوردن، به رسمیت شناختن و به رسمیت شناخته شدن
ولی در این بستر، معنای آن همان دو معنای «به رسمیت شناختن» و «به رسمیت شناخته شدن» است و عجیب است که مترجمین از معادل عجیب شناسایی در بافت فلسفه سیاسی استفاده کرده اند. مثلا وقتی بحث بر سر «مبارزه برای ریکاگنیشن» است، به نظر شما باید آن را مبارزه برای شناسایی نامید یا مبارزه برای برسمیت شناخته شدن؟
[2] Communitarianism
[3] proceduralist liberalism
[4] equal dignity
[5] honor
[6] homogenizing
[7] private and public
[8] collective
September 1, 2023
Collection of essays trying to understand multiculturalism in liberal societies, especially the tension between recognizing the equality of all citizens, regardless of identity, and recognizing cultural differences. Taylor's essay was the best, great argument in favor of a liberal society that recognizes differences, and the value of all cultural traditions. Habermas's essay was boring, knocking this down to 3 stars.
Quotes
“One realizes the end of life, the good life, each and every day by living with a liberal spirit, showing equal respect to all citizens, preserving an open mind, practicing tolerance, cultivating a sympathetic interest in the needs and struggles of others, imagining new possibilities, protecting basic human rights and freedoms, solving problems with the method of intelligence in a nonviolent atmosphere pervaded by a spirit of cooperation. These are primary among the liberal democratic virtues.”
“People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us—what George Herbert Mead called “significant others. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical.”
“The monological ideal seriously underestimates the place of the dialogical in human life. It wants to confine it as much as possible to the genesis. It forgets how our understanding of the good things in life can be transformed by our enjoying them in common with people we love; how some goods become accessible to us only through such common enjoyment. ”
Quotes
“One realizes the end of life, the good life, each and every day by living with a liberal spirit, showing equal respect to all citizens, preserving an open mind, practicing tolerance, cultivating a sympathetic interest in the needs and struggles of others, imagining new possibilities, protecting basic human rights and freedoms, solving problems with the method of intelligence in a nonviolent atmosphere pervaded by a spirit of cooperation. These are primary among the liberal democratic virtues.”
“People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us—what George Herbert Mead called “significant others. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical.”
“The monological ideal seriously underestimates the place of the dialogical in human life. It wants to confine it as much as possible to the genesis. It forgets how our understanding of the good things in life can be transformed by our enjoying them in common with people we love; how some goods become accessible to us only through such common enjoyment. ”
March 8, 2017
I didn't read what the other authors thought, I only read Charles Taylor's essay which is like 50 pages or so. This essay is still very relevant. I unlike other reviewers will not summarize the text. It wouldn't do it justice, nor do I feel like working for you. My own authenticity just tells you what my opinion was. I will keep working with Taylor's views as I think they are so relevant today, and really help to explain some of the problems we are facing with the rise of the authoritarian right with Trump, La Pen, Brexit, etc . Worth the read.
Want to read
July 31, 2010My other recent buy at B&N. Charles Taylor is my new fascination.
October 20, 2017
مقاله اول و آخر کتاب مباحث بسیار جذابی داشتند.
October 19, 2024
TAYLOR’S “POLITICS OF RECOGNITION” ESSAY, PLUS ESSAYS BY OTHERS
The Preface to this 1994 book states, “This volume was first conceived to mark the inauguration of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. Founded in 1990, the University Center supports teaching, research, and public discussions of fundamental questions concerning moral values that span traditional academic disciplines.”
The book begins with Charles Taylor’s essay, ‘The Politics of Recognition,’ which is followed by comments by three other academics. Then is added an essay by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and another essay by Afro-American Studies professor K. Anthony Appiah.
Taylor begins his essay with the statement, “A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for RECOGNITION. The need, it can be argued, is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics. And the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today’s politics, on behalf of minority or ‘subaltern’ groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of ‘multiculturalism.’” (Pg. 25)
He states, “In order to understand the close connection between identity and recognition, we have to take into account a crucial feature of the human condition that has been reduced almost invisible by the overwhelmingly monological bent of mainstream modern philosophy. This crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally DIALOGICAL character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression… The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical.” (Pg. 32)
He argues, “Reverse discrimination is defended as a temporary measure that will eventually level the playing field and allow the old ‘blind’ rules to come back into force in a way that doesn’t disadvantage anyone. This argument seems cogent enough---wherever its factual basis is sound. But it won’t justify some of the measures now urged on the grounds of difference, the goal of which is not to bring us back to an eventual ‘difference-blind’ social space but, on the contrary, to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it will never be lost?” (Pg. 40)
He observes, “Indisputably… more and more societies today are turning out to be multicultural, in the sense of including more than one cultural community that wants to survive. The rigidities of procedural liberalism may rapidly become impractical in tomorrow’s world.” (Pg. 61)
He concludes his essay with the statement, “There is perhaps after all a moral issue here. We only need a sense of our own limited part in the whole human story to accept the presumption. It is only arrogance, or some analogous moral failing, that can deprive us of this. But what the presumption requires of us is not peremptory and inauthentic judgments of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions. What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many ‘multiculturalists’---as well as their bitter opponents---in its grip.” (Pg. 73)
Habermas concludes his essay by saying, “Today what is at stake in adapting Germany’s political role to new realities, without letting the process of civilizing politics that was underway until 1989 be broken off under the pressure of the economic and social problems of unification, and without sacrificing the normative achievements of a national self-understanding that is no longer based on ethnicity but founded on citizenship.” (Pg. 148)
Appiah points out in his essay, “My being, say, as an African-American among other things, shapes the authentic self that I seek to express. And it is, in part, because I seek to express my self that I seek recognition of an African-American identity. This is the fact that makes problems for Trilling’s opposing self, for recognition as an African-American means social acknowledgement of that collective identity, which requires not just recognizing its existence but actually demonstrating respect for it. If, in understanding myself as an African-American, I see myself as resisting white norms, mainstream American conventions, the racism (and, perhaps, the materialism or the individualism) of ‘white culture,’ why should I at the same time seek recognition from these white others?” (Pg. 153-154)
This is a very insightful book, that will be of great interest to anyone interested in issues of “diversity” and multiculturalism.
The Preface to this 1994 book states, “This volume was first conceived to mark the inauguration of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. Founded in 1990, the University Center supports teaching, research, and public discussions of fundamental questions concerning moral values that span traditional academic disciplines.”
The book begins with Charles Taylor’s essay, ‘The Politics of Recognition,’ which is followed by comments by three other academics. Then is added an essay by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and another essay by Afro-American Studies professor K. Anthony Appiah.
Taylor begins his essay with the statement, “A number of strands in contemporary politics turn on the need, sometimes the demand, for RECOGNITION. The need, it can be argued, is one of the driving forces behind nationalist movements in politics. And the demand comes to the fore in a number of ways in today’s politics, on behalf of minority or ‘subaltern’ groups, in some forms of feminism and in what is today called the politics of ‘multiculturalism.’” (Pg. 25)
He states, “In order to understand the close connection between identity and recognition, we have to take into account a crucial feature of the human condition that has been reduced almost invisible by the overwhelmingly monological bent of mainstream modern philosophy. This crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally DIALOGICAL character. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression… The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical.” (Pg. 32)
He argues, “Reverse discrimination is defended as a temporary measure that will eventually level the playing field and allow the old ‘blind’ rules to come back into force in a way that doesn’t disadvantage anyone. This argument seems cogent enough---wherever its factual basis is sound. But it won’t justify some of the measures now urged on the grounds of difference, the goal of which is not to bring us back to an eventual ‘difference-blind’ social space but, on the contrary, to maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it will never be lost?” (Pg. 40)
He observes, “Indisputably… more and more societies today are turning out to be multicultural, in the sense of including more than one cultural community that wants to survive. The rigidities of procedural liberalism may rapidly become impractical in tomorrow’s world.” (Pg. 61)
He concludes his essay with the statement, “There is perhaps after all a moral issue here. We only need a sense of our own limited part in the whole human story to accept the presumption. It is only arrogance, or some analogous moral failing, that can deprive us of this. But what the presumption requires of us is not peremptory and inauthentic judgments of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions. What it requires above all is an admission that we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident. This would mean breaking with an illusion that still holds many ‘multiculturalists’---as well as their bitter opponents---in its grip.” (Pg. 73)
Habermas concludes his essay by saying, “Today what is at stake in adapting Germany’s political role to new realities, without letting the process of civilizing politics that was underway until 1989 be broken off under the pressure of the economic and social problems of unification, and without sacrificing the normative achievements of a national self-understanding that is no longer based on ethnicity but founded on citizenship.” (Pg. 148)
Appiah points out in his essay, “My being, say, as an African-American among other things, shapes the authentic self that I seek to express. And it is, in part, because I seek to express my self that I seek recognition of an African-American identity. This is the fact that makes problems for Trilling’s opposing self, for recognition as an African-American means social acknowledgement of that collective identity, which requires not just recognizing its existence but actually demonstrating respect for it. If, in understanding myself as an African-American, I see myself as resisting white norms, mainstream American conventions, the racism (and, perhaps, the materialism or the individualism) of ‘white culture,’ why should I at the same time seek recognition from these white others?” (Pg. 153-154)
This is a very insightful book, that will be of great interest to anyone interested in issues of “diversity” and multiculturalism.
August 17, 2025
I read Multiculturalism: Taylor and Habermas in Dialogue in 1998, during my Public Administration coursework. It was recommended by our Chair, Dr. Kashinath Kayal, a man with an uncanny knack for steering students toward books that unsettled and deepened their political imagination. At the time, multiculturalism was a buzzword, often invoked in policy discussions and media debates, but rarely dissected with philosophical precision.
This slim volume, with Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas at its centre, was my initiation into the deeper currents beneath the political rhetoric.
Taylor’s essay, The Politics of Recognition, felt revelatory when I first encountered it. His insistence that recognition is not a luxury but a vital human need reframed questions of culture and identity that had seemed to me—then—a matter of fairness or tolerance.
Taylor argued that misrecognition wounds, that it corrodes the self and, by extension, the fabric of democratic society. For a student of public administration, often trained to think in terms of systems and procedures, Taylor’s language of dignity and identity felt disarmingly intimate. It was a reminder that policy is not just about structures; it is about souls.
At the same time, Habermas’ rejoinder was bracing. Where Taylor leaned into the existential stakes of recognition, Habermas insisted on the constitutional and procedural guardrails that make pluralism workable.
His notion of “communicative rationality” seemed, at first reading, dry compared to Taylor’s passionate moral psychology.
But gradually I came to see its importance. Without a shared framework of justification, how would diverse groups avoid spiralling into fragmentation?
Habermas’ fear—that multiculturalism without universal principles could slide into relativism—rang especially true as I looked at real-world struggles over language, religion, and representation.
Reading these essays side by side was less about choosing a winner than about learning to inhabit a tension. In the classroom discussions that followed, I remember our debates oscillating between Taylor’s politics of difference and Habermas’ faith in procedural universalism.
Dr. Kayal often reminded us that the practical administrator must live in both registers: recognising the dignity of cultural identities while also defending the constitutional order that binds them together. That lesson stayed with me far beyond the seminar room.
Looking back now, the dialogue between Taylor and Habermas seems prophetic. The questions they raised in the 1990s—about identity, recognition, and the boundaries of democratic tolerance—echo even louder today. Taylor anticipated the urgency of cultural affirmation, while Habermas anticipated the dangers of polarisation and the need for shared rational ground. Neither alone is sufficient, but together they sketch the dual task of multicultural democracy: to honour difference without abandoning commonality.
For me, 1998 was the year this realisation took root—that political philosophy is not abstract musing but a compass for navigating plural societies.
Multiculturalism: Taylor and Habermas in Dialogue may not have offered neat solutions, but it offered something more enduring: the clarity to see recognition and procedure not as rivals, but as uneasy partners in the ongoing experiment of democracy.
This slim volume, with Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas at its centre, was my initiation into the deeper currents beneath the political rhetoric.
Taylor’s essay, The Politics of Recognition, felt revelatory when I first encountered it. His insistence that recognition is not a luxury but a vital human need reframed questions of culture and identity that had seemed to me—then—a matter of fairness or tolerance.
Taylor argued that misrecognition wounds, that it corrodes the self and, by extension, the fabric of democratic society. For a student of public administration, often trained to think in terms of systems and procedures, Taylor’s language of dignity and identity felt disarmingly intimate. It was a reminder that policy is not just about structures; it is about souls.
At the same time, Habermas’ rejoinder was bracing. Where Taylor leaned into the existential stakes of recognition, Habermas insisted on the constitutional and procedural guardrails that make pluralism workable.
His notion of “communicative rationality” seemed, at first reading, dry compared to Taylor’s passionate moral psychology.
But gradually I came to see its importance. Without a shared framework of justification, how would diverse groups avoid spiralling into fragmentation?
Habermas’ fear—that multiculturalism without universal principles could slide into relativism—rang especially true as I looked at real-world struggles over language, religion, and representation.
Reading these essays side by side was less about choosing a winner than about learning to inhabit a tension. In the classroom discussions that followed, I remember our debates oscillating between Taylor’s politics of difference and Habermas’ faith in procedural universalism.
Dr. Kayal often reminded us that the practical administrator must live in both registers: recognising the dignity of cultural identities while also defending the constitutional order that binds them together. That lesson stayed with me far beyond the seminar room.
Looking back now, the dialogue between Taylor and Habermas seems prophetic. The questions they raised in the 1990s—about identity, recognition, and the boundaries of democratic tolerance—echo even louder today. Taylor anticipated the urgency of cultural affirmation, while Habermas anticipated the dangers of polarisation and the need for shared rational ground. Neither alone is sufficient, but together they sketch the dual task of multicultural democracy: to honour difference without abandoning commonality.
For me, 1998 was the year this realisation took root—that political philosophy is not abstract musing but a compass for navigating plural societies.
Multiculturalism: Taylor and Habermas in Dialogue may not have offered neat solutions, but it offered something more enduring: the clarity to see recognition and procedure not as rivals, but as uneasy partners in the ongoing experiment of democracy.
December 5, 2021
On the occasion of Princeton founding its multiculturalism center, the university commissioned this book, built up around Charles Taylor’s essay, “The Politics of Recognition.” This primary essay was particularly good, and it drew on (or repeated) much of what I’d read in his book-length treatment of much of the same material (The Ethics of Authenticity). The additional essays provided commentary, amplification, and criticism around Taylor’s statements, and they were also sound (albeit sometimes extraordinarily verbose).
My difficulty with a work like this is that the topic—incorporating and treating fairly all those who identify outside the hegemonic majority in a given democratic society—is that the philosophical/ethical/moral groundwork for substantiating the claims of recognition are rigorously straightforward and legal/political measures seem a relatively simple next step. However, where I am most frustrated in thinking about liberalism and inclusivity and justice/fairness for all is that while legal measures may prompt better practices between people in a democratic society, these same laws don’t necessarily change the hearts and minds of that society’s citizens.
It really all boils down to a willingness to understand and practice the golden rule (“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”), but there are so many aggrieved citizens who do not think that this rule extends to those outside their immediate circle. Using the term “politics” in his essay signals just how much the concept of fair play for all citizens is a muddled affair, how top-down attempts via legal/political means can at best only partly change the hearts and minds of citizens in a democratic society—if, in fact, such legislation doesn’t further prompt the aggrieved into becoming more incensed and contrarian.
My difficulty with a work like this is that the topic—incorporating and treating fairly all those who identify outside the hegemonic majority in a given democratic society—is that the philosophical/ethical/moral groundwork for substantiating the claims of recognition are rigorously straightforward and legal/political measures seem a relatively simple next step. However, where I am most frustrated in thinking about liberalism and inclusivity and justice/fairness for all is that while legal measures may prompt better practices between people in a democratic society, these same laws don’t necessarily change the hearts and minds of that society’s citizens.
It really all boils down to a willingness to understand and practice the golden rule (“do unto others as you would have them do unto you”), but there are so many aggrieved citizens who do not think that this rule extends to those outside their immediate circle. Using the term “politics” in his essay signals just how much the concept of fair play for all citizens is a muddled affair, how top-down attempts via legal/political means can at best only partly change the hearts and minds of citizens in a democratic society—if, in fact, such legislation doesn’t further prompt the aggrieved into becoming more incensed and contrarian.
January 4, 2021
Disclaimer: I've only read Taylor's original essay, and not any of the responses that are apparently found in this book.
I was recommended this book by my old architecture professor, who said that this essay really changed how she saw things concerning representation. I have to say, she was right.
This is a well-written and nuanced look at what it means to develop a "group identity" and how the state should respond (i.e. recognize) it. The material throws many references to Hegel, Kant, and Rousseau, which are all dense in themselves, but if you understand the references, this is a very rich argument. Hegel essentially forms the foundation of most modern critical theory with his "master-slave" theory of domination, so if you still need some backing, perhaps start there (though ironically, I still haven't read Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, but he is referenced in so many other critical theory books that I've gotten the gist of his thought). Hegel's idea of the dialectic is also used to note that the formation of identity is not created from oneself (ex nihilo), but through relationships with other people, which is why holding equal relations is important.
Taylor also makes a compelling argument at the end, which relies less on these references to Hegel, about how we should value every culture, as a starting hypothesis. He avoids falling into the confusing pitfall of cultural subjectivism, thankfully, and I think this final part of the essay leaves much to debate about what it means to genuinely recognize difference in a respectful manner.
This is definitely one of those essays that I will think about for a while. Recommended to anyone who wants to think deeply about the origins of identity politics or what it means to associate with groups in general.
I was recommended this book by my old architecture professor, who said that this essay really changed how she saw things concerning representation. I have to say, she was right.
This is a well-written and nuanced look at what it means to develop a "group identity" and how the state should respond (i.e. recognize) it. The material throws many references to Hegel, Kant, and Rousseau, which are all dense in themselves, but if you understand the references, this is a very rich argument. Hegel essentially forms the foundation of most modern critical theory with his "master-slave" theory of domination, so if you still need some backing, perhaps start there (though ironically, I still haven't read Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, but he is referenced in so many other critical theory books that I've gotten the gist of his thought). Hegel's idea of the dialectic is also used to note that the formation of identity is not created from oneself (ex nihilo), but through relationships with other people, which is why holding equal relations is important.
Taylor also makes a compelling argument at the end, which relies less on these references to Hegel, about how we should value every culture, as a starting hypothesis. He avoids falling into the confusing pitfall of cultural subjectivism, thankfully, and I think this final part of the essay leaves much to debate about what it means to genuinely recognize difference in a respectful manner.
This is definitely one of those essays that I will think about for a while. Recommended to anyone who wants to think deeply about the origins of identity politics or what it means to associate with groups in general.
April 24, 2024
"Este es el poderoso ideal moral que ha llegado hasta nosotros. en él se atribuye importancia moral a un tipo de contacto conmigo mismo, con mi propia naturaleza interna, a la que ve en peligro de perderse debido en parte a las presiones en favor de la conformidad externa, pero también porque al adoptar una actitud instrumental hacia mí mismo es posible que haya perdido la capacidad de escuchar esta voz interna (...) cada una de nuestras voces tiene algo que decir. no sólo no debo moldear mi vida según los requerimientos de la confomidad externa; ni siquiera puedo encontrar el modelo de acuerdo al cual vivir fuera de mí mismo. sólo puedo encontrarlo adentro.
Ser fiel a mí mismo significa ser fiel a mi propia originalidad, que es algo, que sólo yo puedo articular y descubrir. y al articularla, también estoy definiéndome a mí mismo. estoy realizando una potencialidad que es mi propiedad"
Ser fiel a mí mismo significa ser fiel a mi propia originalidad, que es algo, que sólo yo puedo articular y descubrir. y al articularla, también estoy definiéndome a mí mismo. estoy realizando una potencialidad que es mi propiedad"
December 26, 2024
It's hard to remember much about the arguments any of the contributors make after finishing the book. I think that means it did a poor job. Taylor, in particular, gets away without defining any of his terms, so it isn't clear what he's arguing about. Habermas and Appiah do a better job. Because they're responding to something unclear, though, it's hard for them to develop any points in a meaningful way. Instead, they reset the debate in their own ways, which makes the collection disjointed as a whole.
February 17, 2018
Quite surprisingly, for my case, a book of liberal theory that I actually-actually liked. More than liked, I find it amazing. Taylor's essay, which is the centre bone of the book, is an almost perfect rendition of the differences at the base of the human-rights discourse. The essays surrounding it, from the prefaces and introductions by Amy Gutmann to KA Appiah are highly illuminating, and all suggesting some interesting critiques and insights.
March 14, 2021
An interesting treatment of the different ethical and political dimensions of multiculturalism. It offers a for the most part fair treatment of both sides and tries to find the path between what Taylor percieves to be the two ditches in this discussion.
July 7, 2020
A fascinating collection of essays that provide differing perspectives on the issues of multiculturalism, equality and liberty
October 31, 2021
i have read and really the ideas help us to be dignified in the society as i m like minority groups
Want to read
February 17, 2022Chris from Hume
December 15, 2023
hyper intéressant
April 9, 2025
Short volume that does an excellent job taking the difficulties of multiculturalism seriously. Recommend for anyone seeking to understand the subject from a sympathetic but critical perspective
May 24, 2025
Hausarbeitslektüreeee
June 20, 2025
Taylor's essay is fine. Habermas's commentary is a liberal master narrative. Other's commentaries are not that interesting.
December 6, 2021
Planning for a multicultural society? The opinions between Taylor and Habermas draw a path towards this possibility
November 27, 2009
Essay by Charles Taylor, followed by responses by several others. The essay was quite interesting. The responses, not as interesting. Taylor deals with the "politics of recognition," which is about how people get their identity from being recognized as having value. To deny a people this is a great offense. The political paradox is that a liberal democracy sees all as "equal". This has a great homogenizing effect, which tends to (violently) force all into the mold of the majority, which is in power. The uniqueness of a particular minority is not "recognized". But on the other hand, to enforce a political system that recognizes a minority, ensuring their survival in its full value, contradicts the universalizing impulse of the democracy. The latter also can easily be patronizing, thus not only missing the goal of recognizing, but actually is worse in that it actively rejects that which needs to be recognized.
His remedy draws from Gadamer's concept of "merging horizons". (I need to read him - my Pastor, Saji George, claims he is a major influence on his thinking) Taylor's idea is a system in which a minority is approached with the a priori assumption there very well may be something of great value to improve one's own knowledge/values/culture/etc, and to engage on that basis, expecting a merging of horizons. The very value system by which the new culture is evaluated may even be changed. This is sort of in between viewing the culture from the outside (homogenization model) and assigning value on no basis (patronization, no true recognizing).
I had wanted to read Taylor, particularly, his "A Secular Age," but this title was all my library had.
His remedy draws from Gadamer's concept of "merging horizons". (I need to read him - my Pastor, Saji George, claims he is a major influence on his thinking) Taylor's idea is a system in which a minority is approached with the a priori assumption there very well may be something of great value to improve one's own knowledge/values/culture/etc, and to engage on that basis, expecting a merging of horizons. The very value system by which the new culture is evaluated may even be changed. This is sort of in between viewing the culture from the outside (homogenization model) and assigning value on no basis (patronization, no true recognizing).
I had wanted to read Taylor, particularly, his "A Secular Age," but this title was all my library had.
November 2, 2008
yada yada. normally wouldn't touch something like this. left these books on the mudd reserve room shelves a few years ago. however the introductory summary, running through the contributors' arguments, appealed to me: a few of the essays describe problems which i've been worrying about for a long time.
so, um, we're all thrown together, different colors, creeds, degrees of modernization / civilization. and we all seem to be clamoring to have our unique racial or cultural heritages not simply tolerated but embraced, even celebrated in the public square. but by whom, and toward what end? the state, with the idea of making us all get along? proactively by our fellow citizens, for the sake a purer mutual engagement, free of the coercive nudging of the state? who sets such standards and enforces them? and here's the biggie for me: what happens when a cultural tradition violates the ground rules of modern/secular/liberal/western life -- which form of tolerance do we then privilege? muslim women walking through our cities alongside college coeds doing their best to expose themselves, and even moreso paris london berlin etc., in head to toe veils, even the whites of their eyes obscured, come to mind.
anyhoww these things all concern me and are, at least, articulated well by the essays collected in this book. but that's where it ends. this is an academic book for an academic audience and thus it is not in the business of offering practicable solutions to these issues or anything ever in any context.
so, um, we're all thrown together, different colors, creeds, degrees of modernization / civilization. and we all seem to be clamoring to have our unique racial or cultural heritages not simply tolerated but embraced, even celebrated in the public square. but by whom, and toward what end? the state, with the idea of making us all get along? proactively by our fellow citizens, for the sake a purer mutual engagement, free of the coercive nudging of the state? who sets such standards and enforces them? and here's the biggie for me: what happens when a cultural tradition violates the ground rules of modern/secular/liberal/western life -- which form of tolerance do we then privilege? muslim women walking through our cities alongside college coeds doing their best to expose themselves, and even moreso paris london berlin etc., in head to toe veils, even the whites of their eyes obscured, come to mind.
anyhoww these things all concern me and are, at least, articulated well by the essays collected in this book. but that's where it ends. this is an academic book for an academic audience and thus it is not in the business of offering practicable solutions to these issues or anything ever in any context.
December 30, 2008
The book focuses on the demand for recongnition of minorities in a multicultural state. Charles Taylor also refers to the historical origins in modern thought. It's a pleading in favour of otherness, in favour of understanding minorities, in favour of freedom, of education...
The discussion starts with Taylor's text and then all the other essays comment upon his ideas.
I was really amused by Saul Bellow's ethnocentricity: "When Zulus produce a Tolstoy we will read him." (This appears quoted in several essays in the book)
Well, there are many "Zulus" in Canada who produced original works. Maybe they cannot compete with Tolstoy, but everyone brings something NEW. Exclussivistic attitudes ruin the charm of literary enrichment and literary communication. I would say that the solution would be a "willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions" (p. 73).
The book cannot be read in a hurry, but with a pencil in hand, underlining.
I cannot give it 5 stars as I consider it doesn't treat all the aspects risen by multiculturalism, multiculturalism doesn't appear well-defined and we don't have many exemplifications for the ideas found in the book.
However I must admit that for those studying Canada and its policies, this book is a MUST.
The discussion starts with Taylor's text and then all the other essays comment upon his ideas.
I was really amused by Saul Bellow's ethnocentricity: "When Zulus produce a Tolstoy we will read him." (This appears quoted in several essays in the book)
Well, there are many "Zulus" in Canada who produced original works. Maybe they cannot compete with Tolstoy, but everyone brings something NEW. Exclussivistic attitudes ruin the charm of literary enrichment and literary communication. I would say that the solution would be a "willingness to be open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions" (p. 73).
The book cannot be read in a hurry, but with a pencil in hand, underlining.
I cannot give it 5 stars as I consider it doesn't treat all the aspects risen by multiculturalism, multiculturalism doesn't appear well-defined and we don't have many exemplifications for the ideas found in the book.
However I must admit that for those studying Canada and its policies, this book is a MUST.
March 24, 2017
There is absolutely no doubt that Charles Taylor is one of leading scholars in the domain of multiculturalism philosophy. His politics of recognition is a clear attack on some of the Enlightenment values, which have been focusing only in individual rights, while neglecting the character of human activity, which regarding to Taylor is not mono-dialogical , but rather dialogical. According to this point, individuals are always in interaction with some other individuals through a set of signs which can be language, as well as other types of expression. Because of this, not only individuals should enjoy equal rights, cultures can claim the same moral argument of equal recognition.
Taylor continues to criticize the classical liberalism point that asserts that a state must be neutral in cultural matters by adopting a policy of color-blindness. He said that a state can't and shouldn't be neutral, because this policy of color-blindness in one way or another is supporting the cultural majority group by discriminating and harming the cultural minority one. Taylor recommends for a politics of recognition in which cultural minorities can survive. In order for them to survive, we must accommodate diversity by recognizing them as a distinct and equal group in our society.
Taylor continues to criticize the classical liberalism point that asserts that a state must be neutral in cultural matters by adopting a policy of color-blindness. He said that a state can't and shouldn't be neutral, because this policy of color-blindness in one way or another is supporting the cultural majority group by discriminating and harming the cultural minority one. Taylor recommends for a politics of recognition in which cultural minorities can survive. In order for them to survive, we must accommodate diversity by recognizing them as a distinct and equal group in our society.
March 4, 2017
Taylor has displayed some very strong arguments. His main idea that we need to preserve cultures and their identity by acknowledging their worth could have, in my opinion, a very wide application. This was displayed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of 'Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite‑Bourgeoys', where the judges borrowed form Taylor's approach to a different culture in order to give a just, and yet liberal judgement. The American and the European judicial systems would greatly benefit, if they try to incorporate such an approach, especially when it comes to religious questions, as it explores the humanity and the pros and cons of different cultures. If they do, the countries' cultures would inevitable be enriched. Such a stance, one of recognising and evaluating different cultures, is by every means useful in a world, where globalisation is a leading process.
October 10, 2012
I read Charles Taylor’s classic, Multiculturalism and the “Politics of Recognition”, where he straddles the fine balance between universalism and relativism, a good nuanced discussion. Quote:
"There must be something midway between the inauthentic and homogenizing demand for recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric standards, on the other. There are other cultures, and we have to live together more and more, both on a world scale and commingled in each individual society."
"There must be something midway between the inauthentic and homogenizing demand for recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric standards, on the other. There are other cultures, and we have to live together more and more, both on a world scale and commingled in each individual society."
January 10, 2012
Read the Charles Taylor essay 'The Politics of Recognition', as an accompaniment to Mansfield Park. Much preferred the essay, although many of the themes touched in the essay are echoed in the Austen. Not going to go into too much detail as I have just had to write a posting on it and I am written out.
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