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Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State
Since the end of World War II, there have been 181 insurgencies around the world. In fact, most modern warfare occurs in the form of insurgencies, including in such high-profile countries as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. However, in spite of their prevalence, we still know relatively little about how insurgencies function. With more than three dozen violent insurgencies currently taking place today, a deeper understanding of insurgent groups is more important than ever. In Waging Insurgent Warfare, Seth G. Jones offers new insights into the dynamics of insurgent groups. Jones weaves together examples from current events and recent history to identify the factors that contribute to the rise of an insurgency, the key components involved in conducting an insurgency, from selecting an organizational structure to securing aid from an outside source, and the elements that contribute to the end of insurgencies. Through examining the strategies, tactics, and campaigns that insurgents use, as well as how these factors relate to each other on the ground, Jones provides a comprehensive understanding of the ways in which insurgent groups operate. Empirically rich and historically informed, Waging Insurgent Warfare features data on over one hundred factors for every insurgency that has taken place between 1946 and 2015.While the primary emphasis revolves around insurgency, the findings in this book also have important implications for waging counterinsurgent warfare. Bringing together the existing body of knowledge on insurgencies, Jones provides a practical, accessible resource to help understand insurgent warfare. The definitive resource on insurgency, Waging Insurgent Warfare will appeal to anyone with an interest in insurgency, counterinsurgency, or modern war.
346 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 1, 2016
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May 10, 2018
Waging Insurgent Warfare:Lessons from the Vietcong to the Islamic State, by Seth G. Jones, is an interesting examination of insurgent warfare, looking at strategies, organization, tactics, and factors of success and failure. This book looks at statistical information in regards to over a hundred active and concluded post WWII insurgencies to come to its conclusions, and is very well sourced, organized and analyzed. This book is concise and interesting, and accurately posits at certain factors necessary for success in an insurgent campaign.
The book begins by looking at how to start an insurgency. Jones analyzes some of the factors that make starting an insurgency successful. These include factors of economic hardship in a country, racial discrimination, and religious discrimination. Any and all of these factors can exist, but most insurgencies started since the end of WWII have had one of (or more than one) of these three factors involved. These factors make recruiting fighters easier, often attract foreign support and sympathy, and ensure resource extraction from local populations does not become overly onerous. One of the biggest challenges in starting an insurgency is gaining support to ensure the movement can survive long enough. After all, state counterinsurgency forces are often much better equipped, funded and organized. Many successful insurgent commanders, such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, have articulated the importance of the political in an insurgency campaign. Ensuring there is a strong political base for an insurgency allows a movement to exhaust all peaceful options first, and ensures a strong framework for organizing a movement. Many insurgent groups, from the M-19 in Colombia, to the IRA and so on, have had political aims put first, and have successfully gained changes in their respective areas.
The second chapter looks at strategies to be used by an insurgent group. The three analyzed strategies are Guerilla Warfare, Conventional Warfare, and Punishment strategies. Each strategy is useful, and all three are often used in an insurgent war. Guerilla warfare is a useful strategy for fledgling groups that are not yet able to face a state force one on one. This allows for the use of various tactics that minimize insurgent casualties while maximizing those of state actors. It also allows insurgent groups to gain time in organizing themselves internally, raid and gather military equipment, and reach out to international actors who may be sympathetic to there cause. This is the quintessential form of insurgent struggle, and is utilized by groups like the Taliban, the PKK in Turkey, and so on. The second strategy is Conventional warfare. This one is obvious; the insurgent group has enough strength or support to engage state forces face to face. This strategy carries the highest success rate, as conventional warfare often means the government has become weak enough to allow for an insurgent group to challenge there monopoly on violence. It is also easiest to engage in this strategy if the group has some sort of outside support. Examples of conventional strategies include Russian separatists in the Ukraine, the PRC in China, ISIS in Iraq. The final strategy is the Punishment strategy. This strategy focuses on punishing supporters of the government through violence. This can include tactics like assassinations, kidnappings, and mutilations. This strategy is often used by insurgent groups to erode support for the government, by dissuading individuals to vote in elections, or to punish informants, or harry government employees and bureaucrats. Suffice to say, this is the least popular of the three strategies, and often has the largest negative impact on the public perception of a group. It is however, a strategy used frequently in insurgencies, with examples like the Mau Mau in Kenya, who mutilated the corpses of informants, or the IRA, who would kneecap informants and traitors.
The next chapter focuses on tactics. These include assassinations, raids and ambushes, subversion and sabotage, mutilations, kidnappings, and bombings. Assassinations are often used as tools to dissuade support for the government, or to target particular individuals. Campaigns like the IRA in Northern Ireland, or recent Islamic insurgencies have seen the use of targeted assassinations against politicians, police personnel, and so on. Raids and Ambushes are useful tactics to disrupt supply lines, target convoys of soldiers, or quickly grab needed resources and intelligence. These tactics are heavily used by the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example. Sabotage is another tactic often used, and this targets infrastructure used by the government. It can include radar and radio equipment, weapons, infrastructure and so on. These are useful tactics because they are costly to the government, and have minimal casualties. Mutilations is a form of dehumanization often used to strike fear into opponents of the insurgency. This was talked about in the punishment strategy, and suffice to say, is an unpopular tactic. Even so, this has been used by many groups, including the Mau Mau in Kenya, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and so on. Kidnapping tactics are often useful as ways to gain funds. This strategy targets either important or wealthy figures in a society, or foreign tourists or business people as a way to gain quick funds. This strategy has been used by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram and many other groups as a way to secure cash transfers, or as prisoner swaps with the government. Finally, bombings is one of the more frequently used tactics. This is a mixed bag tactic, as it can have a high civilian cost if bombs are placed in public locations, but can also successfully disrupt supply chains, kill or maim soldiers, and make counter insurgency difficult. Bombs are often low tech, hard to detect, and useful as targeted forms of destruction. Jones looks at the lethality of each tactic, and finds bombings and raids to be the two most successful tactics in terms of lethality. Most of these tactics are used in insurgencies world wide.
Jones then examines the need for a solid organizational structure in an insurgent group. This should be obvious, as it is difficult to be successful without good leadership structures. Proper organization is also useful to ensure orders are followed, strategies are working, defectors are dealt with, and supplies and remuneration are provided. Jones looks at case studies for numerous insurgencies, and finds that insurgencies with a high degree of centralization have a high success rate, while groups that are highly decentralized have a very low success rate. This also seems intuitive, as it is easier to manage an insurgency and direct campaigns in a unified fashion if a higher degree of control exists for a central organization. Insurgencies like the PRC in China, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, thee African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde and so on. Centralization does not always mean success, however. Highly centralized insurgent groups have failed before, including the Malayan Communist party, and the FARC in Colombia, to name a few. Even so, centralization of an insurgent group seems to be an important step to ensuring organizational success. Jones notes that this can be done either by building a strong political arm, or by eliminating or removing rivals from the groups.
Jones then examines the use of propaganda and advertisement in insurgencies. Much has been written of in modern times about the uses of social media as an important tool for insurgents. Jones however, finds the data to suggest that social media improves the success of an insurgency is unclear. Groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda frequently use social media to communicate aims, telegraph attacks, warn detractors and attract new followers. However, there are downsides to heavy social media use. Accessing the internet and using mobile devices increases the likelihood of counter insurgent detection and identification. This allows for targeted assassination attempts against those mentioned in social media campaigns, or against sites used to generate content.
Jones also looks at the importance of outside support in insurgencies. Jones finds that a groups chance of success is greatest if it has support from a great power. Most successful insurgencies in the world had the backing of either the US, or the Soviet Union or another great power in the post WWII world. Examples include the Viet Cong (China/Russian support), Anti-Qaddafi insurgents (US/NATO support), Russian backed separatists (Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia). Most failed insurgencies were not able to garner support. Examples include Greek communists in 1949, and insurgencies in Burundi, Central African Republic, and Tanzania.
Jones concludes with an examination of successful insurgencies and what they have in common. The author finds that most successful insurgencies have three common characteristics: centralization of their organizational structure, support from a foreign power, and in between 2-4 other insurgent groups in the same conflict. Factors that diminish success seem to be support for the government from a foreign power, secessionist aims, and the use of punishment strategies throughout the campaign. The factors of success show that foreign support is a must, as well as a highly centralized organizational structure. Having numerous groups operating in the same campaign seems an odd factor of success, but Jones shows that this means a government is increasingly weak, and allows rebel groups to coordinate attacks and efforts. Factors of failure show that foreign support for a government is often catastrophic for an insurgent group. Secessionist aims also seem to be unpopular internationally, and a majority of secessionist insurgencies have failed. Finally, the use of punishment strategies against local populations leads to failure, as it is highly unpopular with local populations and usually hurts a groups chances of success.
Suffice to say, Jones has written an interesting and comprehensive book on insurgent warfare. This book looks at insurgencies from an insurgents eyes, and focuses solely on factors important and useful to insurgent groups. This makes it a good read both for those interested in military strategy, and as a counterinsurgency tool, as it allows for examination and targeting of a groups success. It is also obviously useful for insurgents looking to examine factors of success and failure when organizing or initiating an insurgent campaign. Or, like me, it is just a very interesting and well sourced and analyzed study of insurgent conflicts and there various components, for those interested in military and political theory and history.
The book begins by looking at how to start an insurgency. Jones analyzes some of the factors that make starting an insurgency successful. These include factors of economic hardship in a country, racial discrimination, and religious discrimination. Any and all of these factors can exist, but most insurgencies started since the end of WWII have had one of (or more than one) of these three factors involved. These factors make recruiting fighters easier, often attract foreign support and sympathy, and ensure resource extraction from local populations does not become overly onerous. One of the biggest challenges in starting an insurgency is gaining support to ensure the movement can survive long enough. After all, state counterinsurgency forces are often much better equipped, funded and organized. Many successful insurgent commanders, such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara, have articulated the importance of the political in an insurgency campaign. Ensuring there is a strong political base for an insurgency allows a movement to exhaust all peaceful options first, and ensures a strong framework for organizing a movement. Many insurgent groups, from the M-19 in Colombia, to the IRA and so on, have had political aims put first, and have successfully gained changes in their respective areas.
The second chapter looks at strategies to be used by an insurgent group. The three analyzed strategies are Guerilla Warfare, Conventional Warfare, and Punishment strategies. Each strategy is useful, and all three are often used in an insurgent war. Guerilla warfare is a useful strategy for fledgling groups that are not yet able to face a state force one on one. This allows for the use of various tactics that minimize insurgent casualties while maximizing those of state actors. It also allows insurgent groups to gain time in organizing themselves internally, raid and gather military equipment, and reach out to international actors who may be sympathetic to there cause. This is the quintessential form of insurgent struggle, and is utilized by groups like the Taliban, the PKK in Turkey, and so on. The second strategy is Conventional warfare. This one is obvious; the insurgent group has enough strength or support to engage state forces face to face. This strategy carries the highest success rate, as conventional warfare often means the government has become weak enough to allow for an insurgent group to challenge there monopoly on violence. It is also easiest to engage in this strategy if the group has some sort of outside support. Examples of conventional strategies include Russian separatists in the Ukraine, the PRC in China, ISIS in Iraq. The final strategy is the Punishment strategy. This strategy focuses on punishing supporters of the government through violence. This can include tactics like assassinations, kidnappings, and mutilations. This strategy is often used by insurgent groups to erode support for the government, by dissuading individuals to vote in elections, or to punish informants, or harry government employees and bureaucrats. Suffice to say, this is the least popular of the three strategies, and often has the largest negative impact on the public perception of a group. It is however, a strategy used frequently in insurgencies, with examples like the Mau Mau in Kenya, who mutilated the corpses of informants, or the IRA, who would kneecap informants and traitors.
The next chapter focuses on tactics. These include assassinations, raids and ambushes, subversion and sabotage, mutilations, kidnappings, and bombings. Assassinations are often used as tools to dissuade support for the government, or to target particular individuals. Campaigns like the IRA in Northern Ireland, or recent Islamic insurgencies have seen the use of targeted assassinations against politicians, police personnel, and so on. Raids and Ambushes are useful tactics to disrupt supply lines, target convoys of soldiers, or quickly grab needed resources and intelligence. These tactics are heavily used by the Taliban in Afghanistan, for example. Sabotage is another tactic often used, and this targets infrastructure used by the government. It can include radar and radio equipment, weapons, infrastructure and so on. These are useful tactics because they are costly to the government, and have minimal casualties. Mutilations is a form of dehumanization often used to strike fear into opponents of the insurgency. This was talked about in the punishment strategy, and suffice to say, is an unpopular tactic. Even so, this has been used by many groups, including the Mau Mau in Kenya, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and so on. Kidnapping tactics are often useful as ways to gain funds. This strategy targets either important or wealthy figures in a society, or foreign tourists or business people as a way to gain quick funds. This strategy has been used by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram and many other groups as a way to secure cash transfers, or as prisoner swaps with the government. Finally, bombings is one of the more frequently used tactics. This is a mixed bag tactic, as it can have a high civilian cost if bombs are placed in public locations, but can also successfully disrupt supply chains, kill or maim soldiers, and make counter insurgency difficult. Bombs are often low tech, hard to detect, and useful as targeted forms of destruction. Jones looks at the lethality of each tactic, and finds bombings and raids to be the two most successful tactics in terms of lethality. Most of these tactics are used in insurgencies world wide.
Jones then examines the need for a solid organizational structure in an insurgent group. This should be obvious, as it is difficult to be successful without good leadership structures. Proper organization is also useful to ensure orders are followed, strategies are working, defectors are dealt with, and supplies and remuneration are provided. Jones looks at case studies for numerous insurgencies, and finds that insurgencies with a high degree of centralization have a high success rate, while groups that are highly decentralized have a very low success rate. This also seems intuitive, as it is easier to manage an insurgency and direct campaigns in a unified fashion if a higher degree of control exists for a central organization. Insurgencies like the PRC in China, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, thee African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) in Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde and so on. Centralization does not always mean success, however. Highly centralized insurgent groups have failed before, including the Malayan Communist party, and the FARC in Colombia, to name a few. Even so, centralization of an insurgent group seems to be an important step to ensuring organizational success. Jones notes that this can be done either by building a strong political arm, or by eliminating or removing rivals from the groups.
Jones then examines the use of propaganda and advertisement in insurgencies. Much has been written of in modern times about the uses of social media as an important tool for insurgents. Jones however, finds the data to suggest that social media improves the success of an insurgency is unclear. Groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda frequently use social media to communicate aims, telegraph attacks, warn detractors and attract new followers. However, there are downsides to heavy social media use. Accessing the internet and using mobile devices increases the likelihood of counter insurgent detection and identification. This allows for targeted assassination attempts against those mentioned in social media campaigns, or against sites used to generate content.
Jones also looks at the importance of outside support in insurgencies. Jones finds that a groups chance of success is greatest if it has support from a great power. Most successful insurgencies in the world had the backing of either the US, or the Soviet Union or another great power in the post WWII world. Examples include the Viet Cong (China/Russian support), Anti-Qaddafi insurgents (US/NATO support), Russian backed separatists (Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia). Most failed insurgencies were not able to garner support. Examples include Greek communists in 1949, and insurgencies in Burundi, Central African Republic, and Tanzania.
Jones concludes with an examination of successful insurgencies and what they have in common. The author finds that most successful insurgencies have three common characteristics: centralization of their organizational structure, support from a foreign power, and in between 2-4 other insurgent groups in the same conflict. Factors that diminish success seem to be support for the government from a foreign power, secessionist aims, and the use of punishment strategies throughout the campaign. The factors of success show that foreign support is a must, as well as a highly centralized organizational structure. Having numerous groups operating in the same campaign seems an odd factor of success, but Jones shows that this means a government is increasingly weak, and allows rebel groups to coordinate attacks and efforts. Factors of failure show that foreign support for a government is often catastrophic for an insurgent group. Secessionist aims also seem to be unpopular internationally, and a majority of secessionist insurgencies have failed. Finally, the use of punishment strategies against local populations leads to failure, as it is highly unpopular with local populations and usually hurts a groups chances of success.
Suffice to say, Jones has written an interesting and comprehensive book on insurgent warfare. This book looks at insurgencies from an insurgents eyes, and focuses solely on factors important and useful to insurgent groups. This makes it a good read both for those interested in military strategy, and as a counterinsurgency tool, as it allows for examination and targeting of a groups success. It is also obviously useful for insurgents looking to examine factors of success and failure when organizing or initiating an insurgent campaign. Or, like me, it is just a very interesting and well sourced and analyzed study of insurgent conflicts and there various components, for those interested in military and political theory and history.
November 28, 2019
As a practitioner of COIN, it was nice to see such a comprehensive presentation from the insurgent perspective. Definitely what you want if you are going in to this situation as a counter-insurgent. I found nothing spectacularly new, however Mr. Jones clarified some information that may have been previously emerging and confirmed what we were looking at in terms of insurgencies and insurgents' actions within them. Certainly a volume you want to add to your library if are involved and want to ensure we don't lose the lessons learned before we gave up on COIN. The author made it look simple and pretty readable as well. Love the data upon which everything is based.
January 21, 2019
While the author clearly knew his material quite well, the writing was dry and clunky. It often felt that the author did not trust the audience to remember things the book had been over several times, and the authour would often use the same piece of source material to explain multiple different things. Overall, an interesting concept, but poorly written.
July 10, 2025
An important and comprehensive primer on the subject. However, was incredibly repetitive at times. As I read this for a class, I found other materials on the subject to provide greater specificity and clarity for certain chapters. However, this book provides a very thorough overview without much by way of opinion or sentimentality. Importantly, it provides such a view not only for the COIN perspective but also from the eyes of insurgents themselves, which many sources lack.
September 15, 2025
This book concentrates on the details of insurgencies. It is an excellent general book for those who wish to know how insurgencies start, who the participants are, and how to combat them.
November 18, 2023
Very thorough knowledge of COIN, yet just a bit boring to read with a lot of repeating.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews