The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics

by David Goodhart

Many Remainers reported waking up the day after the Brexit vote feeling as if they were living in a foreign country. In fact, they were merely experiencing the same feeling that many British people have felt every day for years.

Fifty years ago, people in leafy North London and people in working-class Northern towns could vote for a Labour party that broadly encompassed all of their interests. Today their priorities are poles apart.

In this groundbreaking and timely book, Goodhart shows us how people have come to be divided into two camps: the 'Anywheres', who have 'achieved' identities, derived from their careers and education, and 'Somewheres', who get their identity from a sense of place and from the people around them, and who feel a sense of loss due to mass immigration and rapid social change.

In a world increasingly divided by Brexit and Trump, Goodhart shows how Anywheres must come to understand and respect Somewhere values to stand a fighting chance against the rise of populism.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, Economics, Society, Sociology, History, Business

256 pages, Hardcover

First published June 12, 2017

Reviews

[Jennie · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was for me. I don't know if it's for you, too, because I don't know you. But, if you are someone who has a university education and has moved away from home I suspect it's for you, too. And it's probably going to be challenging and uncomfortable because it was for me. Challenging in a good way; stick with me here.

David Goodhart makes a cultural/political distinction that I'd never read before, but immediately knew to be true. Somewheres: people rooted to a community who like having an identity and Anywheres: people who have moved, continue to move and see themselves as more of a citizen of the world. I'm firmly an Anywhere. I moved 16 times in 16 years, many of those across regions (for my international friends that's 500+ miles. Wait, for my international friends that's 800+ km ). Aaaannnd... that aside right there is a pretty good indication of my Anywhere orientation.

This book was an eye opener for me in many ways. Firstly, Goodhart is from the UK so his focus is on Brexit and UK policies (although he does use Trump's election as secondary point). Secondly, I had no idea that I was in the minority. There's a good reason that I didn't know that - politics in the past several decades (ie most of my life) has been dominated by Anywheres.

Anywhere priorities have at least dominated the UK and I suspect they've been pretty rampant in the US as well because I've always heard the narrative that Somewhere priorities will die out with the Baby Boomers. Turns out, not so much. About 25% of the population are Anywheres and 50% are Somewheres with the remainder being somewhere in between. I NEVER would have guessed that split. I also wouldn't have guessed that the Anywhere/Somewhere split divides across income and political lines. Turns out lots of people REALLY hate change and REALLY like having an identity. I suppose I should have known this, but, well, I didn't realize I was so far in the minority. And that's got to be a problem, right? That a minority can so dominate things that they don't even know they are the minority???

Obviously, yes, that is a problem and Goodhart poses that both Brexit and Trump are the majority telling us it is. Somewheres value 2 parent families (which TBH I learned a whole lot about the UK welfare and tax system because of) and they value strong communities and they value priority for citizens before immigrants. In fact, they put a priority on stronger immigration controls and less immigration in general. I don't have any complaints about strong communities, but truthfully I can't say I spend a lot of time thinking about them, either. One of the smart suggestions that Goodhart makes is the government not giving any monies to cultural centers/groups that focus on one type of person (ie Jewish, Cambodian, etc.) unless they are applying with another group (ie the Jewish Center AND the Cambodian Center). Seems like a reasonable suggestion to even my very Anywhere self. He further suggests that research shows that stressing similarities rather than differences builds bridges across groups. I thought we knew that. But, I suppose that we don't always do a great job of bringing communities together for a common goal and I can't find anything to object to there either. So, ok, that's two I'm on board with.

The UK and the US have really different histories, policies and practices when it comes to immigration. So, much of the specific suggestions he makes about UK/EU policies don't carry over to the US. And his suggestion that they employ a national ID would probably rub a lot of people in the US (on both the left and right) wrong for about a million reasons. The US already doesn't provide benefits to non-citizens (mostly with few exceptions) and clearly doesn't have the EU migration that the UK does. BUT we DO have a lot of immigration and we certainly have a lot of argument about that. Agriculture in the US particularly is effected by immigration as evidenced by lower migration from Mexico into CA and an increase in food prices because American's aren't willing to take the agriculture jobs. (This could be it's own book and I'm sure it is...) In any case, it's a very different situation even if there are very similar viewpoints on both sides of the pond.

But where this book really challenged me is on gender roles and family life. I'm 100% an elite anywhere feminist. I never wanted kids; I've always been focused on having a career. And even though I ended up with stepkids, I wasn't around when they were little and never had to deal with kids who weren't in school. What surprised me was a large majority of women report that they don't want to work full time while their kids are young and that having a family matters more than having a career (especially for working class women). I do not know these women. At all. Even my friends who have kids and wanted families also wanted fulfilling jobs. If you had held a gun to my head I would never in a million years have guessed that a majority of women don't want to work when their kids are young and don't prioritize career. I also didn't know that the UK's tax code was so unfriendly to couples and stay at home parents. The same can't be said for the US- I got HUGE tax breaks when I married a man with kids. And I've watched a lot of clients with kids get more in tax refunds than they made in a year. (Which is a rant that horrifies my lefty friends and amuses my conservative ones) I find it personally abhorrent to subsidize having children. Yes, I know I'm going to get hate mail for that comment. I understand the need to provide access to affordable health care, child care and housing. But in my heart I loathe tax breaks for kids (I'd be happy to give ours up, too). That's my very 60s 2nd wave feminism coming through. Hey, we all have our unpopular and ungenerous viewpoints. That one is mine.

In any case, this book was a slap across my face to think about how I see the world and remember that other viewpoints are equally valid and have good things that the world can benefit from. And it was a check on my privilege to remember that not everyone has had the opportunities I have nor does everyone have their philosophy spouted back to them by politics and the media. We need to focus more on similarities than differences and find ways to build bridges so that not just the "best and brightest" have the opportunity to have happy, fulfilled lives.

[Somethingsnotright · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really like this book. Many people don't. Some strongly, nay, violently disagree with it, but hear me out...

The basic premise is that populist politics has challenged the traditional Left / Right divide and highlighted another divide between groups dubbed by the author as "Anywheres" and "Somewheres". Anywheres are in the minority but (irrespective of political persuasion) have been in the power position and, therefore, most influential recently in moulding and shaping society. Enter Brexit...

"In the aftermath of the Brexit vote there was a long wail of dismay at how Britain had broken into two nations. Those who voted Leave were said to be Britain's losers: the left behind, the white working class of the Midlands and the North, supplemented by older people from everywhere and Tory southerners. Their experiences and worldviews diverged radically from the core Remain voters, who were winners: optimistic, young, educated and middle class, living in the big metropolitan centres and university towns... fundamental truths are often to be found in first reactions, and the Brexit vote did reveal a central divide in British society."

The author identifies as an Anywhere but reports being "often taken aback at the lack of awareness" of his tribe. He relates stories of academics, NGO's and goverment officials talking about mass migration flows as if they were "generals moving troops around a battlefield" while "blithely ignoring there is such a thing as society", with successful societies being based on "cooperation, familiarity and trust and on bonds of language, history and culture".

Somewheres believe migration inflow levels must be managed in such a way that allows immigrants to be "absorbed into that hard-to-define thing we call a 'national culture' or 'way of life'." The multiculturalism experiment has failed, politicians and policy makers have admitted. Somewheres have seen the fabric of their society altered irrevocably and now feel like foreigners in their own towns. Somewheres weren't even necessarily born in that town or the UK. But, they chose to move there because the way of life attracted them and now they see it unravelling. Do not tell them diversity is strength. They want their way of life back.

Anywheres don't mind. They live in affluent neighbourhoods out of the reach of the majority of immigrants who cannot afford to live there. They live on large plots of land with 3 mile driveways (J.K. Rowling) and cry "racism" when low income Somewheres from Luton complains that they are the minority in their own town. Anywheres probably don't live in Luton. But they can just as easily live in London or Dubai or Sydney or Paris. Their affluence and education shield them.

There is a TV debate worth watching in which Russian / British comedian Konstantin Kisin defends John Cleese's complaint that London is no longer English. Konstantin tries to remove "race" (read: accusations of racism) from the argument by asking whether the hosts would concede London was less English if more than half the population was Scottish. Of course it would, they said. He asked, then what is the difference? That is the point. John Cleese is lamenting the loss of "Englishness" not the racial mix.

Imagine you live in a house with your family. You like to run your house in a certain way. Not a superior way, just "your" way. There is enough space for your family. A spare bedroom that you like having spare. One day, someone knocks on your door, a government official who lives on a country estate miles away, and says, "Erm, well this is awkward but we need your spare room, and use of your kitchen and bathroom for some people who have nowhere to go." You say, "But, I like my spare room and kitchen and bathroom, and this is my house. It was my parents' house before me. And, hang on, I recognise you. Don't you live in a 7 bedroom manor house in Kent? Can't they live with you?" The official clears his throat and looks at his shoes. " Listen old chap - don't be silly. I'm not really asking. I'm telling." "Ah, fair enough, you say." He pats you on the head, somewhat condescendingly you think. 


He continues, "Now, here's the other thing - they don't speak any English and there are 10 of them". "Oh, hold on," you object, "It is only a box room..." The official laughs. "A tad awkward, I know, but I am sure you will work it out amongst yourselves. Oh! I almost forgot - you are not to ask anything of them in terms of house rules or any of that nonsense. Live and let live and all that. However, you must absolutely respect their rules and make them feel at home. Racism and bigotry are, you understand, not the British way. And punishable by law." "Of course," you say, nodding solemnly. The official goes on. "A little thing: they come from a place where books and cats are forbidden so... oh bother, I see you have both. Don't worry old chap, we'll arrange to remove those so as not to cause offence to our valued newcomers"  "Hold on... ", you splutter as you begin to see this is not going to be entirely straightforward. The official waves away your objections. "No, no. Thank me later. You will really enjoy this. I promise! I am doing it for your own good, you know. Diversity is our strength. Well, your strength. Couldn't help but notice you were getting a bit stuck in your ways and could use a shake up. Some different food and, things." "But I like my food... fish and chips on Fridays, a Chinese on the weekend..." A van pulls up outside your house. "Oh look - here's the movers now chap. If you have any problems, do speak to your local member. Here's his card. I must warn you, he doesn't like books or cats either but I am sure he'll sympathise as long as you avoid mentioning books and cats. Don't want to cause offence. Cheerio!"


This is the Somewhere experience (lacking the appropriate level of gravitas, I know, but you see what I'm getting at). But...Somewheres are in the majority, remember? This homeowner undoubtedly voted Brexit and was shocked to realise it when they won. So why do Remainers seem to have all the power? He could have said "no" to the "Enforced Voluntary Diversity Welcoming Committee", surely? Not really. But, populism is getting a foothold, not just in the UK, but across Europe. The voices of the bottom half of the income spectrum are getting louder.


Anywheres are shattered about Brexit. You can understand why. The "new Left" have minimised issues such as pay, jobs, public services, community and public housing, in favour of diversity and minority rights for so long. What will they do after Brexit? London is touted as a shining example of tolerant multiculturalism but this is a myth - firstly, because "the painful truth is fences are being raised everywhere in London". While London's rich are increasingly ethnically mixed (foreign money from Arabs, Russians, Chinese etc), many Londoners are moving into "parallel, monocultural communities". Secondly, London is seen as progressive compared to communities up North, for example. This is also a myth. There may be less open hostility to immigrants but 60% of Londoners think immigration is too high (compared to 75% for the whole country). The author writes that the biggest reason London gets away with telling half-truths about immigration is that "the London ideology largely overlaps with, and indeed contributes to, the wider Anywhere ideology of progressive individualism... " It ignores the other victims of unmanaged mass migration and the "bleak netherworld" of the immigrants who suffer overcrowding and exploitation. London can only get worse, but not for the affluent.

In closing, the author remains positive. He takes the "it takes three swings of the pendulum" approach, whereby he believes the "holy grail of politics for the next generation must be the quest for a new, more stable settlement between Anywheres and Somewheres."

Are you an Anywhere or a Somewhere? 

[Rosalind · Rating 2 out of 5]

"Man is a political animal," said Aristotle, by which he meant that humans like to live in communities. It's the kind of communities that people like to live in that has come under scrutiny in the wake of Brexit. Do they want to stay together in kin groups? Or do they prefer to cluster with others, wherever they may come from, who share their outlook. Since the 2016 referendum the country has divided into sharply divided camps.

David Goodhart sees British society – perhaps one should say English society as he does little more than pay lip service to Scotland – as split between Somewheres – those people in rural areas and smaller provincial and post-industrial towns whose loyalty is to a geographical location and kinship links, and Anywheres – those whose horizons have been expanded by education, travel and global communications. It's the Anywheres, according to Goodhart, that form the elite, run the government whichever party is in power, control the media, set the agenda, and embrace a broader world where borders count for little more than a hindrance to global understanding and cooperation. The Somewheres are the "left behind", those who have stood quietly by as the world changed around them and the old certainties were knocked from under their feet and have now risen up to say enough is enought.

Goodhart seems to approve of the Somewheres. He sees them as standard-bearers for that bygone golden age (which may never have happened) when everybody looked out for everybody else, who were probably relatives anyway, where you learned to read and write and add up and then went into the local factory or down the local pit where you stayed, working your way up the ladder until (if you were lucky) you got your gold watch and a long-service certificate to put on the wall, and you only ventured to the the next town to find a nice girl to marry (you couldn't run the risk of incest after all. There's more than a whiff of the Noble Savage about his account; the author himself is not from such a background, he's the Eton-educated some of Philip Goodhart, the American-educated long-time Conservative MP for Beckenham and a thoroughly Establishment figure; a classic Anywhere in his own terms. Nevertheless he makes it clear in many subtle and not-so-subtle ways that he sees the Anywheres as shallow and self-centred.

I do recognise the Somewheres he describes. It may be that my father was an Anywhere before his time; a bright working-class man who couldn't wait to get away from his stifling family, of which he was the black sheep, and his isolated, inward-looking shipyard town – one of the most heavily Brexit-voting in the country as it happens. His family never forgave him for surviving the war in a reserved occupation while his elder brother got himself killed in Burma. Maybe I was born to be an Anywhere; my grandparents were always elderly people who lived a long way away. My Nanna, my mother's mother, used the occasional visits to repeat the curtain-twitching gossip of the street, not least the dubious doings of Mrs Kennedy and Mrs Dunphy who would always be outsiders in that milieu. Nanna didn't like Catholics, or Irish people, or "darkies" – if my sister and I weren't well-behaved our Mam would run of with a Black Man! Somewheres are Ena Sharples tearing Elsie Tanner off a strip for being no better that she ought to be; they are the community enforcers who ensure that those who step beyond the narrow boundaries of decent social behaviour; they are the ones who accuse those who are bookish (as I was) of being hoity-toity and above themselves. Above all they are people who need an "other" to hate. Goodhart picks up on this – after all, what's the point of circling the wagons if there's nobody to circle them against. There are a diminishing number who have clear memories of the war but Somewheres were brought up on that story: myth and reality alike. Britain stood alone against the Hun when all others had caved in, and Britain prevailed. So why have their leaders being cosying up to the German enemy for the last 45 years? It's no accident that in the digital forums where the more extreme Somewheres hang out, the EU is referred to as the "Fourth Reich".

It's not that Goodhart doesn't have a point. He does; the analysis of the Somewhere/Anywhere spilt is fair enough. It exists and its right at the core of our country's problems right now, and Goodhart describes it effectively. The weakness of the book is where he takes it, Firmly adopting a somewhere stance and drawing largely on the reports of right-wing commentators without making much effort to find a balancing view, he blames the ills of society on everything that he sees as going wrong since the 1960s – divorce and abortion reform and the Pill encouraging sexual freedom and taking women out of the home into the workplace, for example. Opening up higher education so encouraging young people to move away from their roots. Above all, letting the dreaded "other" into the country and not showing clear favouritism towards the white folks in jobs, services and the allocation of housing. He never says as much but the pull-up-the-drawbridge, isolationist mentality is between the lines of every page, and it looks like political expediency rather than serious analysis.

[na · Rating 3 out of 5]

A slightly miserly three stars. I enjoyed this book but not without criticism. Post-Brexit in the UK, and Trump’s election victory in the US, we hand-wringing liberals have been sent into a whirlwind of questioning despair: how could this have happened?

Goodhart capitalises on this and fleshes out what are, by now, well-worn tropes. The “liberal metropolitan elite” has lost touch with those who feel left behind by a rapidly changing country (the UK or US) that they no longer recognise as their own. (The problem is that liberal self-flagellation and right-wing smugness on this point has got to a point where “the elite” is now anyone who has ever read a book and Jacob Rees-Mogg is a populist man of the people... we live in strange times but I digress).

Goodhart’s central premise is that people can be split into three distinct camps. The Anywheres who amount to 25% of the population - a university educated, socially liberal, mobile group who embrace change, enjoy novelty and value the self-realisation of the individual. Then, there are the Somewheres who make up 50% of the population - less well educated, less mobile, more likely to fear change and to prize family life and community over relentless individualism. There’s also the Inbetweeners who make up the rest of the 25% of the population but Goodhart doesn’t talk about them much as they presumably don’t make as good copy as the diametrically opposed Anywheres and Somewheres.

Now, before you think this sounds like the premise of a hilarious clash-of-opposites sitcom (“just what will those crazy Anywheres and Somewheres get up to this week?!”), let me disappoint you by telling you this is a purely political book. Goodhart argues that while the Anywheres have done a lot of good for society, their influence in the public sphere exceeds their number, trampling on Somewhere sensibilities breeding the discontent released in Britain in the form of the Brexit vote. Principally, unfettered immigration (or the notion that we have it) is the key grievance of the Somewheres but divergence is also seen on education and the role of the family.

As someone who ticks Anywhere boxes, I can admit that Goodhart makes some good points. The left means well but has failed to bring its core working class vote with it in the last 20 - 30 years and has overlooked their economic concerns. And while I don’t think all of the left’s pre-occupation with identity politics is entirely a bad thing, by the time audiences at student conferences are encouraged to use “jazz hands” to show appreciation to their speaker lest applause is “triggering”, even the most lefty of us might be fighting an instinct to become a right-wing troll.

The problem is, although Goodhart makes tame efforts at presenting some light and shade within the Anywhere and Somewhere groups, there is still a huge generalisation afoot. It simply cannot he said that 50% of the population does not have sufficient say in the way the country is run. Most of the mainstream media represents Somewhere views with major political parties stricken in fear of the wrath of the Daily Mail.

This can also form policy. Consecutive Tory governments’ gleeful torment of benefit recipients is Somewhere policy enacted against other Somewheres. There’s something to be deconstructed further in the “I’m alright Jack” attitude of many successful Somewheres and their apparent loathing of other less-well off Somewhere groups which isn’t addressed here. Equally, while Goodhart makes much of an education system which favours the academic over the vocational, he doesn’t address the poor regard for education seen in a lot of Somewhere groups which surely contributes to their sense of detachment from it. Throughout the book, the Somewhere viewpoint is sentimentalised and regarded uncritically while the Anywheres are designated as the cause of all Somewhere problems. By the time you reach the Family chapter, you’re pretty sure he’s trolling you.

The end result is a book which makes some valid points and is extremely readable but which comes across as clickbait for Anywheres who enjoy being provoked. And the greatest irony? This book will likely have an entirely Anywhere readership.

[Aloke]

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/...

[Jakub Dovcik · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is an interesting, thought-provoking and timely (especially in 2017) attempt to (at least partially) explain the divides within the British society that led to Brexit. I read it more as an argument into the debate, not as a definitive account, and I think in that sense it is very useful.

Goodhart's basic argument is that there are two dominant groups in British society - Anywheres (about 20ish percents) and Somewheres (about 60ish percent), that can be seen in various social and value surveys. Anywheres have what he calls "portable" or achieved identities - socially and economically liberal people with university education. Somewheres on the other hand have "ascribed" identities - are much more tied to their home communities and are often socially conservative (although very influenced by what he calls the "Great Liberalisation" after the 1970s in terms of race or gender roles). Within these groups, there are two extreme subgroups - "Global Villagers" and "Hard Authoritarians", who are on the 5ish most extreme percent on side of each group.

Goodhart argues that while the subcategory of Hard Authoritarians may include people with extreme and racist views, most of the Somewheres are "decent populists" and their needs are genuine and not at odds with the fundamental standards of British society.

While the labels are novel, Goodhart mostly builds on Eric Kaufman's work or the British Social Attitudes Survey on the authoritarian/liberal divide, which is composed of questions like support for the death penalty or respect for authority. Although they might seem a bit simplistic, I found the two analytical categories useful in conveying the message and creating an approximate mental model of the rations between the two groups.

Most of Goodhart's argument revolves around Anywheres' (or liberal) overreach on the issues of immigration and globalisation and their general dominance in the policy. His argument is that the anywhere political class (in both Labour and Conservative parties) relied too much on the analytical and economic arguments for free trade and university education can be convincing, even if one does not necessarily agree with Goodhart's conclusions.

I can understand why this book was slightly controversial and provocative when it came out, but I think that is why it is important. As a member of the Anywhere group, I definitely see that there is, even in my thinking, often a lack of appreciation and empathy for the perspectives of the Somewheres - and that is why it should be read especially by people who might not fully agree with its conclusions. Because of the individual chapters - on the impact of the decline of polytechnics, different conceptions of the welfare state between Anywheres and Somewheres (need-based vs contributory) can influence thinking about future policies, that bridge the gap between the two groups and make fewer people feel foreign in their country.

While most of it is very enjoyable and interesting, especially chapters on education or economic situation in past 40 years are very heavy on retelling of surveys without any graphs or charts, so can be difficult to follow. Overall, it is enjoyable and cannot recommend it enough.

[Raghu Nathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

The year 2016 brought a couple of major shocks to liberals in Europe and the US who believe in greater integration of the world in social and economic terms. The first was Brexit, the prospective withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) in a referendum on 23 June 2016. The second was the election of Donald Trump as US president in Nov 2016. Both events left the liberals angry and depressed. On Brexit, they, the Remainers, called the Leavers (those who voted for Brexit) racist, small-minded, backward-looking and embodying the energy of the hatred. There were even calls for the subversion of the democratic will. Similar disillusioned rhetoric was heard in the US after Trump’s electoral win. By and large, the tack that liberals took here was to denounce the Trump voter as an angry beast, racist and having a penchant for authoritarianism. It is now almost an year since Trump’s presidency and we see the Democrats still in the belief that Trump colluded with Russia to bring Hillary Clinton down and that he won by playing foul. It is not as though the US is alone in the triumph of the so-called populist politics. The UK and Europe have their fair share of the rise of populism as well. In India, we see the rise of sectarian right-wing nationalism raising its head successfully and securing the right to rule since 2014. Instead of dismissing the right-wing ascendency, it is important for liberals to get an understanding of this phenomena and apply correctives so that they are not shocked into disbelief yet again a few years from now. Among the analysis I have seen, I thought this book’s investigation into this phenomena is insightful and rational. It shows why the so-called ascendency of the right-wing is fundamentally ‘just democracy at work’ and that it is a backlash against a liberal dominance in many aspects of life, all the way from immigration to economy to education and culture.

Author David Goodhart writes mainly about the UK and the Brexit vote. However, I think the analysis is applicable to Donald Trump’s win, the decline of the centre-left and also the rise of populism in Europe. It is accepted wisdom now that decades of Globalization has created great economic and cultural openness in the West, benefiting some sections and destabilizing others. Goodhart says that we must get beyond traditional dichotomies in our societies based on Left and Right to understand the Brexit vote. He says that the new faultline that has resulted in the Brexit or Trump earthquake can be better understood through new categories called ‘the Anywheres’, ‘the Somewheres’ and the ‘InBetweens’. The Anywheres are those UK citizens who are university-educated, having skills valued by the globalized world and are employable anywhere in the EU. They are generally liberal and are comfortable with expanded immigration and see the world as their home rather than restrict themselves narrowly by nationalism. They often live away from where they were born or grew up. They are mobile and value autonomy and fluidity in their lives. In short, any place is home for them. In contrast, the Somewheres are UK citizens who may not be well educated and do not have the necessary skills to compete in the job market elsewhere in the EU. They feel comfortable with ‘the English way of life’ and often live within easy reach of where they were born or grew up. They feel that too much immigration changes UK into a ‘foreign country’. They are more rooted and prioritise local group attachments and security. The InBetweens, as the name implies, are the ones who straddle the space between Anywheres and Somewheres. According to Goodhart, a quarter of the UK comprises of Anywheres, a half of Somewheres and the rest Inbetweens.

How does all this explain Brexit? The author says that the cause for Brexit is a sense of loss and alienation amongst the Somewheres in their own homelands. The reasons for the sense of loss include the generous opening of UK’s borders to East Europeans during Tony Blair’s time, the neighbourhoods becoming rapidly more diverse and hence ‘foreign’, an economy that increasingly wants only University-educated people and a society whose social norms increasingly favor liberal contracts like Gay marriage, multiculturalism and the Global village. Brexit is the democratic backlash to this ‘Anywhere takeover of Britain’. It is an attempt to restore what has been lost over the past couple of decades since the neo-liberalism of Blair, Brown and Cameron. It sounds very much like the criticism of the Remainers that the Leavers are suffering from nostalgia for a past that is only in their minds. But Goodhart argues that the Somewheres are not complaining only about jobs and other material things. He says that they are putting value on more non-material things of the past which they have lost and that it cannot be just dismissed as ‘the foolishness of wanting to turn the clock back’.

Having witnessed the rise of right-wing populism in the Western world, one has to agree with the author that Anywheres must pay heed to Somewheres’ concerns without dismissing them as ‘backward looking’, especially when Somewheres constitute half the population. Liberals perhaps have been guilty for far too long in being impatient with such a ‘Somewhere narrative’. But I feel that Goodhart lets the Somewheres off easily when it comes to their vision for the future. Is it really possible to go back to the nostalgic economic and social past of Britain? Brexit won’t bring back factory jobs from China or Vietnam, nor would it bring back low-end service jobs from India. In all likelihood, restriction of mass immigration from Eastern Europe may only end up in a lower growth rate in the UK. Any amount of the warm glow of one’s neighbourhood being very British again can compensate for a lower standard of living. Nor would abolishing gay marriages contribute to gaining skills necessary to prosper in the UK of the 21st century. Populist leaders like Modi of India and Donald Trump in the US have been successful in articulating what is wrong with the status quo. But their alternate vision is woolly and flaky. They make big promises to their constituencies but are not able to follow through on their big promises, once in power. So, it is not clear what the way forward is after the Anywheres take cognisance of the Somewheres’ concerns.

Secondly, the book is weak on the impact of technology and automation which have also been major contributors to the ‘sense of loss’ of the Somewheres. Even with Brexit, the surge of technology will continue inexorably and contribute to job losses of the kind that Somewheres want to have. Finally, there is a chapter in the book titled, ‘Giving Somewheres a voice’. This is surprising to me. In the UK, Daily Telegraph and The Times are right-wing newspapers among the national media. They are powerful voices for the Somewheres, apart from many tabloids. Probably there are some radio and TV channels as well which are blatantly right-wing like similar ones in the US. In any case, both liberals and conservatives have confirmation bias and mostly read or watch only media that reinforces their biases. So, Somewheres find their voice in the media they follow just as Anywheres do with the Guardian. Very few Somewheres may read The Guardian for its political and social views.

Overall I think this book is an important one because it draws the attention of Anywheres to the other half which has been left behind by globalization and the changing economy. It will help to restore some balance to the discussion in society between Anywheres, Somewheres and the InBetweens.

[Nicholas Whyte · Rating 3 out of 5]

https://nwhyte.livejournal.com/3000083.html

I had an unnerving experience one evening in February. I was chatting with a friend (from Montenegro) about politics, and she asked me if I had read this book. I was about to say that I hadn't, when my phone buzzed with a WhatsApp message from another friend (from Hong Kong) asking me exactly the same question. Clearly it was fate.

Well, it's a rather annoying book, frankly. Part of this is Goodhart’s tendency to unnecessarily resort to ad hominem remarks. In the first chapter he reports on a conversation with Gus O’Donnell, then the UK’s most senior civil servant, and Mark Thompson, then the Director-General of the BBC, in which both expressed the view that global welfare matters more than national welfare. Goodhart obviously disagrees, which is fair enough, but then he says that both men’s views “may reflect their moderately devout Catholic upbringings”. Yep, Catholics, the enemy within. In a more recent review he said that for another writer, understanding the concerns of populists “may be hard for the grandson of a Holocaust survivor raised in Germany surrounded by the ghosts of the past”; and subsequently showed no comprehension at all for how offensive this was. Well, I guess that’s all you can expect from an Old Etonian who is the son of a Conservative MP.

Goodhart divides the world (well, really, white English people, because nobody else much matters) into Anywheres and Somewheres. The Brexit vote is the clear cleavage between them. Anywheres are smug intellectual cosmopolitan elites like me; Somewheres are salt of the earth types, loyal to their particular locality, who have been left behind by globalisation. The fact that along with most of my cosmopolitan friends and colleagues, I remain strongly loyal to my origins in various ways, is not relevant; the fact that Scotland and the Republic of Ireland, not notably places where local sentiment is weak, are strongly pro-EU is also ignored. But I do have to admit that the most telling piece of evidence from the Brexit referendum, one which I have cited myself in several lectures and presentations, gives some support for Goodhart: this is Lord Ashcroft's June 2016 poll of how those who feel strongly one way or the other on certain grand global issues had split between Leave and Remain, showing strong correlations with views on the Green movement, feminism, social liberalism, multiculturalism and most of all immigration.

I'm clearly on the Anywhere side of Goodhart's divide (or would be if I were English; since I'm not, I don't count), and it's difficult to read a book that fundamentally accuses me and my friends of being not just wrong on the arguments, but on the ethics of how society should be run. For me, opposition to immigration, multiculturalism, and feminism go beyond mere political disagreement and cross a moral line, one where I'm not terribly interested in understanding the position of the other side. However, I did my best to put those feeling on hold and to assess Goodhart's book as a whole.

There is one section that he gets completely and woefully wrong. This is his analysis of the EU itself, just before the middle of the book, which completely swallows and regurgitates British Eurosceptic propaganda: in short, the euro is a failure which is tearing the EU apart. In the rest of the EU, the fact that the euro survived the 2008 crisis, with more countries queuing to join, is seen as proof of concept; and it is generally recognised that the crises in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus all had rather different and largely indigenous causes and indeed largely different solutions, whereas British mythology has it that the euro and its fictionally one-size-fits-all policies were responsible in each case. I don't think the poor quality of British reporting on this was the crucial factor in the referendum outcome, but it can't have helped.

One the other hand, I have to admit that there was one section that completely convinced me. This was on the awful conequences of the decision two decades ago to reform vocational education by taking it out of the hands of local authorities (1988) and converting all colleges to universities (1992). By removing the vocational educational track, the UK has made it much more difficult for those who aren't up to university level to get meaningful qualifications which will help them in their careers. I was in student politics at the time that this reform was instituted, and remember wondering how we could measure success. The German apprenticeship system is often invoked as an international comparison (though not by Goodhart, who isn't terribly interested in learning from other countries here); in Belgium we also still have polytechnics and vocational colleges, without the temptation to merge them all into sprawling institutions with university status. It is, alas, telling that although Goodhart happily criticises the 1997-2010 Labour governments on numerous occasions, he does not blame the Conservatives for this particular policy screw-up.

Goodhart claims that his motivation for writing the book is to get the Anywheres in leadership (implicitly in the Conservative Party) to wake up, smell the coffee, and strike a new settlement with the Somewheres for the sake of national stability. I think he's wrong; the most important point I get from the book is that the UK has failed on social mobility as well as on social equality, and that those two failures drive the rise of Goodhart’s Somewhere mentality; so perhaps the Anywheres in leadership might do well to shape policies that increase social mobility and decrease social inequality, and see if that increases affection for the state and decreases the resort to populism caused by other political avenues failing to deliver? Of course, that was more or less what Theresa May said she would do when she took office. Well, that doesn't seem to have worked out so far...

Anyway, I’m grateful to my friends for alerting me to this; I did learn some things from it (mainly that it’s not good for my blood pressure to read too much Conservative political analysis).

[Charlie · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an important book about the new political divides in British politics. The author exchanges the tradition left/right divide for what he terms 'anywheres' and 'somewheres'. I'm not sure what camp I fall into. While it seems like I live the life of an anywhere, most of my views definitely align with the somewheres (The author does point out that the tribes are not mutually exclusive). The problems explained in this book have not really been addressed by any of the mainstream parties. But this is more than an indictment of out of touch politicians, as the author proposes solutions. I recommend this to anyone who wondered why the people voted for Brexit. Reading this I was shocked to learn that the former Cabinet Secretary Gus O'Donnell had argued for the most open door immigration possible. The man who ran the Civil Service which was manifestly against the wishes and interests of the people whom he presided over. With Trump, antifa and rows about immigration, one could conclude that we live in increasingly polarized times. When extremes go up, the centre ground is lost.

The recent news of a new political party being formed in the UK provides a significant opportunity. The cynic in me thinks the party will be dominated by disgruntled Blairites fed up with Corbyn, or that this will just be a repeat of the Social Democrats in the 80s. That said, I have lost faith in all the other parties, the Tories are doing a terrible job managing Brexit, Labour is engulfed in an antisemitism scandal (which I must admit a bit of schadenfreude at), the Lib Dems are going nowhere and Ukip has imploded since the Brexit vote. The Lib Dems and their ex-leader Nick Clegg have tried to portray themselves as the moderate centre between extremes, but it is a role they have miserably failed at.

If this new party adopts the proposals of this book into its platform, than it has the potential to go far and bridge the gap between the anywheres and somewheres. Peter Hitchens has proposed forming a new party at various times, imagine if he would encourage his readers to join this party. Of course, there is the issue of what the new party should be called. I propose the Radical Centrist party as its name.

I suggest reading this alongside Where We Are: The State of Britain Now from Roger Scruton, which is an excellent analysis of the current state of affairs and heavily references this book. Scruton also has solutions of his own. My other recommendation is The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion, which I believe is the best attempt at explaining political divides and it is drawn on in this book.

This is the first review I had requested by a friend.

[Daniel · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the seminal book about Brexit and post-Brexit Britain in the foreseeable future. There are 2 groups of people:

1. Anywheres: went to other cities or counties to study. Have college or postgrad degrees and work in the knowledge economy. Live in vibrant cities. Global outlook and often work in other countries. Does not think it fair to favour fellow citizens. Welcome immigration as they are not affected by the competition. Support progressive causes. Secure financially and furthermore marry each other. Promote personal choice in divorce but are often married traditionally themselves. Dominant politically and constitute the leadership roles. Condescending on Somewheres, labelling them as xenophobic racists. Support meritocracy and make sure their children are well prepared. Talk to their children with thousands of words and spend time with them.
2. Somewheres: have only high school diploma and studied in local university. Used to be middle class working in manufacturing but those jobs have gone to the robots or overseas. Live in the country or small towns. Dislike immigration as their competition, and cause employers to give up on training locals when they can employ cheap trained foreign labour. Treasure community bonds, tradition and family connections. Feel that fellow citizens should be favoured. Financially insecure, especially the men whom no one want to marry. So those men stay with their parents and play online games, or go into drugs, commit suicide or get jailed. So lots of single moms. Frustrated to be forgotten and voted Brexit. Proud of their nation and heritage. Have few control over their jobs and sometimes work 2 or 3 jobs. No time for their children and only speak with limited vocabulary.

Brexit is only the start of this Road to Somewheres.

How to solve this schism?
1. Learn from the Germans: have polytechnics and vocational training because not everyone can go to a university.
2. Provide alternate pathways for late bloomers or people from disadvantaged families.
3. Support married couples financially so it makes sense to stay married than separated.
4. Spend a lot more on the countryside and less on the cities.
5. Start listening to the Somewheres and support them.
6. Cut immigration. This is the primary reason for Brexit!

[Marcus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Refreshingly moderate, Goodhart breaks from the approved echo chamber narratives and merely gives voice to the concerns of the much stigmatised “deplorables” who voted in Trump, Brexit and more recently caused Labour’s “red wall” to collapse in the UK. Former PM Gordon Brown famously got caught out on a hot mic calling the lady that put forward their talking points a “horrible bigoted woman.”

He contrasts the “Somewhere” type who still desires to be regionally rooted and wishes to place value in loyalty to a high trust, secure, homogenous nation with the “Anywhere” position of rootless elites who proffer globalisation and European diktat from Brussels. Theirs is a chessboard of unfettered shifting, atomised consumer units and the identikit McDonalds and Starbucks franchises they are to purchase from.

Statistics and opinion polls abound as the political class is shown to have ignored and held in contempt the majority viewpoints of the citizenry. A citizenry that is willing to put their potential financial interests aside (a slightly thicker flicker of GDP?) in order to defend a sense of place, culture, meaning and arrest the rapid, dizzying rate of change they have had forced on their communities.

For all the posturing from Anywheres they surely do believe in national boundaries. Everything from the welfare state to environmental protections, democracy to law and order derive from regionally agreed on standards. It’s a small miracle that as a species who evolved in small tribes we can even scale up our concerns to include millions of fellow national citizens among the total heaving billions.

Much to the consternation of their social superiors there still remain some who hold values beyond economic growth, materialism and product consumption. A bit dry in parts by nature of the exhaustive source material, this is still a very important report. A challenge to the orthodoxy of globalist determinism, that is well worth delving into for a reality check on public attitudes and how their concerns have been wilfully ignored.

[Herschel · Rating 4 out of 5]

The majority vote to leave the EU has been seen in Britain as a modern-style peasants’ revolt. According to the prevailing wisdom of many of those who voted to remain, masses of uneducated people barely able to conceal their xenophobia inflicted upon the UK a major act of economic self-harm. But it may be a bit more complicated than that and David Goodhart makes his case well. He splits the country crudely into Anywheres and Somewheres. Anywheres are what Theresa May has called ‘citizens of the world’. They are comfortable anywhere and have ‘achieved identities. They are highly mobile and at ease in a modern multicultural Britain in which they are an elite. On the other hand there is the view from Somewhere in which identity is ‘ascribed’. Goodhart gives the example of a working class Geordie. (He notes elsewhere for example that more than 50% of BNP voters live within 15 minutes of their mothers.) But he anticipates the obvious criticism - that most people are a bit of both – even Anywheres have somewhere they call home. The Anywhere/somewhere shorthand works intuitively and is a better fit than the moddish ‘open v closed’. In a world where voters shift from Labour to UKip in one election cycle, there is clearly more going on than a simple left-right split. But other than providing labels, what is Goodhart arguing?

His case is that the economic and social liberalism that has risen to dominance in Britain has brought - along with the obvious benefits - some unacknowledged costs. Primarily he focuses on immigration: arguably the biggest factor in the Brexit vote. High levels of net migration, according to Goodhart, have resulted in a weakening of community cohesion and depressed wages at the bottom end of the labour market. It has meant companies have been able to quickly import labour rather than train local workers. Ultimately, as populations become much more transient, high flows of immigration threaten the support for common goods such as the welfare state. Goodhart presents his case on this highly controversial topic in a reasonable tone and he deserves serious engagement.

So is he right? The data, such as he provides, is not conclusive, but nor is it easily dismissed.

A host of studies show that people are more stressed, wages stagnant, communities weaker and whole regions have failed to replace defunct industries. But there is scant evidence - as Goodhart acknowledges - that wages are being driven down by immigration.

Goodhart delights in pulling the tails of a metropolitan elite he freely admits to being part of. Reading this book you sense it’s the sheer entitlement felt by those at the top that irks him the most. He has a neat line in aphorism too. “Populism is the new socialism,” he writes at one point: it’s captured the imagination of Europe’s working class.

But he is no post-liberal martyr. You can read less sophisticated versions of his arguments almost every day in the tabloids.

Indeed, only last month the outrage of the Daily Mail and the Sun forced the government to abandon raising tax on the self-employed because of its impact on ‘white van man’. If there is a silent majority of resentful ‘Somewheres’, it is one that has its prejudices reinforced on a daily basis by much of the British press.

This is a thoughtful and timely work on the central questions facing Britain this century: who should be allowed to come and live here? How should we educate people? What work will they do? Who will pay for our rising welfare bills? It is light on answers, but it does not duck the questions.

[Jonathan Downing · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of those books that will go down as paradigm-shifting for me, an Anywhere, born to Anywhere parents, starting an Anywhere career in Anywhere London. It's helped me understand the Brexit vote and the rise of Populism so much better (turns out it's not just stupid people who voted Leave, who knew), hopefully enabling me to make better decisions in policymaking and advocacy. Really good stuff. Will be looking out for other titles by Goodhart too!

[Razi · Rating 3 out of 5]

I agree with the division between somewheres and nowheres but this book is unfair to "nowheres" like myself. Yes "somewhere" are underdogs in Britain after years of social engineering and wealth-worship from both the Left and the Right still how could you object to people going to university just because some other people would not be able to go to do so for whatever reason? If meritocracy is problematic then where do we go to seek for guidance and standards? Somewheres and nowheres can work together if they stop trying to change each other. I have 25 years experience of working in non-graduate jobs in spite of possesing four degrees. I was systematically kept down by non-graduates who had got themselves promoted in manegerial positions through mafia-style group ambushes on all good jobs, creating jobs for each other and actively keeping graduates out of all promotions for fear of being overtaken by them. This is horrible which led me to losing respect for unqualified "thicko" professionals.
Yes "thicko" is the abominable term used by "nowheres" or the Graduate Class for non-graduate "somewheres" and is widely used in the context of Brexit and wider politics.
Brexit brought out the very worst in the people of Britain. Racism became mainstream (although the writer of this book denies this fact) so did condescension and narrow-mindedness of the presumably "educated" "Remoaners". The fault-lines appeared overnight though it was part and parcel of the neoliberal consensus (which remains the beast That-Must-Not-Be-Named). Both political parties represent only the super-rich. Remoaners found out to their cost but being lifelong beneficiaries of neoliberalism, wouldn't accept that they've been discarded by the system which now only works for the super-rich, the "Brexiters" being Brexiters wouldn't understand that they were never part of this game nor they ever will be. Always pawns, under any system.
The new British class divide is established within two decades of Tony Blair's opening of the universities to the wider student population. It is there, it is very British with its own paraphernalia of pride and prejudice and it will not go away any time soon. Don't worry, we will not be shoving children down chimnies or pregnant women down coal mines but the English poor will stay invisible, used by political parties and then discarded like they have always been. Somethings never change in the birthplace of the modern capitalism.

[Vidur Kapur · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic book. I would probably be in Goodhart's 'Anywhere' tribe (in fact, I would even fall into his more extreme Global Villager group), but this book was a real eye-opener for me. The fact that the Daily Mail and the Sun are incredibly popular newspapers should have altered me to this sooner, but Goodhart's statistics really highlighted the fact that I'm in the minority.

Goodhart isn't arguing that we should dismantle the progress that we have made, but is calling for a fairer settlement for the Somewheres, who have, arguably, been ignored over the past few decades. In any case, regardless of whether they have been ignored, we should all support policies that maximise the general well-being of the population, and he offers a number of policy prescriptions that can be used to try to mitigate the risk of extreme, far-right parties from coming to power.

He is, as he says, trying to find a 'third way': is it possible for us to ensure that both Anywhere and Somewhere interests are met, simultaneously? In some areas, he makes a good case that this is possible. More family- and marriage-friendly policy need not harm the prospects of women who wish to pursue careers, and the importance of more support (and more prestige) for technical and vocational training and education has been acknowledged across the political spectrum.

I'm one of the people who would support open borders if it were politically feasible, and despite Goodhart's arguments I would still disagree with his desire to reduce immigration. On immigration, perhaps, a 'third way' cannot be found; maintaining immigration at current levels would satisfy one group of people and anger the other; reducing immigration to the 'tens of thousands' would do the opposite.

Overall, the book is a moderate call for Anywheres to at least think more about the interests of Somewheres, and to recognise that not everyone thinks like them.

[Hilary Shearing · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's taken a time for me to finish this book. Apart from the usual round of distractions, The Road to Somewhere is packed with appraisal, analysis, ideas, wide-ranging points of view and an extensive and impressive array of sources. This isn't a regular page-turner. Rather I found I'd embarked on a massive "stop and think hard" read, which means I've often been stuck on the same page for days, researching and reading alternative commentary about the particular issue that Goodhart was concentrating on and had succeeded in making me do the same. Well written, knowledgeable and sometimes controversial, Goodhart discusses issues and asks questions that many within British political circles gloss over or ignore completely. If what's at stake following the UK referendum is not sufficiently clear, The Road to Somewhere will sort that out.

[H · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting and informative until the chapter on women where the quality takes a nosedive.
He says there is a problem with assuming one view represents all women - then cites a survey on Netmums as a good way to gauge female opinions (yes really!!)
The “experts” he uses to back up his view are also one sided, and include Catharine Hakim (whose main theory is that women should seduce their bosses to get promotions), and Belinda Brown (who is an “independent researcher”, whatever that is, and literally writes for The Conservative Woman).
Author seems like a proper Jordan Peterson who is fine with facts, but gets tetchy and emotional when it comes to women.

PS I had to rewrite this because I wrote “Belinda Blinked” by accident

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's focused on the rise of populism in the UK, but draws some parallels as well to current events in the US. Well thought-out arguments prevail throughout, and even though he comes at it from a center-left perspective, there is much on which people with other points of view can agree. Goodhart is a writer who knows his subject matter expertly.

[Jim Robles · Rating 5 out of 5]

Five Stars! A great read for Liberal coastal elites who do not understand how they are regarded in the heartland. The great divide in our current politics is between us "anywheres" and the "somewheres" who increasingly control the Electoral College and Senate.

Certainly all of my friends who support Planned Parenthood should read this to gain some understanding of why our current lobbying efforts or so ineffectual and even counterproductive.

". . . but if we are to be tough on populism we must be tough on the causes of populism too--and one of those causes has been Anywhere over-reach" (5).

"Haidt was a liberal who began to study political psychology in order to help his tribe become more effective in its competition with conservatives. Along the way, he became a centrist who believes each side sees some truths and ignores others" (28). Exactly!

"Mainstream populist sentiment is a restatement of certain basic political intuitions that the dominant Anywhere classes have paid insufficient attention to: the importance of stability and secure borders, the priority of national citizen rights before universal rights, the need for narrative and recognition for those who do not easily thrive in more education-driven economies" (51).

"The Tories have the lowest proportion of graduates among party members out of all the main parties (38 percent to Labour's 60 percent), which might be one of the secrets of their recent success--they often are Somewheres, albeit more affluent than most" (77).

"Professor Dani Rodrik points out that poor people in rich countries (meaning the bottom ten percent) are three times richer than rich people in poor countries (meaning the top 10 percent)" (82).

"As countries, and individuals, grow richer and more secure and more mobile their sympathies usually grow wider too" (109).

"We do know that people, especially poorer people, are acutely sensitive to free riding--. . . ." (122).

"London exemplifies the emerging division between hierarchical, diverse cities and more equal less diverse hinterlands, pinpointed by Michael Kind" (135).

"Both the centre-left and centre-right critiques of modern capitalist economy take too little account of psychology" (150).

"And if people think the game is stacked against them, they often just refuse to play" (153).

"Politicians tend to look past group attachments and describe a frictionless society of individuals moving up the social hierarchy thanks to hard work or ability" (181). I have good friends whose four children seem to have decided to remain in the small town where they were born: that is a choice.

"One of the consequences of double professional couples is that children from such couples have double the contacts and connections that they used to have; . . . ." (189).

"But so long as nearly 20 percent of pupils leave secondary school each year barely able to read or do simple sums the government should have one big and very simple social mobility policy: improve basic education at the bottom" (190).

". . . millions of children suffering the well-documented negative consequences of not being raised in a stable two parent family, . . ." (197).

"But in Britain's case this spending has not caused the decline of the two parent family but it has certainly reinforced it" (202).

"It is now widely accepted that life outcomes are far better on average in married, two parent families . . ." (203).

"In recent decades their has been a shift from regarding marriage as an institution for parents to raise children together in a spirit of companionship, to a more individualized conception where the emphasis is on how the emotional and physical needs of the individual are being met" (212).

"Slightly less than half of taxpayers are actually net contributors" (222).

[Stephen King · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’d wanted to read this for some time as a balance to many of the anxious accounts of the dangers of populism and nativism. The (rather simplistic)
categorism of anywheres and somewheres was, however, an interesting and helpful device to explore different motivations and interests in education, employment, social attitudes and aspirations, etc. Goodhart is somewhat hopeful in some of his policy recommendations- which only appear - rather hurriedly, in the last 10 pages or so. I can’t see many modern governments reviving apprenticeships or providing the comprehensive safety nets he suggests (apart from the Scandinavians, where this social contract has been in place for decades).

[Kitty Red-Eye · Rating 4 out of 5]

When I studied political science, I was surprised to find that I thought comparative politics to be the most interesting part. This is new stuff in that branch, and very interesting too, a new political faultline! (Now this is obviously some hot stuff, lol)

I’d be very happy to read more about it, but it would be more relavant to me if someone wrote about it in a Scandinavian context. The British angle is all good, but a bit hard to follow for an outsider.

[Sung Won · Rating 4 out of 5]

세상에는 두 ‘부족’의 인간이 있다. 그들은 흔히 진보와 보수라고 불리기도 하고, "Prius or Pickup?"에서처럼 fluid와 fixed라고 불리기도 한다. "The Road to Somewhere"에서는 그들을 anywhere와 somewhere라고 부른다. 애니웨어는 진보적이고 고학력이고 이동성이 강하고 변화와 다양성을 선호하고 성취욕이 강하며 도시에 산다. 반면 썸웨어는 보수적이고 저학력이고 안정을 선호하며 고향에 머무른다. 애니웨어는 인구의 20-25% 정도이고 썸웨어는 절반, 나머지는 중도층이다. 책을 읽는 사람들, 특히 이런 정치학/사회학 책을 읽는 사람들은 다 애니웨어다. 따라서 이 책은 독자를 애니웨어로 상정하고, 공간적/문화적 괴리로 인해 그들이 살면서 만날 일이 별로 없는 썸웨어란 어떤 사람들인지를 이해시키는 것을 목표로 한다. 따라서 원제인 "The Road to Somewhere"도, 번역판의 제목인 "엘리트가 버린 사람들"도 더없이 적절한 제목이다.

2016년 트럼프 당선과 브렉시트의 충공깽 후 포퓰리즘은 정치학/사회학에서 가장 핫한 주제가 되었다. (그나마 다행인 것은 그 후 애니웨어들 사이에 썸웨어를 이해하고자 하는 열망이 고조되었고, 이런 책들이 쏟아져나왔다는 점이 아닐까. ) 흔히 브란코 밀라노비치의 ‘코끼리 곡선'에 따르면 1988년~2008년 사이의 세계화의 결과, 가장 경제적으로 손해를 본 것은 부유한 나라의 저소득층이었다. 따라서 브렉시트나 트럼프의 당선은 세계화에 반대하는 썸웨어들의 이유있는 반란이었다. 애니웨어와 썸웨어를 가르는 가장 뚜렷한 기준은 이민에 대한 찬반과 학력이다. 브렉시트는 뚜렷하게 계급적 이해가 반영된 투표였는데, 가장 뚜렷한 경향은 소득이나 직업보다 교육 수준에 따른 투표 경향이었다. 이 점은 피케티의 "자본과 이데올로기"에서 진보정당의 지지자가 점점 더 고학력 - 고소득이나 고자산보다는 - 이 되는 경향과 일치한다.

저자는 애니웨어에게 유리한 세금, 교육, 복지 정책을 썸웨어를 위한 방향으로 바꾸어야 한다고 말한다. 저자는 애니웨어는 썸웨어를 ‘계몽'시켜서 애니웨어로 만들려고 하지만, 썸웨어는 애니웨어가 되지 않는다고 한다. 고개를 끄덕이면서 읽다가도, 여성과 가족에 대한 챕터에서 썸웨어 여성의 입장은 도저히 받아들이기 어려웠다. 썸웨어에 대한 나의 이해는 아직은 부족한 것 같다.

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Worth reading even if you disagree with the book’s positions. Goodhart generally avoids straw men arguments and has some good insights into the class contours that emerged in the shift from industrial capitalism to the knowledge economy. Good for stepping out of the ‘anywhere’ bubble.

[Alex Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

I would probably class myself as a Somewhere; working class family, live in the same town I grew up in, sometimes feel uncomfortable with the changes I've seen over the decades in my local area, that ‘getting ahead’ is an uphill struggle and can feel me and people like me are ignored, patronised and looked down on by the political and cultural elite Anywheres. While I voted Remain, I was conflicted on which way, I can understand why many did for vote to leave the EU and see that many ‘Somewhere’ working class did it as a show of actual political power in the face of ‘Anywheres,’ that many have felt has been denied and ignored for decades.

This book coming out just after the Brexit referendum and election of Trump, shows how people who feel disenfranchised can snap back against the narrative that is played by media and cultural and political elite that serves as a major shock (and the way they talked about both Brexit and Trump like it was the arrival of the 4 horsemen), and this book does what I think, a good analysis on why these events happened and the likelihood on similar outcomes in the future (like the election in the Netherlands of Wilder). Written by David Goodhart, who was very much in the orbit of the new Labour “Anywhere” cultural movement, adds a bit of weight to it, as a sort of self reflection on how this powerful, dominant section of society has control of all the levers of power and culture that are ignoring, infantilising, belittling large parts of the less wealthy, less educated population.

This book looks, specifically in the UK, but with issues that can be applied to both the USA and much of Western Europe, on how changes in education, industry and employment, immigration and political representation have caused a schism between parts of the population. While the divides over income and background are well known and formed large parts of the political discussion for at least the last 20 years, this book makes a compelling case, especially one felt by the Somewheres like me, that on many issues and initiatives they are missing the wood for the trees. That the Anywheres, found dominating the cultural environment (news, films, TV etc) and most of the political one (even parties like the Conservatives are dominated by these and these issues. Labour and the Lib Dems, Greens are fully anywhere echo chambers), either don’t care or don’t understand the Somewheres cultural backdrop and spend more energy trying to convert them to their way of thinking rather than try to improve their way of living.

A big part that the author attributes this shift to anywhere cultural and political dominance is the role university education had now. The idea that residential universities in this country and the US, help cultivate this anywhere mentality and superiority, by separating people from their homes and communities might seem a bit like a paranoid conspiracy, but when you think about it, the drift between middle class graduate Anywheres and Somewheres might have a reason there. The push, especially in this country as seeing university as a way to break away from home, meet (drink and shag) new people is often used by the especially cultural Anywheres on TV as the main reason for going to university. Not like you know, learning something. The push of Anywhere mentality of getting a university education being the ultimate aim, while vocational education has been degraded and forgotten when these skills are not only a way for non graduates to get a chance at more fulfilling, better paid career but also fills vacancies more needed for the country. This has been expanded with the ever-increasing numbers going to university, limiting the pool of graduate level jobs and people taking on debt with limited chances of getting a higher quality paid job, many of these are Somewheres aiming to ‘better themselves’ as they were told by Anywheres as that was the pathway they took. This is coming from someone who now regrets going to a university to get a degree that I haven’t used and would have rather gained a more vocational education.
Residential universities which are described as a particular British/US trend, seem drive this Anywhere mentality. University offering social status and a looking down on Somwhere majority. Yet for all the progressive noises they make, they are as just socially intolerant, that 30% of Labour voters would be upset of child married a tory, and only 10% the other way. This was in the news recently, and the way that women in particular were filtering men on dating sites by their political affiliations and the way they described such men was a bit shocking but fits into the narrative that has been built over the last 40 years.

The author comments on how the old stances of the left, community, work etc have been replaced by Anywheres latch on to social cultural issues and push those causing a backlash against the Somewheres, even when they aren’t particularly offended or bigoted against the issue is one, I can see almost daily now. The SNP described in this book seems out of date to what they are described here. Here, they are seen with its political identity with Somewheres, yet it has become consumed by the progressive mindset, with it twisting the entire government in Holyrood and country over gender identification, seemingly at the expense of Scotland’s failing education and health service.
The lecturing talking down to people who backed Brexit, with little to no effort to see why they did (coming from someone who voted remain but was tempted by leave), instead just lump 51% of the country as a mix of stupid and racist. This has increased the divide between the Somewhere and Anywhere and added a layer of superiority to the class of anywhere and resentment to Somehweres. Where the stances of the somewhere are more on stability of the family, nation etc, and more hesitant on big cultural changes, that the high influx of immigration brought to many areas. Added to the substantial changes in employment and loss of the old industries have left many lost and rather than help provide, things like the right sort of meaningful employment, education, and family support, the Anywheres in charge provide false hope in trying to turn the Somehweres into people more like them. And failing.

I agree with the discussion on a better led integration campaign that is a mix of both immigrant cultural tendencies and government failure to see the issue and now promote “cultural differences” ahead that have caused the problem and there needs to be a campaign from both sides of government and immigration communities to integrate better. But with the numbers arriving each year, would make this an immense, probably impossible task, not including many already here that have failed to integrate. And most likely branded as cultural insensitive and racist by an Anywhere controlled media and political narrative. The successive, and ever increasing rates of immigration have given no forethought into how it would affect multiple areas of life, from the economy, employment, culture, housing etc, and as they predominately live in Somewhere areas, it can feel like decisions are made by Anywheres that rarely affect them but greatly do for the Somewheres who have manage this, and any complaints are hounded as bigoted.

Londonisation of Britain seems to be main aim of the Anywheres, as that seems to be ideal. The old left ideals been replaced by new left diversity and LGBT. Nothing is sacred anymore, no old alliances, community, patriotism, or national pride. The Anywheres like this as this is the way they live and thrive in and reject old, racist imperial legacies they believe exist still in these communities. Yet the worry is that the bright new multicultural city they envisage is a myth and that –
if London-centric Anywhere interests continue to dominate, we will gradually become a more fragmented, unpleasant, and disaffected country with continuing high levels of population churn and different social and ethnic groups retreating into their parallel lives, while an increasingly shrill political class celebrates the virtues of openness from within its gated communities. . Unfortunately, this seems to be the path we are on.

The differences in the life experience and the meaning of a good life, between somewhere and anywhere, especially amongst women, was an issue I hadn't given much thought to before. Somewhere women, predominantly would rather stay at home raising their children or work lesser hours compared to anywhere women, that place career and earning potential as the priority. As Anywheres dominate the political and cultural atmosphere, their concerns are pushed ahead, with the support that Somewheres would prefer; help to stay home more to raise their children almost ignored. Reading this, it does also feel condescending, with Anywheres lecturing somewhere women that they must work on their career. I mean looking at political manifestos of the main parties, there’s a lot on childcare and greater pushes for more female representation in senior roles. These can be seen as desirable goals, but almost nothing on supporting stay at home families.

I think this is an important book, especially for those into politics. People on both sides of the political spectrum should, even if they don’t agree with some the conclusions, but mainly to understand the other side. Anywheres would mostly likely take more offense to what this book lays out, but they have to see that for at least the last 30 years their views have dominated both the political machinery and cultural backdrop, and they have done well out of it, and any concerns and misgivings the usually poorer Somehweres who seem to have missed out, have been ignored and branded as old fashioned, outdated and bigoted. Unfortunately, I don’t think this book will spur any new thinking or direction for Britain’s political forces, but more likely seen in the future as a warning, that like the Somewheres concerns were ignored.

[Douglas · Rating 3 out of 5]

An enlightening book, but it left me wondering many things, just a few of which are below.

First, it seemed important to Goodhart's arguments that the Somewheres:Anywheres ratio was 2:1, that some other division of those "in control" and those "feeling frustrated" that would have the number of those "in control" markedly smaller than the other group. The missing quarter, the in-betweens are hardly discussed. This trick makes the 2:1 ratio seem that much stronger so that we focus on Anywhere dominance over Somewheres. The actual closeness of the 52:48 Brexit vote (different any given week) and that the Trump presidency is due to the strange ways Americans pick their president (he lost the popular vote by 3 million and then 7 million) is glossed over.

Second, Goodhart brings in "hard authoritarians" in such a way that they are <5%, always diminished. Until the very end, when he combines multiple survey question answers to use death penalty support as a proxy for authoritarian strains and boom, a strong correlation with Brexit votes. Numerous other articles have indicated authoritarian tendencies correlate with Brexit and Trump support, so to minimise its presence amongst Somewheres for most of the book is disingenuous.

The same is true for attitudes toward race and ethnicity. He always diminishes the proportion of "hard racists" (if that was the term he used) but 'yes' answers to questions like "Britain feels like a foreign country" and "I want to live in a neighbourhood where people look like me" are treated as natural and sensible, rather than at least borderline racist. Structural racism is also something he hardly considers, instead preferring to put its results down to Anywhere social and immigration policies. You will not find even a paragraph discussing negative effects of imperialism or the US's long history of slavery and then Jim Crow. These both seem to have "ended" mid-20th century and are no longer a concern. That we would be on shaky ground here was clear when within the first few pages, Goodhart cited the racist American sociologist Charles Murray, infamous author of The Bell Curve.

Shifts in attitudes about LGBTQ issues is treated as indicating increasing general tolerance among Somewheres. While the LGBTQ shift is true, it is not a proxy for race and ethnicity nor does it serve to erase structural issues. Despite this, Goodhart uses it continually to soften the hard edges lurking in the data.

Third, more to this point, he uses a lot of survey data and that is part of what made the book so enlightening, but he almost always handles it only one or two levels at a time: this portion thinks this, while that portion thinks that, with a smaller portion a more extreme view; or within this group, half think this way while in this other group, only one quarter think this way. These surveys were sometimes conducted by him, and do not contain just one or two questions, they contain many. Goodhart avoids discussions that involve more levels, more groupings of attitudes. This simplifies things but in ways that explicitly serve his argument. It weakens his treatment of authoritarianism, race and other issues; we are left wondering what differences between his Somewheres, Anywheres and In-Betweens actually exist. We are only given the death-penalty v authoritarianism and Brexit vote taste mentioned above to suggest that there is a lot more we are not being told. What is being left out likely puts large chunks of his Somewhere grouping in an unfavourable light.

Fourth, Goodhart's "decent populism" is an extremely loaded term. The Brexit, Trump, Poland and Hungary populisms have showed and are showing their ugly heads. Goodhart does not discuss coarsening of attitudes on the street post-Brexit, Trump's white supremacy, the Poland and Hungary ruling parties both bending the mechanisms of state to cement their positions and increasing discrimination against convenient target groups.

We have other examples last century of what a rather small portion of Somewhere-savvy, Anywhere-demonising populists are able to get done. Goodhart writes the book as if it's the Anywheres doing the same now.

[Harvey · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a refreshing change from everyone who voted for Brexit or Trump is stupid and only voted that way due to Russian intrigue. Many of the same issues exist in Australia of course. And we have very high mass immigration (which is certainly not very popular with Australian somewheres) but I'm struck by the fact that Australia's bipartisan policy of zero low-skilled immigration (other than refugee intake) seems very sensible.

I would certainly like to see transferable personal allowances in Australia. As Goodhart notes it is just bizarre to tax people as individuals and then assess their eligibility for social security on a family unit basis.

[Mairead Hill · Rating 1 out of 5]

I honestly knew this book wouldn’t be for me when the introduction just seemed to be the author bragging about how right he is. The second clue this book wouldn’t be for me was when the author said something along the lines of my daughters are treated exactly the same (by society) as they would be if they were sons instead. I wish feminism had got this far. This was proceeded by the chapter on “family” which didn’t examine why maybe it was important for woman to have a job, in an ideal world yes it would be nice to spend more time with children but for some women economic independence is necessary and economic independence or equality isn’t relying on the government for a tax cut to stay with your partner.

There just wasn’t very many solutions in this book it was just him moaning and the author quoted an awful lot of Tory MPs for someone who is supposedly labour.

I still didn’t really understand what his issue was with immigration in one chapter he said so now we can see mass immigration is not good for economic and social reasons. How can I see that where did you explain that? Immigrants mainly come here with a job secured it was stated in this book so surely they are paying taxes and if they are paying taxes why not use those taxes to build new hospitals and schools why is the government not doing this?

There was nothing on how the press and government have been using immigration as a scapegoat for years. How that might have caused people to vote leave. If we have an ageing population how are taxes from immigrants not going to help fund pensions which is often included in figures to tar immigrants as if we have some massive benefits system which must have huge amounts of fraud.

The status quo should have been looked at more as an issue causing “somewhere/anywhere” divide. Has the author ever been to Boston the town infamous for voting to leave with such vigour, a town that hasn’t seen its heyday since the war which was probably the last time that area had any decent investment.

The last straw was the whole pages of statistics, did the publishers advice against tables or graphs? The information was impossible to take in and also reams of statistics really aren’t that interesting to read unless the numbers are surprising, just nothing of interest was in this book.

[Conor Sullivan · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book Goodhart presents a very convincing exploration in to the Anywhere-Somewhere dichotomy which he claims divides contemporary British politics and how the relative influences and flexes of those who fall into each category have shaped the policies of recent governments. One thing that sets this book apart from many others that attempt an evaluation on this particular topic is the sheer range of facts and figures used to demonstrate, if not prove, the existence of the chasmic divide in Britain - as well as in most developed nations - which presaged the populist revolt that is currently underway. In addition to this, unlike many other authors, he actually proposes a wide array of potential policy solutions to the problems he identifies. The surgical examination of British society undertaken in this book is commendable; it touches on the results of policy decisions taken decades ago, how the transition away from an industrial society to a knowledge-based economy has left many areas of the country behind and on the impact of concerted attempts to undermine traditional values, such as those to do with the nuclear family and gender roles.

Goodhart starts by presenting and analysing the social, cultural and economic reasonings behind the two competing demographics, which he calls the ‘Anywhere’ and the ‘Somewhere’. The broad definition he gives to these groups is that the Anywhere demographic are progressive individualists ‘who regard society as a shop’, whereas the Somewhere demographic are decent populists who ‘regard it as a home’. As well as framing the beliefs of these two groups through the use of data related to the reasonings above, he also provides a psychological analysis whilst acknowledging throughout that both are legitimate worldviews. Moreover, he outlines the hardline subgroups within both the Anywhere and Somewhere groups - the ‘Global Citizens’ and the ‘Hard Authoritarians’, respectively - and suggests what proportion of the population fall into each category, as well as stating which is the current worldview of the influential.

This book, like many others since the Brexit vote and Trump election, suggest a significant silent majority protest vote served as a backlash to the traditional left-right political divide and marks the rise of the culture and identify challenge, aimed at reining in the prevailing globalist headstrong liberalism we see today. Thankfully, despite having noted the backlash was in many instances identify driven, he uses the facts to suggest that it was not racism or xenophobia that led to the vote but a human psychological longing for community and against a system, in globalism, that has failed a significant proportion of the populace. Since the push for ‘hyperglobalisation’ began in the ‘80s, out of all the groups in the world it is only the middling and low income groups in rich developed countries that have seen no economic benefit, instead seeing zero income growth. Furthermore, in that same time period, contrary to all predictions, the number of low-skilled, low-paid jobs has grown to constitute between 25-40% of the British workforce. Is it any wonder, then, that the silent majority in these nations feel they have been failed by an economic system favoured by the mostly Anywhere political class?

This is certainly a book that will bruise the ego of any politically intolerant, entitled Anywhere - the type who would (now) cry foul at the sentiments found in Gordon Brown’s, now infamous, ‘British jobs for British workers’ speech. Is this not a perfectly reasonable attitude for a national government to hold? Indeed, Goodhart shows the general Anywhere attitude that promotes the inherent good in openness - and, so, tirelessly upholds the value of mass migration - ends up being at the direct expense of the national working class citizen and closes off their opportunity for social mobility. This is shown by the fact a third of the production workers in Britain’s biggest manufacturing industry (food and drink) are now Eastern European whilst so many citizens are unemployed. Doesn’t a country have a duty to help its citizens first and foremost? This book makes no attempt to mollify the Anywhere adherents and political elite for their querulousness, instead lambasting them for the way they prevaricate when the question of the legitimate interests of citizens is dared to be asked. Seen in this way, Goodhart shows very clearly that the Brexit vote was an act of nemesis.

Very early on he makes the observation that in relation to immigration ‘the left abandons its normally social and communitarian instincts and becomes libertarian in its individualism’. Although a striking observation, I can’t help but think he didn’t explore this far enough. It is not simply that the left has become individualistic but, rather, that as the traditional right has continued to cede ground to the left and allowed ever more rights to be considered inalienable, even when the policies themselves are not widely popular (as he shows in his chapter on the family life), they have enabled the left to remain viewed as moderate whilst actually becoming increasingly more extreme. This is something the growing body of graduate firebrands and radicals have maniacally seized upon, with us now witnessing almost weekly appearances of young avowed communists on our television screens (at least pre-lockdown).

The debate around social mobility was perhaps the most interesting and insightful observation made in this book (although, the whole book is interesting) and that I have read in a long time. It hadn’t occurred to me that the promotion of a meritocratic society might legitimise inequality and reduce empathy for the poor. I can’t help but see, particularly in the transition of the Labour Party’s main aims, how the cause of the working class against the very real wealth privilege has mostly been abandoned for a new cause of racial social justice, even though I believe any honest observer would see that the claims of ‘institutional racism’ and ‘white privilege’ don’t stand up to any scrutiny. In fact, the hypocrisy of the mainly wealthy, metropolitan social justice Anywheres is made abundantly clear in the fifth chapter - ‘A Foreign Country?’ - when Goodhart provides us with the survey data for the attitudes and actions of these faux bleeding heart types, and when he quotes Michael Young who opined that “[t]he holders of the power and possessors of wealth [the Anywheres] need, in all societies, to have the assurance of the best of moral titles to their fortune”.

On the whole, I found it a little frustrating that in the beginning he was prone to repeating some of the figures: I must have read that the BNP got a million votes in the 2009 European elections five times! I also found it a touch ironic that an Old Etonian was rallying against the emerging hyper-liberalism and suggesting that the disappearance of a distinctive working class culture and identity (thanks to the achievement culture) does not serve in the best interests of the working class. In fact, I could only laugh when I read his proclamation that ‘[s]ocial mobility and meritocracy are never, thankfully, fully obtainable but should always be aimed at’, even though I agree.

[Daniel Clemence · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a good but flawed book (hence the three stars) about the rise of Right wing populism in the UK (and a bit of Europe and the US). The main narrative in this book is that rather than the UK being politics determined by class, the main division on UK politics was sentiment. This sentiment was divided in the words of Theresa May between the Anywheres and Somewheres. The Anywheres are liberal, metropolitan university educated people. The Anywheres have been supporters of globalisation and support social liberalism but not necessarily political liberalism (Goodhart notes Anywheres are politically intolerant of others). Somewheres on the other hand are communitarians and socially conservative, with large scepticism of globalisation and are attached to nation and their local community.

Goodhart notes that the 80s and the decline of manufacturing and the rise of globalisation has led to a populist takeover of politics. He argued the Left had been disproportionately damaged by this event. The level of detail into how globalisation has hurt the working class Somewheres makes this a book which I value far more than Whiteshift by Eric Kauffman. The Road To Somewhere touches on immigration as you would expect, but argues that economics has had a far greater impact than others who have studied the populist Right. I would say the best chapter was Chapter 6 analysis of the economy and how deindustrialization led to an unstable economy in which the Somewheres were doomed into low skilled employment. What is really interesting is the impact of how the UK created large amounts of low skilled jobs compared with Europe. As Britain followed an American employment model, the jobs were lower skilled compared to Europe and that led to lower wages.

The focus on immigration is obviously going to be the more controversial part but I don't think he has raised anything that is considered too controversial. The book focuses on economic factors as much as social factors, which is positive. The Road to Somewhere also criticises to excess focus on upward mobility and argues for a more nuclear family where women are more supported raising a family at home.

So why did I not view it as a much more valued book? Whilst I think many of the arguments are strong and well thought out, there are some problematic issues with the book. One of my biggest criticisms is that The Road to Somewhere overlooks and downplays the differences in generations. There is a single page dedicated to how younger people maybe more liberal and more Anywhere than other generations. It gives one citation for a paper which argues that Millennials in the UK were considerably more conservative than previous generations on sentiment. If this is true, it makes you wonder why are so many Millennials voting Labour? It is not because they are a bunch of socialists as the book used a paper cited to refute that claim. The anywhere sentiment among younger generations is downplayed by this book. It is particularly this sentiment found on the most divisive referendum result; Brexit. Younger under 40s regardless of their social class voted Remain whilst the over 40s voted Leave or Remain much more down class lines.

My personal experience working in a factory in 2019 very much sums this up. Younger factory workers were more sympathetic to Remain whilst older ones were staunch Brexiteers. What I think is that younger people might have instinctive right-wing economic views mixed with social liberalism but their exposure to the economy and how Britain has been undermined for the past 10 years has turned them into unmitigated social democrats. What I also think is that their views being more aligned to Anywheres, being people who may be economically right-wing but valuing freedom in movement and identity is something that is completely sidelined by the book.

I also think the book has aged not to well in that the central Somewhere project of Brexit has been a failure in its outcomes. Trade has declined substantially (as predicted) and the economy has largely stagnated since leaving. Whilst there have been multiple economic shocks, not all of these things can be blamed on causes outside of Brexit. The UK economy has underperformed on investment and productivity, leading to a lethargic, decrepit state for the UK. Whilst this book does give a fair amount of analysis into the political cause of Brexit (a Somewhere victory voting for an re-establishment of traditional society), the declining UK has put sober realities of a Somewhere country. Communitarianism had its project in Brexit and for someone who saw themselves as a Communitarian, the devastation of Brexit made me recant from that political position as untenable. The problem with The Road to Somewhere is that whilst written before Brexit actually happened, had the esteemed belief in its project. How does a Communitarian come to terms with the failures of Brexit? I don't know. But this book has not been able to address it.

There are also minor criticisms here and there. For one, the main argument about how the Populist Right is a more problematic issue for the Left is not entirely true. Whilst the European social democrats have been undermined, Trump's domination of the GOP has put paid to the idea of a centre-Right riding the storm. The centre-Right's collapse has been quieter than social democracy's crisis but it is real. The Tories civil war is partly a testament to this. Another issue is that national sentiment on immigration as a major issue has declined since Brexit. Immigration has lost its salience at the same time immigration has picked up. This is the paradox of Brexit; a vote to take control of the borders and immigration has never led to a higher rate of immigration. I don't think it is sustainable but it is a product of voting to Leave the EU. And I personally don't think there is a small-state solution to immigration because of the demographics of the UK towards an elderly population means higher taxes.

I think in many ways, The Road to Somewhere has been taken up across the political divides. The Left are as likely to criticise excessive globalisation as the Right now. It is a good, if flawed book that explains many of the trends that are happening today.

[Ideas Sleep Furiously · Rating 5 out of 5]

Re-reading in the wake of Labour's defeat, it becomes clear how incredibly prescient and important Goodhart is. The most important book to understanding the new political settlement and what the left can do to win.

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A very engaging narrative which has somehow garnered controversy. Goodhart doesn't just diagnose issues accurately, he provides perfectly reasonable and measured solutions, which most UK citizens would agree with. A must read for any UK politico.