The Spoils of War: Greed, Power, and the Conflicts That Made Our Greatest Presidents

by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

Two eminent political scientists show that America's great conflicts, from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror, were fought not for ideals, or even geopolitical strategy, but for the individual gain of the presidents who waged them. It's striking how many of the presidents Americans venerate-Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy, to name a few-oversaw some of the republic's bloodiest years. Perhaps they were driven by the needs of the American people and the nation. Or maybe they were just looking out for themselves. This revealing and entertaining book puts some of America's greatest leaders under the microscope, showing how their calls for war, usually remembered as brave and noble, were in fact selfish and convenient. In each case, our presidents chose personal gain over national interest while loudly evoking justice and freedom. The result is an eye-opening retelling of American history, and a call for reforms that may make the future better. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith demonstrate in compelling fashion that wars, even bloody and noble ones, are not primarily motivated by democracy or freedom or the sanctity of human life. When our presidents risk the lives of brave young soldiers, they do it for themselves.

Genres: History, Politics, War, Sociology, Nonfiction, Political Science

311 pages, Kindle Edition

Published September 27, 2016

About the author

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a political scientist, professor at New York University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He specializes in international relations, foreign policy, and nation building. He is also one of the authors of the selectorate theory.

He has founded a company, Mesquita & Roundell, that specializes in making political and foreign-policy forecasts using a computer model based on game theory and rational choice theory. He is also the director of New York University's Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy.

He was featured as the primary subject in the documentary on the History Channel in December 2008. The show, titled Next Nostradamus, details how the scientist is using computer algorithms to predict future world events.

Excerpted from Wikipedia.

Reviews

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

BBDM is a complicated thinker and is not afraid to take on difficult subjects. I don't agree with all his analysis and he simplifies everywhere. But he makes a good case that presidential power is often put to the purpose of achieving personal goals that have little to do with helping the average citizen. The analysis is simplistic but remarkable in how well it matches to actions taken by some of our greatest leaders. He challenged some deeply held assumptions about our country and its given me lots to think about.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 3 out of 5]

controversial book reviews

The Declaration of Independence was basically a load of crap

I did not get past the first part of the book, which asserted that George Washington was scoundrel and a crook, that his greed for western land caused the American Revolution, and that the Declaration of Independence was basically a load of crap. John Adams and Tom Paine would have found these assertions surprising. They thought some other causes than Washington’s alleged greed were involved in the demand for liberty and independence. The authors’ revisionist theory also fails to account for Lexington and Concord or Bunker Hill, George III’s haughty rejection of the “olive branch petition,” or many, many other factors and events.

The authors accuse Washington of cheating his soldiers with respect to a 1754 land grant, that was finally realized in 1772 as a result of Washington’s strenuous efforts to include all of the soldiers in the grants, merely favoring those willing to pay the survey costs. Contrary to the authors’ assertions, Washington was extremely scrupulous in allocating the land, getting the Virginia Council to approve it twice, and a committee of officers to approve it twice. Then Washington formally offered to reallocate the land if anyone complained of unfairness. This offer remained open for a year and a half. But for Washington’s efforts, no one would have received anything.

Although the authors cite George III’s Declaration of 1763, forbidding settlement west of the Allegheny Mountains, as a casus belli, that Declaration was largely superseded by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 with the Iroquois and the Treaty of Lochaber in 1770 with the Cherokees.

Men were willing to die for Washington, and he was entrusted with the fate of the nation, twice receiving the unanimous vote of the Electoral College. The persons who actually knew Washington thought he was a great man. I would favor the opinion of Washington’s contemporaries over that of a couple of wise guys from NYU whom I would not trust with my lunch money.

Ambrose Richardson

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[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

George Washington reconsidered as a sleazy real estate speculator. Who can't love that? Or, how to reevaluate all the iconic presidents of American history as warm-up acts for the current imperial kleptocracy aborning.

[Jim Blessing · Rating 2 out of 5]

This was a decent read with some interesting parts.

[Danilo DiPietro · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent relook at how our presidents make the consequential decision to go to war. Very important reading.

[Chad Manske · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s “The Spoils of War” is a bracing, deeply cynical, and perversely exhilarating reframing of the American presidency through its wars. Drawing on selectorate theory and their earlier work in “The Dictator’s Handbook,” the authors argue that America’s “greatest” presidents earned that status not by selfless statecraft but by skillfully converting war into political capital and private gain. Across case studies from Washington and Madison to Lincoln, FDR, Johnson, and George W. Bush, they insist that the central question is never “Is this war good for the country?” but “Is this war good for the president and his coalition?” The book’s most unsettling through line is the empirical claim that presidential reputation rises with wartime bloodshed, creating a perverse incentive to choose policies that kill more people while inflating the commander in chief’s historical stature. The authors are at their most provocative dismantling presidential hagiography. Their Washington is less Cincinnatus than canny land speculator, whose revolutionary virtue conveniently aligns with the protection and expansion of elite property interests, including his own. Lincoln, meanwhile, is recast as a politician willing to maneuver the country to the brink of dissolution because only secession would give him the constitutional arithmetic to end slavery on his preferred terms—and secure the presidency along the way. Even FDR’s and LBJ’s war decisions are read through electoral calendars, coalition maintenance, and cost-shifting onto political opponents rather than grand strategy or moral necessity. For readers steeped in civil–military relations, the book is both invigorating and incomplete. Its ruthless focus on incentives and political survival slices cleanly through patriotic folklore, and its chapter-level narratives provide a useful counterpoint to more romantic accounts of presidential leadership. Yet in pushing the “it’s all greed and power” thesis, the authors often underplay structural constraints, bureaucratic friction, and genuine (if self-interested) ideological commitments that also shape wartime decision-making. Still, as a provocation it succeeds brilliantly. “The Spoils of War” forces you to ask, in every historical vignette and contemporary crisis, not “What does America want?” but “Who, exactly, is getting paid—in power, reputation, or money—for the bodies on the field?”

[Reza Amiri Praramadhan · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have read somewhere that for a leader of a state, a sure-fire way to revive flagging domestic popularity is by plunging the nation into war, and this book reinforces that view. Building with theories from their earlier book, the Dictator's Handbook, the authors sought to point out the ulterior motives behind some of the most famous wars America had fought, bringing out another side of famous US Presidents such as Washington, Madison, Lincoln, FDR, Johnson, W. Bush, Kennedy and Obama.

On a familiar, cynical note, Washington was exposed as waging Revolutionary war to secure his land holdings, Madison rewarded his supporters while punishing his opponents in War of 1812, Lincoln only emancipating slaves after it suited his political agenda, similar with FDR dilly-dallying in declaring war against the Nazi Germany and his reluctance with Civil Rights Agenda. Comparison between Presidents were also made. Vietnam War destroyed Johnson as he sought to put the cost of Vietnam War on his voters, while W. Bush put it on the cost of people who didn't vote for him. JFK's potentially apocalyptic bluff on Cuba succeeded while Obama's stance on Syria ended up galvanizing Putin on Ukraine.

While interesting reading on its own right, I found the cynical, realist nature of the book sometimes exasperating. However, I am quite interested in finding out more about correlation between war and popularity for each president. I am also looking forward to the updated edition as by the time I read this book, Trump sent troops to Iran, and learning about the motives behind it and how it affects his popularity.

[Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

De eerste paar hoofdstukken vond ik goed geschreven en de argumentatie was sterk en een stuk genuanceerder dan latere hoofdstukken. De laatste hoofdstukken kwam ik simpelweg niet door. De auteur verwijt veel andere schrijvers van the wisdom of hindsight. Maar verwijt vervolgens Roosevelt dat hij niet sneller reageerde op evil Duitsland. Dat zou eigen belang zijn geweest. De tegenargumenten dat het leger van de VS in slechte staat was en dat het veel Amerikaanse levens plus geld zou kosten wordt onvoldoende verkent. Achteraf is het makkelijk een gewonnen oorlog eerder beginnen. Net zo makkelijk als achteraf niet Irak binnen vallen op basis van slechte argumenten. Maar deed Bush dit echt alleen maar om herkozen te worden? Ik vind dat moeilijk te geloven en een simplistische stelling die niet wordt genuanceerd.

Drie sterren omdat de eerste twee hoofdstukken heel plezierig waren om te lezen. Geen vijf omdat ik de laatste hoofdstukken niet door kon komen.

[Rogier Potter van loon · Rating 3 out of 5]

After having read The Dictator's Handbook (TDH) and a description of this book, I had high expectations. As in TDH, the authors accurately show how personal rather than national interests drive leaders' decisions, including US presidents' decisions on wars. This message is, however, brought in a rather lengthy & repetitive manner (1/2 the pages would have sufficed to convey the information). Further, it is clearly written for an American audience, so the authors have to walk on eggshells when discussing practically deified presidents as Lincoln & Washington. This prevents the cold, factual & sarcastic descriptions that made me thoroughly enjoy TDH.

I find is a good book with an eye-opening message. Because of the narrow topic (American presidents & war) and the restrictions that brings, I did not enjoy it nearly as much as TDH.

[Alena Xuan · Rating 2 out of 5]

I think it is my aversion to modern history that makes this book so difficult for me to read. I wish that the authors would have spent more time on our founding fathers, because the best chapter BY FAR was on Washington. I also think they were too soon to write this with Obama…there was so much more they could have dissected (hello, economic crash of 2008).

[Saunaguy · Rating 3 out of 5]

https://digitalsauna.wordpress.com/20...

[Sasquatch Paddle · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good book to remind yourself to never really idolize a historical or political figure

[Max Hoffman · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was fine. Kind of interesting but so many hypothetical scenarios that had a lot of bias in them, I felt

[Alex MacMillan · Rating 1 out of 5]

Whenever the Catholic Church considers sainthood for someone, they first appoint a Devil's Advocate to see whether they can successfully tear down the canonization. In this highly flawed book, the authors try their best to do the same thing to US Presidents. Their "cynicism-explains-everything" approach to political science may have made sense for understanding how authoritarian regimes operate, but is a completely naive and myopic way to explain policy choices in a democracy. To me their criticisms could only come off as plausible to someone who has never read a biography about the President or an American history book explaining the period in which they lived. The FDR chapter was particularly laughable after having just finished a biography about him the day before.

For those still interested in reading about Presidential leadership or the hows and whys of Presidential rankings by professional historians (which these authors certainly are not), I'd recommend The Strategic President and Where They Stand instead.

[Mills College Library]

355.00973 B9286 2016