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Does History Make Sense?: Hegel on the Historical Shapes of Justice
Hegel's philosophy of history--which most critics view as a theory of inevitable progress toward modern European civilization--is widely regarded as a failure today. In Does History Make Sense? Terry Pinkard argues that Hegel's understanding of historical progress is not the kind of teleological or progressivist account that its detractors claim, but is based on a subtle understanding of human subjectivity.
Pinkard shows that for Hegel a break occurred between modernity and all that came before, when human beings found a new way to make sense of themselves as rational, self-aware creatures. In Hegel's view of history, different types of sense-making become viable as social conditions change and new forms of subjectivity emerge. At the core of these changes are evolving conceptions of justice--of who has authority to rule over others. In modern Europe, Hegel believes, an unprecedented understanding of justice as freedom arose, based on the notion that every man should rule himself. Freedom is a more robust form of justice than previous conceptions, so progress has indeed been made. But justice, like health, requires constant effort to sustain and cannot ever be fully achieved.
For Hegel, philosophy and history are inseparable. Pinkard's spirited defense of the Hegelian view of history will play a central role in contemporary reevaluations of the philosopher's work.
Pinkard shows that for Hegel a break occurred between modernity and all that came before, when human beings found a new way to make sense of themselves as rational, self-aware creatures. In Hegel's view of history, different types of sense-making become viable as social conditions change and new forms of subjectivity emerge. At the core of these changes are evolving conceptions of justice--of who has authority to rule over others. In modern Europe, Hegel believes, an unprecedented understanding of justice as freedom arose, based on the notion that every man should rule himself. Freedom is a more robust form of justice than previous conceptions, so progress has indeed been made. But justice, like health, requires constant effort to sustain and cannot ever be fully achieved.
For Hegel, philosophy and history are inseparable. Pinkard's spirited defense of the Hegelian view of history will play a central role in contemporary reevaluations of the philosopher's work.
288 pages, Hardcover
Published February 27, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
December 16, 2018
In this book, Pinkard has offered a compelling restatement of Hegel's philosophy of history for a contemporary audience. While Pinkard, along with Robert Pippen, had been known for their novel, and somewhat deflationary, reading of Hegel, emphasizing his continuity with Kant, in this book he present Hegel as a type of Aristotelian naturalist. Where Hegel differs from Aristotle and familiar contemporary naturalists such as Foot, Hursthouse, and Thompson, is in taking account of the role of history in the changing shapes of consciousness, or, one might say, forms of life, wherein human beings exercise their practical rationality.
For Pinkard's Hegel, human beings are self-conscious primates, and this distinguishing characteristic of self-consciousness is the basic driving factor behind human history. Whereas Fukuyama posited a desire for recognition as a basic element of human nature, Pinkard rejects this sort of appeal to a given fact about human nature. Instead, he argues that self-consciousness, when it encounters normative conflict, becomes a demand for justice, not as a mere fact about human nature, but as basic component of any attempt to make sense out of normative claims of any sort. Thus, self-consciousness functions as a type of "infinite end" that becomes a demand for justice understood as mutual freedom. This end is infinite because it is never completely achieved in the same way that health is an infinite end since one can never completely attain health the way that one might attain a discrete end.
The way in which Pinkard links these concepts together to some extent steps back from his more constructivist claims made previously. More specifically, he now claims that Hegel's master / slave passage is a not a story about how human beings enter into the space of reasons, not a story about how human beings become self-conscious. (He now claims that self-consciousness is a basic aspect of human nature.) Instead, it is a story about how justice becomes a fundamental "infinite end" driving human agency and history. Thus, as Pinkard interprets this passage, it involves the encounter and conflict between persons from rival communities with rival norms and conceptions of value. Through this sort of conflict, the need for the justification of authority becomes evident and the repeated, inadequate attempts at justification make evident the nature of justice as freedom for all. One way of understanding this is to claim that it offers something like an historical justification for a broadly Kantian concern for humanity as an end.
Much of Pinkard's book is devoted to critiquing Hegel's colonialist and somewhat racist understanding of China, India, and Africa. In short, Pinkard argues that this portion of Hegel's lecture on the philosophy of history rests both on inadequate empirical sources and are essentially unnecessary for Hegel's larger argument. Aside from this, Pinkard also goes to great lengths to sympathetically elaborate Hegel's historical narrative whereby the dawn of self-consciousness in ancient Greece developed into modern European society. The details of this history, while tendentious at points, are important because part of Hegel's aim (as Pinkard reads him) is to show that contemporary society offers the elements needed to become adequately self-conscious, to be satisfied with the justifications that we are able to provide for the normative requirements of our shared social world.
Thus, the somewhat arbitrary nature of the rise of modernity is not detrimental to the normative story that Pinkard's wishes tell, the story of the contemporary state as embodying, or capable of embodying, the final end, realized freedom. It is not detrimental because while history could have been somewhat different it necessarily involves elements of rights, universal moral norms, and particular institutions and mores if it is to adequately embody realized freedom and we must appeal to both to make sense of ourselves. To the extent that particular institutions give expression to justice they provide reasons for agents to support them even if we could imagine alternatives that may serve equally as well had history been different.
A question that Pinkard's book leaves open is the role of the divine in Hegel's philosophy of history. At one point, he notes that for Hegel history is in some sense the expression of divinity but he never addresses either the nature of this claim or its importance for Hegel's philosophy, also suggesting that Hegel position is ultimately atheistic. Thus, Pinkard has offered a compelling restatement of Hegel's philosophy of history but his work raises further questions about the relationship between Pinkard's Hegel and earlier, more ontotheological readings, such as that of Charles Taylor. It also raises important questions about the relationship between neo-Aristotelian naturalism and Pinkard's more Aristotelian trend in Hegelian interpretation. Arguably MacIntyre's Aristotelianism has incorporated much that Pinkard emphasizes in his reading of Hegel, suggesting the need for a better statement of the differences between Pinkard's Hegel and MacIntyre's Thomism.
For Pinkard's Hegel, human beings are self-conscious primates, and this distinguishing characteristic of self-consciousness is the basic driving factor behind human history. Whereas Fukuyama posited a desire for recognition as a basic element of human nature, Pinkard rejects this sort of appeal to a given fact about human nature. Instead, he argues that self-consciousness, when it encounters normative conflict, becomes a demand for justice, not as a mere fact about human nature, but as basic component of any attempt to make sense out of normative claims of any sort. Thus, self-consciousness functions as a type of "infinite end" that becomes a demand for justice understood as mutual freedom. This end is infinite because it is never completely achieved in the same way that health is an infinite end since one can never completely attain health the way that one might attain a discrete end.
The way in which Pinkard links these concepts together to some extent steps back from his more constructivist claims made previously. More specifically, he now claims that Hegel's master / slave passage is a not a story about how human beings enter into the space of reasons, not a story about how human beings become self-conscious. (He now claims that self-consciousness is a basic aspect of human nature.) Instead, it is a story about how justice becomes a fundamental "infinite end" driving human agency and history. Thus, as Pinkard interprets this passage, it involves the encounter and conflict between persons from rival communities with rival norms and conceptions of value. Through this sort of conflict, the need for the justification of authority becomes evident and the repeated, inadequate attempts at justification make evident the nature of justice as freedom for all. One way of understanding this is to claim that it offers something like an historical justification for a broadly Kantian concern for humanity as an end.
Much of Pinkard's book is devoted to critiquing Hegel's colonialist and somewhat racist understanding of China, India, and Africa. In short, Pinkard argues that this portion of Hegel's lecture on the philosophy of history rests both on inadequate empirical sources and are essentially unnecessary for Hegel's larger argument. Aside from this, Pinkard also goes to great lengths to sympathetically elaborate Hegel's historical narrative whereby the dawn of self-consciousness in ancient Greece developed into modern European society. The details of this history, while tendentious at points, are important because part of Hegel's aim (as Pinkard reads him) is to show that contemporary society offers the elements needed to become adequately self-conscious, to be satisfied with the justifications that we are able to provide for the normative requirements of our shared social world.
Thus, the somewhat arbitrary nature of the rise of modernity is not detrimental to the normative story that Pinkard's wishes tell, the story of the contemporary state as embodying, or capable of embodying, the final end, realized freedom. It is not detrimental because while history could have been somewhat different it necessarily involves elements of rights, universal moral norms, and particular institutions and mores if it is to adequately embody realized freedom and we must appeal to both to make sense of ourselves. To the extent that particular institutions give expression to justice they provide reasons for agents to support them even if we could imagine alternatives that may serve equally as well had history been different.
A question that Pinkard's book leaves open is the role of the divine in Hegel's philosophy of history. At one point, he notes that for Hegel history is in some sense the expression of divinity but he never addresses either the nature of this claim or its importance for Hegel's philosophy, also suggesting that Hegel position is ultimately atheistic. Thus, Pinkard has offered a compelling restatement of Hegel's philosophy of history but his work raises further questions about the relationship between Pinkard's Hegel and earlier, more ontotheological readings, such as that of Charles Taylor. It also raises important questions about the relationship between neo-Aristotelian naturalism and Pinkard's more Aristotelian trend in Hegelian interpretation. Arguably MacIntyre's Aristotelianism has incorporated much that Pinkard emphasizes in his reading of Hegel, suggesting the need for a better statement of the differences between Pinkard's Hegel and MacIntyre's Thomism.
October 29, 2017
This is a very clear exposition of Hegel's philosophy of history and its relevance today. He does an admirable job of translating and elucidating Hegel's terms, exposing his shortcomings and illustrating his relevance. I would have rated this book 4* (or even 5*) but the copy editing is extremely poor and there are numerous unforgivable simple syntactical errors. Well done Pinkard, shame Harvard University Press.
December 14, 2025
Very good overview of Hegel's philosophy of history and its material applicability beyond the pages of lecture notes.
i-want-money
March 11, 2017....and we just keep chipping away at that tired old strawman caricature of Hegel. And find him again in our everyday bowl of soup. You say you don't believe in 'progress', eh? Why then so disappointed in our current politics?
At any rate, with a name like Pinkard you know it's gotta be good. Now, where the hell is his trans the Phenom?
At any rate, with a name like Pinkard you know it's gotta be good. Now, where the hell is his trans the Phenom?
August 3, 2017
Fuck the democrats, fuck the republicans, fuck the independents, fuck the green party, fuck the rainbow party, fuck the libertarian party, fuck the muslims, fuck the fiddlers, fuck the immigrants, fuck the natives, fuck the city, fuck the town, fuck the flies, fuck the jungle, fuck me, fuck you, fuck groupthink, fuck newspapers, and fuck bananas. All you had to do, all 100,000,000 of you, was follow me in electing Georgetown Bard Pinkard as the head/nominee of the Hegelian Party and everybody could've been happy. Pinkard 2020, fuck the rest of them!
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews