The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions

by Philip Kitcher

During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal and social interests, who cooperate and compete with one another, he argues that, nonetheless, we may conceive the growth of science as a process in which both our vision of nature and our ways of learning more about nature improve. Offering a detailed picture of the advancement of science, he sets a new agenda for the philosophy of science and for other "science studies" disciplines.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Academic, Nonfiction, History Of Science

432 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1993

About the author

Philip Kitcher is John Dewey Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. He was the first recipient of the American Philosophical Association's Prometheus Prize for his work to expand the frontiers of science and philosophy.

Reviews

[Alexander Smith · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was greatly inspiring to my own work. It offers a philosophical formulation of Thomas Kuhn's "Structure" which is much closer to application than nearly all of the work prior, and yet it maintains really close relation to my understanding of what Thomas Kuhn meant. This work provides an excellent road map to some of the problems presented in prior epistemics, such that most realist (strong or weak) thinkers can develop their thoughts a little more concretely on the subject of philosophy and social studies of science and science knowledge.

Although the book itself had terrible timing. Had this book been developed in the early 1980s, perhaps augmentation to the sociology of science field would have put it on an entirely different trajectory, but alas. Much of the technical work on research games at the end is terribly simple, in my view, and needs to be adjusted such that it accounts for all of the varieties of options simultaneously rather than dealing with games individually as disjoint notions.

Also, the author focuses rather strongly on the the fallibility of individual cognizance, and how it can be used in the social relationship of science. I think from an empirical standpoint, this is rather hasty when such issues of sociology need revision first. We need a development of a more accurate social organization of scientific information prior to claiming how psychology affects these organizations.

All in all very inspiring, and helpful to anyone interested in the more philosophical and potential technical outcomes of social science of scientific process.