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China's Political System
The Chinese government is one of the most important actors in international affairs today. To thoroughly understand how the People’s Republic of China has grown in power requires a careful analysis of its political system. To what extent can China’s economic achievements be attributed to the country’s political system and its policies? What are the effects of economic modernization and global economic integration on the Chinese polity? Is the Chinese political system capable of adapting to changing economic, technological, social, and international conditions? Exploring these central questions, this definitive book provides readers with a comprehensive assessment of the preconditions, prospects, and risks associated with China’s political development.
542 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2004
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277 people want to read
About the author
Sebastian Heilmann
16 books2 followersSebastian Heilmann is a German political scientist and sinologist. The founding president of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, a Berlin think tank established in 2013, Heilmann has published on China's political system, economic policy and international relations.
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March 14, 2018
China's Political System is a comprehensive text analyzing the details of China's political systems. This book is written and compiled by the MERICS (Mercator Institute for China Studies) in Germany, and features multiple co-authors covering various topics, from social policy, to economic policy and so on. The book begins by analyzing the desire in China to maintain legitimacy through the CCP organs of the state, and the system of loyalty and party discipline that has made China one of the few successful (so far) one party states in the world today. The CCP (Communist Party of China) is the all powerful party in the state, and most if not all extensions of political administration, from the military and security systems, to political decision making, the judiciary, local governing bodies and so on, are somehow subordinate or connected to the CCP.
The CCP in China boasts of over 80 million members - more than the entire population of most countries in the world. This makes administrating and controlling such a vast apparatus a challenge. China does so by building systems of political patronage (called the cadre system) into the personnel and staffing models of governance. China's cadre system is a closely kept state secret. Lists of potential candidates for positions is considered top secret information (called a nomenklatura system) to reduce the impact of foreign political influencing. The CCP then branches out into subcommittees that examine and create policy for every aspect of Chinese society. These groups cover policies ranging from internal security, to economic development, managing interest rates, funding and procuring at various administrative levels, and so on. The trend since the opening up period beginning in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping has been a gradual decentralization of political power from the centre to the periphery - however this trend has been altered under current leader Xi Jinping. Under Xi, a re-centralization of political power has occurred, seemingly to combat graft and corruption in the highest organs of the CCP. This centralization has taken the form of creating Leading Small Groups which have become the ultimate authority over some sphere's of Chinese society - namely economic growth, wealth management, administration and staffing and defence.
China's political system under the CCP is remarkably robust. It is interesting to examine why and how China has been able to achieve massive growth rates with seemingly no internal political conflicts or calls for greater personal representation by the average Chinese citizen. Western economic logic posits that greater economic mobility and freedom is followed by the desire for greater political rights. This has not been the case in China so far. Aside from the Tiananmen Square tragedy in the late 1980's, calls for democratic reform in China have been mute. Most conflicts seem to take place at a local level, and China has tackled this problem both by expanding the scope of local administration and encouraging quicker resolutions to conflicts at the local level, and by expanding the state security apparatus to tackle issues that cannot be solved this way. The CCP also seemingly has models for political control at the central level to combat crises. One such model encourages two forms of control; one for crisis mode characterized by centralized control by higher level CCP bodies (such as now under Xi Jinping), and one for more calm political moments, characterized by decentralization of power (the previous two administrations). Another model is the "dual track" system of growth. China has been adept at political and economic experimentation, but has had difficulties with dogmatic/conservative elements of its own party. This has been deftly handled by creating "two tracks." One is the old way of doing things, one the new way. This ensures that successful thinking on the new track is slowly examined and adopted at all levels and replaces the old track way of thinking.
Under the CCP, China has experienced remarkable levels of growth since the late 1970's. This growth has led to massive levels of poverty reduction in China, and has seen a nearly total alteration of the traditional methods of economic planning and administration in China. Growth has been characterized first in the coastal trading hubs (Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong etc.). This led to an extension of growth policies to internal provinces. Subsequently, many internal provinces and autonomous regions (such as Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang etc.) have also experienced rapid growth led by resource extraction and manufacturing. Even so, a massive shift into tertiary sectors has begun in China as the cost of labour in China has risen to more competitive levels in recent years. This has been characterized by policies of economic liberalization in China, and the creation of many companies both as State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) for industries necessary to China's internal security (for example, development banks, energy firms, infrastructure firms etc.) and private firms. However, the trend of SOE involvement in the Chinese economy is on the wane in recent years. China has seen a reduction of a majority of SOE's, as many have been sold off, reorganized or combined to promote productivity and efficiency in various fields.
China's economy has been largely commodified as it seeks integration into global marketplaces and looks to change its economy from a centrally planned one, to one based on market forces. This has been a slow and dangerous path for China, but one it has been carefully and skillfully navigating. China has maintained autocratic control over its market forces - seemingly a contradiction. While China's economy is vastly more liberalized than that under Mao, it is certainly still largely controlled by the CCP. The CCP and its organs maintain interest rates, have sway (though less so) over currency values, staff economic administrative posts directly, and closely monitor the fairly new stock exchanges in China. However, China has also begun to liberalize its currency, joined the WTO (with subsequent policy changes), expanded the sway of the private sector, and has encouraged greater participation in the market for its average citizenry. These moves adhere to the long term strategic plan China has for its domestic economy. It seems China would like to move to a more consumer orientated economy, transitioning from its curretn status as an export economy. China has the largest domestic market in the world, and many multi-billion dollar consumer companies thrive just within the Chinese market for consumer goods. Transitions in economic planning, administration, financing and so on all point toward this trend of slowly transforming the Chinese economy.
On the home front, Chinese political adminstration is complex due to the size and scope of the nation. 1.6 billion+ people, 80 million members of the CCP, millions of soldiers and police, hundreds of millions of local administrators, service people and local government workers - all in need of management in a top down autocratic society. The staffing and personnel issues alone are almost baffling, and China indeed struggles from many internal pressures in regards to its political organization. The CCP seems to try and delegate as many issues as possible to the local level, while maintaining control of larger "big picture" categories like economic development, internal and external security, and staffing/HR practices. These bigger categories are characterized by a focus on party discipline, strict doctrine, and technocratic training - seemingly contradictory, but very useful in both promoting and encouraging change and growth, while maintaining overall political control. As the authors mention, power becomes more decentralized as one moves to lower administrative levels, sheerly because of the massive scale of the Chinese bureacracy. This means issues are often able to be resolved at lower levels - a plus, but also that corruption issues at the local level are hard to police. This issue has become a focus of the Xi governmnet - and steps to incorporate aspects of the judiciary, open up the legal system to greater liberalizations through the legalization of private law practices, and the reintroduction of more overt state security and monitoring practices are all steps being taken to curb local corruption. This issue also exists at higher levels due to the cadre system of political patronage incorporated into Chinese staffing models. This means powerful politicians often build large followings of subordinates directly reliant on the "big cheese" for political survival. It also encourages politicians to see payments in kind as part of doing business. This form of corruption is often called "dividend collection" and has upsides and downsides. On the one hand, it increases the speed that transactions can take place - useful in an economy trying to change and reorganize. It can help protect certain sectors from foreign takeover, and can reduce predatory corruption by institutionalizing graft and heavily punishing those who step out of bounds (ie. with capital punishment). However, the downsides of this form of corruption are obvious, and this is a systemic problem in China that the government seems willing to combat with extreme prejudice.
This book contains numerous other interesting tidbits, such as China's informal federalism in terms of devolving political control, the United Front of non-CCP parties aligned with the CCP, China's seemingly apolitical middle class, the organization of the Chinese military and police services, the governing of special administrative regions, autonomous regions, "municipalities" (four large cities direclty controlled by the national government) and so on. This was an authoritatve read on the subject of China's political system, and offers loads of detail, facts and figures on how China is governed, how funding systems work, and the organization and administration of the nation. The book is heavily sourced without being cumbersome, and features a fantastic source list for further study. This is probably the best broad scope overview of the Chinese system currently available in print, and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in the subject of Chinese politics. It is unbiased, critical and fascinating, and I would recommend a read if you have gotten this far and like what you are reading.
The CCP in China boasts of over 80 million members - more than the entire population of most countries in the world. This makes administrating and controlling such a vast apparatus a challenge. China does so by building systems of political patronage (called the cadre system) into the personnel and staffing models of governance. China's cadre system is a closely kept state secret. Lists of potential candidates for positions is considered top secret information (called a nomenklatura system) to reduce the impact of foreign political influencing. The CCP then branches out into subcommittees that examine and create policy for every aspect of Chinese society. These groups cover policies ranging from internal security, to economic development, managing interest rates, funding and procuring at various administrative levels, and so on. The trend since the opening up period beginning in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping has been a gradual decentralization of political power from the centre to the periphery - however this trend has been altered under current leader Xi Jinping. Under Xi, a re-centralization of political power has occurred, seemingly to combat graft and corruption in the highest organs of the CCP. This centralization has taken the form of creating Leading Small Groups which have become the ultimate authority over some sphere's of Chinese society - namely economic growth, wealth management, administration and staffing and defence.
China's political system under the CCP is remarkably robust. It is interesting to examine why and how China has been able to achieve massive growth rates with seemingly no internal political conflicts or calls for greater personal representation by the average Chinese citizen. Western economic logic posits that greater economic mobility and freedom is followed by the desire for greater political rights. This has not been the case in China so far. Aside from the Tiananmen Square tragedy in the late 1980's, calls for democratic reform in China have been mute. Most conflicts seem to take place at a local level, and China has tackled this problem both by expanding the scope of local administration and encouraging quicker resolutions to conflicts at the local level, and by expanding the state security apparatus to tackle issues that cannot be solved this way. The CCP also seemingly has models for political control at the central level to combat crises. One such model encourages two forms of control; one for crisis mode characterized by centralized control by higher level CCP bodies (such as now under Xi Jinping), and one for more calm political moments, characterized by decentralization of power (the previous two administrations). Another model is the "dual track" system of growth. China has been adept at political and economic experimentation, but has had difficulties with dogmatic/conservative elements of its own party. This has been deftly handled by creating "two tracks." One is the old way of doing things, one the new way. This ensures that successful thinking on the new track is slowly examined and adopted at all levels and replaces the old track way of thinking.
Under the CCP, China has experienced remarkable levels of growth since the late 1970's. This growth has led to massive levels of poverty reduction in China, and has seen a nearly total alteration of the traditional methods of economic planning and administration in China. Growth has been characterized first in the coastal trading hubs (Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong etc.). This led to an extension of growth policies to internal provinces. Subsequently, many internal provinces and autonomous regions (such as Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang etc.) have also experienced rapid growth led by resource extraction and manufacturing. Even so, a massive shift into tertiary sectors has begun in China as the cost of labour in China has risen to more competitive levels in recent years. This has been characterized by policies of economic liberalization in China, and the creation of many companies both as State Owned Enterprises (SOE's) for industries necessary to China's internal security (for example, development banks, energy firms, infrastructure firms etc.) and private firms. However, the trend of SOE involvement in the Chinese economy is on the wane in recent years. China has seen a reduction of a majority of SOE's, as many have been sold off, reorganized or combined to promote productivity and efficiency in various fields.
China's economy has been largely commodified as it seeks integration into global marketplaces and looks to change its economy from a centrally planned one, to one based on market forces. This has been a slow and dangerous path for China, but one it has been carefully and skillfully navigating. China has maintained autocratic control over its market forces - seemingly a contradiction. While China's economy is vastly more liberalized than that under Mao, it is certainly still largely controlled by the CCP. The CCP and its organs maintain interest rates, have sway (though less so) over currency values, staff economic administrative posts directly, and closely monitor the fairly new stock exchanges in China. However, China has also begun to liberalize its currency, joined the WTO (with subsequent policy changes), expanded the sway of the private sector, and has encouraged greater participation in the market for its average citizenry. These moves adhere to the long term strategic plan China has for its domestic economy. It seems China would like to move to a more consumer orientated economy, transitioning from its curretn status as an export economy. China has the largest domestic market in the world, and many multi-billion dollar consumer companies thrive just within the Chinese market for consumer goods. Transitions in economic planning, administration, financing and so on all point toward this trend of slowly transforming the Chinese economy.
On the home front, Chinese political adminstration is complex due to the size and scope of the nation. 1.6 billion+ people, 80 million members of the CCP, millions of soldiers and police, hundreds of millions of local administrators, service people and local government workers - all in need of management in a top down autocratic society. The staffing and personnel issues alone are almost baffling, and China indeed struggles from many internal pressures in regards to its political organization. The CCP seems to try and delegate as many issues as possible to the local level, while maintaining control of larger "big picture" categories like economic development, internal and external security, and staffing/HR practices. These bigger categories are characterized by a focus on party discipline, strict doctrine, and technocratic training - seemingly contradictory, but very useful in both promoting and encouraging change and growth, while maintaining overall political control. As the authors mention, power becomes more decentralized as one moves to lower administrative levels, sheerly because of the massive scale of the Chinese bureacracy. This means issues are often able to be resolved at lower levels - a plus, but also that corruption issues at the local level are hard to police. This issue has become a focus of the Xi governmnet - and steps to incorporate aspects of the judiciary, open up the legal system to greater liberalizations through the legalization of private law practices, and the reintroduction of more overt state security and monitoring practices are all steps being taken to curb local corruption. This issue also exists at higher levels due to the cadre system of political patronage incorporated into Chinese staffing models. This means powerful politicians often build large followings of subordinates directly reliant on the "big cheese" for political survival. It also encourages politicians to see payments in kind as part of doing business. This form of corruption is often called "dividend collection" and has upsides and downsides. On the one hand, it increases the speed that transactions can take place - useful in an economy trying to change and reorganize. It can help protect certain sectors from foreign takeover, and can reduce predatory corruption by institutionalizing graft and heavily punishing those who step out of bounds (ie. with capital punishment). However, the downsides of this form of corruption are obvious, and this is a systemic problem in China that the government seems willing to combat with extreme prejudice.
This book contains numerous other interesting tidbits, such as China's informal federalism in terms of devolving political control, the United Front of non-CCP parties aligned with the CCP, China's seemingly apolitical middle class, the organization of the Chinese military and police services, the governing of special administrative regions, autonomous regions, "municipalities" (four large cities direclty controlled by the national government) and so on. This was an authoritatve read on the subject of China's political system, and offers loads of detail, facts and figures on how China is governed, how funding systems work, and the organization and administration of the nation. The book is heavily sourced without being cumbersome, and features a fantastic source list for further study. This is probably the best broad scope overview of the Chinese system currently available in print, and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in the subject of Chinese politics. It is unbiased, critical and fascinating, and I would recommend a read if you have gotten this far and like what you are reading.
July 11, 2018
My first experience with a textbook like political book. Very informative and also accessible. Uses dynamic analysis approaches instead of trying to apply universal laws or place one phenomenon at the center of attention. A bit dry but it is worth the effort.
June 20, 2024
"If we look at these three traditional goals during the decades when business with China was rapidly growing, there is one unavoidable and sobering conclusion: neither rapid economic and technological growth nor the extensive involvement of China in the global economy have led to domestic liberalization or international political integration of China based on Western ideals." (Heilmann 426)
This book, written by the founder of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, is clearly meant to be a repository of facts and analyses to help forces like the US State Department better understand their enemy. For that purpose, it makes a compelling and potentially even more educational read for Marxist-Leninists in the United States.
It must be claimed at the start that the author's political analysis is postmodernist, comparative political science trash. (For instance, he insists that China's political model sits outside of known political ideologies; would rather accept that the Party is bound by "network capitalism" rather than any Leninist concepts; and thinks that the masses are bribed into cooperation with the "political elite" through receiving boundless public services and goods).
That said, he doggedly fans out fact after fact to help readers determine the efficacy of the economic reforms and their relationship to the Party and masses; the Party's relationship to the economy; what forces and classes in society are changing; why the Party is so adaptive and more dynamic than the Soviet Union's was; what its priorities and major projects are; and more. He tells you what new departments and oversight groups emerged from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. He even comes to the conclusion that the CPC stays in power because it excels at adapting its approach to conditions and uses local initiatives and outcomes to realize and strengthen a greater political vision with clear goals and a cognizant understanding of its ideology (even if Heilmann insists that that ideology is not real). What he calls the Party's skill with "crisis-mode campaign styles," an ML in the US might read as "the mass line!"
Fun story: I have Weber's How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate next in line to read, and after just flipping through it for a few minutes, I found citations for another one of Heilmann's books!
Another great thing about reading this book is that its hundreds of pages point to a conclusion Heilmann has dejectedly drawn: that with the rapid changes brought on by Deng's administration and much economic liberalization, the Party has waged a struggle against a line to loosen political oversight over the economy and come out on top. Initiatives and bodies have been established to reverse-course while still allowing for economic reforms to add dynamism to the Chinese economy. SOEs are still the dominant force in the industrial economy, and largely private businesses in China are small and kept that way. Cadre are present at every level of management, training, and oversight. Advocates of bringing in more foreign investment are encountering more obstacles in furthering this agenda. Measures are in place to favor Chinese companies in all new industries like ICT and media. Censorship is not going anywhere. Bolstering the military, especially maritime forces, is a primary objective. Boosting domestic demand and killing the second economy is of great interest, and China still will not give in to WTO's demands to sign the Government Agreement of Procurement (which would force them to turn over their domestic consumption power to foreign companies).
Xi Jinping in particular is determined to bring back ML Party discipline full force and to root out corruption, and, according to Heilmann, is "fixated" on destroying any chances that the CPC will walk the path of Gorbachev. China's days of export-based economy are over.
The seeds for a capitalist restoration are definitely still there, with Heilmann cheering the prospect on heartily. Corruption within the Party exists, spurred on by and spurring on a growing second economy of capitalists who are more interested than ever in becoming monopoly capitalists. But even he must admit that with the current orientation of the Xi administration, the initiative will not come from within the government in the style of a coup or a split. It would stem from the contradiction between centralized governmental leadership and local experimentation with markets in practice. He sees them as mutually exclusive to one another and thinks that a centralized government will impede local experimentation and lead to social turmoil and unhappiness. He uses the USSR versus China as an example.
But less myopic, less ideologically-bought off observers will note that it is the presence of a thriving Party and dictatorship of the working class that helps China take steps to resolve the contradictions and inequality sharpened by the economic reforms, and the violent dismantling of that Party in the USSR that made socialism collapse in the face of economic stagnation. Against his original intention, Heilmann gives the reader plenty of facts to make the connection between Party leadership and a tight rein on the leaders of the new market forces.
Whether he knows it or not, if you're a communist interested in how China is keeping the dictatorship of the proletariat well and alive, Heilmann has written this book just for you!
This book, written by the founder of the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin, is clearly meant to be a repository of facts and analyses to help forces like the US State Department better understand their enemy. For that purpose, it makes a compelling and potentially even more educational read for Marxist-Leninists in the United States.
It must be claimed at the start that the author's political analysis is postmodernist, comparative political science trash. (For instance, he insists that China's political model sits outside of known political ideologies; would rather accept that the Party is bound by "network capitalism" rather than any Leninist concepts; and thinks that the masses are bribed into cooperation with the "political elite" through receiving boundless public services and goods).
That said, he doggedly fans out fact after fact to help readers determine the efficacy of the economic reforms and their relationship to the Party and masses; the Party's relationship to the economy; what forces and classes in society are changing; why the Party is so adaptive and more dynamic than the Soviet Union's was; what its priorities and major projects are; and more. He tells you what new departments and oversight groups emerged from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. He even comes to the conclusion that the CPC stays in power because it excels at adapting its approach to conditions and uses local initiatives and outcomes to realize and strengthen a greater political vision with clear goals and a cognizant understanding of its ideology (even if Heilmann insists that that ideology is not real). What he calls the Party's skill with "crisis-mode campaign styles," an ML in the US might read as "the mass line!"
Fun story: I have Weber's How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate next in line to read, and after just flipping through it for a few minutes, I found citations for another one of Heilmann's books!
Another great thing about reading this book is that its hundreds of pages point to a conclusion Heilmann has dejectedly drawn: that with the rapid changes brought on by Deng's administration and much economic liberalization, the Party has waged a struggle against a line to loosen political oversight over the economy and come out on top. Initiatives and bodies have been established to reverse-course while still allowing for economic reforms to add dynamism to the Chinese economy. SOEs are still the dominant force in the industrial economy, and largely private businesses in China are small and kept that way. Cadre are present at every level of management, training, and oversight. Advocates of bringing in more foreign investment are encountering more obstacles in furthering this agenda. Measures are in place to favor Chinese companies in all new industries like ICT and media. Censorship is not going anywhere. Bolstering the military, especially maritime forces, is a primary objective. Boosting domestic demand and killing the second economy is of great interest, and China still will not give in to WTO's demands to sign the Government Agreement of Procurement (which would force them to turn over their domestic consumption power to foreign companies).
Xi Jinping in particular is determined to bring back ML Party discipline full force and to root out corruption, and, according to Heilmann, is "fixated" on destroying any chances that the CPC will walk the path of Gorbachev. China's days of export-based economy are over.
The seeds for a capitalist restoration are definitely still there, with Heilmann cheering the prospect on heartily. Corruption within the Party exists, spurred on by and spurring on a growing second economy of capitalists who are more interested than ever in becoming monopoly capitalists. But even he must admit that with the current orientation of the Xi administration, the initiative will not come from within the government in the style of a coup or a split. It would stem from the contradiction between centralized governmental leadership and local experimentation with markets in practice. He sees them as mutually exclusive to one another and thinks that a centralized government will impede local experimentation and lead to social turmoil and unhappiness. He uses the USSR versus China as an example.
But less myopic, less ideologically-bought off observers will note that it is the presence of a thriving Party and dictatorship of the working class that helps China take steps to resolve the contradictions and inequality sharpened by the economic reforms, and the violent dismantling of that Party in the USSR that made socialism collapse in the face of economic stagnation. Against his original intention, Heilmann gives the reader plenty of facts to make the connection between Party leadership and a tight rein on the leaders of the new market forces.
Whether he knows it or not, if you're a communist interested in how China is keeping the dictatorship of the proletariat well and alive, Heilmann has written this book just for you!
September 5, 2017
On the whole, a very academic study of Chinese politics, and as such, very different in format or approach to more familiar titles such as The Party or The Hundred Year Marathon.
While one is unlikely to find this account as readable as the other titles available, this is, however, by far the most comprehensive and informative of all titles on Chinese politics.
The book takes a comprehensive, segmented analysis of the modes of governance in China, with a complete and comprehensive overview of China's political system.
The book is largely fact based, although not without analysis, as the last chapter is primarily an analytical chapter and a projection on the outlook for China.
While this book can be read by all, it is more intended for Sinologists who want a complete and comprehensive overview of China's political structure. For those who want a more simplified and readable version, The Party by Richard McGregor is perhaps the best available, however, Heilmann's study is by far and away the most informative, and the most strongly recommended for China watchers who want a complete understanding.
While one is unlikely to find this account as readable as the other titles available, this is, however, by far the most comprehensive and informative of all titles on Chinese politics.
The book takes a comprehensive, segmented analysis of the modes of governance in China, with a complete and comprehensive overview of China's political system.
The book is largely fact based, although not without analysis, as the last chapter is primarily an analytical chapter and a projection on the outlook for China.
While this book can be read by all, it is more intended for Sinologists who want a complete and comprehensive overview of China's political structure. For those who want a more simplified and readable version, The Party by Richard McGregor is perhaps the best available, however, Heilmann's study is by far and away the most informative, and the most strongly recommended for China watchers who want a complete understanding.
July 2, 2019
Lets do a thing!
look at the chart of the top 10 Gdp per country. Note number 2 (as of this writing - April 2nd 2018), it's china! Perhaps you come from a super Euro-centric western country and know just about nothing regarding the internal state of china - save for what you learned in mulan, something about ancestors, and a wall, that you cans see from space (Please test this elon musk oh holy creator of this simulation we call reality), well, would you like to know about china? This book pretty much takes apart most aspects of china's political structure, with lots of charts numbers and symbols to represent cool things. I would never go so far as to state this is a comprehensive overview of china in any regard, but it is certainty a good start to understanding china from the perspective of a foreigner.
I advocate before approaching this text gaining at least a superficial footing within the ideas of Confucianism and legalism. Not because the book heavily works upon these philosophical school of thoughts, but rather it will prime you into understanding some ideas within Chinese culture
look at the chart of the top 10 Gdp per country. Note number 2 (as of this writing - April 2nd 2018), it's china! Perhaps you come from a super Euro-centric western country and know just about nothing regarding the internal state of china - save for what you learned in mulan, something about ancestors, and a wall, that you cans see from space (Please test this elon musk oh holy creator of this simulation we call reality), well, would you like to know about china? This book pretty much takes apart most aspects of china's political structure, with lots of charts numbers and symbols to represent cool things. I would never go so far as to state this is a comprehensive overview of china in any regard, but it is certainty a good start to understanding china from the perspective of a foreigner.
I advocate before approaching this text gaining at least a superficial footing within the ideas of Confucianism and legalism. Not because the book heavily works upon these philosophical school of thoughts, but rather it will prime you into understanding some ideas within Chinese culture
August 14, 2023
Ok for what it was, but I thought a bit messy and inconsistent.
As a textbook it’s ok (do NOT read it cover to cover like I did, that was stupid), but I don’t think the structure is great, it kinda blends some theoretical chapters with policy areas, then examples, and idk. I think more, smaller chapters with some theory integrated throughout might be better.
Also I get that they’re an institute so that’s why they had different people write different sections. But honestly some of the people are not great writers (English almost certainly isn’t their first language so I don’t blame them but it does make the book a bit harder to absorb).
As a textbook it’s ok (do NOT read it cover to cover like I did, that was stupid), but I don’t think the structure is great, it kinda blends some theoretical chapters with policy areas, then examples, and idk. I think more, smaller chapters with some theory integrated throughout might be better.
Also I get that they’re an institute so that’s why they had different people write different sections. But honestly some of the people are not great writers (English almost certainly isn’t their first language so I don’t blame them but it does make the book a bit harder to absorb).
July 18, 2021
I bought this book because it appeared comprehensive (it is!) and especially because it has a section on “analytical approaches to Chinese politics”. In that section, it discusses six different models / lenses for analyzing China, providing strengths, weaknesses, and references for each.
This book is almost an encyclopedia. It’s a slog to read all the way through, but it covers a lot of ground. This is not for a casual reader. All that said, as an academic work, it’s five stars. I’ll be using this as a reference for many upcoming papers I have to write :)
This book is almost an encyclopedia. It’s a slog to read all the way through, but it covers a lot of ground. This is not for a casual reader. All that said, as an academic work, it’s five stars. I’ll be using this as a reference for many upcoming papers I have to write :)
February 17, 2022
This is the book I wish I had read before moving to China (I read it after I left). It explains many obvious things about which you find explanations nowhere else.
Definitely one of the best boring books I ever read.
Definitely one of the best boring books I ever read.
September 11, 2017
A must-read for all aspiring sinologists.
November 3, 2021
Solid, detailed, technocratic textbook. Ends with a series of great policy case studies. Good discussion on political economy structure. A bit dry.
August 31, 2020
Großartiges Buch, bietet einen vielschichtigen Überblick über China, beleuchtet die Aspekte des Systems aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven, erläutert es anhand von Fallbeispielen und geht in die Tiefe. Es schafft es auch weitgehend, eine zu starke Pro- oder Anti-China Perspektive zu vermeiden, was bei dem Thema sehr selten ist.
Für ein Sachbuch ist es sogar überraschend gut zu lesen. Die Zukunftsspekulation im Abschluss beweist, obwohl seit der Veröffentlichung 2015 weltpolitisch einiges passiert ist, schon erstaunlichen Wahrheitsgehalt.
Mein einziger Kritikpunkt ist, dass es zu häufig orthodoxe ökonomische Ansichten als absolut wahr darstellt und auf deren Basis Vorhersagen ausspricht, obwohl der wirtschaftliche Erfolg Chinas sehr oft den Gegenbeweis für die ökonomische Orthodoxie liefert.
Leseempfehlung für jeden der sich tiefgreifend mit Chinas Politik beschäftigen will!
Für ein Sachbuch ist es sogar überraschend gut zu lesen. Die Zukunftsspekulation im Abschluss beweist, obwohl seit der Veröffentlichung 2015 weltpolitisch einiges passiert ist, schon erstaunlichen Wahrheitsgehalt.
Mein einziger Kritikpunkt ist, dass es zu häufig orthodoxe ökonomische Ansichten als absolut wahr darstellt und auf deren Basis Vorhersagen ausspricht, obwohl der wirtschaftliche Erfolg Chinas sehr oft den Gegenbeweis für die ökonomische Orthodoxie liefert.
Leseempfehlung für jeden der sich tiefgreifend mit Chinas Politik beschäftigen will!
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