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Cambridge Philosophy Classics
Dilemmas: The Tarner Lectures 1953
Common sense tells me I can control my life to some extent; should I then, faced with a logical argument for fatalism, reject common sense? There seems to be no place in a physical theory of the universe for the sensory experiences of colours, taste and smells, yet I know I have these experiences. In this book, Gilbert Ryle explores the conflicts that arise in everyday life and shows that the either/or which such dilemmas seem to suggest is a false one side of the dilemma does not deny what we know to be true on the other side. This classic book has been revived in a new series livery for twenty-first-century readers, featuring a specially commissioned preface written by Barry Stroud.
120 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1954
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132 people want to read
About the author
Gilbert Ryle
77 books88 followersGilbert Ryle was a British philosopher, and a representative of the generation of British ordinary language philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein's insights into language, and is principally known for his critique of Cartesian dualism, for which he coined the phrase "the ghost in the machine". Some of his ideas in the philosophy of mind have been referred to as "behaviourist" (not to be confused with the psychological behaviourism of B. F. Skinner and John B. Watson). Ryle himself said that the "general trend of this book [The Concept of Mind, p. 327] will undoubtedly, and harmlessly, be stigmatised as 'behaviourist'."
Ryle was born in Brighton, England in 1900. The young Ryle grew up in an environment of learning. His father was a generalist who had interests in philosophy and astronomy, and passed on to his children an impressive library. Ryle was initially educated at Brighton College. In 1919, he went to Queen's College at Oxford, initially to study Classics but was quickly drawn to Philosophy. He would graduate with first class honours in 1924 and was appointed to a lectureship in Philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford. A year later, he was to become a tutor. Ryle remained at Christ Church until World War II.
A capable linguist, he was recruited to intelligence work during World War II, after which he returned to Oxford and was elected Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy and Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. He published his principal work, The Concept of Mind, in 1949. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1945 to 1946, and editor of the philosophical journal Mind from 1947 to 1971. Ryle died on 6 October 1976 at Whitby, North Yorkshire.
Traditional philosophy believed that the task of a philosopher was to study mental as opposed to physical objects. Ryle believed it was no longer possible for philosophers to believe this. However, in its place, Ryle saw the tendency of philosophers to search for objects whose nature was neither physical nor mental. Ryle believed, instead, that "[p]hilosophical problems are problems of a certain sort; they are not problems of an ordinary sort about special entities."
Ryle offers the analogy of philosophy as being like cartography. Competent speakers of a language, Ryle believes, are to a philosopher what ordinary villagers are to a mapmaker. The ordinary villager has a competent grasp of his village, and is familiar with its inhabitants and geography. However, when asked to consult a map for the same knowledge he has practically, the villager will have difficulty until she is able to translate her practical knowledge into universal cartographal terms. The villager thinks of the village in personal and practical terms while the mapmaker thinks of the village in neutral, public, cartographical terms.
By "mapping" the words and phrases of a particular statement, philosophers are able to generate what Ryle calls "implication threads." In other words, each word or phrase of a statement contributes to the statement in that, if the words or phrases were changed, the statement would have a different implication. The philosopher must show the directions and limits of different implication threads that a "concept contributes to the statements in which it occurs." To show this, he must be "tugging" at neighbouring threads, which, in turn, must also be "tugging." Philosophy, then, searches for the meaning of these implication threads in the statements in which they are used.
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle admits to having been taken in by the body-mind dualism which permeates Western philosophy, and claims that the idea of Mind as an independent entity, inhabiting and governing the body, should be rejected as a redundant piece of literalism carried over from the era before the biological sciences became established. The proper function of Mind-body language, he suggests, is to describe how higher organisms such as humans demo
Ryle was born in Brighton, England in 1900. The young Ryle grew up in an environment of learning. His father was a generalist who had interests in philosophy and astronomy, and passed on to his children an impressive library. Ryle was initially educated at Brighton College. In 1919, he went to Queen's College at Oxford, initially to study Classics but was quickly drawn to Philosophy. He would graduate with first class honours in 1924 and was appointed to a lectureship in Philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford. A year later, he was to become a tutor. Ryle remained at Christ Church until World War II.
A capable linguist, he was recruited to intelligence work during World War II, after which he returned to Oxford and was elected Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy and Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. He published his principal work, The Concept of Mind, in 1949. He was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1945 to 1946, and editor of the philosophical journal Mind from 1947 to 1971. Ryle died on 6 October 1976 at Whitby, North Yorkshire.
Traditional philosophy believed that the task of a philosopher was to study mental as opposed to physical objects. Ryle believed it was no longer possible for philosophers to believe this. However, in its place, Ryle saw the tendency of philosophers to search for objects whose nature was neither physical nor mental. Ryle believed, instead, that "[p]hilosophical problems are problems of a certain sort; they are not problems of an ordinary sort about special entities."
Ryle offers the analogy of philosophy as being like cartography. Competent speakers of a language, Ryle believes, are to a philosopher what ordinary villagers are to a mapmaker. The ordinary villager has a competent grasp of his village, and is familiar with its inhabitants and geography. However, when asked to consult a map for the same knowledge he has practically, the villager will have difficulty until she is able to translate her practical knowledge into universal cartographal terms. The villager thinks of the village in personal and practical terms while the mapmaker thinks of the village in neutral, public, cartographical terms.
By "mapping" the words and phrases of a particular statement, philosophers are able to generate what Ryle calls "implication threads." In other words, each word or phrase of a statement contributes to the statement in that, if the words or phrases were changed, the statement would have a different implication. The philosopher must show the directions and limits of different implication threads that a "concept contributes to the statements in which it occurs." To show this, he must be "tugging" at neighbouring threads, which, in turn, must also be "tugging." Philosophy, then, searches for the meaning of these implication threads in the statements in which they are used.
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle admits to having been taken in by the body-mind dualism which permeates Western philosophy, and claims that the idea of Mind as an independent entity, inhabiting and governing the body, should be rejected as a redundant piece of literalism carried over from the era before the biological sciences became established. The proper function of Mind-body language, he suggests, is to describe how higher organisms such as humans demo
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
September 14, 2018
On The Horns Of
For such a short book Ryle takes awfully long to state his points. Granted it's a transcript of a series of public lectures and not a set of polished essays but a red pencil would have come in handy.
Potentially a rich topic, the issue is recognizing the nature of choices between different world views and Ryle chooses eight examples to illustrate his arguments- A: science vs religion, B: fatalism vs free will, C: Zeno's paradox of Achilles racing the tortoise, D: hedonistic vs utilitarian ethics, E: scientific rigor vs. everyday pragmatism, F: technical vs non-technical frameworks, G: whether reality needs to match the world we perceive and H: the logician's choice between applying formal logic vs informal rhetoric. Ryle confesses he's less interested in the outcome of the dilemmas than in how one chooses between them.
Zeno's non-paradox could have been dismissed in a paragraph or two - mathematically it's simply a question of mathematical limits where time and the traversal of space are reduced at the same rate to the infinitesimally small. The reason Zeno never catches up to the tortoise is that he's never given enough time to do so.
The other dilemmas resolve into utilitarian choices as to which interpretation works best for a particular end. Cases E, F, H and arguably A are highly similar pitting rigorous frameworks which while exacting and precise are too detailed for everyday use. G revolves the philosophical concerns as to whether or not we can believe our senses or our judgement about them as to the nature of the world. Yet, Ryle argues, that we know from the start that our senses are flawed and our interpretations are error prone, does not negate that they are connected to and serviceable approximations of reality. B, fatalism vs free will rests on the difference between looking forward into the future vs. looking backwards into the past, or in Ryle's language, the difference between anterior and posterior truths. Before an event occurs the outcome, though anticipated is largely unknown, and one cannot make true or false statements about the unknown. Since future events are unknowable, neither idea can be validated, making the issue moot. As for D, Ryle believes that the arguments were done to death in the 19th century, a simple way to resolve a dilemma by declaring it uninteresting.
Yet there are other kinds of dilemmas that Ryle ignores such as choosing between alternate aesthetic goods - say a Cezanne vs. a Kandinsky, or between alternate moral evils, choosing under uncertain outcomes such as hiring one contractor vs another; the relatively trivial but at often time consuming dilemmas of choosing an outfit; the dilemma of action vs. inaction. Categorizing these and the basis of response could have been quite fruitful.
Perhaps I'm guilty of here presentism and should not have been so harsh in projecting my expectations. Writing a review is partly a dialog with the author, fellow readers and oneself and since Ryle passed away nearly 40 years ago it's somewhat unfair that he can't have the last word. There has certainly been a lot of work on Decision Theory from an Engineering perspective since publication of the book. I still have my copy of Ryle's The Concept of Mind which I thought very highly of when I was in university, but has anyone else since considered this problem from a purely philosophical POV? I don't know but I'd be interested in finding out.
For such a short book Ryle takes awfully long to state his points. Granted it's a transcript of a series of public lectures and not a set of polished essays but a red pencil would have come in handy.
Potentially a rich topic, the issue is recognizing the nature of choices between different world views and Ryle chooses eight examples to illustrate his arguments- A: science vs religion, B: fatalism vs free will, C: Zeno's paradox of Achilles racing the tortoise, D: hedonistic vs utilitarian ethics, E: scientific rigor vs. everyday pragmatism, F: technical vs non-technical frameworks, G: whether reality needs to match the world we perceive and H: the logician's choice between applying formal logic vs informal rhetoric. Ryle confesses he's less interested in the outcome of the dilemmas than in how one chooses between them.
Zeno's non-paradox could have been dismissed in a paragraph or two - mathematically it's simply a question of mathematical limits where time and the traversal of space are reduced at the same rate to the infinitesimally small. The reason Zeno never catches up to the tortoise is that he's never given enough time to do so.
The other dilemmas resolve into utilitarian choices as to which interpretation works best for a particular end. Cases E, F, H and arguably A are highly similar pitting rigorous frameworks which while exacting and precise are too detailed for everyday use. G revolves the philosophical concerns as to whether or not we can believe our senses or our judgement about them as to the nature of the world. Yet, Ryle argues, that we know from the start that our senses are flawed and our interpretations are error prone, does not negate that they are connected to and serviceable approximations of reality. B, fatalism vs free will rests on the difference between looking forward into the future vs. looking backwards into the past, or in Ryle's language, the difference between anterior and posterior truths. Before an event occurs the outcome, though anticipated is largely unknown, and one cannot make true or false statements about the unknown. Since future events are unknowable, neither idea can be validated, making the issue moot. As for D, Ryle believes that the arguments were done to death in the 19th century, a simple way to resolve a dilemma by declaring it uninteresting.
Yet there are other kinds of dilemmas that Ryle ignores such as choosing between alternate aesthetic goods - say a Cezanne vs. a Kandinsky, or between alternate moral evils, choosing under uncertain outcomes such as hiring one contractor vs another; the relatively trivial but at often time consuming dilemmas of choosing an outfit; the dilemma of action vs. inaction. Categorizing these and the basis of response could have been quite fruitful.
Perhaps I'm guilty of here presentism and should not have been so harsh in projecting my expectations. Writing a review is partly a dialog with the author, fellow readers and oneself and since Ryle passed away nearly 40 years ago it's somewhat unfair that he can't have the last word. There has certainly been a lot of work on Decision Theory from an Engineering perspective since publication of the book. I still have my copy of Ryle's The Concept of Mind which I thought very highly of when I was in university, but has anyone else since considered this problem from a purely philosophical POV? I don't know but I'd be interested in finding out.
February 24, 2024
“A live issue is a piece of country in which no one knows which way to go. As there are no paths, there are no paths to share.”
Rating this is a real dilemma (pun intended, sorry). I love the way Ryle thinks, his ideas are minimalistic and have the uncanny knack of reaching right into the core of an argument and drawing out contradictions with philosophical elegance. However, I did find the extended use of metaphors challenging, not because of the metaphors themselves, which worked fine, but because Ryle would often answer the questions he set out with in context of the metaphors, rather than bringing everything back to a more conceptually grounded level. Everything was comprehensible enough, and yeah it’s a lecture so he can’t be too technical, but something just irked me about the way he presents a lot of the content here. Maybe I just wished he would conclude his thoughts more often. 3 stars for an interesting starting point for wider inquiry but yeah. idk. rating philosophy is hard.
Rating this is a real dilemma (pun intended, sorry). I love the way Ryle thinks, his ideas are minimalistic and have the uncanny knack of reaching right into the core of an argument and drawing out contradictions with philosophical elegance. However, I did find the extended use of metaphors challenging, not because of the metaphors themselves, which worked fine, but because Ryle would often answer the questions he set out with in context of the metaphors, rather than bringing everything back to a more conceptually grounded level. Everything was comprehensible enough, and yeah it’s a lecture so he can’t be too technical, but something just irked me about the way he presents a lot of the content here. Maybe I just wished he would conclude his thoughts more often. 3 stars for an interesting starting point for wider inquiry but yeah. idk. rating philosophy is hard.
July 9, 2022
Acquired 1996
Cheap Thrills, Montreal, Quebec
Cheap Thrills, Montreal, Quebec
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews