A leading scholar of Congress and the Constitution analyzes Congress’s surprisingly potent set of tools in the system of checks and balances.
Congress is widely supposed to be the least effective branch of the federal government. But as Josh Chafetz shows in this boldly original analysis, Congress in fact has numerous powerful tools at its disposal in its conflicts with the other branches. These tools include the power of the purse, the contempt power, freedom of speech and debate, and more. Drawing extensively on the historical development of Anglo-American legislatures from the seventeenth century to the present, Chafetz concludes that these tools are all means by which Congress and its members battle for public support. When Congress uses them to engage successfully with the public, it increases its power vis-à-vis the other branches; when it does not, it loses power. This groundbreaking take on the separation of powers will be of interest to both legal scholars and political scientists.
I heard about this book during one of the panels at the October 2017 ABA Administrative Law Conference, so I got hold of a copy to read during my downtime at work. It's a dense, dry, and academic read -- took me about six months to get through, on and off. Chafetz walks through the historical development and modern significance of six different congressional powers other than legislation (power of the purse, personnel, contempt, speech or debate, internal discipline, and cameral rules) and argues that Congress can use these tools to assert political power during interbranch conflicts. It's a well researched and interesting work, even though I think Chafetz overestimates Congress's institutional self-interest vis-à-vis the executive and downplays party politics a bit too much.
Unfortunately this is mostly academic at this point, having been overtaken by recent political events. However, learning and understanding always retain value.