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On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's Hiero
2015 Reprint of 1948 Edition. Full facsimile of the original edition. Not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. "On Tyranny" is Leo Strauss's classic reading of Xenophon's dialogue "Hiero," or "Tyrannicus," in which the tyrant Hiero and the poet Simonides discuss the advantages and disadvantages of exercising tyranny. Strauss taught that liberalism in its modern form contained within it an intrinsic tendency towards extreme relativism, which in turn led to two types of nihilism. The first was a "brutal" nihilism, expressed in Nazi and Marxist regimes. In "On Tyranny," he wrote that these ideologies, both descendants of Enlightenment thought, tried to destroy all traditions, history, ethics, and moral standards and replace them by force under which nature and mankind are subjugated and conquered. The second type-the "gentle" nihilism expressed in Western liberal democracies-was a kind of value-free aimlessness and a hedonistic "permissive egalitarianism," which he saw as permeating the fabric of contemporary American society. In the belief that 20th century relativism, scientism, historicism, and nihilism were all implicated in the deterioration of modern society and philosophy, Strauss sought to uncover the philosophical pathways that had led to this situation. The resultant study led him to advocate a tentative return to classical political philosophy as a starting point for judging political action. "On Tyranny is a complex and stimulating book with its 'parallel dialogue' made all the more striking since both participants take such unusual, highly provocative positions and so force readers to face substantial problems in what are often wholly unfamiliar, even shocking ways." --Robert Pippin - History and Theory
136 pages, Paperback
First published September 1, 1963
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About the author
Leo Strauss
153 books365 followersLeo Strauss was a 20th century German-American scholar of political philosophy. Born in Germany to Jewish parents, Strauss later emigrated from Germany to the United States. He spent much of his career as a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, where he taught several generations of students and published fifteen books.
Trained in the neo-Kantian tradition with Ernst Cassirer and immersed in the work of the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Strauss authored books on Baruch Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes, and articles on Maimonides and Al-Farabi. In the late 1930s, his research focused on the texts of Plato and Aristotle, retracing their interpretation through medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, and encouraging the application of those ideas to contemporary political theory.
Trained in the neo-Kantian tradition with Ernst Cassirer and immersed in the work of the phenomenologists Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Strauss authored books on Baruch Spinoza and Thomas Hobbes, and articles on Maimonides and Al-Farabi. In the late 1930s, his research focused on the texts of Plato and Aristotle, retracing their interpretation through medieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy, and encouraging the application of those ideas to contemporary political theory.
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August 13, 2025
The first half of the 20th century made fools of politicians, political scientists and political philosophers in more or less equal measure. The radical dangers posed by rising extremist ideologies like National Socialism, existentialism and Bolshevism went unrecognized by most 20th century students of government until far too late. Given a choice, much of humanity had spurned democracy and embraced totalitarianism, the most insidious form of tyranny that humanity had seen since the Inquisition. The consequences were catastrophic. Basic notions of government that had sustained Europe and the New World for generations seemed obsolete. Especially in Europe, the Enlightenment’s assumed improvement of the human condition was cast into grave doubt.
At mid-century, standing at the intersection of the ending Second World War and the dawning Cold War, the political philosopher Leo Strauss posed the question, why did we not see it coming? What is it about modern political science that explains why it was so late to recognize profound tyranny even as it grabbed large portions of the West by the throat?
To explore that question, Strauss turns to the ancients and, in particular, to Xenophon’s dialogue HIERO or THE TYRANT. HIERO is the only surviving classical Greek writing that is devoted to an express discussion of the nature of a tyrant. Strauss seems to suppose that Xenophon can teach us something useful about recognizing tyranny in our own time.
To execute his notion, Strauss gives us his own new translation of HIERO, his explanatory essay dissecting HIERO, a critique of Strauss’s explanatory essay written by Alexandre Kojeve, Strauss’s response to Kojeve’s critique and, in later editions, Strauss’s editors have added the Strauss-Kojeve correspondence.
Xenophon’s dialogue divides into two parts. In the first part, Hiero complains to Simonides that being a tyrant is not what it’s cracked up to be. A tyrant’s lot is not a happy one per Hiero. In the second part, Simonides counsels Hiero that he might be happier if he made an effort to be a benevolent tyrant and offers concrete examples of how to be benevolent. All in all, this is a pretty thin gruel. This dialogue of Xenophon’s has long been regarded as a minor work, and there is nothing about Strauss’s translation that should cause readers to regard it anew.
Strauss’s explanatory essay displays his remarkable talent for interpreting the text of an ancient writer. Strauss can squeeze all of the juice from such a lemon and he does so tediously at times in his essay. But his take on tyranny as posited by Xenophon is disappointingly shallow. What distinguishes a tyrant from a king is ‘legitimacy’. What confers legitimacy is the rule of law. Therefore, what makes a tyrant a tyrant is that he has acquired power (or maintained it) outside legal means. But what makes law? Sometimes, the illegitimate can be transformed and become law by becoming accepted. How does this happen? It happens through benevolence (at least some of the time). In effect, there is an algorithmic relationship between power, legitimacy, law and benevolence that defines the difference between a tyrant and a king as Strauss interprets Xenophon.
Kojeve disputes all of this. For him, there is no significant distinction between tyrants and kings (or other leaders). They all act from a desire to be recognized, a basic human impulse. There is no reason why a dictator cannot be a good leader just as a legally chosen leader can be good. But what Kojeve really wants to talk about is the universal state or the end of history. In particular, given that the universal state is inevitable in his Hegelian-Marxist opinion, do individuals make a difference anyway?
Strauss’s response to Kojeve’s critique is uninspired, it seemed to this reader. He is like an expert witness testifying in a trial to respond to the opinion of another expert. He is all about criticizing the first opinion but fails to give a plausible or complete opinion of his own. In particular, Strauss fails to fully acknowledge the explanatory power of Kojeve’s version of Hegel’s theory of recognition (which itself may not be fully faithful to Hegel).* This may be harsh, but I was disappointed that the exchange progressed in the way that it did between these two brilliant men.
My issue may be that Kojeve hijacked the discussion and the hijacking does not work because Kojeve’s take on Hegel is misguided. I lack sufficient familiarity with Hegel to certify of my own knowledge that this is what went on. I can say this. The questions that Strauss and Kojeve debate are important and deserve our attention. But ON TYRANNY is a flawed forum for sorting out the answers to those questions, it seems to me.
I recommend that before you decide to read ON TYRANNY that you read Robert Pippin’s review of ON TYRANNY that published under the title: “Being, Time and Politics: The Strauss-Kojeve Debate”. Pippin’s short review will give you an excellent sense of whether you want to tackle ON TYRANNY.
*For example, Kojeve’s theory might explain some of Trump’s behavior, thus: Trump craves recognition. But the recognition of his base does not satisfy his craving because he does not respect his base. Only the recognition of the elite can satisfy his craving. Of course, that recognition is forever beyond his reach. Like Xenophon’s tyrant, Trump is doomed to be denied what he craves most, whatever he does.
At mid-century, standing at the intersection of the ending Second World War and the dawning Cold War, the political philosopher Leo Strauss posed the question, why did we not see it coming? What is it about modern political science that explains why it was so late to recognize profound tyranny even as it grabbed large portions of the West by the throat?
To explore that question, Strauss turns to the ancients and, in particular, to Xenophon’s dialogue HIERO or THE TYRANT. HIERO is the only surviving classical Greek writing that is devoted to an express discussion of the nature of a tyrant. Strauss seems to suppose that Xenophon can teach us something useful about recognizing tyranny in our own time.
To execute his notion, Strauss gives us his own new translation of HIERO, his explanatory essay dissecting HIERO, a critique of Strauss’s explanatory essay written by Alexandre Kojeve, Strauss’s response to Kojeve’s critique and, in later editions, Strauss’s editors have added the Strauss-Kojeve correspondence.
Xenophon’s dialogue divides into two parts. In the first part, Hiero complains to Simonides that being a tyrant is not what it’s cracked up to be. A tyrant’s lot is not a happy one per Hiero. In the second part, Simonides counsels Hiero that he might be happier if he made an effort to be a benevolent tyrant and offers concrete examples of how to be benevolent. All in all, this is a pretty thin gruel. This dialogue of Xenophon’s has long been regarded as a minor work, and there is nothing about Strauss’s translation that should cause readers to regard it anew.
Strauss’s explanatory essay displays his remarkable talent for interpreting the text of an ancient writer. Strauss can squeeze all of the juice from such a lemon and he does so tediously at times in his essay. But his take on tyranny as posited by Xenophon is disappointingly shallow. What distinguishes a tyrant from a king is ‘legitimacy’. What confers legitimacy is the rule of law. Therefore, what makes a tyrant a tyrant is that he has acquired power (or maintained it) outside legal means. But what makes law? Sometimes, the illegitimate can be transformed and become law by becoming accepted. How does this happen? It happens through benevolence (at least some of the time). In effect, there is an algorithmic relationship between power, legitimacy, law and benevolence that defines the difference between a tyrant and a king as Strauss interprets Xenophon.
Kojeve disputes all of this. For him, there is no significant distinction between tyrants and kings (or other leaders). They all act from a desire to be recognized, a basic human impulse. There is no reason why a dictator cannot be a good leader just as a legally chosen leader can be good. But what Kojeve really wants to talk about is the universal state or the end of history. In particular, given that the universal state is inevitable in his Hegelian-Marxist opinion, do individuals make a difference anyway?
Strauss’s response to Kojeve’s critique is uninspired, it seemed to this reader. He is like an expert witness testifying in a trial to respond to the opinion of another expert. He is all about criticizing the first opinion but fails to give a plausible or complete opinion of his own. In particular, Strauss fails to fully acknowledge the explanatory power of Kojeve’s version of Hegel’s theory of recognition (which itself may not be fully faithful to Hegel).* This may be harsh, but I was disappointed that the exchange progressed in the way that it did between these two brilliant men.
My issue may be that Kojeve hijacked the discussion and the hijacking does not work because Kojeve’s take on Hegel is misguided. I lack sufficient familiarity with Hegel to certify of my own knowledge that this is what went on. I can say this. The questions that Strauss and Kojeve debate are important and deserve our attention. But ON TYRANNY is a flawed forum for sorting out the answers to those questions, it seems to me.
I recommend that before you decide to read ON TYRANNY that you read Robert Pippin’s review of ON TYRANNY that published under the title: “Being, Time and Politics: The Strauss-Kojeve Debate”. Pippin’s short review will give you an excellent sense of whether you want to tackle ON TYRANNY.
*For example, Kojeve’s theory might explain some of Trump’s behavior, thus: Trump craves recognition. But the recognition of his base does not satisfy his craving because he does not respect his base. Only the recognition of the elite can satisfy his craving. Of course, that recognition is forever beyond his reach. Like Xenophon’s tyrant, Trump is doomed to be denied what he craves most, whatever he does.
December 19, 2021
"On Tyranny" consists of a helpful foreward that frames the dense writings of Strauss and Kojève, Strauss's reprint and commentary on Xenophon's Hiero (an obscure Greek dialogue), Kojève's critique, and Strauss's response to the critique, as well as letters between the two, who, despite occupying vastly different philosophical positions, maintained a close friendship.
Strauss (and Kojève, for that matter) can be a frustrating read. In my estimation, there were two main points of contention in the Strauss-Kojève debate: firstly, the relationship between philosophy and society (both believe that the two are in conflict, but for different reasons and with different upshots) and secondly, implications on the philosopher's relationship to political action, and by extension, the two writers' concept of meaning in history.
In a word, the book could perhaps be summarized by the notion that, where Strauss's patron saint is Plato (and the ancient Greeks, generally), Kojève's is Hegel. Kojève believed that philosophers can only enjoy subjective certainty in private, so must prove their ideas in the "marketplace" of the world, both to gain recognition as well as an epistemic criterion of validity. Public verification, according to him, is necessarily political, since it involves convincing others. Thus, the philosopher finds him or herself caught between their desire to contemplate the Good and the need to become a ruler. Kojève resolves this apparent conflict by invoking Hegelian dialectic, whereby philosophical ideas express themselves politically through history. Somewhat rigidly, he applies the Hegelian system in arguing that the end state of history is the "universal, homogeneous state", wherein the totality of the earth's population subscribes to and recognizes a final philosophy.
To Strauss, this universal state was a disquieting conclusion. Where Kojève invokes Hegel, Strauss appeals to the ancients, who believed that only an elect few could hope to achieve true understanding and virtue (a view that Kojève and many others see as an aristocratic elitism). A few select quotes, since Strauss will say it better than I could ever hope to paraphrase it:
“Did Hegel not say something to the effect that the state in which one man is free is the Oriental despotic state? Is the universal and homogeneous state then merely a planetary Oriental despotism?”
“But if the final state is to satisfy the deepest longing of the human soul, every human being must be capable of becoming wise. The most relevant difference among human beings must have practically disappeared. We understand now why Kojève is so anxious to refute the classical view according to which only a minority of men are capable of the quest for wisdom. If the classics are right, only a few men will be truly happy in the universal and homogeneous state and hence only a few men will find their satisfaction in and through it.”
“Kojève in fact confirms the classical view that unlimited technological progress and its accompaniment, which are indispensable conditions of the universal and homogeneous state, are destructive of humanity.”
“But neither the wise men nor the philosophers will desire to rule. For this reason alone, to say nothing of others, the Chief of the universal and homogeneous state, or the Universal and Final Tyrant will be an unwise man, as Kojève seems to take for granted. To retain his power, he will be forced to suppress every activity which might lead people into doubt of the essential soundness of the universal and homogeneous state: he must suppress philosophy as an attempt to corrupt the young.”
One can never be sure of exactly what Strauss thought of the two contentions I outline above, since he allegedly wrote as esoterically as he believed the ancient Greeks to have written. In my estimation, Strauss viewed philosophy as inherently and necessarily subversive of society. As such, the two could never integrate as Kojève suggested, since, the moment philosophy is accepted, it ceases to be philosophy. Indeed, the Hegelian "final state" is one in which philosophy (and, as a result, humanity) is destroyed, once and for all. Strauss, however, agreed with Kojève that the philosopher should seek to communicate his views through the marketplace – but only for the purpose of finding like-minded, elite individuals. Though not explicitly written in the book, it can be inferred that the means through which philosophers accomplish this seeking is through oblique, esoteric writing. An open question for me is whether or not Strauss saw any responsibility of (or, indeed capacity for) philosophical subversives to impact society and history. He, true to his style, omits commentary here, leaving the reader to simply infer.
Unsurprisingly, the two bards lived out their respective worldviews and each chose a characteristic medium of influence: where Kojève was instrumental in the formation of the EU (what modern conservatives might see as a universalist, globalist project), Strauss became a professor of political philosophy at the University of Chicago.
Strauss (and Kojève, for that matter) can be a frustrating read. In my estimation, there were two main points of contention in the Strauss-Kojève debate: firstly, the relationship between philosophy and society (both believe that the two are in conflict, but for different reasons and with different upshots) and secondly, implications on the philosopher's relationship to political action, and by extension, the two writers' concept of meaning in history.
In a word, the book could perhaps be summarized by the notion that, where Strauss's patron saint is Plato (and the ancient Greeks, generally), Kojève's is Hegel. Kojève believed that philosophers can only enjoy subjective certainty in private, so must prove their ideas in the "marketplace" of the world, both to gain recognition as well as an epistemic criterion of validity. Public verification, according to him, is necessarily political, since it involves convincing others. Thus, the philosopher finds him or herself caught between their desire to contemplate the Good and the need to become a ruler. Kojève resolves this apparent conflict by invoking Hegelian dialectic, whereby philosophical ideas express themselves politically through history. Somewhat rigidly, he applies the Hegelian system in arguing that the end state of history is the "universal, homogeneous state", wherein the totality of the earth's population subscribes to and recognizes a final philosophy.
To Strauss, this universal state was a disquieting conclusion. Where Kojève invokes Hegel, Strauss appeals to the ancients, who believed that only an elect few could hope to achieve true understanding and virtue (a view that Kojève and many others see as an aristocratic elitism). A few select quotes, since Strauss will say it better than I could ever hope to paraphrase it:
“Did Hegel not say something to the effect that the state in which one man is free is the Oriental despotic state? Is the universal and homogeneous state then merely a planetary Oriental despotism?”
“But if the final state is to satisfy the deepest longing of the human soul, every human being must be capable of becoming wise. The most relevant difference among human beings must have practically disappeared. We understand now why Kojève is so anxious to refute the classical view according to which only a minority of men are capable of the quest for wisdom. If the classics are right, only a few men will be truly happy in the universal and homogeneous state and hence only a few men will find their satisfaction in and through it.”
“Kojève in fact confirms the classical view that unlimited technological progress and its accompaniment, which are indispensable conditions of the universal and homogeneous state, are destructive of humanity.”
“But neither the wise men nor the philosophers will desire to rule. For this reason alone, to say nothing of others, the Chief of the universal and homogeneous state, or the Universal and Final Tyrant will be an unwise man, as Kojève seems to take for granted. To retain his power, he will be forced to suppress every activity which might lead people into doubt of the essential soundness of the universal and homogeneous state: he must suppress philosophy as an attempt to corrupt the young.”
One can never be sure of exactly what Strauss thought of the two contentions I outline above, since he allegedly wrote as esoterically as he believed the ancient Greeks to have written. In my estimation, Strauss viewed philosophy as inherently and necessarily subversive of society. As such, the two could never integrate as Kojève suggested, since, the moment philosophy is accepted, it ceases to be philosophy. Indeed, the Hegelian "final state" is one in which philosophy (and, as a result, humanity) is destroyed, once and for all. Strauss, however, agreed with Kojève that the philosopher should seek to communicate his views through the marketplace – but only for the purpose of finding like-minded, elite individuals. Though not explicitly written in the book, it can be inferred that the means through which philosophers accomplish this seeking is through oblique, esoteric writing. An open question for me is whether or not Strauss saw any responsibility of (or, indeed capacity for) philosophical subversives to impact society and history. He, true to his style, omits commentary here, leaving the reader to simply infer.
Unsurprisingly, the two bards lived out their respective worldviews and each chose a characteristic medium of influence: where Kojève was instrumental in the formation of the EU (what modern conservatives might see as a universalist, globalist project), Strauss became a professor of political philosophy at the University of Chicago.
October 5, 2025
I read lots of books I don't understand. This one just got progressively harder and harder.
First, there is a dialogue by Xenephon. Then, an essay by Strauss, a very long review by Kojeve, response by Strauss, and then their correspondence. As soon as I hear Hegelian, I know I will be lost. I read the dialogue and Strauss essay 30 years ago for a class. I think it was very hard then also.
Another Xenephon down!
First, there is a dialogue by Xenephon. Then, an essay by Strauss, a very long review by Kojeve, response by Strauss, and then their correspondence. As soon as I hear Hegelian, I know I will be lost. I read the dialogue and Strauss essay 30 years ago for a class. I think it was very hard then also.
Another Xenephon down!
July 12, 2011
Review:
November 2006
Philosophy and the World it Rules
This book is composed of a translation of Xenophon's Hiero, a commentary by Leo Strauss ('On Tyranny') on it, two essays (one by Kojève, one by Strauss) outlining the controversy between them and finally, in the latest edition, the correspondence between them. After reading the essays Kojève and Strauss aimed at each other one comes to suspect that the major difference between the two is how, precisely, philosophy is to rule the world. Strauss prefers the ancient way of moderately (and occasionally) influencing the Nomos while Kojève insists that Nomos (i.e., Law) must be exactly equal to Philosophy - or, more precisely, equal to exactly what philosophy wants of it. Thus Strauss is for 'ruling' while Kojève wants to Rule.
Thus it really is very funny how Kojève 'accuses' Strauss of insanity! By this, Kojève only means that if a philosopher does not go forth and change the World he can never know that his understanding is not mere private fancy - that is, madness. Since Kojève believes that in order to be rational philosophy must rule all he accuses the practical moderation defended by Strauss of madness. Of course, one could moderately accuse Kojève's 'Enlightened' dream of One World of the same thing...
Thus the argument between them is not whether philosophy should rule - but exactly how it should rule. Kojève believes that without the arrival of the Final Philosophical Artifact -the Universal Homogenous State (UHS)- philosophy is only a private mania. But Strauss says that the UHS will make philosophy impossible. To Kojève, the UHS is a monument to Philosophical Reason while for Strauss it is its tomb. Kojève invites Strauss to join him in making the UHS -it is a great honor!- but Strauss declines because he cannot bring himself to preside over the End of Philosophy.
Thus it is very amusing that over the years, thanks primarily to Allan Bloom (who studied with both Kojève and Strauss) and students (of students) of Bloom there has arisen the 'Straussian' neoconservative position that it is the duty of US foreign policy to make the World into good democratic, liberal capitalists in the Euro-American vein. But this 'Straussian' neoconservative position really is at most a hybrid of Kojève and Strauss which leans decidedly in the Kojèvean direction.
No? Then have the courage to read the exchange between Kojève and Strauss (Essays and Correspondence) and decide for yourself.
For those that only have the old 1983 edition I want to point out, even insist, that the correspondence adds some nice touches to the argument between Kojève and Strauss that should not be missed. For instance, we see here quite clearly how important the Criterion of Knowledge is to Kojève's thought:
"As regards myself, I came to Hegel by way of the question of criteria. I see only three possibilities:
(a) Plato's-Husserl's "intuition of essences" (which I do not believe [for one has to believe it]); (b) relativism (in which one cannot live); (c) Hegel and "circularity." If, however, one assumes circularity as the only criterion of truth (including the moral), then everything else follows automatically." (Kojève, Letter of Sept 19, 1950, p 256.)
Thus when one sees that between the extremes of what Kojève is pleased to call 'intuition' (Religion, Phenomenology, 'esoteric' silence) and its failure ('chatter', relativism, postmodernism) there is only the 'Circularity of the Concept' then one begins to see why Kojève must proclaim the 'End of History' - it is to protect the 'Absolute Knowledge' such Circularity requires. (Absolute Knowledge, btw, means unchanging knowledge while circularity means that wherever we begin our research we end, if we proceed scientifically (i.e., in a Hegelian manner), always in the same place.)
Kojève, in the same letter, goes on to concede that there was for him once a fourth possibility:
"For a time I believed in a fourth possibility: nature is "identical," hence the classical criterion can be retained for nature. But now I believe that one can only be silent about nature (mathematics). Hence: either one remains "classically" silent (cp. Plato's Parmenides and Seventh Epistle), or one chatters "in the modern manner" (Pierre Bayle), or one is an Hegelian." (p. 256)
Thus we see that nature was at one time also a possible 'criterion' for Kojève. But he abandons it and with it the Hegelian 'Philosophy of Nature'. Strauss, however, is insistent that there is a 'human nature' and he continually throws it in the face of Kojève. Of this Kojève writes:
"Regarding the issue, I can only keep repeating the same thing. If there is something like "human nature," then you are surely right in everything. But to deduce from premises is not the same as to prove these premises. And to infer premises from (anyway questionable) consequences is always dangerous." (Kojève, Letter of October 29, 1953, p 261.)
Thus Kojève says to Strauss that he can't prove what he says and, of course, Kojève can. -But he can do so if, and only if, History Ends as Kojève says it will. But the proof of success is no proof of Reason but only of power...
In any case, we see Strauss still pressing the point on nature a few years later:
"You have never given me an answer to my questions: a) was Nietzsche not right in describing the Hegelian-Marxian end as "the last man"? and b) what would you put into the place of Hegel's philosophy of nature?" (Strauss, Letter of Sept 11, 1957, p 291.)
It is my belief that Strauss is convinced that this lack of what the ancients would have thought of as a cosmology (i.e., cosmogony) allows ordinary people in the secular, atheistic UHS to turn to religion. He argues that Wisdom in the UHS can only belong to a tiny few and that:
"...if wisdom does not become common property, the mass remains in the thrall of religion, that is to say of an essentially particular and particularizing power (Christianity, Islam, Judaism...), which means that the decline and fall of the universal-homogenous state is unavoidable." (Strauss, Letter August, 22, 1948, p 238.)
Without some sort of Cosmogony the atheistic UHS cannot hold onto its citizens. Of course, this is true only if the UHS must be entirely secular. However, if somehow a right-Hegelian (i.e., religious) interpretation were to prevail in the UHS this would no longer be necessary. And the UHS could survive indefinitely... But Kojève, of course, discounts this possibility, for him there are only two Hegelian possibilities:
"If the Westerners remain capitalist (that is to say, also nationalist), they will be defeated by Russia, and that is how the End-State will come about. If, however, they "integrate" their economies and policies (they are on their way to doing so), then they can defeat Russia. And that is how the End-State will be reached (the same universal and homogenous State). But in the first case it will be spoken about in "Russian" (with Lysenko, etc.), and in the second case - in "European"." (Kojève, Letter of Sept. 19, 1950, p 256.)
But historically this is false. The first interpretation of Hegel (during his lifetime) was religious. Thus one wonders if the UHS with a universal Hegelian religion could somehow be brought about... But that is another story.
So, for those of you familiar with an earlier edition I hope I have given some hint of how the letters amplify and expand the argument between Kojève and Strauss that we first saw in the essays included in earlier editions. This book is superb - I have only hinted at its intricate arguments - do not pass it up!
November 2006
Philosophy and the World it Rules
This book is composed of a translation of Xenophon's Hiero, a commentary by Leo Strauss ('On Tyranny') on it, two essays (one by Kojève, one by Strauss) outlining the controversy between them and finally, in the latest edition, the correspondence between them. After reading the essays Kojève and Strauss aimed at each other one comes to suspect that the major difference between the two is how, precisely, philosophy is to rule the world. Strauss prefers the ancient way of moderately (and occasionally) influencing the Nomos while Kojève insists that Nomos (i.e., Law) must be exactly equal to Philosophy - or, more precisely, equal to exactly what philosophy wants of it. Thus Strauss is for 'ruling' while Kojève wants to Rule.
Thus it really is very funny how Kojève 'accuses' Strauss of insanity! By this, Kojève only means that if a philosopher does not go forth and change the World he can never know that his understanding is not mere private fancy - that is, madness. Since Kojève believes that in order to be rational philosophy must rule all he accuses the practical moderation defended by Strauss of madness. Of course, one could moderately accuse Kojève's 'Enlightened' dream of One World of the same thing...
Thus the argument between them is not whether philosophy should rule - but exactly how it should rule. Kojève believes that without the arrival of the Final Philosophical Artifact -the Universal Homogenous State (UHS)- philosophy is only a private mania. But Strauss says that the UHS will make philosophy impossible. To Kojève, the UHS is a monument to Philosophical Reason while for Strauss it is its tomb. Kojève invites Strauss to join him in making the UHS -it is a great honor!- but Strauss declines because he cannot bring himself to preside over the End of Philosophy.
Thus it is very amusing that over the years, thanks primarily to Allan Bloom (who studied with both Kojève and Strauss) and students (of students) of Bloom there has arisen the 'Straussian' neoconservative position that it is the duty of US foreign policy to make the World into good democratic, liberal capitalists in the Euro-American vein. But this 'Straussian' neoconservative position really is at most a hybrid of Kojève and Strauss which leans decidedly in the Kojèvean direction.
No? Then have the courage to read the exchange between Kojève and Strauss (Essays and Correspondence) and decide for yourself.
For those that only have the old 1983 edition I want to point out, even insist, that the correspondence adds some nice touches to the argument between Kojève and Strauss that should not be missed. For instance, we see here quite clearly how important the Criterion of Knowledge is to Kojève's thought:
"As regards myself, I came to Hegel by way of the question of criteria. I see only three possibilities:
(a) Plato's-Husserl's "intuition of essences" (which I do not believe [for one has to believe it]); (b) relativism (in which one cannot live); (c) Hegel and "circularity." If, however, one assumes circularity as the only criterion of truth (including the moral), then everything else follows automatically." (Kojève, Letter of Sept 19, 1950, p 256.)
Thus when one sees that between the extremes of what Kojève is pleased to call 'intuition' (Religion, Phenomenology, 'esoteric' silence) and its failure ('chatter', relativism, postmodernism) there is only the 'Circularity of the Concept' then one begins to see why Kojève must proclaim the 'End of History' - it is to protect the 'Absolute Knowledge' such Circularity requires. (Absolute Knowledge, btw, means unchanging knowledge while circularity means that wherever we begin our research we end, if we proceed scientifically (i.e., in a Hegelian manner), always in the same place.)
Kojève, in the same letter, goes on to concede that there was for him once a fourth possibility:
"For a time I believed in a fourth possibility: nature is "identical," hence the classical criterion can be retained for nature. But now I believe that one can only be silent about nature (mathematics). Hence: either one remains "classically" silent (cp. Plato's Parmenides and Seventh Epistle), or one chatters "in the modern manner" (Pierre Bayle), or one is an Hegelian." (p. 256)
Thus we see that nature was at one time also a possible 'criterion' for Kojève. But he abandons it and with it the Hegelian 'Philosophy of Nature'. Strauss, however, is insistent that there is a 'human nature' and he continually throws it in the face of Kojève. Of this Kojève writes:
"Regarding the issue, I can only keep repeating the same thing. If there is something like "human nature," then you are surely right in everything. But to deduce from premises is not the same as to prove these premises. And to infer premises from (anyway questionable) consequences is always dangerous." (Kojève, Letter of October 29, 1953, p 261.)
Thus Kojève says to Strauss that he can't prove what he says and, of course, Kojève can. -But he can do so if, and only if, History Ends as Kojève says it will. But the proof of success is no proof of Reason but only of power...
In any case, we see Strauss still pressing the point on nature a few years later:
"You have never given me an answer to my questions: a) was Nietzsche not right in describing the Hegelian-Marxian end as "the last man"? and b) what would you put into the place of Hegel's philosophy of nature?" (Strauss, Letter of Sept 11, 1957, p 291.)
It is my belief that Strauss is convinced that this lack of what the ancients would have thought of as a cosmology (i.e., cosmogony) allows ordinary people in the secular, atheistic UHS to turn to religion. He argues that Wisdom in the UHS can only belong to a tiny few and that:
"...if wisdom does not become common property, the mass remains in the thrall of religion, that is to say of an essentially particular and particularizing power (Christianity, Islam, Judaism...), which means that the decline and fall of the universal-homogenous state is unavoidable." (Strauss, Letter August, 22, 1948, p 238.)
Without some sort of Cosmogony the atheistic UHS cannot hold onto its citizens. Of course, this is true only if the UHS must be entirely secular. However, if somehow a right-Hegelian (i.e., religious) interpretation were to prevail in the UHS this would no longer be necessary. And the UHS could survive indefinitely... But Kojève, of course, discounts this possibility, for him there are only two Hegelian possibilities:
"If the Westerners remain capitalist (that is to say, also nationalist), they will be defeated by Russia, and that is how the End-State will come about. If, however, they "integrate" their economies and policies (they are on their way to doing so), then they can defeat Russia. And that is how the End-State will be reached (the same universal and homogenous State). But in the first case it will be spoken about in "Russian" (with Lysenko, etc.), and in the second case - in "European"." (Kojève, Letter of Sept. 19, 1950, p 256.)
But historically this is false. The first interpretation of Hegel (during his lifetime) was religious. Thus one wonders if the UHS with a universal Hegelian religion could somehow be brought about... But that is another story.
So, for those of you familiar with an earlier edition I hope I have given some hint of how the letters amplify and expand the argument between Kojève and Strauss that we first saw in the essays included in earlier editions. This book is superb - I have only hinted at its intricate arguments - do not pass it up!
February 20, 2017
An interesting look at how philosophy should rule the world and what happens when it does not. Tyranny is only one of the more odious outcomes, and I found the book particularly interesting now, given our current political state in the U.S. I would definitely recommend.
July 17, 2014
Strauss's analysis of Xenophon's Hiero could charitably be described as "strained." More accurately, his interpretation of Xenophon's text is ludicrous. Nonetheless, the Strauss sections of the book are a pretty good, succinct expression of what Strauss is about.
More to the point, the Strauss/Kojeve debate and correspondence are *great* fun.
My favorite part is an insane line of Kojeve's: “Truth to tell, Xenophon’s text is less precise than Hegel’s.” pg. 142.
This is fine, until you consider that Hiero is like 22 pages long, a dialogue, and not apparently about anything that Strauss and Kojeve are ascribing to it. As long as you don't go in thinking you're going to read about Xenophon's dialogue there is plenty to appreciate.
More to the point, the Strauss/Kojeve debate and correspondence are *great* fun.
My favorite part is an insane line of Kojeve's: “Truth to tell, Xenophon’s text is less precise than Hegel’s.” pg. 142.
This is fine, until you consider that Hiero is like 22 pages long, a dialogue, and not apparently about anything that Strauss and Kojeve are ascribing to it. As long as you don't go in thinking you're going to read about Xenophon's dialogue there is plenty to appreciate.
August 26, 2017
An excellent companion to the roller coaster ride Mr. Trump is providing to the world this year. This book also includes various comparisons from previous works authored by Kant, Hegel, Aristotle, and an entire section devoted to the correspondences of Alexandre Kojeve
Warning to the reader. This is not a simple philosophical treatise; one should start by reading Xenophon, Arendt, Locke and de Tocqueville, failing which many of the more interesting nuances will be passed over.
Warning to the reader. This is not a simple philosophical treatise; one should start by reading Xenophon, Arendt, Locke and de Tocqueville, failing which many of the more interesting nuances will be passed over.
March 3, 2020
Man these guys were so fuckin smart
December 10, 2023
Leo Strauss is one of the most competent writers I've read; this probably deserves a higher rating, but I read it for a class. His careful reading of Xenophon is a lesson to all who read dialogues.
September 12, 2007
In this book you get a translation of Xenophon's Hiero, Strauss' commentary on Xenophon, Kojeve's review of Strauss, Strauss' reply to Kojeve, and the Strauss-Kojeve correspondence. Worth its weight in gold to any thinking person concerned with the problem of tyranny--which problem, as Kojeve especially makes almost too clear, may not be what we typically take it to be. Those who are put off from reading this book merely because it is written by the wicked/asinine/elitist and duplicitous (I believe the word "neoconservative" is considered by many to suggest all the above) Leo Strauss perhaps should not be permitted to read books. If one thinks through the problem posed by tyranny, one will understand that there is a link between the inclination to only read authors that you agree with or that do not disgust you and the tyrannical spirit.
December 8, 2022
کتاب مهمیست ولی ترجمه را نمیشود حواند شوربختانه. بر خلاف ترجمهی «شهر و انسان» نشر آگه (رسول نمازی) و «حقوق طبیعی و تاریخ» نشر آگاه (باقر پرهام) برای همین با کلافگی تا نیمه آن هم برای فهم قرائت اشتراوس از رسالهی اعتراف هیرون خواندم و خلاص. خود رساله که بد ترجمه شده قال و اقول بین اشتراوس و کوژف که دیگر نفرمایید. رساله را در کتاب «زیانهای استبداد» نشر توس میشود خواند و درود فرستاد به مترجمش آقای شیخالاسلامی.
August 11, 2018
A translation of Xenophon’s dialogue, Hiero, or On Tyranny; an interpretation of the dialogue by Leo Strauss; a response to Strauss by noted Hegelian Alexandre Kojéve; and a response from Strauss. An excellent example from Strauss on how to read carefully whether dialogue or essay.
August 19, 2012
A brilliant dialogue between two masterminds: the allegedly conservative Strauss and the Stalinist Hegelian Alexandre Kojeve. Is it necessary to study modern politics with modern political science, or should classical political philosophy suffice?
September 20, 2019
Every part of this is worth being read (so make sure to have the letters as well where some "got lost"), 4 instead of 5 because of a lack of honesty in some parts.
August 9, 2025
On Tyranny by Leo Strauss is a book which is an analysis of Xenophon’s Hiero. As such, it can be seen that the book is an interpretation of Hiero. From Strauss’ view, Xenophon’s Hiero is a story which looks at the follies of being an autocrat. For Strauss, Xenophon’s story is a tale in which being an autocrat means a lack of happiness. Strauss seems to make a big deal about the autocrat lacks homosexual sex.
Other interesting points made by Strauss are that the autocrat Hiero wants to be loved. This is in part why Strauss makes a big deal about the homosexual sex is because Hiero wants to be loved. In this regard, Strauss is making a point that contrasts with Machiavelli’s Prince in that being loved is important for the ruler. In this regard, it is better to be loved than feared. Another fear that the autocrat has is the fear of wise people. Strauss argues this is because wise people threaten an autocrat’s power.
In many ways, the book is a useful book of wisdom that looks at the problems of autocracy. There are modern parallels within the book, particularly with the tangerine who desires significant power and does not seek wise counsel because of the tangerine’s narcissistic tendencies. In the age of the autocratic tangerine, this book is a good book to dwell on the issues of autocracy and in many ways has a timeless quality to it.
Other interesting points made by Strauss are that the autocrat Hiero wants to be loved. This is in part why Strauss makes a big deal about the homosexual sex is because Hiero wants to be loved. In this regard, Strauss is making a point that contrasts with Machiavelli’s Prince in that being loved is important for the ruler. In this regard, it is better to be loved than feared. Another fear that the autocrat has is the fear of wise people. Strauss argues this is because wise people threaten an autocrat’s power.
In many ways, the book is a useful book of wisdom that looks at the problems of autocracy. There are modern parallels within the book, particularly with the tangerine who desires significant power and does not seek wise counsel because of the tangerine’s narcissistic tendencies. In the age of the autocratic tangerine, this book is a good book to dwell on the issues of autocracy and in many ways has a timeless quality to it.
December 24, 2024
An interesting take on Xenophon's Dialogue Hiero. Leo Strauss is one of the great thinkers of the 20th century, underappreciated due to his dense and overwritten essays. If you are patient and prepared to read carefully and slowly, it is usually worth it.
One minor criticism was the amount of time the book spends speculating on the motivations and intentions of the two speakers in the dialogue. Both are historical figures but this is not a transcript of an actual conversation that took place. I don't know if the two ever met or had such a conversation. Dialogues are usually more hypothetical and the form intended to draw out ideas and scrutinize them using the Socratic method. Xenophon was a disciple of Socrates.
I would not have taken much time approaching this as if it was a real dialogue or a scene from a show or movie. Strauss seems to do that for 30 pages or so.
The examination of their views on tyranny, justice, good government, and the unique viewpoints remind me of Machiavelli, another fascinating writer. To me, this warrant more attention then how the wise man Simonides intended to trick the tyrant Hiero.
Still, worth the read.
One minor criticism was the amount of time the book spends speculating on the motivations and intentions of the two speakers in the dialogue. Both are historical figures but this is not a transcript of an actual conversation that took place. I don't know if the two ever met or had such a conversation. Dialogues are usually more hypothetical and the form intended to draw out ideas and scrutinize them using the Socratic method. Xenophon was a disciple of Socrates.
I would not have taken much time approaching this as if it was a real dialogue or a scene from a show or movie. Strauss seems to do that for 30 pages or so.
The examination of their views on tyranny, justice, good government, and the unique viewpoints remind me of Machiavelli, another fascinating writer. To me, this warrant more attention then how the wise man Simonides intended to trick the tyrant Hiero.
Still, worth the read.
October 31, 2022
An interesting discussion on Autocracy as form of government, before convention decided Liberal Democracy was the only acceptable form of government available to man.
The book is divided into 4 parts - a Translation of Xenophon's Hiero, an exposition by Leo Strauss, a back and forth between Strauss and Kojéve and their exchange of correspondence. The last half of the book is a bit Byzantine and a bit boring, as both academics go into very speficic details and points of discussiont that probably wont interest the regular reader. Still, its interesting to see the Marxist Kojéve praising Portugal's Salazar as an example of Good Tyranny!
In general, modern political science has completely abandoned Classical politics - something thats not missed by Strauss - putting individual freedom as the Most important Good any government could support. Using Hiero as a basis of discussion, Strauss analyses the priorities of Classical government and the pros and cons of Classical Tyranny in a dispassionate way, as it should be.
The book is divided into 4 parts - a Translation of Xenophon's Hiero, an exposition by Leo Strauss, a back and forth between Strauss and Kojéve and their exchange of correspondence. The last half of the book is a bit Byzantine and a bit boring, as both academics go into very speficic details and points of discussiont that probably wont interest the regular reader. Still, its interesting to see the Marxist Kojéve praising Portugal's Salazar as an example of Good Tyranny!
In general, modern political science has completely abandoned Classical politics - something thats not missed by Strauss - putting individual freedom as the Most important Good any government could support. Using Hiero as a basis of discussion, Strauss analyses the priorities of Classical government and the pros and cons of Classical Tyranny in a dispassionate way, as it should be.
December 22, 2022
This is a very strange, but profoundly important book. Strange, because Strauss's reading of Xenophon's 'Hiero' is utterly eccentric and completely at odds with the text itself - almost deliberately perverse. Important, though, because despite this he opens up to reflection absoutely fundamental issues concerning government and the will to power/rule, and the role of expertise/scholarship/'scholativism' within them. Rocket fuel is poured on this by his sparring partner, Kojeve, who (partially unwittingly, I think) manages to construct a compelling critique of essentially the entire Western approach to governance since at least Hegel and probably since Machiavelli. I have been sceptical of Strauss's work in the past, but this one is really excellent, despite the genuinely bizarre interpretation he offers of Xenophon's work.
October 23, 2024
Actually very, very interesting for a random library pick. I particularly enjoyed the correspondence between Kojève and Strauss. I found Xenephon's dialogue between Hiero and Simonides quite fun to read. I wish that the critiques had contained more of a discussion about love. I guess because I was surprised by how often Hiero came back to the incapacity for tyrants to have love(or at least its highest form). The part of Strauss' critique which considered the romantic seemed more focused on "pleasure and virtue," so I was glad that Kojève brought back the presence of love in the dialogue. Still that discussion was rather short, so I now would be intrigued to read more about why love and love's economy was so important in Xenephon's dialogue.
July 18, 2022
Truly Excellent.
You don't read Strauss' work on Tyranny to gain information or trivia. You read it to ponder with him, and consider the discussions of Xenophon (whose dialogue Strauss' book is essentially a commentary on). And therefore, you read it to be impacted and personally develop your character.
So many fantastic tidbits are scattered throughout. I am not sure if there's much of a main idea, or thread, running through Strauss' commentary. But you profit from reading and pondering it.
You don't read Strauss' work on Tyranny to gain information or trivia. You read it to ponder with him, and consider the discussions of Xenophon (whose dialogue Strauss' book is essentially a commentary on). And therefore, you read it to be impacted and personally develop your character.
So many fantastic tidbits are scattered throughout. I am not sure if there's much of a main idea, or thread, running through Strauss' commentary. But you profit from reading and pondering it.
January 18, 2025
Γνωμούλα που οι επιλογές μου στην ζωή με οδήγησαν στο να διαβάζω μια εγελιανή ανάλυση του Ξενοφώντα στην μία το βράδυ και να καταλαβάινω όντως τι λέει? Σιγά-σιγά θα αρχίσω να πιστεύω όντως στο τέλος της ιστορίας.
Μ'άρεσε βέβαια ο Κοζεφινούλης μου, αλλά κυρίως απόλαυσα να διαβάζω το πρώτο τμήμα του βιβλίου, την ανάλυση του Στράους, με τον οποίο ναι μεν διαφωνώ σε αρκετά καίρια σημεία, αλλά εκθέτει τις απόψεις του με τέτοιο τρόπο, ώστε να θέλω όντως να ενασχοληθώ και να εξετάσω την "αντίθετη" άποψη. Μπράβο σου έφαγες κι ας είσαι λίγο ελιτιστής.
Μ'άρεσε βέβαια ο Κοζεφινούλης μου, αλλά κυρίως απόλαυσα να διαβάζω το πρώτο τμήμα του βιβλίου, την ανάλυση του Στράους, με τον οποίο ναι μεν διαφωνώ σε αρκετά καίρια σημεία, αλλά εκθέτει τις απόψεις του με τέτοιο τρόπο, ώστε να θέλω όντως να ενασχοληθώ και να εξετάσω την "αντίθετη" άποψη. Μπράβο σου έφαγες κι ας είσαι λίγο ελιτιστής.
March 3, 2024
A highly engaging and interesting exploration of the topic and dialogue.
October 12, 2019
Leo Strauss: Thus tyranny in any form seems to be irreconcilable with the requirement of justice. On the other hand, tyranny would become morally possible if the identification of "just" and "legal" were not absolutely correct, or if "everything according to the law were (only) somehow just." The laws which determine what is legal are the rules of conduct upon which the citizens have agreed. "The citizens" maybe "the multitude" or "the few,"; "the few," maybe the rich or virtuous. That is to say, the laws, and hence what is legal, depending on the political order of the community for which they are given (p. 75).
Strauss-Kojeve: In fact, it is tyranny (in the morally neutral sense of the word) when a fraction of the citizens (it matters little whether it be a majority or a minority) imposes its ideas and acts on all the other citizens, which are determined by an authority which it recognizes spontaneously but which it has not succeeded in making the others recognize; and where it does so without "coming to terms" with these others, without seeking any "compromises" with them, and without taking into account their ideas and desires (determined by another authority recognized by these others). Quite plainly, this fraction can do this only through force or terror by playing in the last analysis on the fear that the others have of the violent death which the former can inflict on them. One can say, then, that in this situation, the others are "enslaved," since they behave in fact like slaves who are ready to do anything to save their lives (153).
In other words, ! he isolated philosopher must necessarily hold that the necessary and sufficient criterion of truth consists in the feeling of "evidentness" which is supposed to be given by the "intellectual intuition" of the real and Being, or which accompanies "clear and distinct ideas" or "axioms," or which is associated from the beginning with divine revelation. This criterion of "evidentness" was accepted by all "rationalist" philosophers from Plato to Husser!, passing by way of Descartes. Unfortunately it is itself not in the least bit "evident," and I think that it is invalidated by the sole fact that there have always been on earth Illuminati and "false prophets" who have never had the least doubt concerning the truth of their "intuitions" or of the authenticity of the "revelations" they have received in one form or another. In short, the subjective "evidentness" that an "isolated" thinker might sense is invalidated as a criterion for truth by the sole fact of the existence of madness or lunacy, which, as correct deduction from subjectively "evident" first principles, can be "systematic" or "logical (p. 162)."
Strauss-Kojeve: In fact, it is tyranny (in the morally neutral sense of the word) when a fraction of the citizens (it matters little whether it be a majority or a minority) imposes its ideas and acts on all the other citizens, which are determined by an authority which it recognizes spontaneously but which it has not succeeded in making the others recognize; and where it does so without "coming to terms" with these others, without seeking any "compromises" with them, and without taking into account their ideas and desires (determined by another authority recognized by these others). Quite plainly, this fraction can do this only through force or terror by playing in the last analysis on the fear that the others have of the violent death which the former can inflict on them. One can say, then, that in this situation, the others are "enslaved," since they behave in fact like slaves who are ready to do anything to save their lives (153).
In other words, ! he isolated philosopher must necessarily hold that the necessary and sufficient criterion of truth consists in the feeling of "evidentness" which is supposed to be given by the "intellectual intuition" of the real and Being, or which accompanies "clear and distinct ideas" or "axioms," or which is associated from the beginning with divine revelation. This criterion of "evidentness" was accepted by all "rationalist" philosophers from Plato to Husser!, passing by way of Descartes. Unfortunately it is itself not in the least bit "evident," and I think that it is invalidated by the sole fact that there have always been on earth Illuminati and "false prophets" who have never had the least doubt concerning the truth of their "intuitions" or of the authenticity of the "revelations" they have received in one form or another. In short, the subjective "evidentness" that an "isolated" thinker might sense is invalidated as a criterion for truth by the sole fact of the existence of madness or lunacy, which, as correct deduction from subjectively "evident" first principles, can be "systematic" or "logical (p. 162)."
March 28, 2023
"On Tyranny" is a book written by German-American political philosopher Leo Strauss, first published in 1948. The book is a critical analysis of the political philosophy of the ancient Greek philosopher Xenophon and his ideas about tyranny.
Strauss argues that Xenophon's writings offer important insights into the nature of tyranny and its relationship to political power. He contends that tyrants are not simply arbitrary or capricious rulers, but rather individuals who are driven by a desire for power and domination.
In the book, Strauss also explores the question of how individuals and societies can resist tyranny and preserve their freedom. He argues that the best defense against tyranny is a strong sense of civic virtue and a commitment to the principles of democratic governance.
Throughout "On Tyranny," Strauss draws on his deep knowledge of classical philosophy and political theory to offer a nuanced and insightful analysis of the nature of political power and the threats to democratic governance. The book has been influential in shaping our understanding of the dangers of tyranny and the importance of defending democratic institutions and values.
GPT
Strauss argues that Xenophon's writings offer important insights into the nature of tyranny and its relationship to political power. He contends that tyrants are not simply arbitrary or capricious rulers, but rather individuals who are driven by a desire for power and domination.
In the book, Strauss also explores the question of how individuals and societies can resist tyranny and preserve their freedom. He argues that the best defense against tyranny is a strong sense of civic virtue and a commitment to the principles of democratic governance.
Throughout "On Tyranny," Strauss draws on his deep knowledge of classical philosophy and political theory to offer a nuanced and insightful analysis of the nature of political power and the threats to democratic governance. The book has been influential in shaping our understanding of the dangers of tyranny and the importance of defending democratic institutions and values.
GPT
to-keep-reference
February 22, 2016En On Tyranny, Leo Strauss contestaba a la pregunta: ¿En qué consiste la filosofía política? de la siguiente manera: "En convencer a la polis de que los filósofos no son ateos, que no blasfeman contra nada de lo sagrado a la ciudad, que reverencian lo mismo que reverencia la polis, que no son subversivos, en suma, que no son aventureros irresponsables sino los mejores ciudadanos".
Visión de Paralaje Pág.17-18
Visión de Paralaje Pág.17-18
December 22, 2011
I am currently reading this title, as it just came in yesterday. The Introduction is a small book, in and of itself. This thing is amazing and some of the philosophical concepts make you stop, chew, and swallow, then revist the same plate to do so again!
July 14, 2011
Amazing book...
June 2, 2015
It is a great lesson in leadership, showing us that even if you command everything and everyone there is a responsibility for such a person to take care of those "underneath" you.
April 6, 2018
A fascinating and highly imaginative, yet rigorous analysis of Xenophon's classic text. A classic example of painstaking yet tentative, cautious hermeneutics.
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