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Meaning in Dialogue: An Interactive Approach to Logic and Reasoning
This book argues for a view in which processes of dialogue and interaction are taken to be foundational to reasoning, logic, and meaning. This is both a continuation, and a substantial modification, of an inferentialist approach to logic. As such, the book not only provides a critical introduction to the inferentialist view, but it also provides an argument that this shift in perspective has deep and foundational consequences for how we understand the nature of logic and its relationship with meaning and reasoning. This has been upheld by several technical results, including, for example a novel approach to logical paradox and logical revision, and an account of the internal justification of logical rules. The book shows that inferentialism is greatly strengthened, such that it can answer the most stringent criticisms of the view. This leads to a view of logic that emphasizes the dynamics of reasoning, provides a novel account of the justification and normativity of logical rules, thus leading to a new, attractive approach to the foundations of logic. The book addresses readers interested in philosophy of language, philosophical and mathematical logic, theories of reasoning, and also those who actively engage in current debates involving, for example, logical revision, and the relationship between logic and reasoning, from advanced undergraduates, to professional philosophers, mathematicians, and linguists.
- GenresPhilosophyLanguage
246 pages, Kindle Edition
Published October 24, 2016
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
February 19, 2023
In Islamic theology, we talk sometimes about Al-Insān al-Kāmil, the complete or perfect man. Reading Jim's book was the closest I've ever come to believing that this ideal man might exist. I guess I have a thing for nerdy Catholic boys, they just love their moms so much. Wholesome. On to the substance.
Jim argues for what he calls a modest inferentialism. I confess I entirely agree with this proposal. Building on Brandom's ground-breaking pragmatic translation of Hegel's system into the language of logic, Jim suggests we go from an Aristotelian view of proof to a more formally expressive approach where proofs are understood as acts. Why does Jim want to go beyond Brandom? Brandom requires that rules be fixed in advance, and rules out symmetry between agents in a game. Jim, quite sensibly, suspends these 2 requirements. Jim knows how to talk like a game theorist, but he emphasizes that the point of the dialogical games that we most care about is not to win. Rather, the point is to check whether an agent is entitled to their statements. Instead of thinking of games as adversarial duels, Jim recommends a cooperative mode.
An interesting consequence of his argument is that it renders redundant any attempt to construct so-called "logical harmony." Why? It inevitably succumbs to Carrollian regress. Jim has read his Kant, and instead suggests that the relevant constraint is a limit on the ends of the interaction. Proofs must terminate; it matters very little if they sound good in the process.
Jim makes a distinction that in my view is essential to understanding any form of logical inference, between reasoning in a closed and open context. In a closed world, negation is viewed as failure. Not so in the open world, a context that is much more suitable for scientific reason. If you'll forgive the stupid slang, the open world assumption is based, and the closed world assumption...isn't. Jim's theory only makes sense in the open context.
Jim's view of justification is built on a non-empirical view of testing. Logic is not just a matter of manipulating syntactic tokens and revising our beliefs accordingly. It is a salvaging operation, a reconstruction of the reasonableness of the activity of thought. Jim is able to account for the interaction of norms, providing an ethics-focused doctrine of angent-agent relation. His frame is defined in relation to Buber, Foucault and the German Idealist philosophy of freedom. It's a pretty cool way of applying seemingly hopelessly abstract logic to practical problems.
The most important lesson in the book is the contrast between reason as an autocratic monologue and social dialogue. When we reason together, we arrive at better conclusions. Sounds naive, perhaps, but I believe it's true.
Jim argues for what he calls a modest inferentialism. I confess I entirely agree with this proposal. Building on Brandom's ground-breaking pragmatic translation of Hegel's system into the language of logic, Jim suggests we go from an Aristotelian view of proof to a more formally expressive approach where proofs are understood as acts. Why does Jim want to go beyond Brandom? Brandom requires that rules be fixed in advance, and rules out symmetry between agents in a game. Jim, quite sensibly, suspends these 2 requirements. Jim knows how to talk like a game theorist, but he emphasizes that the point of the dialogical games that we most care about is not to win. Rather, the point is to check whether an agent is entitled to their statements. Instead of thinking of games as adversarial duels, Jim recommends a cooperative mode.
An interesting consequence of his argument is that it renders redundant any attempt to construct so-called "logical harmony." Why? It inevitably succumbs to Carrollian regress. Jim has read his Kant, and instead suggests that the relevant constraint is a limit on the ends of the interaction. Proofs must terminate; it matters very little if they sound good in the process.
Jim makes a distinction that in my view is essential to understanding any form of logical inference, between reasoning in a closed and open context. In a closed world, negation is viewed as failure. Not so in the open world, a context that is much more suitable for scientific reason. If you'll forgive the stupid slang, the open world assumption is based, and the closed world assumption...isn't. Jim's theory only makes sense in the open context.
Jim's view of justification is built on a non-empirical view of testing. Logic is not just a matter of manipulating syntactic tokens and revising our beliefs accordingly. It is a salvaging operation, a reconstruction of the reasonableness of the activity of thought. Jim is able to account for the interaction of norms, providing an ethics-focused doctrine of angent-agent relation. His frame is defined in relation to Buber, Foucault and the German Idealist philosophy of freedom. It's a pretty cool way of applying seemingly hopelessly abstract logic to practical problems.
The most important lesson in the book is the contrast between reason as an autocratic monologue and social dialogue. When we reason together, we arrive at better conclusions. Sounds naive, perhaps, but I believe it's true.
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