No single human invention has transformed war more than the airplane—not even the atomic bomb. Even before the Wright Brothers’ first flight, predictions abounded of the devastating and terrible consequences this new invention would have as an engine of war. Soaring over the battlefield, the airplane became an unstoppable force that left no spot on earth safe from attack. Drawing on combat memoirs, letters, diaries, archival records, museum collections, and eyewitness accounts by the men who fought—and the men who developed the breakthrough inventions and concepts—acclaimed author Stephen Budiansky weaves a vivid and dramatic account of the airplane’s revolutionary transformation of modern warfare. On the
Historian and journalist Stephen Budiansky is the author of twelve books about military history, science, and nature.
His latest book is The Bloody Shirt: Terror After Appomattox, which chronicles the struggles of five courageous men in the post-Civil War South as they battled a rising tide of terrorist violence aimed at usurping the newly won rights of the freedmen.
This man is a master of storytelling. You'd assume this was just written documentary. But no. Stephen weaves a beautiful story of ego and intrigue, and you feel like you're reading a spy thriller. This man could make maritime legislation interesting and compelling.
I have read this book three times, and I will probably do so again.
In my opinion, this book is neither an overview of Air Power, nor does it adequately explore ideas or machines which revolutionised war. It is more a story of where the concept of strategic bombing came from and how it maintained its grip on political and strategic thinkers pre and post-WWII.
I found some sections extremely interesting and well balanced. It is packed full of detail, and contains an enlightening early chapter on the complications of initial aircraft development. However, there are some shortcomings: -The book overly focussed on strategic bombing throughout. -Only short discussions about air supremacy and close air support. -Little to no discussion on reconnaissance (ISR) or air mobility. -Unbalanced narrative, less than 1/4 of the book (96/441 pages) discussed post-WWII air power. -Written in a slightly incoherent style; constantly flitted backwards and forwards in time, which made following the story a challenge in places.
Here is an unpretentious account of how aircraft changed the art of war. From the struggles of heavier than air machines, to current day precision weapon delivery. Bypassing the usual knights of the air stories, for a more mundane but accurate account of its use to intimidate, obliterate and annihilate ones foe. How people were blindsided by its drawbacks, until the weapons used caught up with the platforms capabilities.
The modern heavier-than-air airplane was invented by Orville and Wilbur Wright, who tested wing designs in a wind tunnel, understood the need to control the roll, pitch and yaw, and realized that a propeller blade is essentially a wing, so the usual consideration of lift and drag apply to it. The brothers wanted to sell their invention to the military, but it wasn't enthusiastic, and neither were the rest of the world's militaries. So when World War I broke out, all the major belligerents had air forces that consisted mostly of observation aircraft, though they proved useful in this role by helping stop the German advance at the Marne and destroy the Russian army that invaded East Prussia. During the war it was realized that one could drop explosives from an airplane upon the enemy, and also use airplanes to shoot down other airplanes; thus were the bomber and the fighter born, though the Sikorsky Ilya Muromets heavy bomber entered service shortly before the war. After the war, the all-metal monoplane became the standard configuration for both civilian and military airplanes, and aerodynamics became a real science. Air forces played a much bigger role in the Spanish Civil War and in World War II. During the Battle of Britain British fighters guided by radar attacked German bombers; the British also jammed radar beams that guided German bombers to their targets. Later in the war, as the Allies achieved air superiority in the skies over Germany, they obliterated many German cities, dropping 2 million tons of bombs and killing 600,000 civilians. The age of jet aircraft began in the last year of the war, and soon after the war, they made piston aircraft obsolete; the swept wing became standard for transonic and supersonic flight; needle-like supersonic fighter-bombers were built to punch a hole in Soviet air defenses and drop hydrogen bombs on the USSR. Air force played a significant role in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, which saw the introduction of a new type of military airplane: the side-shooting gunship that circled its target, and in the Gulf War.
Budiansky's argument is that air force commanders have always been in thrall to the vision of wars being won by bombing. The problem with this vision is that if there is a possibility of winning a battle, the enemy won't surrender however many of his cities have been ruined. The Germans thought that by bombing Britain, they would break the will of the British people; they didn't. The British thought that by bombing Germany, they were destroying enemy morale; the Germans fought to the end. In contrast, when in the summer of 1944 the Allies started targeting German oil installations, Germany quickly ran out of the oil necessary to fight the war; what if they had done it earlier? When B-29s dropped naval mines on Japanese shipping lanes, this destroyed much of the nation's merchant fleet; this may have had a greater effect on Japanese warfighting capability than the burning of Japan's cities. When told about the plans to nuke the Soviets, George Kennan is said to have said, "If you drop atomic bombs on Moscow, Leningrad, and the rest, you will simply convince the Russians that you are barbarians trying to destroy their very society and they will rise up and wage an indeterminate guerrilla war against the West." Nowadays, laser-guided and GPS-guided bombs can destroy targets with unequaled precision; during the Gulf War, infrared targeting allowed American pilots to "plink" tanks, which stood out against the sand at night. Although air forces are becoming ever more powerful; they still cannot win wars by themselves; you still need boots on the ground.
Bought this book cheap and intended to read it 'some day.' Had to read it as a textbook for an online course. It was actually a very interesting book; very well written. It covers Air Power from the dawn of heavier-than-air machines to the current day.
It discusses the changing theories behind air power and how air power should be used; it obviously discusses the tactics that changed as theories were applied in combat situations; it also discusses how the US Military was so short-sighted in forgetting important lessons learned in WWII and Korea into Vietnam. It was very frustrating to read about the stupidity and short-sightedness of military commanders - people died because of their attitude[s]! [I know people die in war and people die in general, but being willfully blind to the realities around you means people die unnecessarily who might have lived had the proper equipment and training been provided.] It also discusses how technology and aeronautical knowledge and science changed, adapted, and grew with each decade. The period between the First and Second World Wars saw exponential growth in terms of avionics and aviation. It is rather remarkable the changes that occurred in terms of abilities and technology and speed and capabilities for each 'generation' of aircraft.
WWII showed that a heavy bomber could not fight its way through enemy defenses to bomb a target and return with impunity. It also showed the need for multipurpose aircraft, yet the military mindset was still set on 'heavy bombers over all!' until Vietnam and beyond. Korea showed the Western mindset did not understand how Communist soldiers thought [minimal amount of supplies needed to fight and survive, especially when compared to 'modern soldiers'] as well as the need for multipurpose aircraft. Vietnam reinforced the need for multipurpose aircraft and the need for Western Armies to understand the need for insurgency tactics when fighting an insurgency as opposed to trying to use large armies to fight foes who refuse to stand and fight until annihilated. The 'small wars' in the Middle East demonstrated the strengths of Air Power used correctly as well as what happens when Air Power is not used correctly. The Gulf War demonstrated how dominating Air Power can be, but it was used against a static target that refused to fight back in a competent fashion, so it is still hard to say 'Air Power Over All!' in every situation.
I really enjoyed this book more than I thought I would. It was very interesting. It did not hide the warts and bad thinking of military commanders. The initial chapters were more 'global' in nature, discussing other nations and not just the United States [such as the British, the Japanese, the French, the Italians, the Russians, and the Germans], but it did remain somewhat 'global' [by discussing the Korean pilots, the Chinese pilots [a little], the Israelis and their Arab enemies, Egyptian and Syrian pilots, and the Iraqis]. And not just US Military commanders were stuck on stupid; other national commanders and theorists were also stuck on stupid in terms of their thinking and refusing to change their minds in the face of facts and data contrary to what they wanted to believe to be true.
Excellent book, well written with interesting content from the Wright Brothers all the way up to the 2nd Iraq war. Learned a lot of new facts about the aviation pioneers and how various governments tried to downplay their achievements in order not to have to pay them for all of their inventions.
Very enjoyable read. For aviation enthusiasts I could highly recommend it. Some very illuminating information on the efficacy and changing role of Air power throughout the 20th century.
This is a history of air power, though mostly American air power, and of the American military's obsession with precision strategic bombing since World War One.