Dialogi

by Alexei Navalny, Adam Michnik, Aleksiej Nawalny

W cieniu Kremla spotykają się ikona polskiej opozycji i krytyk Putina nr 1. Czy metody polskiej opozycji czasów PRL-u uda się zastosować w putinowskiej Rosji? Na jakich warunkach można próbować porozumieć się z autorytarną władzą? Czy polska transformacja to również droga dla Rosjan? Jakie miejsce powinna zająć Rosja w Europie? Jak rozwiązać konflikt z Ukrainą? Czy lustracja jest niezbędna do zapewnienia społecznego pokoju? Adam Michnik, jeden z filarów antykomunistycznej opozycji w Polsce a dziś redaktor naczelny „Gazety Wyborczej” spotkał się z Moskwie z Aleksiejem Nawalnym, bezkompromisowym bojownikiem przeciwko korupcji i najważniejszą dziś postacią antyputinowskiej opozycji. Ich wspólna książka jest zapisem fascynujących rozmów o najważniejszych konfliktach, które rozrywają współczesną Rosję i świat.

Genres: Politics, Nonfiction, Russia, History

207 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2015

About the author

Alexei Anatolievich Navalny (Russian: Алексей Анатольевич Навальный) was a Russian opposition leader, lawyer, and anti-corruption activist. He came to international prominence by organizing anti-government demonstrations and running for office to advocate reforms against corruption in Russia, and against President Vladimir Putin and his government. Navalny has been described as "the man Vladimir Putin fears most" by The Wall Street Journal. He was the leader of the Russia of the Future party and the founder of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK).

Reviews

[Dmitry · Rating 5 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Он пока лишь затеивал спор, спор
Неуверенно и не спеша,
Словно капельки пота из пор,
Из-под кожи сочилась душа.

Только начал дуэль на ковре,
Еле-еле, едва приступил.
Лишь чуть-чуть осмотрелся в игре,
И судья еще счет не открыл.

Очень хорошая книга, которая в отличной форме показывает мировоззрение Алексея Навального. Для тех, кому было лень читать его политические статьи, эта книга предлагает текст, построенный в виде диалога. Конечно, помимо Навального в книге присутствует и Michnik с которым Навальный и ведёт диалог. Но мне кажется, такой подход был выбран верно, т.к. текст приобретает более живой и понятный вид (в отличие от типичного программного текста). Что ж, Навальный ещё раз продемонстрировал, что он был самым адекватным российским политиком. Конечно, мы не знает, как бы повёл себя Навальный, если бы стал главой государства, но то, что он говорил, вполне соответствуют либеральному адекватному взгляду. Поэтому не удивительно, что Навальный был единственным политиком, от внесистемной оппозиции которого поддерживали сотни тысяч людей, а если бы в России была бы демократия, то, скорее всего и миллионы.

Я начну с очень важной для меня темы - ельцинского правления - ибо именно в этой книге мы встречаем оценку, данную Навальным в отношении и Ельцина и его режима, что доказывает тот факт, что фильм "Предатели", это, прежде всего, мнение самого Навального.

I have to admit, over the past few years I’ve re-evaluated the events of the late 80s and early 90s. Back then I was a massive fan of Yeltsin’s, but Gorbachev seems a far more appealing figure to me now. I understand what scenarios he could’ve put into effect – anything from bloodshed to stratospheric personal enrichment. He could’ve done everything Putin’s doing now but didn’t. He was detested by the whole country then, communists and liberals alike.
<...>
What makes Walęsa radically different from Yeltsin, though, is that while Walęsa was the new man on the block, Yeltsin was a descendant of the old elite, who then turned against it – and won. The radical renewal of the elite we witnessed in Poland never happened in Russia.
<...>
It’s to none other than Chubais, I believe, that we owe the existence of Putinism. He and others like him have perverted the meaning of the words “liberalism” and “democracy.” It’s because of them that these words are now being used to stigmatise democratic opposition. And this “liberal democrat” is now running a state-owned corporation while explaining to me that Putin and state ownership are good things.
<...>
Gaidar and Chubais are completely different people. Gaidar’s a liberal and Chubais isn’t. He’s just a hypocrite.

Точно такая же позиция у Навального и по отношению к выборам 1996 года, когда и произошёл главный автократический поворот страны - страна отказалась от главного демократического принципа, принципа сменяемости власти.

Perhaps we needed to have gone through the same thing as Eastern Europe did – the return to power of the Communists in one form or another. Then the pendulum swung once again, and they gave way to others. There’s nothing threatening about alternations of power.
<...>
In 1993 and 1996 we were told that, were it not for Yeltsin, the red-browns [communists-fascists] would be taking power, waging repression against the people and starting wars aimed at the restoration of the Soviet empire. And what do we have on our hands now? We didn’t let the red-browns storm parliament and destroy the elections, but the imperial wars began anyway. I therefore think it’s crucial for the Russian opposition to re-evaluate the events of 1993 and 1996

Олигархия как главная угроза демократии, так же поднимается Навальным и он так же очень точно отмечает начертания решения этой проблемы.

You want to go into gas or oil? Be my guest. But you can’t go into oil and into the media at the same time.

Тема, конечно, огромная и Навальный не пытается дать комплексный ответ. Однако он правильно указывает на то, что после того как олигархи задаром получили огромные куски собственности, они купили на эти деньги СМИ, управляя которыми они пытались секьюритизировать свои приобретения и как результат, избрание тех политиков, которые бы не стали ставить под вопрос эту самую приватизацию.

В книге так же можно встретить позицию Навального по националистическому вопросу, которая вся сводится к двум тезисам. Во-первых, принятие квот для приёма мигрантов и во-вторых, вывод мигрантов из теневой экономики, в которой они пребывают и сегодня.

if we filtered the stream of incomers through a visa regime, migrants would be forced to get work permits and take out medical insurance. And then they’d be able to count on legal and medical assistance if they needed it.

Последнее что я бы хотел отметить, это последняя глава об украинском вопросе. Навальный с Michnik правильно отмечают, что чем дольше длится украино-российский кризис, тем радикальней будут приходящие в этих странах политики.

And Russia’s currently doing everything to bring that notional Ukrainian Zhirinovsky to power. As long as the armed conflict continues, Russophobia and an anti-Russian stance will be popular among voters. And the larger-scale the conflict, the more popular they’ll become.

Так же он проясняет свою позицию по Крыму, с которой полностью солидаризируется Michnik. Вот что говорит Michnik

I think the only correct way to resolve the Crimea issue is to hold a referendum under international supervision. And I’d even admit the possibility of such a referendum in the Donbas. If they want to join Russia, let them do so. If they want independence, they can have that too.

На что Навальный отвечает:

But we must understand that the problem of Crimea is of a political rather than legal character. And it cannot be solved purely by legal means. More than two million Russian passports have been issued to Crimea’s residents, you can’t cancel them just like that. So the only thing we can do is to annul the results of the farce of March 2014 and hold a fair and transparent referendum under international supervision. And accept the results, whatever they may be.

Чтобы понять, почему ни один российский политик не передаст Крым нынешней Украине, давайте представим, что это случилось. Крым, который не то что не хочет слышать украинскую речь, но даже украинскую культуру знать не хочет, переходит обратно в нынешнюю Украину, которая заявляет, что будет выжигать коленом железом всё, что связано с Россией и русскими. Что происходит в таком случаи? Украина навязывает украинизацию жителям Крыма, ибо не может позволить, чтобы в её составе был в прямом смысле русский анклав. Что делают в ответ на это крымчане? Вариантов много, особенно учитывая наличие пророссийских активистов. К примеру, могут перекрыть дорогу на материковую Украину или как-то ещё бойкотировать действия Киева. Далее что делает правительство Украины в таком случаи? Ответ ясен - начинают АТО против Крыма. Ну, а дальше война, даже если Украина будет в этот момент в НАТО. Если любой человек просто подумает о том, как может существовать русский Крым в составе нынешней Украины, тот поймёт, что передать Крым Украине можно только тогда, когда в самой Украине будем комфортно и не страшно жить русским, что в Украине не будет никаких дискриминационных законов. В таком случаи, теоретически можно представить возвращение Крыма без перспективы очередного военного конфликта. Всё остальное настолько взрывоопасно, по обе стороны границы, что нет такого политика, кто бы осмелился бы на такой шаг (именно политика, а не общественного деятеля, писателя и журналиста от которого решение данного вопроса не зависит).

Что же получается, русский либерал ломается на украинском вопросе? Безусловно. Так же как любой американский либерал ломается на мексиканском или канадском вопросе, а немецкий либерал ломается на австрийском или французском вопросе. Чтобы понять, почему эта фраза является демагогией, нужно представить её в более чётком виде: любой российский политик заканчивается на границе с Украиной.

It is a very good book that shows Alexei Navalny's worldview in an excellent form. For those who were too lazy to read his political articles, this book offers a text built in the form of a dialog. Of course, in addition to Navalny, the book also features Michnik, with whom Navalny talks. But it seems to me that this approach was chosen correctly, as the text acquires a more lively and understandable appearance (unlike a typical program text). Well, Navalny once again demonstrated that he was the most adequate Russian politician. Of course, we don't know how Navalny would behave if he became head of state, but what he said was quite consistent with the liberal adequate view. So it is not surprising that Navalny was the only politician from the non-systemic opposition who was supported by hundreds of thousands of people, and if Russia were a democracy, probably millions more.

I will start with a very important topic for me - Yeltsin's rule - because it is in this book that we find Navalny's assessment of both Yeltsin and his regime, which proves the fact that the movie “Traitors” is first and foremost Navalny's own opinion.

I have to admit, over the past few years I’ve re-evaluated the events of the late 80s and early 90s. Back then I was a massive fan of Yeltsin’s, but Gorbachev seems a far more appealing figure to me now. I understand what scenarios he could’ve put into effect – anything from bloodshed to stratospheric personal enrichment. He could’ve done everything Putin’s doing now but didn’t. He was detested by the whole country then, communists and liberals alike.
<...>
What makes Walęsa radically different from Yeltsin, though, is that while Walęsa was the new man on the block, Yeltsin was a descendant of the old elite, who then turned against it – and won. The radical renewal of the elite we witnessed in Poland never happened in Russia.
<...>
It’s to none other than Chubais, I believe, that we owe the existence of Putinism. He and others like him have perverted the meaning of the words “liberalism” and “democracy.” It’s because of them that these words are now being used to stigmatise democratic opposition. And this “liberal democrat” is now running a state-owned corporation while explaining to me that Putin and state ownership are good things.
<...>
Gaidar and Chubais are completely different people. Gaidar’s a liberal and Chubais isn’t. He’s just a hypocrite.

Navalny has exactly the same position with regard to the 1996 elections when the country's main autocratic turnaround took place - the country abandoned the main democratic principle, the principle of succession of power.

Perhaps we needed to have gone through the same thing as Eastern Europe did – the return to power of the Communists in one form or another. Then the pendulum swung once again, and they gave way to others. There’s nothing threatening about alternations of power.
<...>
In 1993 and 1996 we were told that, were it not for Yeltsin, the red-browns [communists-fascists] would be taking power, waging repression against the people and starting wars aimed at the restoration of the Soviet empire. And what do we have on our hands now? We didn’t let the red-browns storm parliament and destroy the elections, but the imperial wars began anyway. I therefore think it’s crucial for the Russian opposition to re-evaluate the events of 1993 and 1996.

Oligarchy as the main threat to democracy is also raised by Navalny, and he also very accurately points out the outlines of a solution to this problem.

You want to go into gas or oil? Be my guest. But you can’t go into oil and into the media at the same time.

The topic is, of course, huge, and Navalny does not attempt to give a comprehensive answer. However, he correctly points out that after the oligarchs got huge chunks of property for nothing, they used the money to buy the media, managing which they tried to securitize their acquisitions and, as a result, the election of politicians who would not question this very privatization.

The book also contains Navalny's position on the nationalist issue, which boils down to two theses. Firstly, the adoption of quotas for the reception of migrants and secondly, the withdrawal of migrants from the shadow economy, in which they remain today.

if we filtered the stream of incomers through a visa regime, migrants would be forced to get work permits and take out medical insurance. And then they’d be able to count on legal and medical assistance if they needed it.

The last thing I would like to point out is the last chapter on the Ukrainian issue. Navalny and Michnik correctly point out that the longer the Ukrainian-Russian crisis lasts, the more radical the politicians who come to these countries will become.

And Russia’s currently doing everything to bring that notional Ukrainian Zhirinovsky to power. As long as the armed conflict continues, Russophobia and an anti-Russian stance will be popular among voters. And the larger-scale the conflict, the more popular they’ll become.

He also clarifies his position on Crimea, with which Michnik is in full solidarity. Here is what Michnik says

I think the only correct way to resolve the Crimea issue is to hold a referendum under international supervision. And I’d even admit the possibility of such a referendum in the Donbas. If they want to join Russia, let them do so. If they want independence, they can have that too.

To which Navalny replies:

But we must understand that the problem of Crimea is of a political rather than legal character. And it cannot be solved purely by legal means. More than two million Russian passports have been issued to Crimea’s residents, you can’t cancel them just like that. So the only thing we can do is to annul the results of the farce of March 2014 and hold a fair and transparent referendum under international supervision. And accept the results, whatever they may be.

To understand why no Russian politician would give Crimea to the current Ukraine, let's imagine that it happened. Crimea, which not only doesn't want to hear the Ukrainian language but doesn't even want to know Ukrainian culture, is being transferred back to the current Ukraine, which says it will destroy everything related to Russia and Russians. What happens in such cases? Ukraine is imposing Ukrainianization on the inhabitants of Crimea because it cannot afford to have a Russian enclave in its composition. What are the Crimeans doing in response to this? There are many options, especially given the presence of pro-Russian activists. For example, they may block the road to mainland Ukraine or boycott Kiev's actions in some other way. Further, what does the government of Ukraine do in such a case? The answer is clear - they start an ATO against Crimea. Well, and then war, even if Ukraine will be in NATO at that moment. If any person simply thinks about how Russian Crimea can exist within the current Ukraine, he or she will realize that Crimea can be handed over to Ukraine only when Russians will be comfortable and not afraid to live in Ukraine itself, when there will be no discriminatory laws in Ukraine. In such a case, it is theoretically possible to imagine the return of Crimea without the prospect of another military conflict. Everything else is so explosive on both sides of the border that no politician would dare to take such a step (a politician, not a public figure, writer, or journalist, on whom the solution to this issue does not depend).

So what do we get, a Russian liberal breaks down on the Ukrainian issue? Absolutely. Just as any American liberal breaks down on the Mexican or Canadian issue and any German liberal breaks down on the Austrian or French issue. To understand why this phrase is demagoguery, we need to visualize it more clearly: any Russian politician ends up at the border with Ukraine.

[Mateo Jaramillo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Alexei Navalny has become very popular in the West since his assassination attempt, but what does he actually believe in?

I was expecting a sort of memoir or manifesto of his ideas, but I was not expecting a Plato-esque dialogue that serves as a handbook for reforming a country battling corruption and authoritarian leadership. Navalny and Adam Michnik (whom I knew nothing about prior to reading this) are very well-spoken and articulate when it comes to identifying problems and proposing solutions. Some of these solutions might be painfully obvious to people living in democratic countries but clearly they still need to be argued for in other societies. Topics of their discussion cover People's support for opposition, lustration, corruption, nationalism, religious influence, EU membership, Russo-Ukraine War, and Revisionist history.

The only thing that would keep me from recommending this book is that it's not a beginner's guide to modern Russia. It presupposes a lot of geopolitical knowledge in Eastern Europe and Soviet-era history. There is an extensive glossary in the back that provides support.

[Ania · Rating 4 out of 5]

madre rzeczy (for the most part)

[Shekhar · Rating 5 out of 5]

'Opposing Forces' is a long conversation between Russia's opposition figure Alexie Navalny and Adam Michnik, one of Poland's leading figure during the Solidarity Trade Union Movement instrumental in uprooting the communist totalitarian regime in the 1980s. The book educated me on the political history of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Europe after the World War 2 though the lens of Adam and Alexie with major focus on Russia and Poland, particularly under Stalin and Gobrachev.

Michnik's idea of revolution is the opposition of the authoriatarian and semi-totalitarian regimes in a non-violent, civil-disobedient Gandhian way. He undelines that the revolutionaries must be very cautious to use violent means to achieve the ends no matter how much they are pushed since not only the state can unleash brute physical force as a response to crush the movement but also justify it as appropriate response and sell it through propaganda at international level. Also in violent revolutions, "power remains at the end with the biggest scoundrels".This Gandhian way of mass struggle has switfly transformed Poland from semi-totalitarianism to a liberal democracy without bloodbath. He also says that it is fair to call out groups who might be in the struggle just for personal gains for example the polite denial to Catholic Conservatives who at one point had demanded special rights for themselves during the course of struggle once the communist regime was uprooted. A similar situation can be seen in Iran where the unchecked powers of the domiant conservatives entirely hacked the revolution and upon victory overflooded prisons with their own revolutionary brothers who were ideologically different. He is thankful to Gorbachev for allowing the changes that were needed for transformation of Eastern European regimes into liberal democracies.

Alexie walks us through Russia's transformation from under the Soviet Union to loosing its way on the path of being a liberal democary to a corrupt authoritarian oligarchy. Alexie is a patriot and a nationalist and supports that Russian nationalism should point in the direction of taking care of their land, resources and people instead of equating it with imperialistic expansion. He says that countries should work effectively on decentralisation of powers and make city mayors the most powerful figures. He encourages people to write letters to dictators about their political prisoners and other civic issues.

Overall, I loved the book since it reaffirms faith in reading, writing and non-violent struggle as very strong means to put forward political demands and achiece ends even in the most suppressed regimes.

[Kacper Karczmarczyk]

Książka jest raczej krótka i szybko się ją czyta. Dla lepszego zrozumienia części rozmowy trzeba by dobrze znać historię Rosji ale książka może zachęcić do własnego szukania informacji. Rozmowa jest ciekawa chociaż autorzy nie wchodzą w dokładniejsze analizy ale ogólnie przedstawiają opinie. Niestety 8 lat później smutno się czyta jak Nawalny omawia co należałoby zrobić w Rosji po przejęciu władzy znając jaki był dalszy ciąg wydarzeń.

[Borys · Rating 5 out of 5]

Gdybym mógł to dałbym więcej niż 5 gwiazdek.
Jest to przede wszystkim ciekawa rozmowa między dwoma mądrymi osobami które wymieniają się obserwacjami i poglądami.
Książka bardzo ciekawa, głównie o walce z autorytaryzmem, z przykładami historycznymi i wyzwaniami którym stawiała (i poniekąd nadal stawia) czoła Polska oraz z wizją tego jak mogłoby dojść do takich zmian w Rosji.

[Tigran Tumanyan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have always admired Navalny's work. After the fact of his passing, I wanted to get a better glimpse into his political views. Navalny does a great job of communicating his points to the reader, providing concrete solutions to problems and remaining objective even in the face of unjustified libel. Sad to see that he was killed, a man of unyielding belief and the greatest patriot there ever was. Покойся с миром, Алексей Анатольевич Навальный.

[Almantas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Įspūdingas lenkų disidento Adam Michnik ir jau velionio rusų disidento opozicionieriaus Aleksejaus Navalny pasikalbėjimai aktualiomis temomis: pasipriešinimas režimui Lenkijoje ir "Solidarumas", paralelės su Rusija, kaip kovoti su režimu ir su korumpuotais režimo funkcionieriais, apie Rusijos buvusius vadovus (Gorbačiovas ir Jelcinas) ir esamą diktatorių, bažnyčios vaidmenį, prisitaikėlius, Rusijos santykius su Ukraina ir dar daug visokių įdomių klausimų ir temų. Verta paskaityti siekiant suprasti, per ką šiuo metu pereina Rusija ir kur tai gali nuvesti.

[Jibin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Navalny

I knew of Navalny the politician, but this book provides a glimpse of Navalny the philosopher. His dialogue with Adam Michnik is insightful into what a Navalny-led Russia might have looked like. But alas, this will not happen.

The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing. So don't be inactive.

RIP Alexei Navalny. 🙏

[Sheila · Rating 4 out of 5]

Alexey Navalny, Russian opposition leader, died last month in a Russian penal colony, likely murdered at the behest of Russian dictator Vladamir Putin. I bought this to read Mr. Navalny's own words. May his memory live on and may Russia one day soon be free of Putin.

[Amanda Em · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ciekawe dialogi, wartościową książka, ale ta kompletnie odjechana rozmowa o kościele... "Nie wyobrażam sobie Polski bez kościoła", to to samo co "nie wyobrażam sobie obiadu bez mięsa." Tylko dlatego, że coś zawsze było i się do tego przyzwyczailiśmy, nie znaczy, że bez tego się nie da.

[Stephen · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good as primary source reading but for me nothing new, per se. Still a great resource for my students, albeit dry as dust. Lovingly.