Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940

Cambridge Military Histories

by John Kiszely

The British campaign in Norway in 1940 was an ignominious and abject failure. It is perhaps best known as the fiasco which directly led to the fall of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his replacement by Winston Churchill. But what were the reasons for failure? Why did the decision makers, including Churchill, make such poor decisions and exercise such bad judgement? What other factors played a part? John Kiszely draws on his own experience of working at all levels in the military to assess the campaign as a whole, its context and evolution from strategic failures, intelligence blunders and German air superiority to the performance of the troops and the serious errors of judgement by those responsible for the higher direction of the war. The result helps us to understand not only the outcome of the Norwegian campaign but also why more recent military campaigns have found success so elusive.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction

400 pages, Hardcover

First published June 30, 2017

Reviews

[Shrike58 · Rating 5 out of 5]

It's been my intention to read this case study for awhile, and while I can report that the main title is blandly accurate, the subtitle is what cuts to the chase. Kiszely finds little or nothing to respect in the Anglo-French Scandinavian sideshow of 1940, as he checks off wishful thinking, lack of imagination (in respects for failing to get to grips with reality), poor preparation, and a general lack of effective organization.

Being a retired lieutenant general in the British Army, Kiszely reserves his strongest criticism for the British service chiefs; Edmund Ironside of the British Army, Dudley Pound of the Royal Navy, and Cyril Newall of the Royal Air Force. If these men are not remembered for their great deeds, Kiszely essentially argues that they should be remembered for their collective dysfunctionalism. They failed to effectively work together, they failed to be an institutional bulwark for their civilian masters, and they just seem to have been totally out of their depth. It is fortunate that the younger generation that took over after them were much more effective. Kiszely has his own criticisms of the likes of Neville Chamberlain and Winston Churchill, but it is the above trio who should have been trying to save the collective national executive from themselves; at least on the functional end, if not that of policy.

Besides that Kiszely also has a lot of effective operational and tactical detail. Even if the strategy had been reasonable, the instrument London wielded in Norway was very flawed. The British ground force was poorly trained, supplied, and organized. The air component was almost non-existent. The Royal Navy, which had some actual successes, was mostly lucky; and luck is not a strategy. Finally, it's still not clear why the intelligence component that should have provided advanced warning was so bad; so deeply buried are the bodies.

I could go on and on about the virtues of this study, even for the current day, as what used to be called the "Free World" suddenly finds itself coping with military menace again. About the only thing that's a negative is that this is really not the first book you should read on the subject, as it's very much staff-grade history.

Rounding up from 4.5, as the reality is that studies like this have a half life until they're replaced by a newer study.

[Erik Steeb (on StoryGraph now) · Rating 5 out of 5]

I meant to read this while I was in Norway a few months ago, but life got in the way and I spent that month dealing with some of the same issues the British and French dealt with in Spring 1940. Norway’s geography is punishing and demands considerable planning, while environmental factors can dramatically hinder operations.

As with any other analysis of a failed campaign, most of the lessons that should have been learned were not. Communication and air superiority continue to be the two most important components of modern warfare, and I’m not sure how much emphasis is being out on that.

[Terry · Rating 5 out of 5]

Probably the best unvarnished look at the inept British decision making in 1940. Provides a good strategic overview of the Norway campaign. A bit dry in pieces, but an enjoyable read.