Labor historian Troy Bramston's 2016 political biography of former PM Paul Keating (subtitled 'The Big Picture Leader') is a testament to the charismatic appeal of its subject's determinedly disciplined personality and substantive achievements: the book never fails to hold the reader's engrossed attention despite spreading its account of Keating's political career at a tad over 800 pages.
The length is understandable. Keating's career was visionary and spectacularly successful: as federal Labor Treasurer from 1983 to 1991 he exploited the serendipitous fact that he was not of the traditional party of business and commerce to engineer an extraordinary transformation of the Australian economy.
Under his stewardship, a nation that was over-reliant on substantial, internationally saleable natural resources, and on heavily protected manufacturing industries, became a liberalised market economy capable of trading in goods and services competitively with the rest of the world.
A comparable achievement may not have been possible for politicians of the non-Labor side, who were mostly constrained by close contact with interests vested in the old order.
Keating dedicated his Dec 1991 - March 1996 Prime Ministership to three major national objectives: the development of a self reliant, self respecting independent nation that commanded attention for its economic cooperation and leadership initiatives in Asia and the Pacific; its momentous realignment of land rights for its native people towards a more just recognition of their status and natural claims; and initial moves to reorient its national governance towards a more mature status by replacing the UK monarchy as its head of state with an independent republic and a new national flag without the legacy Union Jack in its corner.
Only the republican initiative failed to leave a lasting imprint, and efforts in that regard became indicative of Keating's Achilles heel: a failure at times to bring people with him, and in that respect slightly less of a natural leader than many of his acolytes wanted to believe.
Bramston's research for the book was obviously detailed and rigorous, aided by cooperation from Keating, and the result, while not quite definitive, is substantive. It establishes a permanent record of the specifics of Keating's many achievements, and the challenges that he overcame.
The reader is left mystified on one account: why, if Keating was such a towering and impressive figure, was he so resoundingly rejected at the 1996 election? The reasons are more complex than Bramston seems willing to admit.
Bramston is obviously a Keating fan, and while the book is not a hagiography, a little more distance between biographer and subject, with more judicious analysis, might have made the book not only a definitive record, but also a definitive judgement.
A common view of the 1996 electoral rout of Keating's government is that the Opposition's proposed GST denied electors their wish to punish him at the 1993 election for the exceptionally high interest and mortgage rates associated with the 1991-92 recession, and that they exercised their baseball bat revenge when unhindered in 1996.
The reasons are probably more nuanced, and go to Keating's personality, performance, and a substantial gulf between his proposed creation of a vigorously modern, more independent, and self-reliant Australia, and the broader, more cautious preference among a majority of the people to retain a possibly prudent commitment to traditional ties with the UK, Europe, and the powerful defence fortification provided by the US alliance.
The personality is interesting. Keating brought a quasi Jesuitical drive and dedication to his career that was not necessarily always crafted to win the proverbial friends. He lacked the natural popular appeal of Prime Minister Hawke, and the latter's extraordinary popularity provided a buffer for Keating's more adventurous economic policies.
The latter were necessary, but imposed sufficient adjustment pain to make their sale difficult. Keating in his economic reform years benefited substantially from Hawke's popularity cushion, to a degree that he seemed never to fully appreciate.
Nevertheless, his single minded political drive was exemplary. Bramston recounts a telling riposte early in Keating's career when Whitlam nemesis and unremitting left winger Jim Cairns sought Keating's support for an anti Vietnam war protest: 'I'm not here to protest, mate,' Keating is alleged to have said, 'I'm here to run the place.'
The performance was devastatingly effective, and attracted support by being genuinely entertaining. Keating's vituperative and linguistically inventive tirades against his opponents in the Parliament engaged his supporters and enraged his opponents.
However, the robust, performative dramatics did not always impress the broader voting public. When the non-engaged voters looked up from the routine of daily life, the confrontational images from the Parliament induced a less responsive perception among those who expect their politicians to be governing responsibly and projecting a respectable image.
He used Question Time not only to enforce a riveting contest of ideas, but also to theatrically destabilise his main opponents and undermine their psychological confidence. In this regard, he was unparalleled, and it is doubtful a comparable performance will recur.
But his 'big picture' objectives most probably led to his almost embarrassing 1996 defeat. The Howard Opposition scored one of the most substantial election victories in Australia's history.
Keating's 1993-1996 term as Prime Minster displayed a single minded focus on a highly self reliant Australia that went beyond what its relatively small population and defence vulnerabilities seemed at the time capable of supporting.
The swing voters in the electorate were mostly that portion of the population focused on cost of living pressures rather than the broader adventure of more directly aligning Australia's generally European culture and strategic interests with the substantial growth of the Asian economies. And the threat of China's more autocratic tendencies had yet to register significantly in international relations.
A substantial gulf opened in the mid 1990s between the bread and butter issues that engaged by necessity the average voter, and the realignment of strategic interests that occupied Prime Minister Keating. He was energised by the strategic challenges. The voters were looking elsewhere.
After a decade of substantial economic reforms and adjustments, coupled with a crippling recession and high interest rates, it was relatively easy for John Howard to sell the message that it was time to take stock, to reduce the momentum of change, and where possible, to enjoy a time when it was OK to be 'relaxed and comfortable.' Keating could afford the big picture vision. The battlers could not.
Keating's assessment of the need to tilt to Australia's longer term strategic interests more towards Asia seemed not to allow for these changes to work their way gradually into people's lives as the country's economic circumstances adjusted over time, rather than being imposed as an urgent priority. In this respect, Keating misread the public view, and leadership will not work when the troops are unwilling to follow.
In hindsight, Keating's assessment of future strategic priorities seems deficient. The recent emergence of a reinvigorated triumphalism in the two principal autocracies of China and Russia, fuelled by a growing sense of American decline, has undercut the presumption 25 years ago that encouraging China and Russia to engage in liberalised global trade arrangements would induce more democratic tendencies in the autocracies, to the benefit of all.
On the contrary, both have preferred to embed old fashioned dictatorship. Angela Merkel thought buying Russian gas would liberalise that nation. Instead, it empowered opportunistic blackmail in pursuit of territorial ambitions. And Keating's recent pronouncements on China suggest he continues to share the former German Chancellor's naïvety.
Bramston records Keating's view that the people got it wrong in 1996, contesting Hawke's opinion that the Australian people invariably 'get it right' at elections. Keating's spectacular moderninisation of the economy in the 1980s arrested Australia's decline. His leadership in that regard was historic. But history has been less kind to his broader vision for Australia's role in world affairs, and the 1996 vote may in part have indicated a general unwillingness to share Keating's broader ambitions.
Bramston records the economic achievements well, but is a little too attached to the Keating charisma to note the flaws in the longer term objectives. Keating's legacy therefore rests much more on his economic reforms as Treasurer than his transformative ambitions as Prime Minister.
The economic legacy has an ironic feature: its failure to enthuse his colleagues. Keating's own party did not embrace the reforms, and abandoned any pretence of belief in their value and efficacy as soon as Keating left politics.
In retrospect, Labor's market oriented reforms in the 1980s were promoted largely by the Party's elite - PM Hawke, Keating himself, their Finance Minister, and possibly one or two others (the industry Minister, and maybe their Communications Minister). The rank and file remained wedded to the narrower interests of the party's union base, which largely funded their operations.
The Party did not support the relatively routine replacement of wholesale tax measures with a broader, more efficient goods and services tax that PM Howard initiated in the late 1990s (similar to the consumption tax promoted unsuccessfully by Keating in the early 1980s). It resisted also the labour market reforms that became a signature Howard advance in the 2010s.
More generally, Labor evolved into very much the middle class party of Whitlamite social security policies that had been its primary driver in the decade after the ideological struggles of the 1950s between classic Marxists and social democrats. Labor also became the natural home in the 2010s of the identitarian politics that dominated Western politics in that decade.
The somewhat Quixotic commitment to transforming traditional energy infrastructure into a smorgasbord of 'renewable' wind and solar power also became a central idée fixe of the party in the belief that climate change will dominate 21st century politics (something they are likely to rethink as the substantial limitations of those technologies become more apparent).
What then is the Keating legacy? A national economy more efficient and effective, but unremarked by his own political kind who remain more interested in social engineering and economic regulation than market economics.
Similarly, Keating's rejection of traditional historical ties with the Anglo-sphere and a desire to establish a Republic remains popular only with a minority subset of the community centred on the universities and the public broadcaster (both of which were attracted and entranced by Keating's interest in large scale 19th century symphonic music).
Bramston has done history a service by presenting a detailed and convincing record of Keating's political life and policy achievements. That record deserves to be remembered and treasured (no pun intended) in much more detail, and with much greater gratitude, than exhibited by his political colleagues.
Keating's place in in history is assured as the politician with the grit and vision to rescue Australia from almost certain economic decline in the 1980s. His broader vision for a more robust and independent national culture remains orphaned.
Keating's historical significance is noteworthy also in the context of the broader comparative history and performance of the US and the Australia. Both are immigrant nations which replaced native cultures with the modernising European heritage.
The US severed its umbilical European cord relatively quickly, and established an uncontested right to be the natural occupant of its land. Australia, much less so, partly motivated by a lingering sense of insecurity in a largely Asian sphere distant and hemispherically obverse from its UK origin.
The Chinese Communist Party sees Australia as a resource rich country with a relatively diffident immigrant culture, and vulnerable to substantial influence in the event of US decline.
Keating had the advantage of Irish forbears, which reduced substantially the impact of British legacy. He had observed and experienced the inexcusable misuse of power and economic squander of the Whitlam years.
He was determined therefore not to repeat the mistakes of the previous Labor administration, and was sufficiently intelligent to recognise the need for substantial economic modernisation in Australia.
Keating matched this with a vision for advancing Australia's integrity, self reliance and promotion of its democratic values and benefits. He was unable to bring the rest of the country with him in that crusade, and developments in the autocracies since his time have undercut the detail of his plans.
But, as Bramston demonstrates so well, his economic legacy is unparalleled. It saved Australia. The inability of his party and his country to respond to his broader vision of national maturity, and to develop and refine it in the context of more recent international developments, is a loss.