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European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815: France against Europe
Chapters include: the Coming of War; On the Brink of Defeat; Triumphs of the Republic; the Assault upon Europe; World War; the Second Coalition; Bonaparte and Europe; Napoleonic hegemony; the Grand Empire; Collapse; the destruction of French hegemony.
- GenresHistory
425 pages, Hardcover
First published June 1, 1981
31 people want to read
About the author
Steven T. Ross
34 books2 followersStephen Thomas Ross taught at the United States Naval War College, where he held the William V. Pratt Chair in Military History. A Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Williams College, Ross earned his Ph.D. from Princeton University and taught at the University of Nebraska and the University of Texas before taking up his position at the Naval War College, Ross also worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency as a military analyst and was a scholar-in-residence at the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
March 5, 2013
A good quick read on the Republic/Napoleon's campaigns. Lots on the diplomatic front which I thoroughly enjoyed. I recommend this one for those of you looking for an overall history of the Republic/Napoleonic era and the coalition(s) that conquered the Tyrant.
January 6, 2024
Steven T. Ross is not a well known name in the field of military, or political/diplomatic, history any longer, but he deserves to be. A military analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, a visiting scholar with the CIA, and a member of the faculty of the Naval War College, he was a man who, during the height of the Cold War, knew a thing or two, about a thing or two.
He was most well known for his books on the French Revolution, and Revolutionary Wars. Ross must have seen similarities in that period of violent upheaval, and increased tempo of diplomatic and military operations, which mirrored those in his own day. However, much like with the French Revolutionaries, and later the Empire, the Soviet Union, born out of the ideology, conducted affairs of State not radically different from those of their Imperial forebears.
This is one of the chief thesis’ of Ross’ 1969 book, “European Diplomatic History 1789-1815: France Against Europe”. As the Soviet Union stood against a large portion of the world, and for propagandistic purposes was portrayed as radically different than anything that had come before, the truth was that the Soviet Union, while Revolutionary, was still a primarily Russian State (faux notions of racial egalitarianism notwithstanding, this was still very much a Russian Empire), which conducted business in a deeply Russian fashion, and manner little changed from that of the Romanov Dynasty.
The same held true for the French in the period between the Revolution, and Waterloo.
While the masses get bombarded with varying degrees of State sanctioned propaganda regarding outsiders, and internal political opposition, reality tends towards far more that of the pragmatic, not the idealistic.
Ross hammers home the point, albeit subtly, that the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were not truly unique in European history, but rather an extension of already established precedents, and policies of geostrategic doctrine long solidified by the major players involved.
When the Revolutionary governments were first formed in France in 1789 and 1790, they inherited from their Bourbon predecessors long established strategic goals, and practices that they quickly sought to achieve.
Ross points out that this quest for what became known as The Natural Ambitions of States bore a striking resemblance to French actions taken most of a century earlier under Louis XIV. Under the rule of the Sun King, the French sought to establish, by force, their hegemony over the Continent, and to reorder the balance of power to suit their own ends. Germany, long a source of problems for the French since the Reformation, was a target for French hegemony, and Louis had grand designs to extend French physical control over all of the Low Countries, the Rhineland, Switzerland, and much of Northern Italy.
France was so powerful at the turn of the 18th century, both financially as well as militarily, that the only way that the Central European power of the Hapsburgs could hope to survive the onslaught was form Coalitions, and hope to defeat France in a war of allies.
A century before Napoleon marched to Austerlitz in modern day Czechia, British and Hapsburg armies were racing to stop French advances in the exact same area, in an earlier war of Coalitions. In short, nothing that the Revolutionary governments of France did was exactly new or groundbreaking, except the guillotine.
And that was extraordinary enough that people tended to lose their heads over it.
As Ross points out, with some fairly clear, though unspoken, parallels to be drawn with the height of the Cold War, it wasn't what the new Revolutionary power did that was novel, but rather the intensity of the efforts they put behind their pursuit of very long standing aims.
Into this one must consider that the backdrop of the story of France against Europe was in itself in the midst of another, larger and broader, story being played out in the background. And that is the tale of the Second Hundred Years War between France and England.
Beginning roughly around 1690, and ending on the blood soaked fields of Waterloo in 1815, this conflict would literally span the globe, and would be a contest for total maritime, colonial, Imperial, and economic hegemony of the entire world. In truth, without this broader conflict, the global lingua franca would still be French, rather than English
All of this is important to bear in mind if one wishes to go into this book. Ross mentions this deep background, but assumes the reader is already aware of it. Ross merely hopes to tie all of the threads together to point out that what was done by both the Directory, and Emperor Napoleon, had well established precedent. And certainly this entire study served as a reminder to those prone to wax lyrically about the apocalyptic happenings between the Soviet and Western Bloc powers, to perhaps calm themselves, and be grounded in the reality that States, even Revolutionary ones, act with a certain natural cadence.
As the French Revolutionary governments sought to achieve in their own name, long standing policies and ambitions of the Bourbons, simultaneously, the rest of Europe's Great Powers were acting within their own natural cadences as well. Almost two generations before Dr. Mikaberidze’s excellent work, “The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History”, Ross stresses the question of Polish Partition in Eastern Europe as one of the main catalysts to light the match on a generation of war in Europe.
Austria, Russia, and Prussia nearly came to blows over who got to gobble up what of Poland, with no one paying much mind as to what the Poles had to say about it all. It was only the escalation of events in France, Louis XVI meeting the Guillotine, and the French declaring war on the surrounding powers in order to expand to achieve a buffer zone via their natural frontiers (much in the same way that Russia will traditionally seek to expand to create a buffer zone, using the caustic excuse of such being their natural frontiers as a justification, both in the Imperial, and Soviet eras), which caused the powers in Eastern Europe to aim their muskets at France as opposed to each other.
The course of the Revolutionary Wars took on a similar course as that of the War of the Spanish Succession, earlier in the century. French armies sought to enforce French domination of the Low Countries, the Rhineland, Switzerland, and northern Italy, and the armies of the Ancien Régimes sought to block them, and push them back. Ross points out that while the ideologies of the Revolution served as a useful rallying cry to levee French conscripts, or conversely to rally anti-French support, that war aims of both France and the Coalition were decidedly pragmatic, not idealistic.
Nowhere is this showcased more clearly in that at various times, Spain, Portugal, Prussia, and even Austria would enter into negotiations with France, and in the case of both Prussia and Spain, enter into armistice with her, and in Spain's case even switch sides and embrace her as ally. Throughout all of this period, is the notion of both the Austrians, and the British, seeking to curb the ambitions of particularly the Russians, but also the Prussians.
Both St. Petersburg and Berlin saw little wrong with taking advantage of the chaos of Continental war to aggrandize their own positions, and to advance their own ambitions. Prussia in gaining hegemony over Germany, and Russia both in expansionist projects, further breaking apart the Ottoman Empire, and in extending Russian influence and power into Central Europe.
The question of hegemony over Germany is one of the central themes of the book.
As previously mentioned, the Bourbons had long sought to enforce French hegemony over Germany, possibly a holdover from the ancient days when the French were the Franks, before the full break with their German cousins during the period of the Charlemagnic Imperium.
So too did both the Prussians, and the Austrians. The Russians likewise were keen to have a say in the destiny of the Germans, and the British as well were keen to keep abreast of developments in Germany, especially as their Royal Dynasty hailed from Hanover.
Again, while Ross doesn't make the connection, one can see the parallel to the 1960's and 70's with divided Germany, and who had hegemony over it, was the central theme of much of the Cold War.
Over half of the book focuses on the Revolutionary Wars, leaving just over a third of the remainder to discuss Napoleon and the Empire. But this serves to underline Ross’ chief point. Nothing France did, even under Napoleon, was exactly revolutionary, as it were. Rather it was an extension, albeit with increased tempo and intensity, of pre-established strategic doctrine pre-dating the birth of all of the players involved.
And when one discusses the Napoleonic Empire, one must bear in mind Napoleon’s nearly obsessive quest to defeat Great Britain, which overruled all other considerations. Including, at times, common sense.
Admittedly, Ross is no admirer of Napoleon, and so clearly is not of the J. David Markham school of Napoleon historiography, but rather that of Charles Esdaille. Despite that, Ross does admit to Napoleon’s sheer genius in the art of war, calling him the definitive master of it, while at the same time showcasing that the Emperor was rather less gifted as a diplomat.
However, Napoleon’s entire course upon the world stage is less a maniacal bid for Empire and domination, but rather calculated decisions made in the pursuit of long established French aims and ambitions, placed within the context of both the normalcy of 18th century European power politics, and the reality of the Second Hundred Years War with Napoleon’s chief rival: Britain.
Throughout the course of making his point, Ross gives an excellent single volume summary of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, as well as a primer on the normal course of power politics and diplomacy. Rather than seemingly apocalyptic and metaphysical, these events were all a part of the already established trajectory of European power politics, albeit with a serious uptick in tempo and intensity.
To my knowledge this book hasn't been reprinted since the early 80's, and I can't really understand why as it's wonderfully written, and is an excellent one volume look at the time period both as political history, but also as military history. After all, war is simply politics by other means.
If you can find a copy of this one, I highly recommend it.
He was most well known for his books on the French Revolution, and Revolutionary Wars. Ross must have seen similarities in that period of violent upheaval, and increased tempo of diplomatic and military operations, which mirrored those in his own day. However, much like with the French Revolutionaries, and later the Empire, the Soviet Union, born out of the ideology, conducted affairs of State not radically different from those of their Imperial forebears.
This is one of the chief thesis’ of Ross’ 1969 book, “European Diplomatic History 1789-1815: France Against Europe”. As the Soviet Union stood against a large portion of the world, and for propagandistic purposes was portrayed as radically different than anything that had come before, the truth was that the Soviet Union, while Revolutionary, was still a primarily Russian State (faux notions of racial egalitarianism notwithstanding, this was still very much a Russian Empire), which conducted business in a deeply Russian fashion, and manner little changed from that of the Romanov Dynasty.
The same held true for the French in the period between the Revolution, and Waterloo.
While the masses get bombarded with varying degrees of State sanctioned propaganda regarding outsiders, and internal political opposition, reality tends towards far more that of the pragmatic, not the idealistic.
Ross hammers home the point, albeit subtly, that the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were not truly unique in European history, but rather an extension of already established precedents, and policies of geostrategic doctrine long solidified by the major players involved.
When the Revolutionary governments were first formed in France in 1789 and 1790, they inherited from their Bourbon predecessors long established strategic goals, and practices that they quickly sought to achieve.
Ross points out that this quest for what became known as The Natural Ambitions of States bore a striking resemblance to French actions taken most of a century earlier under Louis XIV. Under the rule of the Sun King, the French sought to establish, by force, their hegemony over the Continent, and to reorder the balance of power to suit their own ends. Germany, long a source of problems for the French since the Reformation, was a target for French hegemony, and Louis had grand designs to extend French physical control over all of the Low Countries, the Rhineland, Switzerland, and much of Northern Italy.
France was so powerful at the turn of the 18th century, both financially as well as militarily, that the only way that the Central European power of the Hapsburgs could hope to survive the onslaught was form Coalitions, and hope to defeat France in a war of allies.
A century before Napoleon marched to Austerlitz in modern day Czechia, British and Hapsburg armies were racing to stop French advances in the exact same area, in an earlier war of Coalitions. In short, nothing that the Revolutionary governments of France did was exactly new or groundbreaking, except the guillotine.
And that was extraordinary enough that people tended to lose their heads over it.
As Ross points out, with some fairly clear, though unspoken, parallels to be drawn with the height of the Cold War, it wasn't what the new Revolutionary power did that was novel, but rather the intensity of the efforts they put behind their pursuit of very long standing aims.
Into this one must consider that the backdrop of the story of France against Europe was in itself in the midst of another, larger and broader, story being played out in the background. And that is the tale of the Second Hundred Years War between France and England.
Beginning roughly around 1690, and ending on the blood soaked fields of Waterloo in 1815, this conflict would literally span the globe, and would be a contest for total maritime, colonial, Imperial, and economic hegemony of the entire world. In truth, without this broader conflict, the global lingua franca would still be French, rather than English
All of this is important to bear in mind if one wishes to go into this book. Ross mentions this deep background, but assumes the reader is already aware of it. Ross merely hopes to tie all of the threads together to point out that what was done by both the Directory, and Emperor Napoleon, had well established precedent. And certainly this entire study served as a reminder to those prone to wax lyrically about the apocalyptic happenings between the Soviet and Western Bloc powers, to perhaps calm themselves, and be grounded in the reality that States, even Revolutionary ones, act with a certain natural cadence.
As the French Revolutionary governments sought to achieve in their own name, long standing policies and ambitions of the Bourbons, simultaneously, the rest of Europe's Great Powers were acting within their own natural cadences as well. Almost two generations before Dr. Mikaberidze’s excellent work, “The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History”, Ross stresses the question of Polish Partition in Eastern Europe as one of the main catalysts to light the match on a generation of war in Europe.
Austria, Russia, and Prussia nearly came to blows over who got to gobble up what of Poland, with no one paying much mind as to what the Poles had to say about it all. It was only the escalation of events in France, Louis XVI meeting the Guillotine, and the French declaring war on the surrounding powers in order to expand to achieve a buffer zone via their natural frontiers (much in the same way that Russia will traditionally seek to expand to create a buffer zone, using the caustic excuse of such being their natural frontiers as a justification, both in the Imperial, and Soviet eras), which caused the powers in Eastern Europe to aim their muskets at France as opposed to each other.
The course of the Revolutionary Wars took on a similar course as that of the War of the Spanish Succession, earlier in the century. French armies sought to enforce French domination of the Low Countries, the Rhineland, Switzerland, and northern Italy, and the armies of the Ancien Régimes sought to block them, and push them back. Ross points out that while the ideologies of the Revolution served as a useful rallying cry to levee French conscripts, or conversely to rally anti-French support, that war aims of both France and the Coalition were decidedly pragmatic, not idealistic.
Nowhere is this showcased more clearly in that at various times, Spain, Portugal, Prussia, and even Austria would enter into negotiations with France, and in the case of both Prussia and Spain, enter into armistice with her, and in Spain's case even switch sides and embrace her as ally. Throughout all of this period, is the notion of both the Austrians, and the British, seeking to curb the ambitions of particularly the Russians, but also the Prussians.
Both St. Petersburg and Berlin saw little wrong with taking advantage of the chaos of Continental war to aggrandize their own positions, and to advance their own ambitions. Prussia in gaining hegemony over Germany, and Russia both in expansionist projects, further breaking apart the Ottoman Empire, and in extending Russian influence and power into Central Europe.
The question of hegemony over Germany is one of the central themes of the book.
As previously mentioned, the Bourbons had long sought to enforce French hegemony over Germany, possibly a holdover from the ancient days when the French were the Franks, before the full break with their German cousins during the period of the Charlemagnic Imperium.
So too did both the Prussians, and the Austrians. The Russians likewise were keen to have a say in the destiny of the Germans, and the British as well were keen to keep abreast of developments in Germany, especially as their Royal Dynasty hailed from Hanover.
Again, while Ross doesn't make the connection, one can see the parallel to the 1960's and 70's with divided Germany, and who had hegemony over it, was the central theme of much of the Cold War.
Over half of the book focuses on the Revolutionary Wars, leaving just over a third of the remainder to discuss Napoleon and the Empire. But this serves to underline Ross’ chief point. Nothing France did, even under Napoleon, was exactly revolutionary, as it were. Rather it was an extension, albeit with increased tempo and intensity, of pre-established strategic doctrine pre-dating the birth of all of the players involved.
And when one discusses the Napoleonic Empire, one must bear in mind Napoleon’s nearly obsessive quest to defeat Great Britain, which overruled all other considerations. Including, at times, common sense.
Admittedly, Ross is no admirer of Napoleon, and so clearly is not of the J. David Markham school of Napoleon historiography, but rather that of Charles Esdaille. Despite that, Ross does admit to Napoleon’s sheer genius in the art of war, calling him the definitive master of it, while at the same time showcasing that the Emperor was rather less gifted as a diplomat.
However, Napoleon’s entire course upon the world stage is less a maniacal bid for Empire and domination, but rather calculated decisions made in the pursuit of long established French aims and ambitions, placed within the context of both the normalcy of 18th century European power politics, and the reality of the Second Hundred Years War with Napoleon’s chief rival: Britain.
Throughout the course of making his point, Ross gives an excellent single volume summary of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, as well as a primer on the normal course of power politics and diplomacy. Rather than seemingly apocalyptic and metaphysical, these events were all a part of the already established trajectory of European power politics, albeit with a serious uptick in tempo and intensity.
To my knowledge this book hasn't been reprinted since the early 80's, and I can't really understand why as it's wonderfully written, and is an excellent one volume look at the time period both as political history, but also as military history. After all, war is simply politics by other means.
If you can find a copy of this one, I highly recommend it.
March 31, 2015
Well written. I'd say almost a page-turner. Much info written with great fluidity.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews