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China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission
Foreword. Part From Pearl Harbor to the Cairo Conference. Part From the Cairo Conference to the Surrender of Japan. Part From the Surrender of Japan to the Marshall Mission.
Originally published in 1953.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Originally published in 1953.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
- GenresHistory
456 pages, Hardcover
First published September 1, 1953
22 people want to read
About the author
Herbert Feis
82 books2 followersHerbert Feis (born on June 7, 1893, in New York City, died on March 2, 1972, in Winter Park, FL) was an American Author and former Economic Advisor for International Affairs to the Department of State in the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations.
Feis was the Author of some 13 books and won the Pulitzer Prize for History for his work, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (1960). The book was about the Potsdam Conference and the origins of the Cold War.
The Herbert Feis Prize is awarded annually by the American Historical Association, the pre-eminent professional society of historians, to recognize the recent work of public historians or independent scholars.
Feis was the Author of some 13 books and won the Pulitzer Prize for History for his work, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (1960). The book was about the Potsdam Conference and the origins of the Cold War.
The Herbert Feis Prize is awarded annually by the American Historical Association, the pre-eminent professional society of historians, to recognize the recent work of public historians or independent scholars.
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
March 23, 2016
In 1949, the U.S. experienced “the loss of China”—the victory of the Chinese Communists over the American-backed Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-Shek.
The "Loss of China" was a hugely controversial issue in the 1950s. Soviet-American relations had broken down. The Cold War was gearing up. McCarthyism, HUAC, Loyalty Programs, etc. were all in full swing. The Right Wing blamed the "communists" in the State Department for undermining Chiang Kai-Shek and promoting Communist rule. They believed that, had the "China Hands" been prevented from influencing and making American policy, China would have been "saved," and molded into a Western-type democracy.
Herbert Feis published The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission in 1953 - right in the middle of the anti-communist uproar. Feis must be commended for being so even-handed and dispassionate towards all the parties involved. Because really, this is not just a dry book of policy positions arising out of the military needs of the various theaters in WWII, and the political and security needs of the post-war world. It is ALSO a story about personalities, relationships, bargaining styles, observations, arguments, accusations, and leadership qualities, and how they also influenced American decisions on policy.
Feis argues that American policy was, in the main, focused on avoiding or preventing civil war, and transforming China into an effective ally against Japan. That policy obstructed by political, economic, and military conditions on the ground:
1. China was not united behind the Nationalist Government. There were numerous factions, dissidents, competing warlords, and, of course, the communists.
2. The Nationalists were just as concerned, if not MORE concerned about containing the Communists and preserving/extending their own power than they were about fighting the Japanese.
3. The Chinese Army was disorganized, untrained, ill-equipped, starving, and led by corrupt officers.
4. The Communists and Nationalists were unable/unwilling to reach a compromise on how to share political and military power in order to fight the Japanese.
That policy was unevenly carried out because of the personalities involved: Generals Stilwell and Wedemyer, Major General Chennault, T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-Shek, George Acheson, Patrick Hurley, Clarence Gauss, James, F. Byrnes, Chou En-Lai, etc. and their perceptions of the conditions in China and their causes, and the way they viewed requests for aid from the Nationalist government. For example, Stilwell believed Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist government were corrupt and obstuctionist. Chennault was defender of the Chiang, and believed that Stilwell was obstructing efforts to supply China by air. Hurley believed that he could bring the Communists and the Nationalists to agreement. Hurley also believed that State Department personnel were deliberately undermining and discrediting his efforts.
That policy was also subject to the military needs in Europe and the Pacific (as opposed to China-Burma-India) as determined by Great Britain, The Soviet Union and the US, and also what the Allies were planning for the post-war world. Even though the Allies might agree on military strategy, including manpower and material to be allocated to China, those decisions were usually overcome by greater needs in other theaters.
Feis exonerates the China Hands by presenting overwhelming evidence that they were not, in fact, the source of American policy towards China. He documents their observations, reports and recommendations, but he also documents the cacophony of competing necessities, priorities, decisions, events, and personalities. Feis does not attempt to place blame for the "Loss" of China. Instead, he argues that American policy was unclear, conflicting, and unevenly carried out. It was, indeed, a tangle.
The "Loss of China" was a hugely controversial issue in the 1950s. Soviet-American relations had broken down. The Cold War was gearing up. McCarthyism, HUAC, Loyalty Programs, etc. were all in full swing. The Right Wing blamed the "communists" in the State Department for undermining Chiang Kai-Shek and promoting Communist rule. They believed that, had the "China Hands" been prevented from influencing and making American policy, China would have been "saved," and molded into a Western-type democracy.
Herbert Feis published The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission in 1953 - right in the middle of the anti-communist uproar. Feis must be commended for being so even-handed and dispassionate towards all the parties involved. Because really, this is not just a dry book of policy positions arising out of the military needs of the various theaters in WWII, and the political and security needs of the post-war world. It is ALSO a story about personalities, relationships, bargaining styles, observations, arguments, accusations, and leadership qualities, and how they also influenced American decisions on policy.
Feis argues that American policy was, in the main, focused on avoiding or preventing civil war, and transforming China into an effective ally against Japan. That policy obstructed by political, economic, and military conditions on the ground:
1. China was not united behind the Nationalist Government. There were numerous factions, dissidents, competing warlords, and, of course, the communists.
2. The Nationalists were just as concerned, if not MORE concerned about containing the Communists and preserving/extending their own power than they were about fighting the Japanese.
3. The Chinese Army was disorganized, untrained, ill-equipped, starving, and led by corrupt officers.
4. The Communists and Nationalists were unable/unwilling to reach a compromise on how to share political and military power in order to fight the Japanese.
That policy was unevenly carried out because of the personalities involved: Generals Stilwell and Wedemyer, Major General Chennault, T.V. Soong, Chiang Kai-Shek, George Acheson, Patrick Hurley, Clarence Gauss, James, F. Byrnes, Chou En-Lai, etc. and their perceptions of the conditions in China and their causes, and the way they viewed requests for aid from the Nationalist government. For example, Stilwell believed Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist government were corrupt and obstuctionist. Chennault was defender of the Chiang, and believed that Stilwell was obstructing efforts to supply China by air. Hurley believed that he could bring the Communists and the Nationalists to agreement. Hurley also believed that State Department personnel were deliberately undermining and discrediting his efforts.
That policy was also subject to the military needs in Europe and the Pacific (as opposed to China-Burma-India) as determined by Great Britain, The Soviet Union and the US, and also what the Allies were planning for the post-war world. Even though the Allies might agree on military strategy, including manpower and material to be allocated to China, those decisions were usually overcome by greater needs in other theaters.
Feis exonerates the China Hands by presenting overwhelming evidence that they were not, in fact, the source of American policy towards China. He documents their observations, reports and recommendations, but he also documents the cacophony of competing necessities, priorities, decisions, events, and personalities. Feis does not attempt to place blame for the "Loss" of China. Instead, he argues that American policy was unclear, conflicting, and unevenly carried out. It was, indeed, a tangle.
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