The battle of Loos was one of the most hard-fought battles that the British Expeditionary Force ever waged on the Western Front during the First World War. In three weeks of intensive fighting—which not only witnessed the first British use of poison gas but also the debut of New Army divisions filled with citizen volunteers—British forces managed to drive up to two miles into the German positions. However, they were unable to capitalize on their initial gains. After suffering nearly 60,000 casualties and being driven from the German second line in some disorder, bitter recrimination followed. Nick Lloyd presents a radical new interpretation of Loos, placing it not only within its political and strategic context, but also discussing command and control and the tactical realities of war on the Western Front during 1915.
One of Britain’s new generation of military historians, Nick Lloyd is a Professor of Modern Warfare at King’s College London and the author of four books on World War I, including The Western Front, Hundred Days, and Passchendaele. He lives in Cheltenham, England.
1915 was a hell of a year for the BEF. Lyn Macdonald called her book on 1915, The Death of Innocence. That has always struck me as a perfect title for the year of Gallipoli, gas at Ypres, and bloody battles like Loos. This book by Nick Lloyd discusses the battle of Loos in great detail from its promising beginning to its tragic failure in late September and October. The men of the BEF had hoped the war would have been over by 1915, but instead the bloodletting had just begun.
The final chapter deals with the consequences of Loos, not only for the men but for those who led them such as John French, Douglas Haig, and Henry Rawlinson. French was out by the end of the year, but the other two continued on until the end of the war while overseeing such tragedies as the Somme eight months later.
Lloyd ably discusses the mistakes of Loos: lack of artillery support, unsuitable attack terrain, ill-trained troops in many cases, the late arrival of reserves, over-ambitious attack plans and poor staff planning were just some of the things that went wrong. In addition, there was the lack of effective communication about what was expected between French and those officers who were in command on the field. In short, the BEF expected much, but gained little despite bravery and appalling sacrifice.
This fine book offers much about the BEF at Loos. It does not discuss much about their opponents who obviously had a great deal to do with the failure of the campaign. 1915 was a year of learning for both sides. Unfortunately, millions more would die before final victory could be achieved.
This was a fairly dry, yet readable analysis of the Battle of Loos which took place on the Western Front during 1915 of WWI. It was not Britain's finest hour. I was motivated to read this book because I had made friends with a couple of RAF veterans while touring Ypres and attending The Last Post a few years back. One of the gentlemen was the grand nephew of Pte George Short who, at 18 years of age, was killed at Loos. They were going there the next day to place a wreath at his uncle's grave site. They had explained to me that Loos was the battle in which gas was deployed by the UK and the direction of the wind shifted and it killed several Tommies. Yes, that did happen, and the tactics they used to deploy the gas were folly but this was only the tip of the iceberg. Most of the problems were the result of the insufficient artillery preparatory bombardment and what was summed up as by the author as "bad staff work." Loos stands as a prime example of ''bungling'' by the British High Command. According to the author, "Around Loos there lingers a bitter sense of futility and slaughter, only redeemed by tales of astonishing courage." The BEF did learn some important lessons at Loos but at a great cost. Haig thought that his use of Cl gas was going to magically turn the tide and make up for other shortcomings such as the shortage of heavy artillery but the gas killed more Tommies than Jerries.
Excellent detailed analysis of a neglected battle that was to be a key moment in the BEF's learning curve - over-optimism combined with unclear objectives and a breakdown in communications proved to be an expensive mix.
Lloyd plumbs the historiography of the BEF's great fall offensive in 1915, shattering popular myths and bringing astute analysis to understanding a needless loss of life. The commanders are accurately criticized and taken to task for an unfocused attack that could never have succeeded. The lead up to the battle is a little dry, but the focus on 'why this battle matters' is spot-on, clearly explaining its importance in the run-up to the Somme and Passchendaele.
While the Battle on the Somme has been examined in a number of books, studies,etc comparatively little was been done about the British Army's largest offensive of 1915. This takes a broad operational look at the origins of the attack, planning and subsequent execution. I was particularly interested in how Haig looked at it as decisive all attack while there was confusion on the part of his corps commanders as how and what it was to accomplish. Hair ever the optimist was seeking a breakthrough while some of his principal subordinates , Rawlinson preferred an attack and hold method. In particular it shows how the BEF suffered from its expansion in 1915 and the lack of trained staff. Overall I would recommend.
This book reads like an expanded PhD thesis, with Lloyd putting a lot of effort into outlining the historiography of the topic and then quoting other historians before building an irrefutable evidence base for what he is saying. This is great for him, but less fortunate for the poor person who has to read it.
This is a book that is very thorough, but is never ever in danger of taking off as an actual interesting read. If Lloyd had spent less time worrying that someone was going to nitpick what he was saying and more time writing good flowing prose, then this would have been a great book. Instead, it's put me off of reading anything by him. I'm not studying the period at a post grad level. I'm just looking to learn something and enjoy picking up a book.
If Lloyd wants to write academic and dry papers, then that's great. However, if he wants to write something that folk enjoy reading then, he could:
improve the maps, as these were poor. include diary excerpts instead of extremely short quotes, as these would really bring it to life and show the personal side of it. shove all of the historiography and opinions of other historians into their own chapter where no one else need ever tread. perhaps not feel as if he has to write the definitive account of what each division, brigade, battalion, company, platoon, section, Joe Bloggs was doing in a particular episode as the interest is lost amongst lots of very specific detail.
An excellent detailed book. Very much what happened and why rather than a collection of personal accounts (of which there are few in the book). Probably the best book on the battle, a rather neglected part of the war.
Developed from a PhD it has an academic feel and lots of references and appendices.
My first history book specifically about the battle of Loos. I highly recommend as it is very readable and also very well notated. (Wonderful notes and reference section.) Very nice maps at the back——I did have to consistently flip back and forth to a map to follow progress of the battle and to understand what was happening.