For seven weeks in 1929, the Republic of China and the Soviet Union battled in Manchuria over control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. It was the largest military clash between China and a Western power ever fought on Chinese soil, involving more that a quarter million combatants. Michael M. Walker’s The 1929 Sino-Soviet War is the first full account of what UPI’s Moscow correspondent called “the war nobody knew”—a “limited modern war” that destabilized the region's balance of power, altered East Asian history, and sent grim reverberations through a global community giving lip service to demilitarizing in the wake of World War I.
Walker locates the roots of the conflict in miscalculations by Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang about the Soviets’ political and military power—flawed assessments that prompted China’s attempt to reassert full authority over the CER. The Soviets, on the other hand, were dominated by a Stalin eager to flex some military muscle and thoroughly convinced that war would win much more than petty negotiations. This was in fact, Walker shows, a watershed moment for Stalin, his regime, and his still young and untested military, disproving the assumption that the Red Army was incapable of fighting a modern war. By contrast, the outcome revealed how unprepared the Chinese military forces were to fight either the Red Army or the Imperial Japanese Army, their other primary regional competitor. And yet, while the Chinese commanders proved weak, Walker sees in the toughness of the overmatched infantry a hint of the rising nationalism that would transform China’s troops from a mercenary army into a formidable professional force, with powerful implications for an overconfident Japanese Imperial Army in 1937.
Full disclosure, I did not read the whole book, just skimmed it to get an idea of what it is about (a war I had never heard of). It is a very detailed account (including background and consequences) of the short sharp war that Nationalist China and the Soviet Union fought in 1929. The Chinese had taken over one of the neo-imperialist projects of the age, the China Eastern Railway in Manchuria, which was still run by Russians. Stalin responded with mobilization and a small invasion in which the Russian army totally outclassed the Chinese. China backed down and the railway returned to its "century of humiliation" status, but the lasting effect of this episode was that Japan saw how weak the Chinese were and took over Manchuria in 1931.. and this time Stalin, ever the practical man, sold his share in the railway to the Japanese. By the way, the Chinese communist party tried to organize resistance.. to the Nationalist Chinese, in favor of the Soviets. An interesting little side note in East Asian history.
A well-written and fascinating history of one of the last known conflicts of the 20th Century. The author not only explains why and how it happened, but also lucidity details the military operations. It is also an insightful analysis of why the Chinese lost and of the consequences for all the concerned powers - China, the Soviet Union and Japan. Excellent book.
Half the book is notes and lists of sources. Of the remaining half, about half of it is the history of Chinese and Russian relations from the 1880s to the beginning of the war, the military history of both powers, as well as the history of the Chinese Eastern Railway which was the focus for the war. The remaining covers the then current state of the opposing armies and equipment, the actual war, and then the consequences from the war.
An outstanding, detailed study of the largest military conflict between World Wars I and II, which set the USSR, China, and Japan on their respective courses to the outbreak of World War II in Asia.