I'm writing this review from Vietnam, having visited Cambodia last week and bought this book in the Killing Fields museum just outside Phnom Penh. "Get Kiernan, he's the best by far," the lively shopkeeper advised. I was only happy to: the museum, just like the Tuol Sleng torture site, doesn't really teach history, but vibes. "No smiling", a pictogram warned redundantly, hung on the wall of a still bloodstained interrogation room, side by side with a censored photo of its last victim, taken by the Vietnamese liberators. Our Killing Fields guide: "Let this be a warning for all you tourists to take back home." I'm sure no one on this trip came out with an understanding of how the Khmer Rouge came to power, why the killings occurred, or what this means. Hence, Kiernan.
If US intervention in Vietnam hadn't spilled over, there would be no Pol Pot. That much is clear. The porous borders of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia permitted Viet Minh and Viet Cong to establish bases in the jungle, which Henry Kissinger subsequently felt obliged to carpet bomb. The pragmatic Khmer prince Sihanouk was deposed by his US-inclined general, Lon Nol, and fled to China in 1970. Between the military quislings and a decapitated monarchy, a power vacuum opened up in the countryside.
The Indochinese communist party and its paramilitaries, the Issaraks, had fought together against the French since the 50s, and still consituted a broad, multinational and ideologically moderate network. The Cambodian communists in the east of the country worked together with the Vietnamese. Those further inland, however, sought to build an autonomous movement that might one day liberate Cambodia from not just US bombings and an urban ruling class that felt wholly alien to its secluded countryside, but also from its more powerful neighbour, Vietnam. As the B-52s devastated ever more of the countryside, landing cushily on the Phnom Penh airfields, so did the hatred towards the central government grow and the membership of the Khmer Rouge swell. In 1973, the US pulled back its military support; in 1975, Phnom Penh was taken by the Khmer Rouge.
Everything before this point is explainable. Very little after is. Phnom Penh, a city which had objectively become overcrowded with a million rural refugees, was wholly emptied in a few days' time. Michael Vickery elsewhere suggests that this is in keeping with official Red Cross advice, in order to keep starvation at bay, but Kiernan shows that Angkar (the secret committee behind the regime) was uninterested in such a goal. They wanted the city emptied to consolidate political power and make impossible organized resistance, to remove the most obvious target for foreign bombers, and also as a logical step towards smashing the exploiter class.
Henceforth, Cambodians belonged to one of three castes: 'base people', the dependable rural inhabitabts; 'new people', former urban dwellers, government officials, intellectuals and traders; and 'deportees'. Only base people had a semblance of rights; the others were forever treated with suspicion. Religion was forbidden, as were most minority and foreign languages. Angkar was to build a clean slate for its new system, with no money or private property, no feudal remnants nor privacy — all meals were to be had in communal halls, there was to be no private cutlery, nor any individual foraging. Offences were, from the early days of the regime, punished by wanton violence. The entire country was transformed into a massive labour camp, with all groups mixed together, supposedly in the interest of national reconstruction and the creation of a new revolutionary psyche.
While this was going on, to no-one's particular enthusiasm, the ultranationalist Center of the secret Communist Party was waging war against its Indochinese chapters. Eastern officers were incessantly summoned to their own unprovoked execution, with everyone with potential loyalties towards Lon Nol or Vietnam thrown in for good measure. As in Nazi Germany, the more the state became embroiled in foreign wars, the more voracious these paranoiac massacres became. This undeclared civil war only ended because the eastern party chapters, sensing that they would never survive their own comrades, reached out to Vietnam and beat Phnom Penh together. Pol Pot's dreams of "1 Khmer beating 30 Vietnamese" were snuffed out in only a few days.
Between all this, Kiernan estimates almost 2 million Cambodians lost their lives -- today, Cambodian experts round this up to 3 million. Kiernan attributes this in equal parts to violence, disease and starvation, but it's clear that all these plagues were a consequence of Angkar's calamitous governance. I wish, however, he'd given the reader an insight into what the organisation's members hoped to achieve. Like the nazis, the leadership genuinely seemed to believe its own wildest fantasies; by "purifying the Khmer" the war with Vietnam should swing in its favour. But what about the untold members on every other level, who implemented daily punishments, disappearances, the banning of religion and the complete disruption of everyday family life? Drawing on James C Scott, Kiernan argues that the peasantry was not an enthusiastic actor in this process, but then who was? The nazi holocaust can be pretty well explained at every level of the process of decisionmaking; the Khmer Rouge, however, remains a monster whose contours can be sketched, but whose inner drive remains a feverish mystery.