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Intention
Intention is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
94 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1963
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About the author
G.E.M. Anscombe
58 books119 followersGertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, better known as Elizabeth Anscombe, was a British analytic philosopher. A student of Ludwig Wittgenstein, she became an authority on his work, and edited and translated many books drawn from his writings, above all his Philosophical Investigations. She wrote on the philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and ethics. Her 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" introduced the term "consequentialism" into the language of analytic philosophy; this and subsequent articles had a seminal influence on contemporary virtue ethics. Her monograph Intention is generally recognized as her greatest and most influential work, and the continuing philosophical interest in the concepts of intention, action and practical reasoning can be said to have taken its main impetus from this work.
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December 12, 2015
In 1956, Anscombe aroused controversy by publicly opposing Oxford University's decision to award an honorary degree to Harry Truman, whom she considered a mass murderer for his decision to use atomic weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. She did not mince words. On May 1, 1956, in the Oxford Mail, she writes:
In this dense book, without apparent structure apart from its division into 52 sections, Anscombe sets out to describe the concept of intention and contend that the way it has been understood is highly problematic. Her first act towards this purpose is to disambiguate the concept into three ways in which it is used, namely: 1) expressions of intention ["I am going to open the window"¹], 2) actions as intentional ["I am opening the window"], and 3) intentions with which actions are done ["I am opening the window with the intention to cool the room"]. In the end, however, it turns out that their really is only one sense of intention. How can we tell what someone's intention is? Here is where Anscombe takes an important step. The answer lies, she claims, not in what goes on inside the mind of the man who acts (where a Cartesian would look), but rather in "what physically takes place, i.e. what a man actually does" (9), which is his intentional action. This is where to look, because of all the things you could say a person is doing, most of them would be things she intends to do. But what, then, distinguishes intentional actions from other kinds of events? This is another important part of Anscombe's argument. She proffers two answers. The first is that an action is intentional when a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; this sense is such that, if the answer is positive - if it applies - then it gives a reason for acting. This, of course, is circular: the relevant sense of 'Why?' and 'reason' are the same. Here Anscombe makes a crucial step. According to her, the key aspect of acting intentionally is to know what one is doing; however, this knowledge of what one does does not come through observation. Rather, it is known without observation. Take the position of your limbs, for instance. You know where they are without having to look at them. If someone asks you, "where are your legs?" you will answer "under my torso" without having to observe the position of your legs. In the same way, acting intentionally is acting in such a way that when someone asks you 'Why?' you will be able to answer without first having to observe your actions.
--- Will add more to this review later. ---
¹Examples taken from Essays on Anscombe's Intention.
If you give this honour, what Nero, what Gengis Khan, what Hitler, or what Stalin will not be honoured in the future?Her opposition to the award culminated in a famous pamphlet, Mr. Truman's Degree (1958), in which she elucidated and defended her views. Her main contention in this pamphlet is that Truman dropped the bomb on those cities, not despite the civilian population, but at least in part because of that population; for the effect it would produce. Truman used innocent civilians as a means to end the war, which is wrong on Anscombe's view. She believed that the presence of victims entered into his deliberation as a positive, rather than as a detracting factor, which makes the dropping of the bombs a case of outright murder. That Truman could have chosen a different course of action - for instance, to drop the bombs on an isolated island in order to demonstrate force without victims, or to negotiate with the Japanese, evidence of whose willingness to do so existed at the time - strengthens her case against Truman. The pamphlet is an intriguing read; you can find it here. Some people attempted to exculpate Truman, who, after all, in their view, only signed his name at the end of the document that gave green light to the bombings. He only pressed the proverbial button; so how can he be a murderer? Anscombe would respond that some button-pressings or signature-givings are murderings. Yet this leads to a philosophical puzzle: how can two physically similar occurrences (e.g., signing one's name at the bottom of a document) constitute different actions? This puzzle lies at the heart of Intention, the book that Anscombe would publish in 1975.
In this dense book, without apparent structure apart from its division into 52 sections, Anscombe sets out to describe the concept of intention and contend that the way it has been understood is highly problematic. Her first act towards this purpose is to disambiguate the concept into three ways in which it is used, namely: 1) expressions of intention ["I am going to open the window"¹], 2) actions as intentional ["I am opening the window"], and 3) intentions with which actions are done ["I am opening the window with the intention to cool the room"]. In the end, however, it turns out that their really is only one sense of intention. How can we tell what someone's intention is? Here is where Anscombe takes an important step. The answer lies, she claims, not in what goes on inside the mind of the man who acts (where a Cartesian would look), but rather in "what physically takes place, i.e. what a man actually does" (9), which is his intentional action. This is where to look, because of all the things you could say a person is doing, most of them would be things she intends to do. But what, then, distinguishes intentional actions from other kinds of events? This is another important part of Anscombe's argument. She proffers two answers. The first is that an action is intentional when a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application; this sense is such that, if the answer is positive - if it applies - then it gives a reason for acting. This, of course, is circular: the relevant sense of 'Why?' and 'reason' are the same. Here Anscombe makes a crucial step. According to her, the key aspect of acting intentionally is to know what one is doing; however, this knowledge of what one does does not come through observation. Rather, it is known without observation. Take the position of your limbs, for instance. You know where they are without having to look at them. If someone asks you, "where are your legs?" you will answer "under my torso" without having to observe the position of your legs. In the same way, acting intentionally is acting in such a way that when someone asks you 'Why?' you will be able to answer without first having to observe your actions.
--- Will add more to this review later. ---
¹Examples taken from Essays on Anscombe's Intention.
June 20, 2019
Anscombe’s Intention is in turns brilliant and infuriating. The influence of Wittgenstein is evident in numerous references (mainly to the Philosophical Investigations), but more importantly in the method: every new (sub-)investigation begins with a survey of everyday linguistic usage.
Wittgenstein’s method serves to defuse illegitimate questions (typically those brought about by the tendency to invent new substances whose essence then becomes a topic of investigation, e.g. “chess is a game”, “football is a game”; “what is the essence of game-ness?”). But not all questions are of that sort. Indeed, already in §1, having discovered several distinct senses of “intention”, Anscombe remarks that, despite its varied uses, “it is implausible … that the word [intention] is equivocal”. So there is some thing that we call “intention”. If “what is intention” is not merely a matter of (conventional) linguistic usage, then it is a matter of empirical fact: we are right to think of intention as some “thing”, and we must find out what this “thing” is. What does a cat have, when it has the intention to catch a bird? If the question “what is intention?” is a legitimate one, then Wittgenstein’s method can only be complementary; it can stop us from getting lost, but it will not bring us to our destination.
But Anscombe slavishly uses Wittgenstein’s method beyond its scope of application: when Wittgenstein points to the moon, she stares at his finger. As a result, the study of intention becomes a survey and synthesis of folk theories of intention (via linguistic use) and a pre-scientific empirical study of intentional action with behaviourist undertones (via anecdotes and thought experiments). To be sure, this is done with considerable intelligence, leading to the discovery of a lot of examples which shed light on the concept of intention. But this also results in bizarre omissions due to Anscombe’s own biases. There is almost no mention of empirical psychology. I do not think Anscombe uses the word “brain” even once - her agents have “minds”, sometimes nerves, never brains.
The purely philosophical treatment of empirical matters occasionally leads to incorrect dogmatic pronouncements. For example in §8 (and several times after that), she distinguishes knowledge from observation from knowledge without observation, separating internal from external senses; for instance, knowledge of the body’s position is considered to be “without observation”. This seems utterly absurd: people can be wrong about their body position and will correct themselves via observation; there is no reason why certain senses should be considered observational and others not based on whether they are external or internal senses (e.g. body position, but why not equilibrium, digestive processes, muscular soreness, etc.?). In §14, Anscombe writes “no discovery would affect an assertion of mental causality”: why not? It is not difficult to think of examples; people often reflect upon past actions and discover mental causes of which they had no awareness, e.g. one may be unfair to somebody else due to unacknowledged resentment or misdirected anger. In §19, after a single paragraph of inconclusive investigations, Anscombe rejects the possibility that intentions might have a physical substrate, on the grounds that this would lead to causal chains of intentions, which is bad because it would be... confusing? In §32-35, Anscombe discusses practical reason, which she finds not to resemble the all-or-nothing, true-or-false nature of syllogisms; but she never switches to a probabilistic or optimization-based interpretation that would begin to resolve the issue. By the way, this particular argument does not appear to be specific to practical reason: all syllogisms are in that sense flawed (e.g. no one can be certain of the absolute veracity of statements such as "Socrates is a man; All men are mortal", even though they are not practical statements).
These mistakes are compounded as Anscombe takes these pronouncements for granted and builds houses of cards upon unstable foundations. Other parts are confusing or unclear (e.g. §10 to §13), because Anscombe favours brevity where redundancy would have allowed for disambiguation (“not a single wasted breath”, says the back cover: a sign that Anscombe has failed to strike the right balance between succinctness and clarity). Despite this, it would be a gross exaggeration to say that Anscombe writes poorly; occasionally her wit is entertaining, and most of the time the arguments flow rather naturally. For somebody interested in the topic of intention, this should not be excessively challenging to read.
Overall, this short book is worth reading for some brilliant examples, for its historical importance, and to understand the dogmatic baggage carried by the concept of “intention”. But it bears witness to the deplorable “linguistic turn” of the second half of the 20th century: philosophers, having been instructed to be wary of the misleading features of everyday language, paid so much attention to everyday language that they forgot to pay attention to whatever it was that the language was misleading about.
For a sober treatment of intention, I am pinning my hopes on Bratman’s “Intention, plans, and practical reason”.
Wittgenstein’s method serves to defuse illegitimate questions (typically those brought about by the tendency to invent new substances whose essence then becomes a topic of investigation, e.g. “chess is a game”, “football is a game”; “what is the essence of game-ness?”). But not all questions are of that sort. Indeed, already in §1, having discovered several distinct senses of “intention”, Anscombe remarks that, despite its varied uses, “it is implausible … that the word [intention] is equivocal”. So there is some thing that we call “intention”. If “what is intention” is not merely a matter of (conventional) linguistic usage, then it is a matter of empirical fact: we are right to think of intention as some “thing”, and we must find out what this “thing” is. What does a cat have, when it has the intention to catch a bird? If the question “what is intention?” is a legitimate one, then Wittgenstein’s method can only be complementary; it can stop us from getting lost, but it will not bring us to our destination.
But Anscombe slavishly uses Wittgenstein’s method beyond its scope of application: when Wittgenstein points to the moon, she stares at his finger. As a result, the study of intention becomes a survey and synthesis of folk theories of intention (via linguistic use) and a pre-scientific empirical study of intentional action with behaviourist undertones (via anecdotes and thought experiments). To be sure, this is done with considerable intelligence, leading to the discovery of a lot of examples which shed light on the concept of intention. But this also results in bizarre omissions due to Anscombe’s own biases. There is almost no mention of empirical psychology. I do not think Anscombe uses the word “brain” even once - her agents have “minds”, sometimes nerves, never brains.
The purely philosophical treatment of empirical matters occasionally leads to incorrect dogmatic pronouncements. For example in §8 (and several times after that), she distinguishes knowledge from observation from knowledge without observation, separating internal from external senses; for instance, knowledge of the body’s position is considered to be “without observation”. This seems utterly absurd: people can be wrong about their body position and will correct themselves via observation; there is no reason why certain senses should be considered observational and others not based on whether they are external or internal senses (e.g. body position, but why not equilibrium, digestive processes, muscular soreness, etc.?). In §14, Anscombe writes “no discovery would affect an assertion of mental causality”: why not? It is not difficult to think of examples; people often reflect upon past actions and discover mental causes of which they had no awareness, e.g. one may be unfair to somebody else due to unacknowledged resentment or misdirected anger. In §19, after a single paragraph of inconclusive investigations, Anscombe rejects the possibility that intentions might have a physical substrate, on the grounds that this would lead to causal chains of intentions, which is bad because it would be... confusing? In §32-35, Anscombe discusses practical reason, which she finds not to resemble the all-or-nothing, true-or-false nature of syllogisms; but she never switches to a probabilistic or optimization-based interpretation that would begin to resolve the issue. By the way, this particular argument does not appear to be specific to practical reason: all syllogisms are in that sense flawed (e.g. no one can be certain of the absolute veracity of statements such as "Socrates is a man; All men are mortal", even though they are not practical statements).
These mistakes are compounded as Anscombe takes these pronouncements for granted and builds houses of cards upon unstable foundations. Other parts are confusing or unclear (e.g. §10 to §13), because Anscombe favours brevity where redundancy would have allowed for disambiguation (“not a single wasted breath”, says the back cover: a sign that Anscombe has failed to strike the right balance between succinctness and clarity). Despite this, it would be a gross exaggeration to say that Anscombe writes poorly; occasionally her wit is entertaining, and most of the time the arguments flow rather naturally. For somebody interested in the topic of intention, this should not be excessively challenging to read.
Overall, this short book is worth reading for some brilliant examples, for its historical importance, and to understand the dogmatic baggage carried by the concept of “intention”. But it bears witness to the deplorable “linguistic turn” of the second half of the 20th century: philosophers, having been instructed to be wary of the misleading features of everyday language, paid so much attention to everyday language that they forgot to pay attention to whatever it was that the language was misleading about.
For a sober treatment of intention, I am pinning my hopes on Bratman’s “Intention, plans, and practical reason”.
October 18, 2021
Review from my second read:
I'm really glad I read this a second time; and this time aided by Wiseman's guide. Many new and important points stood out to me this time around, which had been invisible to me the first time. Anscombe examines how we talk about intentions in order to draw certain conclusions. It is controversial whether her conclusions are solely about patterns of use of the concept “intention,” or about the nature of intention itself, as a phenomenon that is psychologically real. (Even if the former is true, I think it is possible to use facts about our use of this concept to serve as a guide in our investigation into the nature of the phenomenon referred to by the concept). I will summarize some of her key points below
One of Anscombe’s main points is that the intentional character of an action is not based in any property of an action, as an individual event, itself. Instead, the intentional character is based in the fact that the question “Why are you doing that?” (which I will call the “why-question”) may be appropriately asked of the agent, and the agent’s answer appeals to reasons for acting (§8). What is a reason for acting? These reasons are made possible by our capacities for practical reasoning and are known in a non-observational fashion—I will unpack these two features below.
Practical reasoning is sometimes defined as our drawing conclusions from premises in the form of a practical syllogism. For example, “Dry food is good for humans; I am a human; I will eat dry food.” According to Anscombe, this account is misleading. Practical reasoning does not necessarily consist in our running through practical syllogisms in our heads (§33, 42). Instead, it involves our being able to grasp the situation in which we act in such a way that can be captured by the form “I do Y in doing X” or, synonymously, “I do X in order to do Y” (§38, 43). There may be a whole range of different means and ends that nest under one another in this form. For example, I may move my fingers in order to play the flute, play the flute in order to impersonate Schopenhauer, impersonate Schopenhauer in order to be possessed by his spirit, and be possessed by his spirit in order to do epic philosophy. We may call this the “formal order” of descriptions of action (§47). “Why are you playing the flute?”—“I am playing the flute in order to do epic philosophy [or, to be possessed by Schopenhauer’s spirit, to impersonate Schopenhauer…].” A reason for acting depends on the entire formal order of descriptions of action that characterizes the action. Something is a reason for acting insofar as it serves a role, within the formal order, as an end or as a means—each means (X) is also an end (Y) of the previous description of action in the series, and each end (Y) is also a means (X) in the subsequent description of action in the series. Anscombe takes practical reasoning as formally constituted by answers an agent would give to the why-question.
A significant feature of Anscombe’s account is that she refuses to conceptualize intention as based in any inner psychological state or process. It is rather a concept we employ, based in our language game of asking one another for our reasons for acting and in our capacity to reason practically. Playing this language game makes it possible for us to understand an intentional bodily movement as characterizable by a formal order of descriptions of action, which explain that intentional movement. An agent need not consciously grasp this formal order to perform an action; rather, the formal order serves as a criterion for whether an action is intentional or not. If the why-question is applicable to an action, and the agent’s answer would supply a reason for acting; and reasons for acting are, grammatically or logically, dependent on this formal order of descriptions of action. So this formal order is presupposed, in a manner of grammatical or logical necessity, whenever the why-action is applicable and an action is intentional.
Anscombe argues that the potential fallibility of non-observational knowledge of our reasons for acting (which she calls practical knowledge) is different in kind from the potential fallibility of knowledge in general (§32, 48). Knowledge in general is false when it fails to correspond to facts which stand independently of our knowledge of them. In contrast, practical knowledge may fail to be true in two distinct ways: (1) It’s false when an expression of intention presupposes mistaken facts, and (2) It’s erroneous when we fail to execute our intentions (§32). For example, if I form the expression of intention “I will speak Chinese with my dad” but I do not know Chinese whatsoever, this fails in the sense of (1). If I form the expression of intention “I will speak English with my dad” but I speak very imperfect German with him instead, I fail in the sense of (2).
According to Anscombe, there is no analogue of (2) to be found in knowledge in general. When I form the expression of intention “I will speak English with my dad” and I speak German instead, the outcome of my action fails to correspond with the state of affairs that I intend to produce; nevertheless, my practical knowledge is correct. The failure of correspondence must be understood in the sense of knowledge in general; the state of affairs of my speaking German would fail to correspond only to an empirical or descriptive claim such as “My speech to my dad happens in English.” But my expression of intention (“I will do X”) is not this kind of claim; it is rather constituted by reasons for acting, characterizable according to the formal order of descriptions of action. So the formation of my intention is successful and “true”; my intention applies to my situation, and I have formulated it correctly, regardless of what happens when I try to execute it (§52).
It might be potent to think about Anscombe's analysis of intention in conjunction with Gibson's theory of affordances, and any rich-content view of perception. The idea of non-observational knowledge seems to connect up nicely with the perception of affordances or meanings of objects. I'd like to think more about this.
_____________________
Review from my first read:
What are the necessary conditions of intentional action? What are intentions - are they some inner mental acts? Is there a singular intention that defines the essence of an action, or are there many various intentions that drive a given action? What is the relation between an intention and the bodily motions that one goes through during an action - does the intention simply cause the bodily motions? These are examples of some of the questions Anscombe raises in this brief, 100 page book. Anscombe shows that some of our intuitive responses to these questions are problematic, and the nature of action is far more complex than we might have initially believed, or that philosophers have tended to assume throughout the history of western philosophy.
For example, in addressing the question of whether there are singular intentions that correspond with a given action, Anscombe shows that any action might be described in many different ways, which span across different levels of temporal durations, and across different degrees of intentional directness (section 23). She provides a story of a worker who pumps water for a house, occupied by Nazi officials. This worker knowingly pumps poisoned water, with the intent of murdering the officials and making room for a better governmental regime. This 'action' could be described as: moving one's arm up and down on the pump; pumping water to the house; murdering the officials; or changing the political climate (and there could be even more applicable descriptions). Does this mean that there are in fact many different actions, and many different intentions, involved in this seemingly single action? Anscombe says no. There is one action, and the ultimate intention that defines it is the "final" intention: changing the political climate. This intention "swallows up" all the others; or, in other words, the other movements should count as sub-actions, which all are performed for the sake of the final intention and play a role within the overall action defined by that intention.
I found that the most interesting points Anscombe made were in response to the question of the relation between an intention and the bodily motions of an action (sections 27-29). A naive view on this matter is "volitionism", or that intentions are inner mental acts, and they cause bodily motions in a linear causal fashion. Anscombe points out that this view presumes that intentions and physical movements are categorically separate things; this distinctiveness seems to be the case when we are observing another person in action. From this observational standpoint, we can only directly see the physical movements, and must infer the intentions. But, Anscombe argues, when we are in action ourselves, from this first-person standpoint we see that the intention and the physical movements aren't separable in this way. We don't have to physically observe our movements to know them; these movements are given in direct "feeling", just as our own intentions are. Anscombe claims the relation between intention and physical movement is that the latter is the "vehicle" of the former; I express my intention through my bodily motion. This makes a lot of sense to me. When we are acting, our intentionality is dynamically responsive to the events that we enact in the world. If I am trimming my hair, for example, and I accidentally cut off all of it, I can no longer trim it, and so can no longer intend to trim it.
Anscombe is a very clear and structured writer. She is also pretty funny. On my philosophical view, however, she comes from a tradition of representationalism (or 'referentialism'); the agent is set against a mind-independent, objective world and can access this world only through the construction of representations, including intentional attitudes. Only when one assumes this metaphysics of mind do the problems about action that Anscombe takes seriously arise. If we reject this metaphysics and shift to a phenomenological or embodied one (e.g. embodied cognitive science; enactivism; existential phenomenology), then we see that the truly mind-independent world would be totally unknowable, and the truthfulness of our representations cannot be defined in relation to that world. Instead, the world that is independent of any given agent, and that supplies the truth conditions of any agent's representations, is still dependent on human perspectives; it is a social, embodied world. This world is already interdependent with our human subjectivity, and it is structured by "affordances", or opportunities for action (J.J. Gibson). I think any person who is seriously interested in the nature of action should look into Gibsonian ecological psychology and embodied cognitive science. From this metaphysics, many of the paradoxes of action that philosophers of action are consumed by turn out to be empty.
--An additional note: I first encountered Anscombe's ideas on action in Ian Hacking's book Rewriting the Soul. Hacking here presents his theory of "looping effects", that sociocultural authorities hand to us intentions which constitute our actions and experiences. Since personal identity depends on memory (of our actions and experiences), our own identities are thereby constructed by those authorities. This is an incredibly powerful application of Anscombe's insight into the constitutive role of descriptions/intentions in our actions.
I'm really glad I read this a second time; and this time aided by Wiseman's guide. Many new and important points stood out to me this time around, which had been invisible to me the first time. Anscombe examines how we talk about intentions in order to draw certain conclusions. It is controversial whether her conclusions are solely about patterns of use of the concept “intention,” or about the nature of intention itself, as a phenomenon that is psychologically real. (Even if the former is true, I think it is possible to use facts about our use of this concept to serve as a guide in our investigation into the nature of the phenomenon referred to by the concept). I will summarize some of her key points below
One of Anscombe’s main points is that the intentional character of an action is not based in any property of an action, as an individual event, itself. Instead, the intentional character is based in the fact that the question “Why are you doing that?” (which I will call the “why-question”) may be appropriately asked of the agent, and the agent’s answer appeals to reasons for acting (§8). What is a reason for acting? These reasons are made possible by our capacities for practical reasoning and are known in a non-observational fashion—I will unpack these two features below.
Practical reasoning is sometimes defined as our drawing conclusions from premises in the form of a practical syllogism. For example, “Dry food is good for humans; I am a human; I will eat dry food.” According to Anscombe, this account is misleading. Practical reasoning does not necessarily consist in our running through practical syllogisms in our heads (§33, 42). Instead, it involves our being able to grasp the situation in which we act in such a way that can be captured by the form “I do Y in doing X” or, synonymously, “I do X in order to do Y” (§38, 43). There may be a whole range of different means and ends that nest under one another in this form. For example, I may move my fingers in order to play the flute, play the flute in order to impersonate Schopenhauer, impersonate Schopenhauer in order to be possessed by his spirit, and be possessed by his spirit in order to do epic philosophy. We may call this the “formal order” of descriptions of action (§47). “Why are you playing the flute?”—“I am playing the flute in order to do epic philosophy [or, to be possessed by Schopenhauer’s spirit, to impersonate Schopenhauer…].” A reason for acting depends on the entire formal order of descriptions of action that characterizes the action. Something is a reason for acting insofar as it serves a role, within the formal order, as an end or as a means—each means (X) is also an end (Y) of the previous description of action in the series, and each end (Y) is also a means (X) in the subsequent description of action in the series. Anscombe takes practical reasoning as formally constituted by answers an agent would give to the why-question.
A significant feature of Anscombe’s account is that she refuses to conceptualize intention as based in any inner psychological state or process. It is rather a concept we employ, based in our language game of asking one another for our reasons for acting and in our capacity to reason practically. Playing this language game makes it possible for us to understand an intentional bodily movement as characterizable by a formal order of descriptions of action, which explain that intentional movement. An agent need not consciously grasp this formal order to perform an action; rather, the formal order serves as a criterion for whether an action is intentional or not. If the why-question is applicable to an action, and the agent’s answer would supply a reason for acting; and reasons for acting are, grammatically or logically, dependent on this formal order of descriptions of action. So this formal order is presupposed, in a manner of grammatical or logical necessity, whenever the why-action is applicable and an action is intentional.
Anscombe argues that the potential fallibility of non-observational knowledge of our reasons for acting (which she calls practical knowledge) is different in kind from the potential fallibility of knowledge in general (§32, 48). Knowledge in general is false when it fails to correspond to facts which stand independently of our knowledge of them. In contrast, practical knowledge may fail to be true in two distinct ways: (1) It’s false when an expression of intention presupposes mistaken facts, and (2) It’s erroneous when we fail to execute our intentions (§32). For example, if I form the expression of intention “I will speak Chinese with my dad” but I do not know Chinese whatsoever, this fails in the sense of (1). If I form the expression of intention “I will speak English with my dad” but I speak very imperfect German with him instead, I fail in the sense of (2).
According to Anscombe, there is no analogue of (2) to be found in knowledge in general. When I form the expression of intention “I will speak English with my dad” and I speak German instead, the outcome of my action fails to correspond with the state of affairs that I intend to produce; nevertheless, my practical knowledge is correct. The failure of correspondence must be understood in the sense of knowledge in general; the state of affairs of my speaking German would fail to correspond only to an empirical or descriptive claim such as “My speech to my dad happens in English.” But my expression of intention (“I will do X”) is not this kind of claim; it is rather constituted by reasons for acting, characterizable according to the formal order of descriptions of action. So the formation of my intention is successful and “true”; my intention applies to my situation, and I have formulated it correctly, regardless of what happens when I try to execute it (§52).
It might be potent to think about Anscombe's analysis of intention in conjunction with Gibson's theory of affordances, and any rich-content view of perception. The idea of non-observational knowledge seems to connect up nicely with the perception of affordances or meanings of objects. I'd like to think more about this.
_____________________
Review from my first read:
What are the necessary conditions of intentional action? What are intentions - are they some inner mental acts? Is there a singular intention that defines the essence of an action, or are there many various intentions that drive a given action? What is the relation between an intention and the bodily motions that one goes through during an action - does the intention simply cause the bodily motions? These are examples of some of the questions Anscombe raises in this brief, 100 page book. Anscombe shows that some of our intuitive responses to these questions are problematic, and the nature of action is far more complex than we might have initially believed, or that philosophers have tended to assume throughout the history of western philosophy.
For example, in addressing the question of whether there are singular intentions that correspond with a given action, Anscombe shows that any action might be described in many different ways, which span across different levels of temporal durations, and across different degrees of intentional directness (section 23). She provides a story of a worker who pumps water for a house, occupied by Nazi officials. This worker knowingly pumps poisoned water, with the intent of murdering the officials and making room for a better governmental regime. This 'action' could be described as: moving one's arm up and down on the pump; pumping water to the house; murdering the officials; or changing the political climate (and there could be even more applicable descriptions). Does this mean that there are in fact many different actions, and many different intentions, involved in this seemingly single action? Anscombe says no. There is one action, and the ultimate intention that defines it is the "final" intention: changing the political climate. This intention "swallows up" all the others; or, in other words, the other movements should count as sub-actions, which all are performed for the sake of the final intention and play a role within the overall action defined by that intention.
I found that the most interesting points Anscombe made were in response to the question of the relation between an intention and the bodily motions of an action (sections 27-29). A naive view on this matter is "volitionism", or that intentions are inner mental acts, and they cause bodily motions in a linear causal fashion. Anscombe points out that this view presumes that intentions and physical movements are categorically separate things; this distinctiveness seems to be the case when we are observing another person in action. From this observational standpoint, we can only directly see the physical movements, and must infer the intentions. But, Anscombe argues, when we are in action ourselves, from this first-person standpoint we see that the intention and the physical movements aren't separable in this way. We don't have to physically observe our movements to know them; these movements are given in direct "feeling", just as our own intentions are. Anscombe claims the relation between intention and physical movement is that the latter is the "vehicle" of the former; I express my intention through my bodily motion. This makes a lot of sense to me. When we are acting, our intentionality is dynamically responsive to the events that we enact in the world. If I am trimming my hair, for example, and I accidentally cut off all of it, I can no longer trim it, and so can no longer intend to trim it.
Anscombe is a very clear and structured writer. She is also pretty funny. On my philosophical view, however, she comes from a tradition of representationalism (or 'referentialism'); the agent is set against a mind-independent, objective world and can access this world only through the construction of representations, including intentional attitudes. Only when one assumes this metaphysics of mind do the problems about action that Anscombe takes seriously arise. If we reject this metaphysics and shift to a phenomenological or embodied one (e.g. embodied cognitive science; enactivism; existential phenomenology), then we see that the truly mind-independent world would be totally unknowable, and the truthfulness of our representations cannot be defined in relation to that world. Instead, the world that is independent of any given agent, and that supplies the truth conditions of any agent's representations, is still dependent on human perspectives; it is a social, embodied world. This world is already interdependent with our human subjectivity, and it is structured by "affordances", or opportunities for action (J.J. Gibson). I think any person who is seriously interested in the nature of action should look into Gibsonian ecological psychology and embodied cognitive science. From this metaphysics, many of the paradoxes of action that philosophers of action are consumed by turn out to be empty.
--An additional note: I first encountered Anscombe's ideas on action in Ian Hacking's book Rewriting the Soul. Hacking here presents his theory of "looping effects", that sociocultural authorities hand to us intentions which constitute our actions and experiences. Since personal identity depends on memory (of our actions and experiences), our own identities are thereby constructed by those authorities. This is an incredibly powerful application of Anscombe's insight into the constitutive role of descriptions/intentions in our actions.
October 22, 2024
Intentionality is a mental state that has such a formidable influence on how we make assessments about accountability and moral responsibility that it is unexpected just how challenging it is to grasp what kind of thing an intention is.
Intentions are mental states. They are the “why” of our actions, but is the object of one’s intention the same thing as the object of one’s action? There are many reasons to problematize that relationship. We can intend to do something and then not do it. Or we can intend to do something that doesn’t happen without us ever letting go of our intention. We can also act without intention; our bodies make involuntary actions all the time. Even actions that we may understand to be guided by intentions are not clearly delineated by the boundaries of our intentions. For example, if I intend to be at my desk writing my comments on this book, that may be my intended action, but I am also making a noise from my keyboard and I am adding my body heat to the room, neither of which are intentional but they are my actions. There are also acts that we think of as intentional that follow from a series of intentional and unintentional acts. How, for example, does my intentional act of getting up from my desk to get a pencil and write a note to someone result, ultimately, in the intentional action of that person letting the dog outside later in the day? Less trivially, how does a person’s signature on an order result in an action that brings about a morally dubious result? Whose intention entails the intentional acts that follow? Who bears responsibility?
Elizabeth Anscombe attempts to answer these problems methodically, a process that reveals the logical inconsistencies of attempting to make truth-conditional statements about intentions when all that we really have are 1) the potentially unreliable things that people say about their intentions, and 2) a field of observable actions in the world, some of which are entailed by intention and some of which are not. Ultimately, Anscombe decides that the Aristotelian notion of practical reason, expressible in a practical syllogism (e.g., major premise establishing a universal desire or need + minor premise of local circumstance resulting in a conclusion that a particular action is required) allows us the best access to intention. The formation of intention is the logical entailment that comes from accepting the soundness of the premises and the conclusion about what action is necessary. At least this is how I take her point, which is not always entirely clear.
One point that I wish Anscombe had dealt more with is agency or how people perceive their ability to act in response to a logically derived course of action. The practical syllogism works pretty well for explaining intentional actions for which the action immediately follows assessment of the premises, but she also established that actions can be seen as part of causal chains of “I intend P in order to Q,” where the Q of one action formulation becomes the P of the next. For example, I select a pencil to write a note. I place the note where it will be seen by another person. That person reads the note. That person understands the message. That person completes the action that I intended. At each stage of this chain there is a possibility of a divergent path to be followed, especially when the intended or likely outcomes of an action are further from one’s direct control. The wind may blow the note away. Someone other than the intended recipient may find the note. The note may be misunderstood, etc. It is not until we get close to the intended action that the path toward that ultimate outcome becomes more and more likely, and perhaps in some cases inevitable. For instance, if I just scrap the idea of writing a note and ask the person to take the action I intend there are fewer possible divergent paths leading away from my intended action. These kinds of differences begin to matter if the outcome is morally objectionable because at what point does one start to bear responsibility for those intentions? Or at what level of remove does one’s responsibility lessen?*
Surprisingly, there is not much discussion of this kind of agency or of agency that extends beyond a person’s immediate control. Following Anscombe’s famous example of the person pumping water from a well known to be poisoned, the person pumping the water might not see his moral culpability if that water is delivered to the house and consumed if he limits his intentionality by the scope of his job duties (i.e., my job is to bring water to the house). However, playing out these actions along a network of intervening human and non-human actors one might be able to see results that may not be necessary outcomes but are likely ones. If this person pumps poisoned water into a pitcher and brings the pitcher to the house, how does that intentional action then interact with other downstream intentional actions that involve the pitcher of water (e.g., drinking, cooking, etc.)? It seems that a question of agency must come into the analysis.
*See Anscombe’s speech to her Oxford U colleagues about why Truman should not be awarded an honorary degree because of his authorization to drop atomic bombs on Japan: “Mr. Truman’s Degree.”
Intentions are mental states. They are the “why” of our actions, but is the object of one’s intention the same thing as the object of one’s action? There are many reasons to problematize that relationship. We can intend to do something and then not do it. Or we can intend to do something that doesn’t happen without us ever letting go of our intention. We can also act without intention; our bodies make involuntary actions all the time. Even actions that we may understand to be guided by intentions are not clearly delineated by the boundaries of our intentions. For example, if I intend to be at my desk writing my comments on this book, that may be my intended action, but I am also making a noise from my keyboard and I am adding my body heat to the room, neither of which are intentional but they are my actions. There are also acts that we think of as intentional that follow from a series of intentional and unintentional acts. How, for example, does my intentional act of getting up from my desk to get a pencil and write a note to someone result, ultimately, in the intentional action of that person letting the dog outside later in the day? Less trivially, how does a person’s signature on an order result in an action that brings about a morally dubious result? Whose intention entails the intentional acts that follow? Who bears responsibility?
Elizabeth Anscombe attempts to answer these problems methodically, a process that reveals the logical inconsistencies of attempting to make truth-conditional statements about intentions when all that we really have are 1) the potentially unreliable things that people say about their intentions, and 2) a field of observable actions in the world, some of which are entailed by intention and some of which are not. Ultimately, Anscombe decides that the Aristotelian notion of practical reason, expressible in a practical syllogism (e.g., major premise establishing a universal desire or need + minor premise of local circumstance resulting in a conclusion that a particular action is required) allows us the best access to intention. The formation of intention is the logical entailment that comes from accepting the soundness of the premises and the conclusion about what action is necessary. At least this is how I take her point, which is not always entirely clear.
One point that I wish Anscombe had dealt more with is agency or how people perceive their ability to act in response to a logically derived course of action. The practical syllogism works pretty well for explaining intentional actions for which the action immediately follows assessment of the premises, but she also established that actions can be seen as part of causal chains of “I intend P in order to Q,” where the Q of one action formulation becomes the P of the next. For example, I select a pencil to write a note. I place the note where it will be seen by another person. That person reads the note. That person understands the message. That person completes the action that I intended. At each stage of this chain there is a possibility of a divergent path to be followed, especially when the intended or likely outcomes of an action are further from one’s direct control. The wind may blow the note away. Someone other than the intended recipient may find the note. The note may be misunderstood, etc. It is not until we get close to the intended action that the path toward that ultimate outcome becomes more and more likely, and perhaps in some cases inevitable. For instance, if I just scrap the idea of writing a note and ask the person to take the action I intend there are fewer possible divergent paths leading away from my intended action. These kinds of differences begin to matter if the outcome is morally objectionable because at what point does one start to bear responsibility for those intentions? Or at what level of remove does one’s responsibility lessen?*
Surprisingly, there is not much discussion of this kind of agency or of agency that extends beyond a person’s immediate control. Following Anscombe’s famous example of the person pumping water from a well known to be poisoned, the person pumping the water might not see his moral culpability if that water is delivered to the house and consumed if he limits his intentionality by the scope of his job duties (i.e., my job is to bring water to the house). However, playing out these actions along a network of intervening human and non-human actors one might be able to see results that may not be necessary outcomes but are likely ones. If this person pumps poisoned water into a pitcher and brings the pitcher to the house, how does that intentional action then interact with other downstream intentional actions that involve the pitcher of water (e.g., drinking, cooking, etc.)? It seems that a question of agency must come into the analysis.
*See Anscombe’s speech to her Oxford U colleagues about why Truman should not be awarded an honorary degree because of his authorization to drop atomic bombs on Japan: “Mr. Truman’s Degree.”
October 5, 2023
ENGLISH: Elizabeth Anscombe is hailed as one of the best English philosophers of the twentieth century, and this monograph is considered as her best work. The subject is abstruse, but the development is very good, with many examples taken from ordinary life.
ESPAÑOL: A Elizabeth Anscombe se la considera uno de los mejores filósofos ingleses del siglo XX, y esta monografía es la mejor de sus obras. El tema es abstruso, pero el desarrollo que le da es muy bueno, con muchos ejemplos sacados de la vida cotidiana.
ESPAÑOL: A Elizabeth Anscombe se la considera uno de los mejores filósofos ingleses del siglo XX, y esta monografía es la mejor de sus obras. El tema es abstruso, pero el desarrollo que le da es muy bueno, con muchos ejemplos sacados de la vida cotidiana.
February 9, 2023
Like Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Aquinas’ De Ente, this is a book that I will likely read a dozen times or more over the course of my life without ever exhausting its contents. I can only imagine how much I overlooked on this first reading.
July 17, 2018
Christ: difficult. Very brief, very ordinary, and yet unsettling.
Her language looks very clear – it's jargon-free – but on engaging with it you see it's blurred, terse, arduous. She never introduces the question at hand, nor does she make any introduction at all: on page 1 she sets about the concept with a monologue, an air of Wittgenstein's observational tragedy.
Anyway I'm pretty sure it's about the problem of intention (‘what answers ‘why?’, and why does it?’ Or: ‘how can teleology be explained in terms of brute causation (science)?’).
I think her points are that:
* intentions are justified with reasons and not evidence;
* intentional explanation is not causal explanation;
* intentional action is not amenable to a naturalist reduction (because to explain an action with reasons is precisely to not explain it with laws of nature); that intention is not a mental state but a process involving (?);
* that we have synthetic but non-observational and non-inferential knowledge of the world;
* that we have this simply because we 'know about' our bodies and intentions.
(That needs more work to be representative:
1) if you don’t know that you are doing something, you’re not doing it intentionally;
2) if it’s only during, or after the fact that you infer you’re doing something, you can’t be doing it for reasons.
So) if you are doing something intentional, you necessarily know you are doing it.
She thinks this knowledge isn’t based on observing oneself or post-hoc theorising.
Intention was intended as the first piece of the first 'proper', psychologised account of agency. (She thought one needed an action theory before one could have a real moral theory. But consequentialism sidesteps that need, just as it ducks the free-will responsibility question, and the warm-glow problem, and the meta-ethical status of moral language... But a key need, one consequentialism can never avoid, is people’s need to assert their own importance and metaphysical uniqueness.)
If you take nothing else from it, take the "reasons" vs "causes" distinction seriously. It is a real problem, necessary for serious inquiry into humans.
Her language looks very clear – it's jargon-free – but on engaging with it you see it's blurred, terse, arduous. She never introduces the question at hand, nor does she make any introduction at all: on page 1 she sets about the concept with a monologue, an air of Wittgenstein's observational tragedy.
Anyway I'm pretty sure it's about the problem of intention (‘what answers ‘why?’, and why does it?’ Or: ‘how can teleology be explained in terms of brute causation (science)?’).
I think her points are that:
* intentions are justified with reasons and not evidence;
* intentional explanation is not causal explanation;
* intentional action is not amenable to a naturalist reduction (because to explain an action with reasons is precisely to not explain it with laws of nature); that intention is not a mental state but a process involving (?);
* that we have synthetic but non-observational and non-inferential knowledge of the world;
* that we have this simply because we 'know about' our bodies and intentions.
(That needs more work to be representative:
1) if you don’t know that you are doing something, you’re not doing it intentionally;
2) if it’s only during, or after the fact that you infer you’re doing something, you can’t be doing it for reasons.
So) if you are doing something intentional, you necessarily know you are doing it.
She thinks this knowledge isn’t based on observing oneself or post-hoc theorising.
Intention was intended as the first piece of the first 'proper', psychologised account of agency. (She thought one needed an action theory before one could have a real moral theory. But consequentialism sidesteps that need, just as it ducks the free-will responsibility question, and the warm-glow problem, and the meta-ethical status of moral language... But a key need, one consequentialism can never avoid, is people’s need to assert their own importance and metaphysical uniqueness.)
If you take nothing else from it, take the "reasons" vs "causes" distinction seriously. It is a real problem, necessary for serious inquiry into humans.
Read
August 3, 2023This is one of the most difficult 100 pages I've ever read, and it's not because it's particularly technical. Rather, Anscombe takes the approach of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations – gorgeous hermetic codex that it is – and applies it to the question of what is intention. That makes it perhaps even more infuriatingly difficult, because you feel like you SHOULD be able to get it. What I got was a series of questions and (I think) Anscombe's perspective on how intention is decided (i.e. from knowledge, but there's more than that, not that I'm confident in my own analysis here). I think I have disagreements with her? I think? I also know that she's quite big on virtue ethics, which is an approach I find error-ridden to say the least, and that seems to play into her arguments here, at least on a superficial level. But hey I didn't really understand. Would need a second go-around.
February 20, 2020
This book took me months to read mostly because I read it in sporadic chunks (the first half for class in November, the middle sections in December-January, and the rest of it in February). It is a brilliant but challenging text, one which already looms large in my philosophical thinking. It is one of those rare books that one is never truly done reading in my opinion — there is so much packed into this fairly short text.
It is a masterpiece, a philosophical landmark, and a touchstone for thinking about philosophy of action and related problems. I will certainly continues to read, study, struggle, and reread it for many years.
It is a masterpiece, a philosophical landmark, and a touchstone for thinking about philosophy of action and related problems. I will certainly continues to read, study, struggle, and reread it for many years.
May 7, 2022
Nothing reveals to you more that the book you're reading is written by a Thomist than the fact that it contains 100 pages and 50 chapters. The almost absurd density of the analysis on human intention is, however, neutralised by Anscombe's very female approach to philosophical inquiry, where her particular sensitivity extracts crucial conceptual distinctions out of nowhere again and again. Intuition also plays such a pivotal role in this analysis, and yet she can always navigate her way through the logical jungles and obtain a satisfying justification. This work is a solid proof that women can do analytical philosophy just as brilliantly as men if they wish to, but in a quite different manner.
November 10, 2022
Impressive and at times funny actually! But way way over my head at times
December 31, 2024
I DO WHAT HAPPENS
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
February 26, 2024
i just a little lost in the weeds of time at the end (not convinced the future is important… or unsure how important it is. ends with a sort of internal multiplicity which i suppose is created by time?) but this was a really interesting read and i think, especially after i have class on it, that i will often return to this text.
also surprisingly readable for the type of philosophy it is
also surprisingly readable for the type of philosophy it is
October 25, 2021
This is totally unlike anything else I've read this year, and I enjoyed it very much. I was very grateful to have a philosophy prof to read it with me, otherwise, I would have been totally lost. As it is, I think I've just grazed the surface of what Anscombe's doing here, but I found it very, very interesting. She's also, somewhat to my surprise, really funny. All the little witty asides and humorous examples were extra fun.
October 30, 2025
School book again. Super interesting but I don’t think I would have gotten even a tenth of what I did out of it without having a prof to walk me through it.
October 18, 2021
It was a treat to read this again with a friend and former student. Returning to it after more than half a decade--but more importantly, after writing a book about Anscombe and some of her university friends--I saw more clearly how the book ties in to all sorts of things in her life and work: her deep grounding in Aristotle and Aquinas, her apprenticeship with Wittgenstein, her outrage and worry at the views of intention implicitly accepted by her peers (inside and outside of academic philosophy). My friend and I were speculating in our final conversation about the ethical implications of Anscombe's account of practical reasoning, something she addresses glancingly in section 41. Anscombe thinks, contrary to lots of contemporary philosophers, that you can't derive substantive answers to ethical questions simply by *reasoning carefully*. Rather, you need to have good starting points for your reasoning, and you need dispositions to fortify your commitment to acting on those starting points. *Then* careful reasoning can become an important aid to a good human life.
Intention is full of delightful asides and passages that continue to puzzle me; will I have occasion to read it again in 2027 or so?
Intention is full of delightful asides and passages that continue to puzzle me; will I have occasion to read it again in 2027 or so?
October 15, 2020
Half of the Goodreads reviews for this book are like "it's brilliant, also I don't get it", and I agree with the latter half of that statement. Anscombe is not at all a clear writer, and that's on her.
A larger theoretical issue is that by characterizing "intention" primarily through "intentional action", Anscombe misses a large subset of intentions - those that are never carried out. At the very end, there is some discussion of thwarted actions, or completed actions that do not ultimately fulfill the intention, or tantalizingly, even statements of "I am going to...unless I change my mind". But what about intending and then forgetting? Or intending without knowing what actions to implement?
A larger theoretical issue is that by characterizing "intention" primarily through "intentional action", Anscombe misses a large subset of intentions - those that are never carried out. At the very end, there is some discussion of thwarted actions, or completed actions that do not ultimately fulfill the intention, or tantalizingly, even statements of "I am going to...unless I change my mind". But what about intending and then forgetting? Or intending without knowing what actions to implement?
August 16, 2014
this is one of the better books written in 20th century analytic philosophy. also one of the more infuriating. anscombe charts out an area of inquiry, intentional action (or "acting under a reason"), drawing on aristotle and to some degree wittgenstein as guides. along the way, she gives her own account of what practical reasoning is meant to be. anscombe exemplifies the virtue of stating things we all know to be true yet are always inclined to forget when we do philosophy.
July 11, 2019
Fascinating from a moral point of view. Where does intention end and deed begin?
July 19, 2021
This seminal work now seems so obvious, but it sure created something new. A must-read.
June 22, 2023
INTENTION
noun
a thing intended; an aim or plan.
"she was full of good intentions"
“An intentional object is given by a word or a phrase which gives a description under which.”
-G.E.M. Anscombe
Introduction:
Intention by G.E.M. Anscombe is a profound philosophical work that delves into the nature of intentional action and its implications for moral responsibility. Published in 1957, this book has had a lasting impact on ethical theory and philosophy of mind. Anscombe's exploration of intention brings clarity to an often murky and complex topic, shedding light on the connections between action, motivation, and morality.
Summary:
Anscombe's Intention is not a narrative-driven story but a rigorous philosophical inquiry. The book begins by analyzing the concept of intention and distinguishing it from other related concepts, such as desire and wish. Anscombe argues that intentions are a distinct type of mental state that has a special relationship to action. She introduces the notion of a "basic action" as a fundamental unit of intentional action, highlighting the importance of the agent's knowledge and control in executing an intended action.
Anscombe further explores the concept of intention in relation to practical reasoning and moral philosophy. She challenges the prevailing views that treat intentions as mere mental states divorced from their moral implications. Instead, Anscombe argues for a holistic understanding of intentional action, where the agent's intentions and motivations play a crucial role in determining the moral value of their actions.
Themes:
The central theme of Intention revolves around the nature of intention and its significance for moral responsibility. Anscombe rejects the idea that intentions can be reduced to psychological states or mere desires. Instead, she emphasizes the practical nature of intention, highlighting the agent's active role in executing their intentions. Through careful analysis and logical arguments, Anscombe makes a compelling case for the inseparability of intention and action.
One of the key insights of the book is Anscombe's exploration of the connection between intentions and reasons. She argues that intentions are intimately tied to reasons for action, and they provide the basis for moral evaluation. Anscombe contends that agents' intentions shape their character and define their ethical stance. By examining the intentions behind actions, we can understand the agent's values and motivations, enabling us to make informed moral judgments.
Author:
G.E.M. Anscombe was a prominent philosopher and one of the leading figures of the analytic tradition. Known for her clarity of thought and rigorous logical analysis, Anscombe's writing style in Intention is precise and meticulous. She presents her arguments in a systematic manner, carefully defining concepts and building logical frameworks to support her claims.
Anscombe's voice in Intention is authoritative yet engaging. She avoids unnecessary jargon and presents her ideas in a manner accessible to both experts and non-experts in philosophy. Her arguments are well-reasoned and persuasive, challenging conventional views while providing a solid foundation for her own claims.
Born in 1919, Anscombe had a distinguished career as a philosopher and was highly regarded for her contributions to moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. She studied under Ludwig Wittgenstein and was deeply influenced by his philosophical ideas. Anscombe's background and training are evident in her nuanced approach to philosophical inquiry and her commitment to logical analysis.
Conclusion:
Intention by G.E.M. Anscombe is a seminal work in the field of moral philosophy and philosophy of action. It offers a profound analysis of the nature of intention and its significance for moral responsibility. Anscombe's meticulous arguments and logical frameworks provide a solid foundation for understanding the complexities of intentional action.
This book is a must-read for philosophers, ethicists, and anyone interested in the nature of action and moral decision-making. Anscombe's insights challenge conventional wisdom and provide a refreshing perspective on the role of intentions in ethical evaluation. Intention is a thought-provoking and intellectually stimulating work that continues to shape the discourse in philosophy to this day.
noun
a thing intended; an aim or plan.
"she was full of good intentions"
“An intentional object is given by a word or a phrase which gives a description under which.”
-G.E.M. Anscombe
Introduction:
Intention by G.E.M. Anscombe is a profound philosophical work that delves into the nature of intentional action and its implications for moral responsibility. Published in 1957, this book has had a lasting impact on ethical theory and philosophy of mind. Anscombe's exploration of intention brings clarity to an often murky and complex topic, shedding light on the connections between action, motivation, and morality.
Summary:
Anscombe's Intention is not a narrative-driven story but a rigorous philosophical inquiry. The book begins by analyzing the concept of intention and distinguishing it from other related concepts, such as desire and wish. Anscombe argues that intentions are a distinct type of mental state that has a special relationship to action. She introduces the notion of a "basic action" as a fundamental unit of intentional action, highlighting the importance of the agent's knowledge and control in executing an intended action.
Anscombe further explores the concept of intention in relation to practical reasoning and moral philosophy. She challenges the prevailing views that treat intentions as mere mental states divorced from their moral implications. Instead, Anscombe argues for a holistic understanding of intentional action, where the agent's intentions and motivations play a crucial role in determining the moral value of their actions.
Themes:
The central theme of Intention revolves around the nature of intention and its significance for moral responsibility. Anscombe rejects the idea that intentions can be reduced to psychological states or mere desires. Instead, she emphasizes the practical nature of intention, highlighting the agent's active role in executing their intentions. Through careful analysis and logical arguments, Anscombe makes a compelling case for the inseparability of intention and action.
One of the key insights of the book is Anscombe's exploration of the connection between intentions and reasons. She argues that intentions are intimately tied to reasons for action, and they provide the basis for moral evaluation. Anscombe contends that agents' intentions shape their character and define their ethical stance. By examining the intentions behind actions, we can understand the agent's values and motivations, enabling us to make informed moral judgments.
Author:
G.E.M. Anscombe was a prominent philosopher and one of the leading figures of the analytic tradition. Known for her clarity of thought and rigorous logical analysis, Anscombe's writing style in Intention is precise and meticulous. She presents her arguments in a systematic manner, carefully defining concepts and building logical frameworks to support her claims.
Anscombe's voice in Intention is authoritative yet engaging. She avoids unnecessary jargon and presents her ideas in a manner accessible to both experts and non-experts in philosophy. Her arguments are well-reasoned and persuasive, challenging conventional views while providing a solid foundation for her own claims.
Born in 1919, Anscombe had a distinguished career as a philosopher and was highly regarded for her contributions to moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. She studied under Ludwig Wittgenstein and was deeply influenced by his philosophical ideas. Anscombe's background and training are evident in her nuanced approach to philosophical inquiry and her commitment to logical analysis.
Conclusion:
Intention by G.E.M. Anscombe is a seminal work in the field of moral philosophy and philosophy of action. It offers a profound analysis of the nature of intention and its significance for moral responsibility. Anscombe's meticulous arguments and logical frameworks provide a solid foundation for understanding the complexities of intentional action.
This book is a must-read for philosophers, ethicists, and anyone interested in the nature of action and moral decision-making. Anscombe's insights challenge conventional wisdom and provide a refreshing perspective on the role of intentions in ethical evaluation. Intention is a thought-provoking and intellectually stimulating work that continues to shape the discourse in philosophy to this day.
January 8, 2020
This is difficult book, but it is brilliant and extremely thought-provoking once one is able to understand its basic objectives. One key idea is that this book is born of Anscombe's reflections on Truman's use of the atomic bomb. In this act, we become aware of a distinction between what we intend, and the consequences of our action that we may not have intended. This is related to the doctrine of double effect, which has to do with consequences we intend and those we only forsee but do not intend. Anscombe does not introduce these ideas in this book, nor does she introduce her topic in any clear manner. The book might be slightly opaque for a beginner. But, the prose is extremely tight and dense. She is rattling off powerful ideas and insights with every sentence.
Aristotle is always in the background. Aristotle thought that human action is always directed towards a highest good. The highest good is that which is the ultimate end. It is not a means to something else. It is what everyone wants for its own sake.
Anscombe then asks a series of provocative questions about this seemingly basic notion of intention. There are too many insights to recount here. But, for example, she distinguishes between intention and intentional. There can be an act that is intentional but done without intention. For instance, I might just randomly tap on my desk. Anscombe also meditates on the difference between an intention and a prediction. Are intentions essentially connected to the future? If so, how are they different from predictions, which are also essentially concerned with the future? How about the difference between orders and predictions? We evaluate these two things differently. We evaluate orders in terms of whether they are good or bad, but we evaluate predictions in terms of whether they come true or not.
This book is well worth meditation and discussion!
Aristotle is always in the background. Aristotle thought that human action is always directed towards a highest good. The highest good is that which is the ultimate end. It is not a means to something else. It is what everyone wants for its own sake.
Anscombe then asks a series of provocative questions about this seemingly basic notion of intention. There are too many insights to recount here. But, for example, she distinguishes between intention and intentional. There can be an act that is intentional but done without intention. For instance, I might just randomly tap on my desk. Anscombe also meditates on the difference between an intention and a prediction. Are intentions essentially connected to the future? If so, how are they different from predictions, which are also essentially concerned with the future? How about the difference between orders and predictions? We evaluate these two things differently. We evaluate orders in terms of whether they are good or bad, but we evaluate predictions in terms of whether they come true or not.
This book is well worth meditation and discussion!
March 8, 2022
I started this after reading Lipscomb’s “The Women are Up to Something” about Anscombe, Foot, Midgley, and Murdoch and their careers at Oxford and elsewhere after WW2. I thought this would be a book on ethics but it turns out that it was not. It is more a book about philosophical psychology, in particular how people come to form and act upon intentions to do things, perform actions, or bring varied states of being into existence. Sure, ethical issues arise, but they are not central to this. The study is much more one of “practical reason” as opposed to the traditional contemplative reasoning one associates with philosophy. This is only the roughest of summary statments. The book is not unrelated to the types of statements, plans, and frameworks that one comes to associate with management or motivational writings, although this book is light years beyond such writings.
It is surprisingly hard to explain intentional actions clearly.I could not begin to summarize the range of issues that arise. I have read philosophy before but was reminded of the care and craft that goes into really thinking about something. The style is dense - very dense - and philosophers do not seem motivated to be flashy writers or to seek broad audiences. Sometimes the text proceeds in terms of examples, counter-examples, and exceptions that appear several times and get quite detailed. More general readers may find these examples less rewarding, but they are worth following through.
Overall, this well worth the effort to read (and reread) but it is not for the casual reader.
It is surprisingly hard to explain intentional actions clearly.I could not begin to summarize the range of issues that arise. I have read philosophy before but was reminded of the care and craft that goes into really thinking about something. The style is dense - very dense - and philosophers do not seem motivated to be flashy writers or to seek broad audiences. Sometimes the text proceeds in terms of examples, counter-examples, and exceptions that appear several times and get quite detailed. More general readers may find these examples less rewarding, but they are worth following through.
Overall, this well worth the effort to read (and reread) but it is not for the casual reader.
June 23, 2024
I remember being really interested in reading this book when I first heard of it. Unfortunately, it took me so long to get my hands on a copy, that when I finally got one last year, I'd completely forgotten the reason why I wanted to read it, i.e., my intention in reading it and the context and circumstances under which I first came across it. I've been wracking my brain for the last year now, but to no avail. I think if I had remembered, it would have an easier read.
That said, it's isn't an easy read, but not because it's poorly thought out or written. Each section is dense and packed with arguments where she expects that one has read/is familiar with the philosophies of philosophers such as Aristotle, Wittgenstein, etc. i.e., it's not that easy for the average layperson to follow. It's the sort of book that you have to unpack over several reads. At the moment, I feel like I only have the most superficial understanding of it. But I will definitely be coming back it and am looking forward to seeing what I can find with each new read.
That said, it's isn't an easy read, but not because it's poorly thought out or written. Each section is dense and packed with arguments where she expects that one has read/is familiar with the philosophies of philosophers such as Aristotle, Wittgenstein, etc. i.e., it's not that easy for the average layperson to follow. It's the sort of book that you have to unpack over several reads. At the moment, I feel like I only have the most superficial understanding of it. But I will definitely be coming back it and am looking forward to seeing what I can find with each new read.
February 8, 2019
I think I learned a decent amount from this, but not all that much about what intention is. I take it that Anscombe is arguing that an intentional action is one that is justified by reasons and is knowable "without observation" (perhaps proprioceptively would make more sense). There are more aspects to her argument than just this, but I think this is the core of it.
As other readers have pointed out, Anscombe relies a lot on interrogating phrases and manners of speech. This is quite frustrating to read as she often produces these phrases Gatling gun-style and it is effortful to keep track of what she's talking about. The book also lacks any clear structure, which makes each new section a bit hard to follow until you get a grip of the new philosophical thread. Also it was just boring.
Overall, probably a worthwhile read, despite its significant presentational problems.
As other readers have pointed out, Anscombe relies a lot on interrogating phrases and manners of speech. This is quite frustrating to read as she often produces these phrases Gatling gun-style and it is effortful to keep track of what she's talking about. The book also lacks any clear structure, which makes each new section a bit hard to follow until you get a grip of the new philosophical thread. Also it was just boring.
Overall, probably a worthwhile read, despite its significant presentational problems.
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February 5, 2023Sinceramente me resultó muy difícil de llevar. Lo terminé a duras penas por el simple hecho de terminarlo, pero lo hubiera abandonado por la mitad. Por momentos el tema del texto, el objeto del libro, a saber, la filosofía de la acción, se me hizo terriblemente aburrido, de muy poco interés, al menos para mí. Es como si fuera un objeto de estudio demasiado específico y extensamente desarrollado; para gente especializada o interesada en el tópico. Yo me topé y decidí leer este libro porque su autora, Anscombe, fue discípula de Wittgenstein y una filósofa católica de firmes convicciones que generó polémica en su momento. Esas eran mis únicas razones para acercarme a este texto. Nada más que decir, quizá en algunos (muchos) años, pueda agarrarlo de nuevo y, con más conocimiento detrás mío, poder sacarle más provecho.
April 17, 2023
Anscombe has proven herself to be one of the finest philosophers and Thomists of all time. She manages to merge the brilliant thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein with the solid of Scholasticism of St Thomas Aquinas. "Intention" is her analysis of the philosophy of action, particularly of intentional action and what makes an action intentional or unintentional (or merely volitional). She proves the case to be far more complex than one may initially presume it to be. It gets better when she backs up many of her ideas with Aristotelian notions of practical reasoning. Here is an interesting excerpt from the work:
“…in some cases one can be as certain as possible that one will do something, and yet intend not to do it.”
“…in some cases one can be as certain as possible that one will do something, and yet intend not to do it.”
April 20, 2024
Not really my cup of tea. There are sections of the book that are certainly quite good - through analytical clarity or humour or both. But I found myself for much of the time thinking ‘yeah and?’ against the murkiness Anscombe paints: to both the imprecision of each term she examines, but also against her posited examiner - the sense of ‘no ordinary interlocutor would find issue with this’ or conversely ‘this wouldn’t make any sense to a reasonable interlocutor’.
Intention, voluntarism, and action are certainly all issues; yet as her work presupposes the terms sort of work in an everyday way even if they frequently butt heads on any sort of closer examination.
Maybe I’m just a philistine.
Intention, voluntarism, and action are certainly all issues; yet as her work presupposes the terms sort of work in an everyday way even if they frequently butt heads on any sort of closer examination.
Maybe I’m just a philistine.
March 25, 2021
I did not study this book which is what was required of it. I read it in the hope of finding insights but they are nestled in a word salad that is hard to wade through. I imagine that Aristotle and Aquinas would have done a much better job with the same exact topic. Their orderliness and clarity of distinction is easy to follow and ultimately to unerstand. This reminds me of one of her other famous works, the essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" which is also a muddle.
December 26, 2021
Absolutely brilliant philosophical masterpiece.
It took me 6 months and I had to read a few guidebooks for it, but I managed to finally digest it to some extent. I am going to re-read it more than once. (Unless I am prevented or change my mind! :P Wink for those who have read this.)
It took me 6 months and I had to read a few guidebooks for it, but I managed to finally digest it to some extent. I am going to re-read it more than once. (Unless I am prevented or change my mind! :P Wink for those who have read this.)
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