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Unwinnable: Britain's War in Afghanistan, 2001-2014
British and US forces could have successfully withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2002, having done the job they set out to do: to defeat al-Qaeda and stop it from launching further terrorist attacks against the West. Instead, British troops became part of a larger international effort to stabilise the country. Yet over the following thirteen years the British military paid a heavy price for their presence in Helmand province; and when Western troops departed from Afghanistan in 2014, they had failed to stop a Taliban resurgence.
In this magisterial study, Theo Farrell explains the origins and causes of the war, providing fascinating insight into the British government’s reaction to 9/11 and the steps that led the British Army to Helmand. He details the specific campaigns and missions over the subsequent years, revealing how the military’s efforts to create a strategy for success were continually undermined by political realities in Kabul and back home. And he demonstrates conclusively that the West’s failure to understand the reasons and dynamics of local conflict in the country meant that the war was unwinnable.
Drawing on unprecedented access to military reports and government documents, as well as hundreds of interviews with Western commanders, senior figures in the Taliban, Afghan civilians and British politicians, Unwinnable is an extraordinary work of scholarship. Its depth of analysis, scope and authority make it the definitive history of Britain’s War in Afghanistan.
In this magisterial study, Theo Farrell explains the origins and causes of the war, providing fascinating insight into the British government’s reaction to 9/11 and the steps that led the British Army to Helmand. He details the specific campaigns and missions over the subsequent years, revealing how the military’s efforts to create a strategy for success were continually undermined by political realities in Kabul and back home. And he demonstrates conclusively that the West’s failure to understand the reasons and dynamics of local conflict in the country meant that the war was unwinnable.
Drawing on unprecedented access to military reports and government documents, as well as hundreds of interviews with Western commanders, senior figures in the Taliban, Afghan civilians and British politicians, Unwinnable is an extraordinary work of scholarship. Its depth of analysis, scope and authority make it the definitive history of Britain’s War in Afghanistan.
576 pages, Hardcover
First published September 7, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
October 2, 2021
This is a very good and accessible history of the British campaign in Afghanistan. After the US invasion, following 9/11, the UK force was assigned Helmand province, in the southeast, near the heartland of the Taliban movement. The initial US military victory had not changed the nature of tribal-militia rule in the provinces, and this led to many scores being settled as warlords tipped off US forces about alleged Taliban men (who were then bombed or hauled off to Guantanamo, often with no proof). This helped foster distrust and raised support for the Taliban, who soon returned to make life very hard for the UK forces in the area, whose bases were under continual attack, as were their patrols – they were often only able to survive because of air power. The cycle of violence was unending and not helped by the US tendency to bomb anything that looked problematic in the early stages of the war, even if that meant killing civilians, and the general issue of heavy weaponry causing massive damage to towns and villages, which did not endear the British forces to the locals. The police were also totally corrupt and the local people not averse to helping the Taliban, if it meant that they could get on with their lives.
Aside from the liberal ideal of developing a feudal society within a decade or so, this reads like an imperial occupation in many respects, so it is not hugely surprising that it was doomed to failure, given the lack of resources and political will, not to mention the Taliban’s fighting prowess (far higher, it is is said, than that of the Iraqi militia forces). Much of the main sections of the book detail many skirmishes and battles, which usually resulted in very high losses for Taliban fighters but did not seem to stop their attacks or dent their will. The Counter-insurgency doctrine of ‘winning hearts and minds’ was somewhat obviated by the huge destructive force used by the Western militaries and by the corrupt practices of the government led by Karzai. In 2009 elections in Helmand, for example, where the Taliban threatened to cut off the fingers of voters (illiterate voters used finger prints), the government claimed a huge turnout despite the evident lack of voters willing to risk being maimed.
From 2009 the new Obama administration focused more on Afghanistan, seeing this as the ‘good war’ of the War On Terror, which was failing badly in Iraq. Obama wanted to up the US troop numbers considerably, against the strong opposition of many generals and, tellingly, VP Biden, who later pulled them out in 2021. Britain also had to increase its troops, despite the demands of the final crash and the reluctance of PM Gordon Brown to spend more on the failing war on terror. Then, Obama announced a draw-down of forces from 2011, effectively giving the Taliban notice that they would win the war if they could wait it out. Despite various COIN strategies, such as people-centric warfare and targeting the Taliban leadership with Special Forces raids, based on intelligence, the Taliban persisted and were always a threat. In one interesting section, the author describes how the Taliban adapted their own strategy to the ISAF forces’ attacks – they went from traditional infantry-style assaults on UK bases to a more IED/sniper based tactic, which were more successful and harder to repel, causing casualties and impeding movement. The Taliban also favoured a more local recruitment strategy, recruiting local fighters over the non-Afghan, non-Pashto speaking ones of the early campaigns, on the basis that the foreign invaders must be repelled, allied to a promise not to disrupt the poppy fields too much. One of the highest causes of Western injuries in the later years of the war was ‘insider’ attacks from Afghan soldiers, inside the bases.
The utter corruption of Karzai’s regime, which, the book notes, was allowed to become a kleptocracy in which all the millions of foreign aid money was sucked upwards into the higher elites, who then squirreled it away into offshore accounts, was one the key reasons for the success of the Taliban as the new faux-democratic state had no real legitimacy. The West also poured huge resources into building up the police and army, but with little success and the police were totally corrupt, and often in league with the militias, druglords and the Taliban, while the army was a shambles, with no discipline or motivation – they were essentially dependent on Western airpower in all engagements. Reading this, it is not a surprise that they ran away when the Taliban returned in 2021. Karzai left in 2014 and was replaced by the ex academic Ghani [who later fled the country in 2021 with, allegedly, $52m in a suitcase], but nothing much changed, except that there were fewer US and UK forces in the country (though drone attacks were frequent under Obama, with the usual risk of collateral damage). In the final chapter, the author notes that the British campaign, although it did some good (such as increasing levels of education), was ‘characterised by political absenteeism and military hubris’ – essentially, this falls on Blair, who broke defence planning assumptions by agreeing to fight on two wars at once, and then just left the military to its own devices, in effect (with little political oversight). There was ‘no British strategy as such’, beyond being seen to be a partner to the US. The amount of aid pumped into the country to build up its state was merely fuel for the corruption that was undermining its very legitimacy – what was needed was some conditionality to the aid, ensuring some reform by the elites, which was not forthcoming from the US in particular. The book ends saying that at some point political accommodation with the Taliban would be necessary for peace.
Aside from the liberal ideal of developing a feudal society within a decade or so, this reads like an imperial occupation in many respects, so it is not hugely surprising that it was doomed to failure, given the lack of resources and political will, not to mention the Taliban’s fighting prowess (far higher, it is is said, than that of the Iraqi militia forces). Much of the main sections of the book detail many skirmishes and battles, which usually resulted in very high losses for Taliban fighters but did not seem to stop their attacks or dent their will. The Counter-insurgency doctrine of ‘winning hearts and minds’ was somewhat obviated by the huge destructive force used by the Western militaries and by the corrupt practices of the government led by Karzai. In 2009 elections in Helmand, for example, where the Taliban threatened to cut off the fingers of voters (illiterate voters used finger prints), the government claimed a huge turnout despite the evident lack of voters willing to risk being maimed.
From 2009 the new Obama administration focused more on Afghanistan, seeing this as the ‘good war’ of the War On Terror, which was failing badly in Iraq. Obama wanted to up the US troop numbers considerably, against the strong opposition of many generals and, tellingly, VP Biden, who later pulled them out in 2021. Britain also had to increase its troops, despite the demands of the final crash and the reluctance of PM Gordon Brown to spend more on the failing war on terror. Then, Obama announced a draw-down of forces from 2011, effectively giving the Taliban notice that they would win the war if they could wait it out. Despite various COIN strategies, such as people-centric warfare and targeting the Taliban leadership with Special Forces raids, based on intelligence, the Taliban persisted and were always a threat. In one interesting section, the author describes how the Taliban adapted their own strategy to the ISAF forces’ attacks – they went from traditional infantry-style assaults on UK bases to a more IED/sniper based tactic, which were more successful and harder to repel, causing casualties and impeding movement. The Taliban also favoured a more local recruitment strategy, recruiting local fighters over the non-Afghan, non-Pashto speaking ones of the early campaigns, on the basis that the foreign invaders must be repelled, allied to a promise not to disrupt the poppy fields too much. One of the highest causes of Western injuries in the later years of the war was ‘insider’ attacks from Afghan soldiers, inside the bases.
The utter corruption of Karzai’s regime, which, the book notes, was allowed to become a kleptocracy in which all the millions of foreign aid money was sucked upwards into the higher elites, who then squirreled it away into offshore accounts, was one the key reasons for the success of the Taliban as the new faux-democratic state had no real legitimacy. The West also poured huge resources into building up the police and army, but with little success and the police were totally corrupt, and often in league with the militias, druglords and the Taliban, while the army was a shambles, with no discipline or motivation – they were essentially dependent on Western airpower in all engagements. Reading this, it is not a surprise that they ran away when the Taliban returned in 2021. Karzai left in 2014 and was replaced by the ex academic Ghani [who later fled the country in 2021 with, allegedly, $52m in a suitcase], but nothing much changed, except that there were fewer US and UK forces in the country (though drone attacks were frequent under Obama, with the usual risk of collateral damage). In the final chapter, the author notes that the British campaign, although it did some good (such as increasing levels of education), was ‘characterised by political absenteeism and military hubris’ – essentially, this falls on Blair, who broke defence planning assumptions by agreeing to fight on two wars at once, and then just left the military to its own devices, in effect (with little political oversight). There was ‘no British strategy as such’, beyond being seen to be a partner to the US. The amount of aid pumped into the country to build up its state was merely fuel for the corruption that was undermining its very legitimacy – what was needed was some conditionality to the aid, ensuring some reform by the elites, which was not forthcoming from the US in particular. The book ends saying that at some point political accommodation with the Taliban would be necessary for peace.
July 27, 2021
A superb account of Britain's role in the War in Afghanistan. An insightful read for anyone looking to understand what went wrong, how things could have been handled better, and why Afghanistan is now once again rapidly falling back into the hands of the Taliban despite billions of US and UK dollars being spent and thousands of lives being lost.
January 1, 2019
Blisteringly honest and sad look at a campaign that went pretty much as could be expected. There's a common fallacy that UK is talented in COIN-operations, given their many years during the Troubles. But there is something inherently wrong when a war like this goes wrong. Maybe US had too much leadership on this and given their inexperience (and failing to learn from the past), they simply couldn't do what was needed. Or maybe UK just committed way too much and took a bigger chunk of the cake than they could eat.
The central mistake lies in the simple things and that is focus - during the many years of britain's involvement in Afghanistan, at no point was there consensus on what the definition of victory is and what it would entail. And that's where the quagmire begins. When everyone has a different idea on what needs to be accomplished so that troops can be pulled out, the vietnam syndrome of "I don't know why we're here" starts to kick in after a few years and tours. The common grunt lacks the knowledge of local culture and the massive aversion towards casualties builds a concrete wall between the soldiers and the locals. Thus the understanding of what is needed on ground level quickly becomes a very vietnam'esque mantra of body counts. When soldiers lose focus and don't know who the enemy is, the escape vent for that is pretty much everyone, which then builds up hostility from the general population. And when it's about hearts and minds, you're quickly on the losing side.
Meanwhile, US is completely unawares that they are dealing with a more or less medieval society and completely miss the point why Afghanistan is typically run by warlords and what Taliban did to keep them in reign. The things that Bremer and many others did during the first few years of the war are on a level that I can't understand how they can sleep at night.
The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are probably the most mismanaged and saddest affairs since Vietnam war and I can't help but think that all those young kids (who I also saw when living in UK), who died in some dirt pit in Helmand, completely forfeited their lives for absolutely no reason. I don't know how their parents can cope with something like this.
Sad, but very well written book.
The central mistake lies in the simple things and that is focus - during the many years of britain's involvement in Afghanistan, at no point was there consensus on what the definition of victory is and what it would entail. And that's where the quagmire begins. When everyone has a different idea on what needs to be accomplished so that troops can be pulled out, the vietnam syndrome of "I don't know why we're here" starts to kick in after a few years and tours. The common grunt lacks the knowledge of local culture and the massive aversion towards casualties builds a concrete wall between the soldiers and the locals. Thus the understanding of what is needed on ground level quickly becomes a very vietnam'esque mantra of body counts. When soldiers lose focus and don't know who the enemy is, the escape vent for that is pretty much everyone, which then builds up hostility from the general population. And when it's about hearts and minds, you're quickly on the losing side.
Meanwhile, US is completely unawares that they are dealing with a more or less medieval society and completely miss the point why Afghanistan is typically run by warlords and what Taliban did to keep them in reign. The things that Bremer and many others did during the first few years of the war are on a level that I can't understand how they can sleep at night.
The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are probably the most mismanaged and saddest affairs since Vietnam war and I can't help but think that all those young kids (who I also saw when living in UK), who died in some dirt pit in Helmand, completely forfeited their lives for absolutely no reason. I don't know how their parents can cope with something like this.
Sad, but very well written book.
September 29, 2021
Massively insightful. Wanted to read this in the wake of everything currently happening in the country.
Read
December 10, 2025readable, detailed, depressing/infuriating
September 17, 2021
Like Mike Martin's An Intimate War: An Oral History of the Helmand Conflict, 1978-2012, this is a book that should have been read by everyone that went to Afghanistan between 2001 and now. Perhaps if the lessons within it had been taken on and fully absorbed by governments, the military personnel and NGOs then we might not have seen the collapse of Afghanistan and the return of rule under the Taliban that has produced shocking images since August 2021.
Theo Farrell is an academic - but an academic with purpose. He conducted a number of studies on Afghanistan for the British military and authorities as well as for the International Strategic Arms Force (ISAF). This book looks at the long picture from 2001 to 2014, the strategies in place (or the lack of them), the build up of troop numbers in the country and the removal of those forces as well as giving insight into the reasons the troops were there in the first place and who and what the Taliban were and are. It is a book which on finishing, you will want to go back and read again to see how the final mess started.
The story begins with 9/11 and the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers. This brought about Bush's 'War on Terror' wherever it may lie, and the determination to hold Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden (OBL) to task. But perhaps the roots lie even further back with the war between Soviet forces and the Afghanmujadideen seen as a war of liberation throughout the world which drew in predominantly Islamic fighters from around the world and saw the US provide aid for these fighters through Pakistan. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan saw the formation of Al Qaeda from those that had fought in Afghanistan. But even that isn't the complete start and Farrell carefully looks at how this group came about with it's belief in the militancy of Islam and it's right to wage jihad against the West and ostensibly against capitalism personified in the US and Britain.What Bin Laden specifically did was to target the US culminating in 9/11. The Taliban shielded OBL in Afghanistan and when Bush's challenge to deliver him was rejected then Afghanistan itself and the Taliban became targets.
The Taliban too came out of the Soviet War but as Mike Martin makes clear they were a much harder group in terms of identity to pin down. What might be a talib fighter one month might be a villager the next. This theme and the (mis)understanding of what the Taliban were runs all the way through the book. Farrell goes out of his way to pin down who and what the Taliban were / are but it is not until the final chapter on the pull out of US, UK and ISAF forces during the period of negotiations based in Doha where he nails it to the post for us. But like everything in Afghanistan .... its complicated!With the statement that the US, UK and ISAF would pull their forces out of Afghanistan by late 2014, all the Taliban had to do was wait, with the military side winning an argument with the political side of the movement.
Several questions arise whilst reading the book. Farrell makes it clear that the huge amount of money poured into the country in aid made a climate where corruption became rife and endemic. The identity with State, was very far from a Helmandi farmer's idea of his country. Local police and Army were corrupt and often under the control of State-appointed officials who themselves had previously been local warlords. Underneath it lies the growth of poppies and the production of opium by which farmers could earn far more than any other crop. This production and distribution was controlled by the very same warlords and landlords appointed by the State and was at odds with a particular British target which was the cessation of the opium trade and the destruction of poppy fields. At no time does it appear to occur to anyone that the US, UK and ISAF should BUY the whole crop. The cost of doing this might have been far less than the billions of dollars poured into campaigns and development.
The main reason why the Taliban could not be defeated was first and foremost because of the support from Pakistan and its security service, the ISI. The Taliban could retreat and recoup over the border in Pakistan and indeed its leadership was at home there in Quetta and Peshawar. They received training, base facilities, supply and a homeland within Pakistan. Major political confrontation with Pakistan DID NOT OCCUR. Fighters could join and train with the Taliban in Pakistan before being sent into Afghanistan as and when needed. Though pressure was put on Pakistan, their aid and support for the Taliban continued right to the end, though the US treated the long border with impunity towards the end in particular with the assassination of OBL in 2011. The reasons for Pakistan's support for the Taliban and lack of following of the lead of the US evenb given the amount of aid that went to Pakistan from the US had to do with even greater global and regional politics , in particular the continuing conflict for power between India and Pakistan.
The depth of this book is phenomenal. Only by reading this can one begin to gain a semblance of an understanding why Afghanistan has fallen to the Taliban in 2021. I look forward to the release of Craig Whitlock's of te Washington Post's the The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War for a deeper insight into the US perspective.
Theo Farrell is an academic - but an academic with purpose. He conducted a number of studies on Afghanistan for the British military and authorities as well as for the International Strategic Arms Force (ISAF). This book looks at the long picture from 2001 to 2014, the strategies in place (or the lack of them), the build up of troop numbers in the country and the removal of those forces as well as giving insight into the reasons the troops were there in the first place and who and what the Taliban were and are. It is a book which on finishing, you will want to go back and read again to see how the final mess started.
The story begins with 9/11 and the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers. This brought about Bush's 'War on Terror' wherever it may lie, and the determination to hold Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden (OBL) to task. But perhaps the roots lie even further back with the war between Soviet forces and the Afghanmujadideen seen as a war of liberation throughout the world which drew in predominantly Islamic fighters from around the world and saw the US provide aid for these fighters through Pakistan. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan saw the formation of Al Qaeda from those that had fought in Afghanistan. But even that isn't the complete start and Farrell carefully looks at how this group came about with it's belief in the militancy of Islam and it's right to wage jihad against the West and ostensibly against capitalism personified in the US and Britain.What Bin Laden specifically did was to target the US culminating in 9/11. The Taliban shielded OBL in Afghanistan and when Bush's challenge to deliver him was rejected then Afghanistan itself and the Taliban became targets.
The Taliban too came out of the Soviet War but as Mike Martin makes clear they were a much harder group in terms of identity to pin down. What might be a talib fighter one month might be a villager the next. This theme and the (mis)understanding of what the Taliban were runs all the way through the book. Farrell goes out of his way to pin down who and what the Taliban were / are but it is not until the final chapter on the pull out of US, UK and ISAF forces during the period of negotiations based in Doha where he nails it to the post for us. But like everything in Afghanistan .... its complicated!With the statement that the US, UK and ISAF would pull their forces out of Afghanistan by late 2014, all the Taliban had to do was wait, with the military side winning an argument with the political side of the movement.
Several questions arise whilst reading the book. Farrell makes it clear that the huge amount of money poured into the country in aid made a climate where corruption became rife and endemic. The identity with State, was very far from a Helmandi farmer's idea of his country. Local police and Army were corrupt and often under the control of State-appointed officials who themselves had previously been local warlords. Underneath it lies the growth of poppies and the production of opium by which farmers could earn far more than any other crop. This production and distribution was controlled by the very same warlords and landlords appointed by the State and was at odds with a particular British target which was the cessation of the opium trade and the destruction of poppy fields. At no time does it appear to occur to anyone that the US, UK and ISAF should BUY the whole crop. The cost of doing this might have been far less than the billions of dollars poured into campaigns and development.
The main reason why the Taliban could not be defeated was first and foremost because of the support from Pakistan and its security service, the ISI. The Taliban could retreat and recoup over the border in Pakistan and indeed its leadership was at home there in Quetta and Peshawar. They received training, base facilities, supply and a homeland within Pakistan. Major political confrontation with Pakistan DID NOT OCCUR. Fighters could join and train with the Taliban in Pakistan before being sent into Afghanistan as and when needed. Though pressure was put on Pakistan, their aid and support for the Taliban continued right to the end, though the US treated the long border with impunity towards the end in particular with the assassination of OBL in 2011. The reasons for Pakistan's support for the Taliban and lack of following of the lead of the US evenb given the amount of aid that went to Pakistan from the US had to do with even greater global and regional politics , in particular the continuing conflict for power between India and Pakistan.
The depth of this book is phenomenal. Only by reading this can one begin to gain a semblance of an understanding why Afghanistan has fallen to the Taliban in 2021. I look forward to the release of Craig Whitlock's of te Washington Post's the The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War for a deeper insight into the US perspective.
June 16, 2020
Well written and researched. If you have any interest in the UK in Afghanistan then you could start here.
March 16, 2023
An incredibly well-researched and profound source of knowledge on the British military engagement in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Farrell on the one hand describes the political and military aspects from a British point of view and analyzes the reasons for the failure to keep the Taliban down and turn the nation-building attempt in Afghanistan into a success. He evaluates a vast number of documents and literature and has led numerous interviews with involved political as well as military players. Even interviews with Taliban commanders took place to also offer an inside view from the opponent's side. The book also considers the events after the end of the ISAF mission until 2016 and provides a very analytical summary of the main factors leading to the bleak perspectives for the future of Afghanistan. While the tragic breakdown of the Western-backed statehood and the Taliban takeover only weeks after the complete withdrawal of NATO forces in 2021 were of course not yet predicted, the author did not paint a very bright picture of the potential outlook and had already foreseen that the future of Afghanistan would in some way include a strong role of the Taliban.
Looking on the downside, I have to mention that it was not an easy or compelling read. The sheer number of facts (names, units, geographical locations, arms types, etc.) stringed together, often undermined my motivation to continue reading, especially in the second third of the book. This is also the reason that it actually took me several years to finalize it. Also, it would have been great to see the described military operations visualized on maps in the respective chapters. There are some general maps of Afghanistan, the Helmand province and some of its districts at the beginning of the book. But I had to jump back and forth from text to maps to be able to getter a better idea of the events.
In summary, a really good analysis of the the failed attempt to bring peace to the people of Afghanistan after the fall of Afghanistan with some flaws as far as readability is concerned.
Looking on the downside, I have to mention that it was not an easy or compelling read. The sheer number of facts (names, units, geographical locations, arms types, etc.) stringed together, often undermined my motivation to continue reading, especially in the second third of the book. This is also the reason that it actually took me several years to finalize it. Also, it would have been great to see the described military operations visualized on maps in the respective chapters. There are some general maps of Afghanistan, the Helmand province and some of its districts at the beginning of the book. But I had to jump back and forth from text to maps to be able to getter a better idea of the events.
In summary, a really good analysis of the the failed attempt to bring peace to the people of Afghanistan after the fall of Afghanistan with some flaws as far as readability is concerned.
May 9, 2025
having served in Afghanistan on multiple deployments 2007/08/10. I saw this book & it immediately got my attention. this is a very different book to most you will find in the conflict, most are mainly first hand accounts of the war and what happened on the ground.
this book will take you on a journey of the higher plannings of high ranking Army officers, and politicians, and why and how the war failed. there is so much I learnt from this book of information that I was not aware of whilst serving in theatres, this proves of the miscommunication from th top down to the bottom.
I served as a searcher searching for IEDs all over Helmad, and this is the best book I have read on the subject so Afghanistan.
this book will take you on a journey of the higher plannings of high ranking Army officers, and politicians, and why and how the war failed. there is so much I learnt from this book of information that I was not aware of whilst serving in theatres, this proves of the miscommunication from th top down to the bottom.
I served as a searcher searching for IEDs all over Helmad, and this is the best book I have read on the subject so Afghanistan.
December 22, 2021
After watching the last British troops leave Afghanistan earlier this year, I realised I was shamefully ignorant of the details of the 20 year conflict. This book has had glowing reviews, and for good reason - the author had incredible levels of access to military records and government documents, and wrote this after exhaustive research and interviews with senior figures from all sides of the various conflicts and battles. It's a hard read as the mistakes, tragedies, futility, and political gameplaying stack up. If you want to learn more about the war, this is what you need.
September 19, 2024
An extremely thorough accout of Britains contribution and the challenges to lasting peace in Afganistan. It is primarily focused on the British military and government dealings with the war but Afghan, Pakistan and American actions/events are discussed in detail where relevant to the context of the conflict.
So thorough it became a bit of a slog for me but it is definitely worth reading.
The book closes with a summary of the situation in 2016, the key event being returning Taliban influence and a struggling Afghan National Army following major ISAF troop withdrawls in 2014.
So thorough it became a bit of a slog for me but it is definitely worth reading.
The book closes with a summary of the situation in 2016, the key event being returning Taliban influence and a struggling Afghan National Army following major ISAF troop withdrawls in 2014.
April 15, 2022
An interesting recount of the War in Afghanistan, but this is only that. A factual retelling of the political aspect of the war, with limited telling of the physical nature of it, and only passing analysis. For the ins and outs of American and British political appetite and support for the war, this is the book, though not exactly a page-turner.
May 6, 2018
A detailed narrative of the conflict that gave me a better understanding of both what we were doing and the wider context. The analysis that is e unwinnable is woven in to the narrative which makes the book light on analysis and makes the author selective on what he includes. Still the most comprehensive summary of the conflict I have read and there is enough to allow a reader to come to their own conclusion.
May 24, 2019
Best book I've read on the conflict. Objective, good referencing, covers the international/strategic context as well as the realities on the ground.
I think it was very balanced.
I think it was very balanced.
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