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War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory
Success in war ultimately depends on the consolidation of political order. Nadia Schadlow argues that the steps needed to consolidate a new political order are not separate from war. They are instead an essential component of war and victory.
The challenge of governance operations did not start with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army's involvement in the political and economic reconstruction of states has been central to all its armed conflicts from large-scale conventional wars to so-called irregular or counterinsurgency wars. Yet, US policymakers and military leaders have failed to institutionalize lessons on how to consolidate combat gains into desired political outcomes. War and the Art of Governance examines fifteen historical cases of US Army military interventions, from the Mexican War through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improving future outcomes will require US policymakers and military leaders to accept that plans, timelines, and resources must be shaped to reflect this reality before they intervene in a conflict, not after things go wrong.
Schadlow provides clear lessons for students and scholars of security studies and military history, as well as for policymakers and the military personnel who will be involved in the next foreign intervention.
The challenge of governance operations did not start with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army's involvement in the political and economic reconstruction of states has been central to all its armed conflicts from large-scale conventional wars to so-called irregular or counterinsurgency wars. Yet, US policymakers and military leaders have failed to institutionalize lessons on how to consolidate combat gains into desired political outcomes. War and the Art of Governance examines fifteen historical cases of US Army military interventions, from the Mexican War through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improving future outcomes will require US policymakers and military leaders to accept that plans, timelines, and resources must be shaped to reflect this reality before they intervene in a conflict, not after things go wrong.
Schadlow provides clear lessons for students and scholars of security studies and military history, as well as for policymakers and the military personnel who will be involved in the next foreign intervention.
320 pages, Paperback
Published March 1, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
June 10, 2017
Here you are decent and life loving people of goodreads, the inside scoop on how the Empire is preparing for all out WAR!
Nadia Schadlow doesn't miss a mark as she thoroughly explains how the oligarch's representatives (THE DEEP STATE) should get their ducks in a row in preparation of mass murder and mayhem for imperial conquest. Worldwide gloom and doom needs to be a well oiled machine, and no part of the WAR apparatus should be overlooked. Public Moral is essential. That means, one way or another, they need a majority of us to support their blood lust and deranged ambitions. False Flags are the usual, tried and true measure for that goal.
If you can accept that the USA is an Empire (the identifiable traits are too numerous and blatant to list; that Empire includes the NATO Alliance in a supportive role), you are going to have to swallow the fact that Empires are not run by We The People. That means whether it is the megalomaniac Trump or the two-bit hustler with a golden tongue, Obama, divisive politics is theater as distraction while the powers-that-be run their business as they see fit without interference from the peasants. Divide and Conquer is their technique for managing the populace.
Certainly there are competing political factions/gangs (Republicans vs. Democrats) battling against each other, but they battle to serve their masters - not the people. Sort of how corporate teams working for the same company compete with each other for more power and influence on rank and file. Politicians and their mainstream/corporate media counterparts give us lip service, soap opera, and petty critique (covfefe, really?).
Who are the Masters? It is a conspiracy of culture, and that culture is that of the 0.00001% - Military/Finance/Energy/Pharmaceutical/Media-Entertainment Industrial Complex owners. In the words of the late great George Carlin: "It's a big club, and you ain't in it."
WAR is on the table folks. The economic world order is in the midst of transitioning away from the petro-dollar to a new and yet to be fully realized financial system that is working out kinks and defaults, all while China and Russia try to squeeze in a seat at the main banquet table. King of the hill tensions are simmering.
Read this book if you want to know what our Masters are attempting to do in our name. It will help you see the signs they are signaling in the run up to international mega killings. Or, if you stand for peace, despise the mass murder of innocent children and women, read this book for a real eye-opener, a reality check - just try not to gag.
(This review is more a clarion call for peace rather than an examination of a book. The book is simply a cold heart systems analysis for a super power prepping for successful war and what that success means in the age of technocracy. More important than the content of the book is the fact that the author just returned from the latest Bilderberg meeting. Bilderberg up until a few years ago only existed in the realm of conspiracy theories. The internet and passionate citizen journalism has blown the lid off of Bilderberg secrecy. Bilderberg has been meeting annually for nearly the last 60 years. It is a collection of the biggest military-corporate-government heads of an international order getting together to discuss and likely plan coordinated actions - all of which is in violation of their national laws and all without public awareness. The author, Nadia Schadlow, was a Bilderberg guest speaker this year. In the past, the topics discussed at Bilderberg came to fruition. The best example is the creation of the Euro and the European Union. The EU is an un-elected governing power of technocrats.)
Nadia Schadlow doesn't miss a mark as she thoroughly explains how the oligarch's representatives (THE DEEP STATE) should get their ducks in a row in preparation of mass murder and mayhem for imperial conquest. Worldwide gloom and doom needs to be a well oiled machine, and no part of the WAR apparatus should be overlooked. Public Moral is essential. That means, one way or another, they need a majority of us to support their blood lust and deranged ambitions. False Flags are the usual, tried and true measure for that goal.
If you can accept that the USA is an Empire (the identifiable traits are too numerous and blatant to list; that Empire includes the NATO Alliance in a supportive role), you are going to have to swallow the fact that Empires are not run by We The People. That means whether it is the megalomaniac Trump or the two-bit hustler with a golden tongue, Obama, divisive politics is theater as distraction while the powers-that-be run their business as they see fit without interference from the peasants. Divide and Conquer is their technique for managing the populace.
Certainly there are competing political factions/gangs (Republicans vs. Democrats) battling against each other, but they battle to serve their masters - not the people. Sort of how corporate teams working for the same company compete with each other for more power and influence on rank and file. Politicians and their mainstream/corporate media counterparts give us lip service, soap opera, and petty critique (covfefe, really?).
Who are the Masters? It is a conspiracy of culture, and that culture is that of the 0.00001% - Military/Finance/Energy/Pharmaceutical/Media-Entertainment Industrial Complex owners. In the words of the late great George Carlin: "It's a big club, and you ain't in it."
WAR is on the table folks. The economic world order is in the midst of transitioning away from the petro-dollar to a new and yet to be fully realized financial system that is working out kinks and defaults, all while China and Russia try to squeeze in a seat at the main banquet table. King of the hill tensions are simmering.
Read this book if you want to know what our Masters are attempting to do in our name. It will help you see the signs they are signaling in the run up to international mega killings. Or, if you stand for peace, despise the mass murder of innocent children and women, read this book for a real eye-opener, a reality check - just try not to gag.
(This review is more a clarion call for peace rather than an examination of a book. The book is simply a cold heart systems analysis for a super power prepping for successful war and what that success means in the age of technocracy. More important than the content of the book is the fact that the author just returned from the latest Bilderberg meeting. Bilderberg up until a few years ago only existed in the realm of conspiracy theories. The internet and passionate citizen journalism has blown the lid off of Bilderberg secrecy. Bilderberg has been meeting annually for nearly the last 60 years. It is a collection of the biggest military-corporate-government heads of an international order getting together to discuss and likely plan coordinated actions - all of which is in violation of their national laws and all without public awareness. The author, Nadia Schadlow, was a Bilderberg guest speaker this year. In the past, the topics discussed at Bilderberg came to fruition. The best example is the creation of the Euro and the European Union. The EU is an un-elected governing power of technocrats.)
October 12, 2020
Good book. Got this one from a military reading list and it was a good recommendation. Lays out the US experience with phase IV operations and gives some recommendations for future endeavors. Recommended for my fellow planners. Should probably be read before the next invasion.
November 26, 2017
An interesting argument that, like most of the literature on this topic, misses the larger (and far more important) strategic questions. The author’s basic premise is that “nation-building” is the answer for our strategic challenges. Schadlow, like many before her, focus on the Army’s organization and tactics and other internal matters rather than the real questions of strategy - namely, should we even be directly involved in an area in the first place? or is it even feasible to transform native societies from the outside?
Comparing post WW II occupations of Germany (a country with a cohesive society and well-established governmental institutions) and Japan (a homogenous society that revered an Emperor who, in essence, ordered his subjects to submit) to current challenges in places that have NEVER been governed effectively by anything other than foreign colonialists or local strongmen/warlords is ridiculous. It’s the same misguided “apples and oranges” technique as John Nagl’s comparison of British operations in Maylayia with the American experience in Vietnam. Even with the example of the American West, it wasn’t a matter of transforming a native society. The US supplanted that society with another using brutal methods that would be intolerable today. Not the same as the endless (and futile) “nation building” endeavors that people like Schadlow would have us undertake over and over again.
This is just more recycled population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine dressed up in new clothes. It is tactics masquerading as strategy. There are many ways to consolidate military objectives into political gains besides organizing, equipping, and training our forces for large scale occupations and administering foreign lands. If you have already bought into this fundamentally flawed idea, Schadlow’s book provides a way to prepare our military for that one prohibitively expensive and generations-long approach. On the other hand, if you are interested in the more fundamental strategic questions, look elsewhere.
Comparing post WW II occupations of Germany (a country with a cohesive society and well-established governmental institutions) and Japan (a homogenous society that revered an Emperor who, in essence, ordered his subjects to submit) to current challenges in places that have NEVER been governed effectively by anything other than foreign colonialists or local strongmen/warlords is ridiculous. It’s the same misguided “apples and oranges” technique as John Nagl’s comparison of British operations in Maylayia with the American experience in Vietnam. Even with the example of the American West, it wasn’t a matter of transforming a native society. The US supplanted that society with another using brutal methods that would be intolerable today. Not the same as the endless (and futile) “nation building” endeavors that people like Schadlow would have us undertake over and over again.
This is just more recycled population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine dressed up in new clothes. It is tactics masquerading as strategy. There are many ways to consolidate military objectives into political gains besides organizing, equipping, and training our forces for large scale occupations and administering foreign lands. If you have already bought into this fundamentally flawed idea, Schadlow’s book provides a way to prepare our military for that one prohibitively expensive and generations-long approach. On the other hand, if you are interested in the more fundamental strategic questions, look elsewhere.
June 18, 2017
I love works like this. They are written crisply, directly with plenty of documentation, footnotes, and other sources. Recommendations are given without an agenda in a professional manner. It was, in short, a delight to read and learn from this work. There is nothing easy or glamorous about the subject matter. Read only if you want to stay victorious.
The author is able to stay laser-focused on only American experiences consolidating combat success. In itself that focus is commendable. I am left thirsty (surely the mark of a good work!) for more knowledge in this field. How did other nations handle this exact problem, especially Britain? The author addresses a uniquely American problem (skittishness of using its military to govern, even abroad) by speaking exclusively of Americans. Ultimately in my opinion that point is the great strength and weakness of this study. I realize that in the real world her recommendations are much more palatable to a still skeptical American military and political community by a fixation on American experiences. I hope her ideas are taken seriously.
The author is able to stay laser-focused on only American experiences consolidating combat success. In itself that focus is commendable. I am left thirsty (surely the mark of a good work!) for more knowledge in this field. How did other nations handle this exact problem, especially Britain? The author addresses a uniquely American problem (skittishness of using its military to govern, even abroad) by speaking exclusively of Americans. Ultimately in my opinion that point is the great strength and weakness of this study. I realize that in the real world her recommendations are much more palatable to a still skeptical American military and political community by a fixation on American experiences. I hope her ideas are taken seriously.
August 25, 2023
Amazone
Some errors on the Panama Expedition
4/10
While I agree with Dr. Nadia Schadlow that the U.S. consolidates combat success poorly, her analysis of the Panama experience (1989) is both philosophically and technically flawed.
She found all of the "source material," much of which I have seen, but she makes two mistakes.
First, she assumed the contemporary authors had no axe to grind and that they themselves correctly interpreted what their sources were telling them. She hides the real downstream flaws produced in this case by a lack of "national policy" on these issues.
Second, there is at least two researcher faux pas between pages 194-219.
As to the first, interpretative researchers years after historical events seek confirmation of their own world view. That's how Columbus can become an economic disaster, George Washington can be dismissed as merely another slave-holder, and Attila the Hun can be the Father of his Country. In today's book market, it sells.
Specifically, with regard to Panama, most contemporary writers were chaffing over the effects of Goldwater-Nichols and the reorganization bringing non-Special Forces Army units, like Civil Affairs, into Special Operations.
She makes little note that the original "plan" was to establish military government in Panama, al a, post-World War II Germany. This was a doctrinal template that would be gone by the end of 1990 and the senior CA leaders in the USAR knew it.. She also failed to show the real effects of needing to drag the U.S. Department of State through every phase of the operation.
The simple fact is, we will fail at these efforts (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan), until we have a true "national policy," not just a DoD policy on matters related to Civil Affairs (and incidentally PSYOP, too). In today's world (I hate that term), service and joint doctrine and DoD policy pronouncements are not enough.
International relations is truly an interagency endeavor. ALL of the functions of government must be fully engaged. That's why it's called 'war'!
As to flawed research, if the establishment of the Military Support Group (MSG) in Panama was instrumental in what happened after Noriega was captured, wouldn't you think that the author would want to know and state who was that "senior civil affairs specialist" (p. 199) who was sent to evaluate and make recommendations on any post-conflict CA organization?
How did that "specialist" come to offer a MSG to his hosts?
Wouldn't you also think that any researcher may want to understand what that "specialist" faced within General Thurman's staff?
Further, even a mediocre writer and certainly a competent editor would see that it was highly unlikely that two officers with a rare surname of "Youmans" would be in Panama during this short period of time.
Who was there, "Harry" (p.199, Fn.178) or "Harold" (p. 200, Fn. 186)?
I was misidentified.
This simple error raised the point: what other errors have crept into the book?
---
War and the Art of Governance is a must read for any senior political or military official trying to understand how to turn military interventions into successful and enduring political outcomes...Quite simply, this is a timely and brilliant book.
David Johnson
RAND Corporation
Some errors on the Panama Expedition
4/10
While I agree with Dr. Nadia Schadlow that the U.S. consolidates combat success poorly, her analysis of the Panama experience (1989) is both philosophically and technically flawed.
She found all of the "source material," much of which I have seen, but she makes two mistakes.
First, she assumed the contemporary authors had no axe to grind and that they themselves correctly interpreted what their sources were telling them. She hides the real downstream flaws produced in this case by a lack of "national policy" on these issues.
Second, there is at least two researcher faux pas between pages 194-219.
As to the first, interpretative researchers years after historical events seek confirmation of their own world view. That's how Columbus can become an economic disaster, George Washington can be dismissed as merely another slave-holder, and Attila the Hun can be the Father of his Country. In today's book market, it sells.
Specifically, with regard to Panama, most contemporary writers were chaffing over the effects of Goldwater-Nichols and the reorganization bringing non-Special Forces Army units, like Civil Affairs, into Special Operations.
She makes little note that the original "plan" was to establish military government in Panama, al a, post-World War II Germany. This was a doctrinal template that would be gone by the end of 1990 and the senior CA leaders in the USAR knew it.. She also failed to show the real effects of needing to drag the U.S. Department of State through every phase of the operation.
The simple fact is, we will fail at these efforts (i.e., Iraq and Afghanistan), until we have a true "national policy," not just a DoD policy on matters related to Civil Affairs (and incidentally PSYOP, too). In today's world (I hate that term), service and joint doctrine and DoD policy pronouncements are not enough.
International relations is truly an interagency endeavor. ALL of the functions of government must be fully engaged. That's why it's called 'war'!
As to flawed research, if the establishment of the Military Support Group (MSG) in Panama was instrumental in what happened after Noriega was captured, wouldn't you think that the author would want to know and state who was that "senior civil affairs specialist" (p. 199) who was sent to evaluate and make recommendations on any post-conflict CA organization?
How did that "specialist" come to offer a MSG to his hosts?
Wouldn't you also think that any researcher may want to understand what that "specialist" faced within General Thurman's staff?
Further, even a mediocre writer and certainly a competent editor would see that it was highly unlikely that two officers with a rare surname of "Youmans" would be in Panama during this short period of time.
Who was there, "Harry" (p.199, Fn.178) or "Harold" (p. 200, Fn. 186)?
I was misidentified.
This simple error raised the point: what other errors have crept into the book?
---
War and the Art of Governance is a must read for any senior political or military official trying to understand how to turn military interventions into successful and enduring political outcomes...Quite simply, this is a timely and brilliant book.
David Johnson
RAND Corporation
December 5, 2017
Illuminating and realistic a must-read unbiased very resourceful in where she got her sources will make you look at war with a more understanding eye, instead of just going off what people around you are saying in which they have no direct or real expierence with. Use this book as a guide to your own conclusion to the big picture and what's best for our countries and how can the top-dogs best pass policy/plans/organization creations (sometimes not creating more organization which just end up being under-manned and under-resourced making it essentially completly ineffective) etc. She also shines a light on using technology on war fare where it seems people have a common misconcepcion that drones strikes (and air-strikes) alone will win wars and make it all easy, which is not the case. But I digress do you self a favor and purchase this book if you wish to learn more about the bigger picture, as I have only very vaugely spoken on important matters in regards to military governance.
July 23, 2020
In my opinion if you wanted to understand the key lessons (which are very important and worth understanding) from this book you could probably just read the final «conclusions» section. The other chapters provide more specific historical context for those lessons and are useful if you want an understanding of how the US addressed the timeless challenges of wartime governance during a particular conflict.
December 21, 2020
I will recommend it to all Mil/ Non Mil professionals, who are dealing with governance task in war torn countries. This book gives insight of how civil-mil must deal with each other to achieve not only victory but also enduring peace.
July 29, 2018
This was a very insightful commentary on an aspect of history that is seldom written about. I found it very helpful for perspective on "nation building" although it did read rather dry.
October 24, 2025
At its core, this book has a straightforward argument: during and after war, the US military (and in particular, its army) has always been asked to take on "governance" tasks that go beyond the stereotypical military role. This includes major political roles (like Reconstruction after the Civil War, or Japanese + German occupation after WW2), but even things like maintaining order in occupied territory or organizing food to prevent famine of the civilian population. Schadlow's core argument is that these tasks have always been necessary but also overlooked -- there is incredible discomfort with the army taking on these roles and so they are almost always unprepared (and do not seem to plan for such roles afterwards).
Overall, I was slightly meh on the book -- I found the core argument interesting, but IMO the historical analysis wasn't really deep enough for me to be thoroughly convinced. It also doesn't really engage with any of the broader philosophical questions around army involvement with governance (e.g. how does this change civil-military relations?), so it felt very incomplete.
It also doesn't really seem to question the ethics of the US army's actions (or broader US imperialism), but I don't think this gap detracted from the core argument.
Overall, I was slightly meh on the book -- I found the core argument interesting, but IMO the historical analysis wasn't really deep enough for me to be thoroughly convinced. It also doesn't really engage with any of the broader philosophical questions around army involvement with governance (e.g. how does this change civil-military relations?), so it felt very incomplete.
It also doesn't really seem to question the ethics of the US army's actions (or broader US imperialism), but I don't think this gap detracted from the core argument.
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