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Self-Determination: The Ethics of Action, Volume 1
Thomas Pink offers a new approach to the problem of free will. Do we have control of how we act, so that we are free to act in more than one way, and does it matter to morality whether we do? Pink argues that what matters to morality is not in fact the freedom to do otherwise, but something more primitive - a basic capacity or power to determine for ourselves what we do. This capacity might or might not take the form of a freedom to act in more than one way, and it might or might not be compatible with causal determinism. What really matters to morality is that it is we who determine what we do. What we do must not simply be a function of powers or capacities for which we are not responsible, or a matter of mere chance. At the heart of moral responsibility is a distinctive form of power that is quite unlike ordinary causation - a power by which we determine outcomes in a way quite differently from the way ordinary causes determine outcomes. Pink examines how this power is
involved in action, and how the nature of action permits the operation of such a power to determine it.
involved in action, and how the nature of action permits the operation of such a power to determine it.
- GenresPhilosophy
320 pages, Hardcover
Published February 1, 2017
16 people want to read
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December 15, 2019
Pink has written a strikingly clear and cogent book about free will. As the title indicates, the book is predicated on an investigation concerning the notion of self-determination. He illustrates this notion by noting that one can fail to live up to some standard of rationality, possessing misguided desires or false beliefs, without being personally responsible for such a failure. In other words, Pink argues that it is one question whether an agent's beliefs, for example, are false, but another question whether she is at fault for holding such beliefs. He thinks that this latter notion of fault depends upon a concept of self-determination where we pin responsibility for such a failure on the agent.
Many of the early chapters of the book are devoted to showing that the Hobbesian / Davidsonian model of agency cannot account for self-determination. Pink calls this voluntariness, where action is understood as caused by or expressing a prior belief and pro-attitude. This model fails to account for self-determination, according to Pink, because pro-attitudes are viewed as passive, the voluntariness model cannot be applied to pro-attitudes, and no account is supplied to explain how pro-attitudes could themselves be actions. The last two points are crucial: Pink is claiming both that intentions must themselves be understood as actions and that they cannot be understood according to the voluntariness model as actions that are expressions of beliefs and pro-attitudes. Why not? First, because this leads to a regress, never explaining how pro-attitudes can be anything other than expressions of passive states. And second because intentions are not formed as a result of a desires to form a given intention but instead intentions are formed because one wishes to perform the action that is the object of the intention. This point is crucial to grasp. Applying the voluntariness model to intention formation as itself a type of action leads to the claim that a specific desires motivate intention formation, desires which must be desires to for actions of type t where t is the the type characterizing the formation of the intention in question. The problem with this is that intentions are not motivated by desires for their formation but rather by desires for the actions to which the intentions are directed. This means that the voluntariness model cannot apply to intention formation understood as a distinct mode of agency.
What is needed is an account of intention formation that can explain how it is a distinct modes of action that serves to explain self-determination, thereby overcoming the voluntariness model, which explains action as the expression of passively acquired pro-attitudes. Along the way Pink rejects, what he calls, rationalism about self-determination. This is the view that freedom as self-determination is essentially a function of practical reason. Pink's target's are Aquinas and John McDowell but Kant also holds a similar view, essentially equating the will with practical reason. Likewise, Hegel defends a similar view in the Philosophy of Right. The core element of this view is the idea that human freedom is a function of the nature of practical reason, specifically the fact that practical reason only presents limited manifestation of the good. Because of this, practical judgements never determine an action, no matter how much they speak in favor of it. Pink has a curious objection to this view, arguing that reason is passive, necessitated by its objects. Because of this passivity, the dependence of a judgement on its object, Pink argues that any active component is at best unnecessary. This amounts to the view that reason is not essentially self-conscious, that in judging that p one need not also and in that very judgment also judge that one know's that p. There is no need to rehearse the problem with this but if one rejects it, then Pink's arguments against rationalism about self-determination have little merit. (I will note below, one other argument that is offered in defense of an alternative view of self-determination.)
Despite these criticisms, Pink gives practical reason a central place in his account. He argues that intentions or decisions (which he treats as interchangeable) involve an intrinsically practical exercise of reason that is inherently goal-directed. A decision to do x is inherently goal-directed, because it is by its very nature directed toward the doing of x. This obviates the need for an appeal to a prior desire as the source of an action's goal-directedness as in the voluntariness model of Hobbes and Davidson.
In conjunction with this account of decision, Pink's account self-determination involves two elements: Contingency of determination and freedom in relation to the power. The first aspect means that the power of self-determination is not determined by external conditions. The second means that the the nature of the power is determined by the agent. Pink (164) says,
"When we determine for ourselves what we do, the exercise by us of the power to determine is not dictated by the very nature of the power; our operation to determine that we do something is not necessitated like that of an ordinary cause. Rather that or how we exercise our power is up to us."
This is an account of self-determination as essentially self-conscious. The nature of self-determination is determined by its actions, which are what the agent thinks that they are. Curiously, Pink has provided an account of the will as essentially self-conscious while denying this quality to practical. Beyond his criticisms of rationalism about self-determination, Pink's primary argument in favor of his own view concerns cases where reason does not provide a compelling reason for either of two options. Imagine one is sitting on a bench in a park and makes a decision to stroll to the left rather than to the right, though for no particular reason. In such a case, it seems as if the will must have some independent role beyond that of practical reason, whereas on the rationalist approach the will is an intellectual appetite that essentially follows the determinations of practical reason. It is far from clear that such a case cannot be accommodated by the rationalist approach - Pink takes this as a given with little additional argumentation - and it is also not so clear that far-reaching conclusions can be drawn from these types of cases. Maybe idiosyncratic factors nudge agents toward one of two equally appealing options without needing to go beyond the more limited role of will in the rationalist approach.
Regardless, Pink has offered an insightful discussion of self-determination that has the rare virtue of combining an erudite grasp of the history of discussions of agency with an equally erudite knowledge of contemporary debates. And beyond this, Pink combines these two perspectives seamlessly, in a way that sheds light on both historical figures and contemporary questions. One can only hope that the second volume will be published soon.
Many of the early chapters of the book are devoted to showing that the Hobbesian / Davidsonian model of agency cannot account for self-determination. Pink calls this voluntariness, where action is understood as caused by or expressing a prior belief and pro-attitude. This model fails to account for self-determination, according to Pink, because pro-attitudes are viewed as passive, the voluntariness model cannot be applied to pro-attitudes, and no account is supplied to explain how pro-attitudes could themselves be actions. The last two points are crucial: Pink is claiming both that intentions must themselves be understood as actions and that they cannot be understood according to the voluntariness model as actions that are expressions of beliefs and pro-attitudes. Why not? First, because this leads to a regress, never explaining how pro-attitudes can be anything other than expressions of passive states. And second because intentions are not formed as a result of a desires to form a given intention but instead intentions are formed because one wishes to perform the action that is the object of the intention. This point is crucial to grasp. Applying the voluntariness model to intention formation as itself a type of action leads to the claim that a specific desires motivate intention formation, desires which must be desires to for actions of type t where t is the the type characterizing the formation of the intention in question. The problem with this is that intentions are not motivated by desires for their formation but rather by desires for the actions to which the intentions are directed. This means that the voluntariness model cannot apply to intention formation understood as a distinct mode of agency.
What is needed is an account of intention formation that can explain how it is a distinct modes of action that serves to explain self-determination, thereby overcoming the voluntariness model, which explains action as the expression of passively acquired pro-attitudes. Along the way Pink rejects, what he calls, rationalism about self-determination. This is the view that freedom as self-determination is essentially a function of practical reason. Pink's target's are Aquinas and John McDowell but Kant also holds a similar view, essentially equating the will with practical reason. Likewise, Hegel defends a similar view in the Philosophy of Right. The core element of this view is the idea that human freedom is a function of the nature of practical reason, specifically the fact that practical reason only presents limited manifestation of the good. Because of this, practical judgements never determine an action, no matter how much they speak in favor of it. Pink has a curious objection to this view, arguing that reason is passive, necessitated by its objects. Because of this passivity, the dependence of a judgement on its object, Pink argues that any active component is at best unnecessary. This amounts to the view that reason is not essentially self-conscious, that in judging that p one need not also and in that very judgment also judge that one know's that p. There is no need to rehearse the problem with this but if one rejects it, then Pink's arguments against rationalism about self-determination have little merit. (I will note below, one other argument that is offered in defense of an alternative view of self-determination.)
Despite these criticisms, Pink gives practical reason a central place in his account. He argues that intentions or decisions (which he treats as interchangeable) involve an intrinsically practical exercise of reason that is inherently goal-directed. A decision to do x is inherently goal-directed, because it is by its very nature directed toward the doing of x. This obviates the need for an appeal to a prior desire as the source of an action's goal-directedness as in the voluntariness model of Hobbes and Davidson.
In conjunction with this account of decision, Pink's account self-determination involves two elements: Contingency of determination and freedom in relation to the power. The first aspect means that the power of self-determination is not determined by external conditions. The second means that the the nature of the power is determined by the agent. Pink (164) says,
"When we determine for ourselves what we do, the exercise by us of the power to determine is not dictated by the very nature of the power; our operation to determine that we do something is not necessitated like that of an ordinary cause. Rather that or how we exercise our power is up to us."
This is an account of self-determination as essentially self-conscious. The nature of self-determination is determined by its actions, which are what the agent thinks that they are. Curiously, Pink has provided an account of the will as essentially self-conscious while denying this quality to practical. Beyond his criticisms of rationalism about self-determination, Pink's primary argument in favor of his own view concerns cases where reason does not provide a compelling reason for either of two options. Imagine one is sitting on a bench in a park and makes a decision to stroll to the left rather than to the right, though for no particular reason. In such a case, it seems as if the will must have some independent role beyond that of practical reason, whereas on the rationalist approach the will is an intellectual appetite that essentially follows the determinations of practical reason. It is far from clear that such a case cannot be accommodated by the rationalist approach - Pink takes this as a given with little additional argumentation - and it is also not so clear that far-reaching conclusions can be drawn from these types of cases. Maybe idiosyncratic factors nudge agents toward one of two equally appealing options without needing to go beyond the more limited role of will in the rationalist approach.
Regardless, Pink has offered an insightful discussion of self-determination that has the rare virtue of combining an erudite grasp of the history of discussions of agency with an equally erudite knowledge of contemporary debates. And beyond this, Pink combines these two perspectives seamlessly, in a way that sheds light on both historical figures and contemporary questions. One can only hope that the second volume will be published soon.
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