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On to Petersburg: Grant and Lee, June 4-15, 1864
On to Petersburg is the final book in Gordon Rhea’s five-volume history of the Overland Campaign, a series of Civil War battles fought between Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee in southeastern Virginia in the spring and summer of 1864. Having previously covered the campaign in; The Battle of the Wilderness May 5–6, 1864; The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7–12, 1864; To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13–25, 1864; and Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26 – June 3, 1864, Rhea concludes his series with a comprehensive account of the last twelve days of the campaign, which concluded with the beginning of the siege of Petersburg. Like the four volumes that preceded it, On to Petersburg represents decades of research and scholarship and will stand as the most authoritative history of the final battles in the campaign.
512 pages, Hardcover
First published August 9, 2017
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170 people want to read
About the author
Gordon C. Rhea
20 books54 followersMr. Rhea is a nationally acclaimed historian. He has lectured extensively on topics of military history at the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, at several National Military Parks, and at historical societies and civil war round tables across the country. He had been a member of numerous boards of directors of historical societies, magazines, and historic preservation organizations, including the Civil War Library and Museum, Philadelphia, and North and South magazine. Mr. Rhea has appeared on History Channel, A&E Channel, and Discovery Channel in programs related to American history and has written scores of articles for various scholarly and popular publications. His books, which are considered authoritative in their fields, include:
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
May 2, 2022
The fifth and final volume in the epic study of the Overland Campaign, this book does not disappoint. The author spent over twenty years working on this series, and deserves some serious credit for chronicling this important campaign. The book flowed very well, with no major errors in the text. If you haven't read this series, make it a summer reading goal. It is totally worth it.
July 28, 2022
Gordon Rhea's belated conclusion to his excellent series about the Overland Campaign in the American Civil War. This fifth and final volume runs from the aftermath of the failed assault at Cold Harbor through Grant's brilliant maneuver across the James River, through the overcautious breakthrough of the Dimmock Line outside Petersburg. Rhea demonstrates what went right about this famous brilliant operation, but also what went wrong. The result was the loss of "a sterling opportunity" and the beginning of the nine-month Siege of Petersburg. A concluding chapter gives an retrospective and final verdict about the entire Overland Campaign.
A few odd things about this volume. Over the course of the events covered, the divisions or corps of Breckenridge, Sheridan, Hampton, and Early all exit stage north or west. Trevilian Station is outside the scope of this book, to say nothing of Lynchburg. Also, the Army of Northern Virginia is essentially sidelined through the latter half of the book as Lee vacillates about where the Army of the Potomac is going. It's all factually correct and understandable in the narrative; it just feels a little strange.
The first four volumes of this series came out in the same of a decade; this last volume took 15 years. Rhea's writing style fits with the rest of the series and his analysis remains insightful and fair. I would have been happy to see the author continue this series through the entire Petersburg Campaign, but A. Wilson Greene is doing a series on that subject so I'm sure Rhea is done here.
If you've read the first four volumes then it's certainly worth reading this one too. Like them, this book is a must-read for American Civil War buffs.
A few odd things about this volume. Over the course of the events covered, the divisions or corps of Breckenridge, Sheridan, Hampton, and Early all exit stage north or west. Trevilian Station is outside the scope of this book, to say nothing of Lynchburg. Also, the Army of Northern Virginia is essentially sidelined through the latter half of the book as Lee vacillates about where the Army of the Potomac is going. It's all factually correct and understandable in the narrative; it just feels a little strange.
The first four volumes of this series came out in the same of a decade; this last volume took 15 years. Rhea's writing style fits with the rest of the series and his analysis remains insightful and fair. I would have been happy to see the author continue this series through the entire Petersburg Campaign, but A. Wilson Greene is doing a series on that subject so I'm sure Rhea is done here.
If you've read the first four volumes then it's certainly worth reading this one too. Like them, this book is a must-read for American Civil War buffs.
December 5, 2020
This is another splendid effort by Gordon Rhea, whose string of histories documents the Union army’s advance toward Richmond in 1864. The accuracy in his detail of the daily operations and the usually spot-on descriptions of the campaign’s participants and events equals the author’s typical, outstanding level.
Each of the major actions (e.g., Gillmore’s and Kautz’s abortive assault on Petersburg June 9th; the Army of the Potomac’s well-organized crossings of the Chickahominy and then the James; and the final, flawed movement on Petersburg) is comprehensively analyzed.
The major criticism stems from Rhea’s continually giving General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant the benefit of the doubt during this period, as well as throughout the Overland Campaign as summarized in the book’s last chapter. This is quite evident in the “flag of truce” episode following the June 3rd assault at Cold Harbor. Here, Rhea allows Grant to escape well-deserved opprobrium, ascribing the delay in rescuing the hundreds of wounded soldiers in between the battle lines to the Union commander’s “misunderstanding” of Lee’s requirements. Actually, Grant said that he had “no objection” to Meade’s offering a cease-fire under a flag of truce (with its implication of Union defeat), but Grant repeatedly refused to do so himself, as protocol demanded. Many of his soldiers died needlessly as a result, before he finally got around to it.
Rhea gets it right, however, in the chapter titled “Grant Loses a Sterling Opportunity” in which he concludes that “[r]esponsibility for the Union failure to capture Petersburg on June 15 began at the top.” This contradicts the standard version provided by many Civil War histories where William F. (Baldy) Smith gets the blame for not following up his initial success in breaching the Confederate fortifications. Yet, Grant put the less-than-militarily-proficient Ben Butler in overall charge of the expedition, and he didn’t alert Smith, who had immediate command of the assaulting troops, until the last minute. Worse, Generals George G. Meade and Winfield S. Hancock weren’t even informed at all, and those two could have assured that there were sufficient troops at the front to have taken Petersburg. The author concludes: “Hindsight leaves little doubt that a joint attack by Hancock and Smith during the afternoon or evening of June 15 would have overrun the Dimmock Line and Petersburg as well, achieving the mission’s objective of severing Lee’s supply line.”
And Rhea also provides information about the Confederate reinforcements arriving in Petersburg that same evening, a fact which many other histories ignore or even contradict. Ulysses Grant’s Personal Memoirs claimed that Hoke’s Confederate division appeared a day later than it actually did: “Up to this time Beauregard … had received no reinforcements, except Hoke’s division from Drury's Bluff, which had arrived on the morning of the 16th.” By doing so, Grant assigned Baldy Smith’s even greater guilt for not continuing his advance into the city that night. At the time these events transpired, however, General Grant felt exactly the opposite. He and his staff had exalted Smith for taking “a line of works there, stronger than anything we have seen this campaign,” and within weeks were trying to push Ben Butler out of command of the Army of the James and to replace him with Smith. For various, unwarranted reasons, the General-in-Chief soon turned against Smith, relieved him of command, and turned him into a scapegoat for Grant’s own failure to capture Petersburg.
The last chapter neatly summarizes the Overland Campaign, describing Lee’s succession of tactical victories, while Grant is credited for ultimately achieving strategic success. A footnote indicates that the Union losses may have been higher than usually calculated, just as the expanded number of Confederate casualties enumerated in Alfred C. Young’s Lee’s Army during the Overland Campaign.
Each of the major actions (e.g., Gillmore’s and Kautz’s abortive assault on Petersburg June 9th; the Army of the Potomac’s well-organized crossings of the Chickahominy and then the James; and the final, flawed movement on Petersburg) is comprehensively analyzed.
The major criticism stems from Rhea’s continually giving General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant the benefit of the doubt during this period, as well as throughout the Overland Campaign as summarized in the book’s last chapter. This is quite evident in the “flag of truce” episode following the June 3rd assault at Cold Harbor. Here, Rhea allows Grant to escape well-deserved opprobrium, ascribing the delay in rescuing the hundreds of wounded soldiers in between the battle lines to the Union commander’s “misunderstanding” of Lee’s requirements. Actually, Grant said that he had “no objection” to Meade’s offering a cease-fire under a flag of truce (with its implication of Union defeat), but Grant repeatedly refused to do so himself, as protocol demanded. Many of his soldiers died needlessly as a result, before he finally got around to it.
Rhea gets it right, however, in the chapter titled “Grant Loses a Sterling Opportunity” in which he concludes that “[r]esponsibility for the Union failure to capture Petersburg on June 15 began at the top.” This contradicts the standard version provided by many Civil War histories where William F. (Baldy) Smith gets the blame for not following up his initial success in breaching the Confederate fortifications. Yet, Grant put the less-than-militarily-proficient Ben Butler in overall charge of the expedition, and he didn’t alert Smith, who had immediate command of the assaulting troops, until the last minute. Worse, Generals George G. Meade and Winfield S. Hancock weren’t even informed at all, and those two could have assured that there were sufficient troops at the front to have taken Petersburg. The author concludes: “Hindsight leaves little doubt that a joint attack by Hancock and Smith during the afternoon or evening of June 15 would have overrun the Dimmock Line and Petersburg as well, achieving the mission’s objective of severing Lee’s supply line.”
And Rhea also provides information about the Confederate reinforcements arriving in Petersburg that same evening, a fact which many other histories ignore or even contradict. Ulysses Grant’s Personal Memoirs claimed that Hoke’s Confederate division appeared a day later than it actually did: “Up to this time Beauregard … had received no reinforcements, except Hoke’s division from Drury's Bluff, which had arrived on the morning of the 16th.” By doing so, Grant assigned Baldy Smith’s even greater guilt for not continuing his advance into the city that night. At the time these events transpired, however, General Grant felt exactly the opposite. He and his staff had exalted Smith for taking “a line of works there, stronger than anything we have seen this campaign,” and within weeks were trying to push Ben Butler out of command of the Army of the James and to replace him with Smith. For various, unwarranted reasons, the General-in-Chief soon turned against Smith, relieved him of command, and turned him into a scapegoat for Grant’s own failure to capture Petersburg.
The last chapter neatly summarizes the Overland Campaign, describing Lee’s succession of tactical victories, while Grant is credited for ultimately achieving strategic success. A footnote indicates that the Union losses may have been higher than usually calculated, just as the expanded number of Confederate casualties enumerated in Alfred C. Young’s Lee’s Army during the Overland Campaign.
October 29, 2017
Really good. I have read several books about the Civil War and its battles and campaigns and causes, but never one quite like this. Disclosure: I have not read any of the preceding books in this Overland Campaign Series of Rhea; this is the first one (and the last in the series.) The book covers the events of 12 days: from the conclusion of the heavy fighting at the Battle of Cold Harbor to just before the beginning of the nine-month siege of Petersburg, focusing in particular on Grant’s brilliantly conceived and executed maneuver of secretly extricating the Army of the Potomac from its Cold Harbor entrenchments just yards away from the Confederate lines, and -- unbeknownst to Lee until almost too late -- moving that massive army and all of its supply wagons southward across the imposing James River to move on Petersburg hoping thereby to cut off Lee’s supplies and force the abandonment of Richmond and hopefully bringing about an imminent end of the war.
I can’t imagine any other book drilling down to this almost hourly detail of these days. That an entire book could be written on a 12-day period in the Civil War when – although there was certainly sharp fighting – there was no major pitched battle involving the two armies as a whole on the scale of previous battles and to make it very interesting and engaging is amazing in itself.
Rhea writes with authority using letters and reports of officers and soldiers of the time as well as accounts of journalists following the action. The maps in the book are excellent, along with the helpful Order of Battle in the Appendix and lengthy notes and bibliography.
The author concludes with an epilogue that sums up his entire Overland Campaign set of books and assesses the degree to which Grant and Lee each succeeded and failed both strategically and tactically. Thumbs-up recommendation.
I can’t imagine any other book drilling down to this almost hourly detail of these days. That an entire book could be written on a 12-day period in the Civil War when – although there was certainly sharp fighting – there was no major pitched battle involving the two armies as a whole on the scale of previous battles and to make it very interesting and engaging is amazing in itself.
Rhea writes with authority using letters and reports of officers and soldiers of the time as well as accounts of journalists following the action. The maps in the book are excellent, along with the helpful Order of Battle in the Appendix and lengthy notes and bibliography.
The author concludes with an epilogue that sums up his entire Overland Campaign set of books and assesses the degree to which Grant and Lee each succeeded and failed both strategically and tactically. Thumbs-up recommendation.
March 30, 2021
Wilderness was good, Spotsylvania very good, North Anna excellent, Cold Harbor beyond excellent and Petersburg is better than all of them. This guy understands Grant and that is the key to understanding this 45 day battle.
February 4, 2022
Gordon Rhea finishes his masterful 5 volume study of the Overland Campaign with this volume, which covers the time from the disastrous attack at Cold Harbor on June 3rd to the Army of the Potomac entrenching outside Petersburg 12 days later. This volume differs from the other volumes, as this timeframe consisted more of movement than battle. Grant’s disengagement from Lee and his movement to the James River is considered one of his finest maneuvers. It’s possible, had the movement on Petersburg occurred more promptly, that the war could have ended in the summer of 1864, instead of months later.
Rhea concludes this volume with an analysis of the campaign. While Grant’s strategic vision of outflanking Lee to combat him on open ground was sound, the results were not up to his expectations, based upon poor tactical planning and execution, both by Grant and his subordinates, and by dogged defensive fighting by Lee. It is notable that, unlike other campaigns, Grant kept Lee reacting to his moves, and Lee was never able to effectively go on the offensive.
Rhea also examines Grant’s reputation as a butcher by examining casualties from this campaign and comparing them to other campaigns. No single day of combat in the Overland Campaign matches the casualties McClellan incurred at Antietam, and no three consecutive days matched the casualties Meade suffered fighting on the defensive at Gettysburg. The Overland Campaign was costly to the Army of the Potomac, with approximately 55,000 casualties, and the Army suffered multiple tactical setbacks. However, unlike previous commanders, Grant kept pushing. By the end of the campaign, Lee’s Army had been reduced by 50%, many of his top commanders were gone, and he had been maneuvered into a siege. Lee had stated that, once he was forced onto the defensive in a siege, it would only be a matter of time. Grant’s maneuvering laid the groundwork for the eventual defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia 10 months after the conclusion of the Overland Campaign and just over a year after Grant took overall command.
If you want to understand the Overland Campaign, read this series. It’s worth the effort.
Rhea concludes this volume with an analysis of the campaign. While Grant’s strategic vision of outflanking Lee to combat him on open ground was sound, the results were not up to his expectations, based upon poor tactical planning and execution, both by Grant and his subordinates, and by dogged defensive fighting by Lee. It is notable that, unlike other campaigns, Grant kept Lee reacting to his moves, and Lee was never able to effectively go on the offensive.
Rhea also examines Grant’s reputation as a butcher by examining casualties from this campaign and comparing them to other campaigns. No single day of combat in the Overland Campaign matches the casualties McClellan incurred at Antietam, and no three consecutive days matched the casualties Meade suffered fighting on the defensive at Gettysburg. The Overland Campaign was costly to the Army of the Potomac, with approximately 55,000 casualties, and the Army suffered multiple tactical setbacks. However, unlike previous commanders, Grant kept pushing. By the end of the campaign, Lee’s Army had been reduced by 50%, many of his top commanders were gone, and he had been maneuvered into a siege. Lee had stated that, once he was forced onto the defensive in a siege, it would only be a matter of time. Grant’s maneuvering laid the groundwork for the eventual defeat of the Army of Northern Virginia 10 months after the conclusion of the Overland Campaign and just over a year after Grant took overall command.
If you want to understand the Overland Campaign, read this series. It’s worth the effort.
August 19, 2020
Over several decades, Gordon Rhea has focused on the Overland Campaign of the American Civil War. "On to Petersburg" is the fifth and final volume in his series covering the events in Virginia from late April through mid-June 1864.
In addition to the official military reports from the time, published by the U.S. government in the massive collection known as "War of the Rebellion," Rhea seems to have read unit histories for nearly every regiment that took part in the spring 1864 campaign in Virginia. As a result, he has been able to untangle events that were very confusing to those who actually participated in them. Truly, I think Rhea understands the Battle of the Wilderness, covered in the first volume of his series, better than anyone before or since, including the soldiers themselves.
"On to Petersburg" covers from the aftermath of the Battle of Cold Harbor up to the Army of the Potomac's surprise movement south to Petersburg. Frankly, the first few chapters of the book are a bit boring, as Rhea details what seemingly every regiment in both armies was up to in the fortifications at Cold Harbor. It really picks up around a third of the way through, when Rhea begins to detail Ulysses S. Grant's thought process that led to the successful disengagement from Cold Harbor and movement towards Petersburg.
The best part of the book, and the reward for reading through Rhea's whole series, is his epilogue. Here he gives an honest assessment of the performance of Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and their respective armies and subordinate officers. He has positive and negative things to say about everyone involved. His arguments are cogent and well-reasoned. Civil War buffs should really read all five volumes, but you will get the essence of the series from reading this 15-page summing-up.
Gordon Rhea is one of the best historians of the eastern theater. Personally I prefer Stephen Sears's style of writing. But if you want to understand the Overland Campaign, and the interaction of Grant and George Meade, you will want to read Gordon Rhea.
In addition to the official military reports from the time, published by the U.S. government in the massive collection known as "War of the Rebellion," Rhea seems to have read unit histories for nearly every regiment that took part in the spring 1864 campaign in Virginia. As a result, he has been able to untangle events that were very confusing to those who actually participated in them. Truly, I think Rhea understands the Battle of the Wilderness, covered in the first volume of his series, better than anyone before or since, including the soldiers themselves.
"On to Petersburg" covers from the aftermath of the Battle of Cold Harbor up to the Army of the Potomac's surprise movement south to Petersburg. Frankly, the first few chapters of the book are a bit boring, as Rhea details what seemingly every regiment in both armies was up to in the fortifications at Cold Harbor. It really picks up around a third of the way through, when Rhea begins to detail Ulysses S. Grant's thought process that led to the successful disengagement from Cold Harbor and movement towards Petersburg.
The best part of the book, and the reward for reading through Rhea's whole series, is his epilogue. Here he gives an honest assessment of the performance of Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, and their respective armies and subordinate officers. He has positive and negative things to say about everyone involved. His arguments are cogent and well-reasoned. Civil War buffs should really read all five volumes, but you will get the essence of the series from reading this 15-page summing-up.
Gordon Rhea is one of the best historians of the eastern theater. Personally I prefer Stephen Sears's style of writing. But if you want to understand the Overland Campaign, and the interaction of Grant and George Meade, you will want to read Gordon Rhea.
January 18, 2021
This is the 5th & final volume of Gordon Rhea's history of the 1864 Overland Campaign. This volume begins shortly after the Battle of Cold Harbor on June 4 and concludes with the initial attacks by Smith's & Hancock's Corps on the Dimmock Line of defenses at Petersburg on June 15. The author does a good job relating the impacts of some of Grant's strategic moves, like attempting to coordinate Hunter's march up the Shenandoah Valley with Sheridan to disrupt several of the railroads and canals supplying Richmond caused Lee to have to divert a significant portion of his infantry and most of his cavalry away from the defenses around Richmond & Petersburg.
Some other things that I liked about this book are the many good maps illustrating the strategic and tactical pictures and his discussion of how the Union cavalry and infantry screened the movement of the Army of the Potomac across the Chickahominy River to the James River from Lee. At the end of the book there's a good discussion of the pros and cons of Grant, Meade, Lee, and other commanders. The Union troops overran much of the Dimmock Line on June 15, but they missed a critical opportunity to capture Petersburg or to sever the rail link between Richmond and Petersburg when the Uni0n forces greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces.
I recommend this book and the other books in Rhea's series for anyone wanting to learn more about the Overland Campaign.
Some other things that I liked about this book are the many good maps illustrating the strategic and tactical pictures and his discussion of how the Union cavalry and infantry screened the movement of the Army of the Potomac across the Chickahominy River to the James River from Lee. At the end of the book there's a good discussion of the pros and cons of Grant, Meade, Lee, and other commanders. The Union troops overran much of the Dimmock Line on June 15, but they missed a critical opportunity to capture Petersburg or to sever the rail link between Richmond and Petersburg when the Uni0n forces greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces.
I recommend this book and the other books in Rhea's series for anyone wanting to learn more about the Overland Campaign.
June 22, 2021
Reading military histories of battles, especially major engagements featuring the maneuverings involving multiple unit actions, can be as frustrating as unraveling a plate of spaghetti noodles into parallel lines. (Just try to decipher color-coded battle history maps.). Rhea masterfully avoids losing his legion of readers in the wilderness.) His classic work, covering Grant’s Spring, 1864, Overland Campaign from Cold Harbor to the gates of Petersburg is masterful. Should one still have confusion/questions at book’s end, Rhea supplies final chapters summing up and an insightful Epilogue. This is not intended as a “cheat” or “spoiler”. To merely jump to the book’s end, denies the perpetrator of excellent character studies, personal memoir segments (general to private to politicians to “contraband” (free slaves), to journalists, etc. There remains controversy up to this day re: who “won” and who “lost” and why. I have to go with Rhea’s even-handed judgement.
July 1, 2021
This book is the fifth book by author Gordon Rhea on the Overland Campaign of 1864 in Virginia during the American Civil War. It does a very good job of showing how General Grant stole a march on the Confederates at Cold Harbor, crossed the James River, and moved towards Petersburg. The writing is clear and makes it very understandable for the reader to see how the events unfolded. In the epilogue, a synopsis of the full Overland Campaign is discussed with assessments of the leaders of each Army from both positive and negative actions. This is a really good book for anyone who wants to know more about this movement to help seal the eventual defeat of the Confederate Army in Virginia and the end of the war.
May 4, 2022
Last in the series that began with The Battle of the Wilderness. This series is the best written and most detailed analyis of the "Overland campaign". My only complaint? Rhea is far too easy on Grant who makes one massive mistake after another. For example, the failure to secure a TIMELY truce to save the wounded and bury the dead, was inexecusably delayed almost entirely to Grant's laxidasical attitude.
Nor does Rhea comment negatively on the akward Command structure of the Army of the Potomac. Grant insisted on being the actual army Commander and making all the important decisions, but left Meade -MOST OF THE TIME- to coordinate and execute Grant's plans. The end result was time wasted getting Grant's concurrance, and confusion caused by Grant bypassing Meade or the Corp Commanders going over Meade's head directly to Grant, or Grant/Meade not keeping the other fully informed. In an age, where everything had be done face-to-face or in writing this was NOT a good system.
Nor does Rhea comment negatively on the akward Command structure of the Army of the Potomac. Grant insisted on being the actual army Commander and making all the important decisions, but left Meade -MOST OF THE TIME- to coordinate and execute Grant's plans. The end result was time wasted getting Grant's concurrance, and confusion caused by Grant bypassing Meade or the Corp Commanders going over Meade's head directly to Grant, or Grant/Meade not keeping the other fully informed. In an age, where everything had be done face-to-face or in writing this was NOT a good system.
November 21, 2017
This is the concluding book in Gordon Rhea's,on Grant's Overland Campaign.
It is as detailed,as the other books in the series,but at times drags a bit.
The maps are outstanding,and easy to read.
As the book went along,it did pick up and made for a good read.
My main objection is the Eastern Campaigns,have always taken more study,than the Civil war in the West.
But if you are a student of the Eastern Campaigns,this is a great book to read.
It is as detailed,as the other books in the series,but at times drags a bit.
The maps are outstanding,and easy to read.
As the book went along,it did pick up and made for a good read.
My main objection is the Eastern Campaigns,have always taken more study,than the Civil war in the West.
But if you are a student of the Eastern Campaigns,this is a great book to read.
January 7, 2022
As always, Rhea has produced another masterpiece in Civil War scholarship. His work on the Overland Campaign is indispensable to any serious student of the Civil War. Well written with excellent analysis.
December 3, 2017
Good if long-awaited end to Rhea's history of the Overland Campaign. Up to his usual standard.
August 20, 2018
8/19/2018
December 17, 2022
Final book in THE best history of The Overland Campaign.
November 15, 2023
A very interesting follow-up to Rhea's book on the Battle of the Wilderness. I enjoyed it and found it informative.
September 29, 2024
Good wrap up at the end of the entire Overland Campaign.
August 24, 2022
Rhea's final volume is a very conflicted book. On the one hand he goes into pretty exhaustive detail about the aftermath of Cold Harbor and the march to the James River. Every skirmish is explored and it can get tedious, if still enlightening. Rhea thinks Grant handled the Cold Harbor truce well. I think it was one of the low points of his career and shows that in war he was more callous than we assume (same is true of Lee by the way). The book ends with the first day of the battle of Petersburg, and it is one of Rhea's best passages. However, he stops there and for now there is no indication he will cover June 16-18. I have never seen a battle narrative end before the more serious fighting begins. In the Overland Campaign series, I think the best were the first two books. I place this one 4th in the series, since I find the Cold Harbor book flawed. I rate this four stars considering what it does right and the exhaustive research and solid arguments.
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews