Metaphysics

by William Hasker, C. Stephen Evans (Editor)

What is ultimately real? What is God like? Do human beings have minds and souls or only brains in bodies? Are humans free agents or are all human acts determined by prior circumstances? Through insightful analysis and careful evaluation, William Hasker helps readers answer these questions and thereby construct a world view to make sense of the universe and the people in it.

Genres: Philosophy, Theology, Metaphysics, Christian, Nonfiction, Religion, Textbooks

121 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1983

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 2 out of 5]

The Contours of Christian Philosophy series is hit ot miss. Wood's contribution on epistemology was a good entry. Hasker's, on the other hand, while not being horrible, can simply be skipped. The reasons for this are that, first, the book was written in 1983. While not wanting to condemn something just because it is old, thus engaging in chronological snobbery, it is just a fact that the field Hasker is writing in has progressed quite a bit since 1983. Still, this wouldn't be so bad if it were not for another hindrance: the book is extremely short. Thus, we are not only treated to dated views, but brief excerpts of dated views. Lastly, many important issues in metaphysics are not addressed in this book. For these reasons I find this book to be insufficient as a good introduction to metaphysics. The up-side of some of these problems is that for the philosopher the book has some historical value for those up on Hasker's position on some philosophical and theological matters (e.g., Open Theism, emergent dualism, and the argument from reason), the book gives us some early and more tentative expressions of the views he later becomes somewhat well known for defending.

The topics hasker discusses are freedom and necessity (free will and determinism, free will and foreknowledge), minds and bodies (dualism, physicalism, emergentism), the world (realism, idealism, and scientific realism), and God and the world (theism, pantheism, and panentheism).

Hasker also doesn't seem to be on his game here. There are a few lapses, while not substantive, that are bothersome. For example, in his chapter on freedom and necessity Hasker says that he will discuss positive arguments for determinism as well as negative arguments against it. Then, after that, Hasker promises us that "libertarianism will receive the same treatment" (37). However, it seems that Hasker all together forgot to discuss arguments against libertarianism. Another example is when he offers us a brief and undeveloped statement of the argument from reason against physicalism and determinism. Hasker tells us that his is going to give an argument "directed at a specific kind of determinism" (47), the kind which says man is "physically determined" (ibid). After he gives the argument he concludes that the alternatives are for the physicalist are to either think that his belief in determinism is not the product of rational arguments, that is, the conclusion that physical determinism is the case is not drawn because of the logical inferences from the premises. If the physicalist does not like this, and why would he (!), then "the other alternative is to abandon determinism" (49). But that doesn't follow. For there is another alternative. The physicalist determinist can abandon his physicalism. Indeed, this is the more likely conclusion anyway since the argument is aimed at beliefs caused only by neurons firing verses beliefs produced by "seeing" that a conclusion follows from premises, and this causing the belief in the conclusion.

Overall, though this book was not terrible, I cannot recommend it as the best placed to go and get an introduction to metaphysics, even a Christian introduction.

[Bailey Marissa · Rating 1 out of 5]

1.4

When I was first reading this, I could tell that this was leaning towards Free Will and felt slightly preachy, but then I listened to another professor from LUO who was a lot worse and then I was like 'This is the best ever.'

I feel like this book looks at the world through philosophy, then the Bible instead of looking at the world through the Bible, then philosophy.

Recommended 12+

Used with Week 3 of LUO: Philosophy and Contemporary Ideas.

[Jeffrey Romine · Rating 5 out of 5]

At just over 120 pages, this is a fast-reading, well-written, presentation on the various views pertaining to metaphysics, and the Christian perspective. I especially like the primary and secondary perceptual properties stemming from Locke and an earlier argument against determinism on the basis that it excludes true rationality. The conclusion? Like cultivating one's doctrinal views, it all demands understanding, surmising, and a fair bit of interpretation to arrive a substantive position.

[Carson Phillips · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good introduction to the subject for someone wanting to dip their toe into metaphysics, especially with a specifically Christain angle. It is always refreshing to read an introductory book that is actually written at the introductory level. For seasoned philosophy readers, it will not add much to your knowledge, but perhaps could help with returning to the basics.

[Ben · Rating 2 out of 5]

While Metaphysics is intended to be an introductory level text, Hasker’s selection of topics appeared rather arbitrary and overly truncated and the discussion of the topics he undertook was often somewhat vacuous. Additionally, at times the text seemed overly biased towards Hasker’s own views—an ideal introductory level text should, I think, provide the reader with a more balanced assessment of the various positions (arguments and counterarguments). This is especially true of those topics about which Christians may and do disagree.

Take, for example, Hasker’s treatment of “Freedom and Necessity” (chapter 2). He gave short shrift to the “compatibilist” position, and provided no meaningful critique of his own “libertarian” views. It is highly questionable, however, whether the concept of Libertarian Free Will—the ability to do otherwise in all relevant choices—is even logically coherent. Buridan’s donkey is referenced in passing, but never meaningfully addressed (the libertarian must show how an agent “breaks the tie” between equally compelling options in a manner that preserves genuine choice—neither determined nor left to mere chance—so as not to collapse moral responsibility into randomness or arbitrary caprice).

Additionally, Hasker appears to draw an overly sharp demarcation between the realms of philosophy and theology. Although Metaphysics is part of the “Contours of Christian Theology” series, at times Hasker seemed somewhat reluctant to allow “theology” to overflow into or inform “philosophy”. Again, take as an example his discussion of “Freedom and Necessity” (chapter 2). Some points for consideration might include:

(1.) If Libertarian Free Will (LFW) is necessary to genuine love and relationship, what are we to make of the fact that—according to the Scriptures—the sovereign and free (Psalm 115:3) God of creation, who is the fountain and source of love itself (1 John 4:8) does not have LFW? He cannot do evil. He is incapable of lying or breaking His promises (Numbers 23:19; Titus 1:2), He is impervious to the lure of evil (James 1:13), and He is unable to act contrary to His perfectly righteous, holy nature (2 Timothy 2:13; 1 Peter 1:16). If God is free, despite lacking libertarian freedom, why would we assume that His creatures, created in His image (Genesis 1:27), would require LFW inorder to attain genuine “freedom”? John Calvin succinctly encapsulates this issue in Institutes of the Christian Religion (2.3.5) when he writes:

Suppose someone asks them: Is not God of necessity good? Is not the devil of necessity evil? What will they reply? God’s goodness is so connected with his divinity that it is no more necessary for him to be God than for him to be good. But the devil by his fall was so cut off from participation in good that he can do nothing but evil. But suppose some blasphemer sneers that God deserves little praise for His own goodness, constrained as He is to preserve it. Will this not be a ready answer to him: not from violent impulsion, but from His boundless goodness comes God’s inability to do evil? Therefore, if the fact that he must do good does not hinder God’s free will in doing good; if the devil, who can do only evil, yet sins with his will—who shall say that man therefore sins less willingly because he is subject to the necessity of sinning?

(2.) The Scriptures aver that one-day God will remake the world, such that suffering, evil and sin are no more. The saints in this new heaven and earth will be incapable of sin (LFW) and yet will still be capable of love (freedom). Hence St. Augustine, in A Treatise on Rebuke and Grace (32), observed:

For what shall be more free than free will, when it shall not be able to serve sin?

(3.) Libertarian freedom is primarily conceptualized as the ability to sin or not to sin, to accept God or to reject Him. However, the Scriptures never depict “freedom” in this manner. The Scriptures never present sin as genuine freedom but rather as bondage; only when every trace of sin is removed will we truly be free (Romans 8:21). Our freedom is measured by our capacity to live according to God’s design—namely, to worship and serve Him. Hence, the greater our ability to choose evil, the less freedom we possess (Romans 6:17-18; John 8:34). Only upon entering the new heaven and earth—when the possibility of sin is finally eliminated—will we experience perfect (true) and lasting freedom. In the new heaven and earth the saints will be incapable of rejecting God. Yet they will certainly be more free then than they are now. How is it, then, that the ability to sin could possibly be a valid biblical conceptualization of freedom?

(4.) LFW holds that if God grants us genuine freedom, He must relinquish control over how we use it. Yet the Scriptures repeatedly indicate that God can sovereignly guide our decisions without undermining our freedom or moral responsibility (Genesis 50:20). Take the crucifixion of Jesus (Acts 2:23; 4:27-28): it was predestined, and yet those who carried it out acted freely—and are held accountable—for their choices. In the Scriptures divine providence and human freedom appear to coexist (e.g., cf. Jonah 1:15 with 2:3). Throughout Scripture, God grants his creatures real choice and yet orchestrates events to fulfill His purposes. Thomas Aquinas rightly observed in Summa Theologiae (I.83.1) that:

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

(5.) Finally, the question remains, is LFW truly as “valuable” as its adherents advocate? Timothy Keller poses an interesting question in Walking with God Through Pain and Suffering (Part 1, Chapter 4):

There is a final question about the premises underlying the free will theodicy. It assumes that despite the horrendous evils of history, merely having freedom of choice is worth it. But is it? What if you saw a child walking into the path of an oncoming car? Would you say: “I can’t violate her freedom of choice! She will have to take the consequences.”? Of course not. You would not consider her freedom of choice more important than saving her life. You would violate her freedom of will as fast as you could possibly do it. You would snatch her out of the path of the car and teach her how to keep that from happening again. Why couldn’t God have done that with us? Assume that the Fall of humankind happened the way the Bible says. Why couldn’t God have shown Adam and Eve a lurid, detailed full-length movie of all that would happen to them and to their descendants if they ate of the tree? Surely he could have scared them and convinced them to avoid eating the forbidden fruit.

[Joseph Bradley · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a very basic, solid introduction to SOME issues in Metaphysics. It is intended to be brief, and for what it is, it is written well! But I wish it was longer for a couple of reasons: (1) To include more topics (he doesn’t get into time, causation, identity, etc.) (2) To go deeper into topics (the chapter on minds and bodies was getting really good, then it ended) (3) To compile it all into a more consistent argument for why distinctly Christian philosophy is worth pursuing.

The other books in this series did a much better job at these areas, but I like Hasker and this is still beneficial for someone just dipping their toe into the subject from a Christian perspective!

[Jenn West · Rating 2 out of 5]

Thought the book, even for a brief introduction, was rather poor in quality. The explanations of the topics chosen to be discussed seemed to oversimplify arguments and theories and then subsequently provide flimsy defenses of those against which the author was clearly not inclined to. Learned a few helpful distinctions, making the book not entirely without merit.

[Chandler Collins · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hasker: a truly Christian metaphysic must speak about God, Creation, and man in the image of God.

All in all, I thought this was a pretty great introduction to metaphysics. The book is a little dated now, but I bought it for 80¢ so I am not going to complain at all. The author also draws a very sharp distinction between philosophy and theology that I think is unhelpful for the task of each discipline. Yet, Hasker does conclude with an epilogue on the possibility of a Christian metaphysic.

The standout of the book was the chapter on the mind-body problem and Hasker’s explanations of dualism, materialism, and emergentism. From his discussion, I found emergentism to be the most compelling approach to the mind-body issue, but I need to do further research on this matter. I also appreciated his discussion of scientific realism and instrumentalism. There are certain sections where he can only dip his toe in certain metaphysical questions or problems, but this can spur the reader on to further research in this field of philosophical study. Overall, I appreciated Hasker’s clear writing and humble spirit when it comes to the possibility of being right or certain in philosophical and scientific inquiry.

[Brett Surbey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hasker does a brilliant job of examining the discipline of Metaphysics with an introductory lens. His writing is lucid, his examples are well placed, and his thinking is sharp. He covers many of the most important Metaphysical questions such as: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" "Do we have free will, and what is it?" and "What are the bounds of science?"

As this book is part of a Christian series, Hasker tackles these questions from a Christian perspective and looks at other "in house" topics such as divine sovereignty and human freedom.

Overall, Hasker does a very good job presenting the reader with not only information, but tools to judge a worldview by, so that one can have a well-reasoned view of the world around them. Ome critique I do have of the book is his odd lack of objections to the theories which seem to be his own, which he presents in the book. Most of the theories in each section have a very level-headed weighing of the evidence except for one from each topic, which he suggests as the better theory of the bunch. It would be better to have a more critical approach to his own theories, as I'm sure he does in other writings.

[Joel Wentz · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a surprisingly-clear introduction to several core concepts within the broad category of "metaphysics." The writing is very accessible, and though Hasker's personal leanings are clear, he gives pretty careful discussion to multiple views in each chapter. The book is from the early 80s, and the dating is clear in a few of the chapters (for example, the short discussion of "emergentism," which doesn't seem to be a contender in the mind-body conversations today). Nevertheless, this is an easy recommendation as an intro text to philosophical issues. The chapters on "freedom and determinism" and the "mind-body relationship" are the better sections of the book, in my opinion. Worth reading for its synthesis of different ideas, but not an essential philosophical text.

[Aaron Green · Rating 1 out of 5]

This rating is based solely on the requirement to read this selection not on the writing itself. In other words, William Hasker wrote a book on what he knows, and it is clear he knows and understands metaphysics. This would be a good book for an entry level class for undergraduate students first encountering the idea of worldview. The issue I take with it is that it was assigned reading for a Master's level course in which I feel students should already have a general (beginner) grasp of to begin with; therefore this book offered nothing 'new' to understand.

[L Gregory Lott · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a good basic and solid introduction to metaphysics. Whilst it is not a long book, it does give one an overview of metaphysical concepts. It can help to whet one's appetite for delving into metaphysics further.

[Josiah Watson · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am impressed with Hasker's ability to introduce the topic of Metaphysics in just 120 pages. Just for that reason, this book deserves 4 stars, although you might want to go somewhere else for a deeper dive. But as a starting point, this is great and has a good further reading section.

[J.J. Richardson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting book, though I find philosophy fascinating so I am biased. If you don't find philosophy interesting, you probably won't like it.

[☠︎︎༒︎✞︎ ѕℓιм ☠︎︎༒︎✞︎ · Rating 3 out of 5]

I thought this book, gave some type of interesting information. I had to read this book for my philosophy class.

[Julie Winkler · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent study!

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brief yet helpful introduction to metaphysics culminating in the consideration of the possibility of a Christian metaphysic and what that must entail.

[Michael Vincent · Rating 3 out of 5]

A bit dry, but some helpful discussions about how to think of mankind, the world, and God.

[Braden Sullenger · Rating 2 out of 5]

Written in 1935 so keep that in mind with the ideals he uses compared to the times.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 3 out of 5]

This review will only cover certain sections of Hasker's work.

He defines freedom as “Freedom of choice” or “freedom of the will” (30).

He defines determinism as “For every event which happens, there are previous events and circumstances which are its sufficient conditions or causes, so that, given those conditions it is impossible that the event not occur” (32).

Libertarianism: “some human actions are chosen and performed by the agent without their being any sufficient condition or cause of the action prior to the action itself” (32).

compatibilism: “there is no logical inconsistency between free will and determinism” (33).

Objection: must the compatibilist accept this definition? Indeed, given Hasker’s (otherwise decent) definition of freedom for a compatibilist (the agent could have acted otherwise if he had wanted to) it’s hard to see why the compatibilist must accept the hard determinist view of freedom. Hasker’s following example is a good critique of determinism, not compatibilism since he sees “Max” as guilty because of a chain of causes and he never once introduces the idea of psychological causes which he previously admitted.

He says, however, that is an illusion because on the compatibilist gloss it could not have been otherwise. But that’s not the argument. The argument is that if it were otherwise (subjunctive mood) Max could have done other than x. I do not see the argument meaning that there had to be two equally viable existence-options. This is the distinction older Reformed scholastics called between the necessity of the consequence (a necessity arising from the contingent act) and the necessity of the consequent thing (necessity).

I understand Hasker will balk at that distinction. Fair enough, but given his earlier criteria (logical consistency (p. 26) he must allow the distinction as a viable option.

Speculative criticisms of free will: Hasker asserts that libertarianism is not “Pure chance” (44). Okay. I still ask, “is man’s decision to act floating in a realm of contingency?” I have not seen Hasker offer anything like God’s Providence to challenge this question. I can only assume the answer is yes.


Cons and Pros

Cons:

Uneasy relationship between philosophy and theology. I agree with Hasker that we shouldn’t dismiss philosophy ala Karl Barth. It’s not clear, though, whom Hasker would allow to adjudicate competing claims. He wants philosophy to be “Free” (23) from theology. This unwittingly justified Van Til’s (and even Schaeffer’s, yikes!) charges of autonomy.

His opening chapter seemed to endorse a form of classical foundationalism. I say “seemed” because he hinted at something like it but didn’t develop it (a recurring problem in this book).

If he is a foundationalist, and his project rests upon foundationalist’s assumptions, and if foundationalism is proved wanting, does his project necessarily fall as well? Maybe.

While he gives a lucid discussion of libertarian free will, it’s hard to see how God’s providence factors in. In fact, he seems to rule it out: “he [the determinist] regards his efforts, choices, and actions as inevitable parts of the necessary and unalterable order of things” (38). If I then add the verse, “Declaring the end from the beginning” (Is. 46:10), it’s hard to see how Hasker can give that verse anything but poetic exaggeration. He does deal with predestination, but dismisses it (and divine foreknowledge) outright (51).

Hasker at this point in his career (1983) does not accept open theism, but he is pretty close (He denies that God knows future contingencies, p.53. Hasker holds that, but offers another argument: Divine Timelessness. God doesn’t know my future actions because there is no future for God. This is hard for the reader of Paul to accept, “chosen before the foundation of the world”).
The book is outdated beyond repair. The bibliography has few works past 1979. I don’t want to be a chronological snob, but it’s hard to do philosophy of religion without interacting with Plantinga or the a-theologians (Dawkins, Dennett).

Pros

While his brevity is fatal to his work in some areas, it does make it relatively easy to read. In this sense the book is a good intro to the subject--but only that. The book is decently written and accessible, something few--if any--books on metaphysics can say.
I found his take on emergentism as a solution to the mind-body problem interesting. I think there are difficulties, and I suspect that communicative categories are superior, but I won’t dismiss it outright.

He gives a number of interesting criticisms of pan(en)theism and process theology that I hadn’t thought of (if we are part of God and we get saved, is God saving himself? If not everyone is saved, then is part of God damned?)

Should you get the book? Sure, Why not? It is cheap, well-written, and accessible. However, it is woefully inadequate.

[Yohanes Saputra · Rating 3 out of 5]

I like the entry of Epistemology in the series The Contours in Christian Philosophy than the entry of Metaphysics. I think Hasker can develop this book more in depth.

And while there is just a palm of topics he addressed,---and very few of it---his treatment of that topic is sometimes biased like in his chapter Freedom and Necessity, which Hasker strongly argue more libertarianism than determinism. That's biased and not good for introducing people to metaphysics.

And lapses too, that's what Hasker is suffering.

[Carol]

Hasker is able to explain Metaphysics in way that is clear and understandable to the philosophy novice. It can be read in one sitting. It's a very basic introduction, so if you're looking for something a little meatier, this isn't it.

[Chris Bloom · Rating 3 out of 5]

For an assigned text, this was alright. Hasker acknowledges that a 130-page book on metaphysics can't help but be superficial, but as a basic introduction it does the job.

[Alexander · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good little textbook occasionally marred (as all philosophy textbooks are) by the author's prejudices.

[Chris Kalbach · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good introduction to metaphysics, but very very light.

[Brenda · Rating 3 out of 5]

Only upon pain of death will I ever discuss Metaphysics again!!!!!!!!!!!!
Probably a good author though, I passed this section.
:P

[Jeffrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good intro into Metaphysics.