When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War

by Jeffrey A. Engel

Based on unprecedented access to previously classified documents and dozens of interviews with key policymakers, here is the untold story of how George H. W. Bush faced a critical turning point of history—the end of the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War was the greatest shock to international affairs since World War II. In that perilous moment, Saddam Hussein chose to invade Kuwait, China cracked down on its own pro-democracy protesters, and regimes throughout Eastern Europe teetered between democratic change and new authoritarians. Not since FDR in 1945 had a U.S. president faced such opportunities and challenges.

As the presidential historian Jeffrey Engel reveals in this page-turning history, behind closed doors from the Oval Office to the Kremlin, George H. W. Bush rose to the occasion brilliantly. Distrusted by such key allies as Margaret Thatcher and dismissed as too cautious by the press, Bush had the experience and the wisdom to use personal, one-on-one diplomacy with world leaders. Bush knew when it was essential to rally a coalition to push Iraq out of Kuwait. He managed to help unify Germany while strengthening NATO.

Based on unprecedented access to previously classified documents and interviews with all of the principals, When the World Seemed New is a riveting, fly-on-the-wall account of a president with his hand on the tiller, guiding the nation through a pivotal time and setting the stage for the twenty-first century.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, American History, Presidents, Biography, Politics, Us Presidents

608 pages, Hardcover

First published November 7, 2017

Reviews

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and fascinating history of George HW Bush’s foreign policy during his term as president.

I was a kid during this time period and though I thought I knew the history pretty well, there was so much I had no idea about - especially the 1991 coup attempt on Gorbachev.

This is the story of Tiananmen Square, the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, the invasion of Panama, the first Gulf War, and the fall of communism in Russia. But all of that is, in reality, the story of Bush and Gorbachev. I didn’t realize just how much everything that happened in Bush’s term all connected so directly to the Cold War, especially the US-led rescue of Kuwait. Engel makes a solid and very interesting case that the Gulf War was really just the last battle of the Cold War.

Engel also makes the case - without actually coming out and saying it - that Bush was a great foreign policy president who made all the right moves in one of the most dangerous times in our nation’s history, and that what look like miracles - the clean US victory in the Cold War, the smooth reunification of Germany, the salvation of NATO, etc - weren’t accidents, but the results of excellent presidential leadership.

Notes:
- Engel shows you how Putin and bin Laden each got started on their paths in history from the events covered here.
- When the Berlin Wall fell the USSR was still in pretty good shape. But things fell away from them so quickly. At their lowest point Gorbachev was literally begging Bush for help, and even asking about joining NATO.
- Swan Lake being broadcast on Russian television was apparently the understood sign that a coup was happening during the Cold War years. Lots of interesting facts like that throughout the book.
- The book starts with Bush as Vice President, and it was interesting to see the stark differences he had with Reagan when it came to Soviet Union policy.

Engel is a great writer and he had access to lots of newly released documents, but most importantly access to President Bush himself who sat for several interviews and seems to have been very forthcoming. Engel admires Bush, but is very fair and even-handed throughout the book. Below is a link to a great interview the author did with C-SPAN that gets into some behind-the-scenes of how the book was made.

www.c-span.org/video/?450829-1/qa-jef...

[Chris Tharrington · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you're looking for a riveting read of how President George HW Bush handled the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, stop what you're doing and pick up this book. Mr. Engel has written a fantastic book on how Bush approached an unprecedented event in world history: the end of an empire and an ideology in Europe. I lived through this time period, and this book added a great deal of detail to events that I experienced as they happened. For instance, I didn't know that China's crackdown in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989 made it virtually impossible for East Germany to use the same methods on its citizens as they clamored for freedom. Bush had warned Gorbachev that any use of force from the Soviet Union against restive Warsaw Pact members would mean the immediate cancellation of American and World Bank monetary credits, which Gorbachev desperately needed to keep his country afloat. The recalling of the August 1991 abortive coup against Gorbachev is recalled in page turning detail. I also learned that the reunification of Germany was a touch and go matter, with France and the United Kingdom being the most vehement opponents. I also liked how Mr. Engel provided a min biography of George HW Bush, which helped shed light on how he approached his presidency and the end of the Cold War. He wasn't the soaring speech maker that Ronald Reagan was, but that didn't mean that he wasn't a champion of freedom and democracy. Bush was very careful not to gloat as European communism came to an end, and he was also very careful to ensure that the end of the Soviet Union did not lead to anarchy and chaos. For that he deserves the thanks of a grateful nation and world.

[Julian Douglass · Rating 5 out of 5]

A rich and engaging account of the end of the Cold War and the leadership of H. W. to see it to its peaceful conclusion. Mr. Engel did his research and gave us a wonderful step-by-step account of Bush Sr handling of the international crisis that popped up during his solo term as president. I think it was his lack of bombasticity that led to the smooth transition of a more liberal world order than one where societies still competed against each other. It is a sad reminder that we once had leaders and people with a vision for world peace and prosperity, rather than the current crop we have today. Let's hope that we can one day find the path that many of these leaders did.

[Michael Samerdyke · Rating 5 out of 5]

It took a long time to read this book, in part because the contrast between George H. W. Bush and the current President is so painful.

"When the World Seemed New" is superb. It not only covers the many diplomatic crises that unfolded between 1989 and 1991, but it also looks at the intellectual baggage people had in those days with "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" and "The End of History." Engel shows the importance of the Tiananmen Square incident in influencing subsequent events.

Engel is also aware that the world has changed since 1991. He points out that almost as soon as the Berlin Wall fell, there were stirrings of isolationism/unilateralism in the American public and media, things that would eventually lead to Donald Trump. A book written before 2016 would probably have ignored those developments.

In short, this was a thorough and thoughtful look at one of the most important, and, paradoxically, one of the most taken-for-granted, eras in American diplomacy.

[Henry Atkinson · Rating 4 out of 5]

George H.W. Bush is rightly credited for his role in stage managing the end of the Cold War, securing German reunification, saving the US-China relationship, and building an international coalition to push Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Jeffrey Engel does a good job of bringing this era to light, showing how President Bush worked with Secretary Baker, NSA Scowcroft, Secretary Cheney, Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, and the rest of his administration. We see Bush’s diplomacy with world leaders and how the momentous events of the time and a thyroid condition sometimes weighed on President Bush. Yet for a man who said he wasn’t gifted with “the vision thing,” Bush’s prudence and judgment delivered a victory for human freedom and a role for the US in the post-Cold War world. The only major flaw in Engel’s study is his occasionally critical marks about Bush’s predecessor Ronald Reagan, minimizing the key role Reagan played in making many of these events possible. Still, this is a great read and crucial to understanding the end of the Cold War and the geopolitical issues we deal with today. Rating: 4.25/5

[Bill Lucey · Rating 5 out of 5]

Drawing heavily on declassified documents from the George Bush Presidential Library and the National Security Archives, Jeffrey. A. Engel, (founding director of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University) does a masterful job of chronicling the end of the Cold War between Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union and the United States with Bush as its able custodian in “When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War.”

As Engel fluidly unravels the fall of the Berlin Wall, I was struck how the deft statesmanship and hard diplomacy of George Bush convinced both Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher that a unified Germany (and its inclusion into NATO) wouldn’t mean a return to their wicked past and smashing of stability that existed in Western Europe over the last 45 years.

As Engel documents, Bush’s foreign policy certainly had its flaws, such as being too slow to embrace the dissenters during the Tiananmen Square protests. The U.S. administration also botched the assassination of Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian politician and military leader.

Domestically, his inability to manage the economy (think “Read My Lips-No New Taxes”) ultimately restricted him to a one-term president.

But coming into office following a wildly popular Republican president (The Great Communicator) who didn’t quite have the same eloquence as Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush does deserve mountains of credit for ushering in the “New World Order” and ending of the Cold War under his highly skilled stewardship.

--Bill Lucey
WPLucey@gmail.com
July 2, 2018

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

From reading this, I get the sense that Bush knew he was risking being a one-term president by focusing almost exclusively on foreign policy during his term, but he was at peace with this reality, and he really didn't have a choice, anyway. The world we knew in the 20th century began to come apart in '89, right after Bush took office. Fortunately, diplomacy was where his experience and interests were the strongest, and he ended up being the perfect president for the particular time he served.

The years 1989-1991 are often overlooked, possibly because Bush lacked the natural charisma of the presidents that bookended him, but wow, the world was in such a state of change, and Bush's patience was quite helpful. The problem was that he was less of a natural at domestic affairs, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, his popularity sank, largely due to a short but brutal recession that he was not successful navigating politically.

This is a solid history of the events that led to the end of the Cold War. Not the final say, as there are books written about all of these events individually, but a very well-written historical overview.

[John Plowright · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive/But to be young was very heaven!” wrote William Wordsworth in response to the outbreak of the French Revolution, and those in the West who lived through the presidency of George H. W. Bush from 1989 to 1993, were likely to have echoed that sentiment given the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of democracy in its former Iron Curtain satellites. For a brief moment everything seemed possible, including the creation of a new and better world order.

Jeffrey A. Engel’s ‘When the World Seemed New’ reviews this heady period. It is subtitled ‘George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War’ but actually reviews Bush’s overall record on the world stage, which also includes the US interventions in Panama and Somalia; the First Gulf War; and negotiations for NAFTA and the expansion of NATO, although Engel regards Bush’s keeping lines of communication open with China despite the horrors of Tiananmen Square as “his single greatest diplomatic achievement”.

Engel has already published on several of these subjects and this book is based upon declassified documents and private interviews with key American players in addition to consulting the research of others in the public domain. Moreover, Engel has the ability to express his thoughts clearly and to express his argument with gusto.

That argument, in essence, is that Bush is “underappreciated” as a world statesman and that he was, in fact, a “grand strategist”, who not only had a plan but translated it into reality.

Now it is obviously perfectly possible to make out this case if, like Engel, you admit that others (most notably Gorbachev) may have had as great, or even a greater, impact upon events; if you characterise Bush’s vision in relatively modest terms; if you admit that Bush was fallible; and if you are flexible regarding the application of time-scales in which to assess his achievements.

There is, however, a paradox in Engel’s approach. It is central to his defence of Bush that he exercised self-restraint and cautioned others to do likewise. Thus in “ignoring cries from critics demanding more public exultation at all the apparent victories of their democratic era, Bush tempered the hopes and fears of his age with caution”. Indeed, one of the two quotations which Engel places between the Contents and the Introduction, is the following from Bush (being interviewed by foreign journalists on 21 November 1989):

“And so, I come back to the word of prudent - managing of what we do and what we say - and resist flamboyant actions. Things are moving our way. … Democracy? Freedom? They are moving our way. And so, we don't need to be out there trying to micromanage the desire for change.”

That is to say, it is central to Engel’s revisionist appreciation of Bush that a large part of his success consisted of benign inactivity and specifically in counselling no crowing over America’s “winning” of the Cold War and the spreading of “its” democratic values, yet in making the case for Bush Engel cannot always resist the temptation to express patriotic pride. Thus one sentence (ignoring the British Empire) postulates that “If one ranks the American empire as the world’s most powerful, rivalled only by imperial Rome in its heyday, then for a brief moment … George H. W. Bush was the most powerful man in human history.” More tellingly still, Engel at one point refers to the Soviet Union having “surrendered”. In other words, he indulges in the kind of language which he praises Bush for condemning.

On a more mundane level Engel’s book is also open to criticism. Take, for example, his account of Bush’s role in relation to the First Gulf War. He defends Bush from the charge that he should have gone on to Baghdad and overthrown Saddam Hussein by pointing out that this would have exceeded the UN mandate, would have broken up the coalition, and that the US had no plans for occupation and reconstruction. These are all perfectly valid points. However, Engel also claims that Bush believed that, “Democracy would come to the Middle East in time … believing its residents as subject to the stream of history as any other”: a claim that ignores the fact that Washington encouraged the Kurds in the north and the ‘marsh Arabs’ in the south to rise up against Saddam but then offered them no practical assistance.

As Richard A. Clarke writes in ‘Against All Enemies’:

“What I cannot understand is how anyone can defend the Bush administration’s decision to stand by and let the Republican Guard mass-murder the Shi’a and the Kurds. We had it within our power to resume the bombing of the Republican Guard and regime targets. Our Arab coalition partners and the world in general would have had to respect an American decision to renew hostilities for the limited purpose of stopping the slaughter. If we had bombed the Republican Guard and defended the Shi’a and Kurds, the Bush calculus that Saddam Hussein would fall without our occupying Baghdad might have proved true. Since we did not, a moral outrage was committed and Saddam Hussein stayed in power, and the US had to keep forces in Saudi Arabia to defend against a renewed strike on Kuwait by a reconstituted Republican Guard.”

In short, Engel puts up a spirited defence of Bush which makes interesting reading but ultimately his attempted enhancement of Bush’s reputation on the world stage is achieved by dodging some difficult questions. In bigging up Bush, Engel is thus sometimes guilty of beating around the bush.

[Dawn Wells · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mr Engel has written a very informative and interesting book about President HW Bush, it tells of the many highlights during his presidency and all the good things that happened during that period. It is in short a book written about him being under appreciated.

[Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991, I hardly paid attention. I was 16 years old and probably more interested in arguing with my friends about sports than discussing global events. But it wasn’t entirely lost on me that something of enormous historical importance had occurred.

The nation Reagan called an “evil empire” had rapidly (and mostly bloodlessly) vanished just a couple years after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Soviet Communism’s 70-year reign over hundreds of millions of people collapsed – a collapse not expected just months before. Suddenly the Cold War, the defining event of the second half of the 20th century, was over. What the hell happened?

To live through momentous events does not mean one understands them. Indeed, the passing of decades is necessary to develop some perspective and, for the work of the historian, to be able to access previously unavailable documents. The fall of Communism opened Eastern European and Russian archives to Western eyes, and the passage of time has made possible the declassification of U.S. national security documents and other records from the Reagan/Bush era.

It seems to me that Americans do not fully understand the end of the Cold War. Or maybe we get the story half right. Communism’s collapse was brought about by decades of internal rot in its political and economic systems, as well as imperial overreach (see: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979). Millions of people took to the streets in Eastern Europe demanding change. And the reforms launched by Gorbachev, instead of improving the socialism to which he dedicated his life, accelerated its demise.

That’s the part of the story we might have right. Where we may go wrong is to take the credit for it. There is the simplistic, sophomoric “Reagan won the Cold War” by goading the Soviets into an arms race it could not afford. Or, Communism’s death is proof of Western capitalism/society’s triumph and correctness. Maybe a better answer lies in understanding the presidency that coincided with these momentous years of 1989 to 1992.

Enter Jeffrey A. Engel, the author or editor of ten books on American foreign policy. His latest work, When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War, is an enlightening and important addition to Cold War studies. He wants us to reconsider Bush’s presidency, and his analysis seems to come at the right time, given the past two decades of U.S. unilateralism, “nation building,” and wars of aggression.

“He guided the world through dangerous moments, whose peaceful outcome in hindsight continues to obscure their difficulty. The Cold War need not have ended so well,” Engel concludes (p. 484). Bush’s best “statesman-like virtue” was his Hippocratic diplomacy toward Eastern Europe and the USSR (not, for instance, Panama), his prudent approach to the whirlwind events happening inside other countries whose people, Bush understood, defended their sovereignty just as passionately at the U.S. defended its own.

“We cannot know for certain what a triumphalist, a more hawkish, or a more virulently nationalist president would have meant for global security in 1989 and immediately after,” Engel writes. “He was neither creative nor innovative, neither a radical nor a revolutionary, but was instead content to follow ‘what worked.’” (p.484)

What worked was democracy, and throughout the text Engel cites passages from Bush’s diary to show that the president believed democracy would ultimately prevail, that things would continue to go our way as long as he didn’t interfere too much. Thus, he knew when to apply the pressure and when to back off.

Bush believed in multilateralism, but also grasped when he had leverage over Gorbachev. He knew he could not dictate events, but could strongly influence them, i.e. the re-unification of Germany with Soviet acquiescence.

For this “prudent” approach (prudent is the word Bush himself seemed to use most often to describe his foreign policy toward the USSR and Eastern Bloc) Bush was vehemently criticized by both Democrats and Republicans who said he was being too cautious, even wimpy.

For example, Bush refused to triumphantly dance atop the crumbling Berlin Wall because he feared fueling chaos in an already volatile situation and further complicating matters for Gorbachev, who remained the priority. His “public inaction gave further ammunition to his congressional opponents” (p. 268).

Gorbachev, too, grew impatient with Bush’s early refusal to engage during the U.S. policy “pause” in 1989. But, in Engel’s telling, the new president was right not to rush into things. This was not Reagan’s third term. He made clear he would approach matters on his own terms.

Through Bush’s diary we see a man who did not question the fundamentals of U.S. power – including the notion that the Europeans would always need and desire our protection. So although Bush was no innovator, in Engel’s view, he did seek to establish something new when the opportunity arose: a “new world order.”

I have heard this term for the past 20 years and never really understood it until picking up this book.

“Bush and those around him believed they represented the right side of history; they also feared both that the end of American influence might well be at hand even as democracy triumphed, and that democracy’s inevitable victory could still be forestalled, perhaps dangerously so, by unexpected events.” (p. 75).

And here is the key sentence: “Freed of its need for American protection, democratic Europe might turn elsewhere.”

In other words, the Warsaw Pact, Iron Curtain, and USSR may be sliding into the dustbin of history, but the U.S. was not about to leave – no way. Still, who was the enemy that justified NATO? For a time, Bush argued the enemy was the unknown – whatever unpredictable and destabilizing events that awaited us as the pages of history continued to churn.

But then on August 2, 1990, the definition of enemy moved from the abstract to the concrete: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait.

The most remarkable revelation here is that the initial response by Bush’s national security advisors was “disjointed, unclear, and largely devoid of any high-minded principle of salvation or defense of the Kuwait regime.” They “openly discussed whether it really mattered, from a purely strategic standpoint, if an Iraqi or a Kuwaiti flag was printed on the side of an exported barrel [of oil].” (p. 385).

Iraq had “every reason to continue pumping [oil] once the dust from the invasion settled.” Did it really matter who controlled Kuwait?

“The fundamental U.S. interest in the security of the Persian Gulf is oil,” wrote Paul Wolfowitz in 1990, later one of the architects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Indeed, Engel argues the record of this first NSC meeting remain classified for so long (until 2013) because many of its participants played key roles in formulating the war policy of George W. Bush a generation later. “Revelation of their candid views back in 1990 would undoubtedly have complicated contemporary relations,” (p.385).

Amazing, isn’t? Cheney, Wolfowitz, et al, doubted, at least at first, the wisdom of U.S. intervention in the Middle East as Iraq rampaged over Kuwait. Saudi Arabia had not even asked for American protection, and as Cheney put it, “The rest of the world badly needs oil. They have little interest in poor Kuwait.”

So, what happened? Engel contends a larger strategic consideration prevailed, one that included an opportunity for further strengthening U.S.-Soviet ties by convincing Gorbachev to support the eventual U.S. effort to evict Iraq from Kuwait.

“Times had changed. Where once Soviet and American strategists had threatened war to keep each other from unilaterally acting in the gulf, in response to Saddam’s invasion the two superpowers ‘must send a signal that together we have entered a new era,’ [James] Baker told Shevardnadze.” (p. 388).

Eventually, the U.S. grasped that an opportunity to shape the post-Cold War security structure had fallen into their lap. The drug of empire is, of course, control.

“Given time to collect their thoughts, Bush’s White House team, and other powerful elements of his administration, slowly began to recalculate the full consequences of inaction,” (p. 391).

As one top official put it, a terrible precedent would be set if Saddam were allowed to get away with his aggression, one that “would only accelerate violent centrifugal tendencies in this emerging ‘post-Cold War’ era… That also raises the issue of U.S. reliability in a most serious way.”

This is where we encounter one of the most disturbing aspects of Bush’s thinking: his equating Saddam Hussein with Adolph Hitler. He so frequently wrote it in his diary and spoke it publicly that one must conclude Bush truly believed it. The overwrought comparison (especially since Saddam owed his survival in the Iraq-Iran war to the Reagan administration) betrayed an underlying insecurity in Bush’s mind as he undertook an effort to rally global opinion, money, and military hardware toward a multilateral effort to push Saddam out of Kuwait.

Hussein was a cruel bastard, but he commanded a weak economy and hollowed-out army. The specter of Hitler was needed because the internal dynamics of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute were not nearly enough to convince the rest of the world to get behind forging of a “new world order.”

We cannot know what would have happened had the U.S. stayed out of the Middle East in 1991. In the event, Bush reasonably believed the world he left his successors, by virtue of the international coalition he built to attack Iraq, generally approved of American leadership, with a relevant United Nations.

As a historian wary of counterfactual events, Engel does not entertain such what-ifs. Nor is his book a hagiography of either Bush or Gorbachev, the latter whose political dexterity as well as flaws are described throughout this fascinating work of narrative history.

Bush succeeded in helping bring about a peaceful dismantling of Communism, and he left office with the United States in possession of the most powerful military and largest economy not only in 1993, but in all of history. But “peace never materialized… It did not even prevail in Europe during Bush’s presidency.” (p. 475).

Still, a less prudent president than George H. W. Bush could have created catastrophe in 1989. That would happen under his son in 2003. And although the first Bush is not to blame for the second Iraq War, the permanent U.S. military presence in the Middle East established after the first Iraq War – along with an attitude that the U.S. must take an active role in policing that region, as it did with sanctions and no-fly zones since the early 1990s – helped make the second conflict possible.

What was reckless in 1991 – going all the way to Baghdad – appeared necessary in 2003. The difference was 9/11. The terrorist attacks convinced our leaders that it wasn’t enough to let “democracy” takes it course. It had to be exported now, via smart bomb, cruise missile, and 130,000 American soldiers.

[Rick Zinn · Rating 5 out of 5]

I found this book on Hoopla when I had heard President George H.W. Bush had passed away. The book is a highly looked at an important time in World History. The Book thoroughly researched from both the US and Russia side. You will relive Tiananmen Square, the day the Berlin Wall came down, The Velvet Revolution, Arms control negations, The Malta Summit, the August Coup and so much more. The book is history coming alive in vivid detail. If you are a fan of recent history, this book is for you.

[Shane · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic. Portrayal of the first President Bush is a needed antidote to the chaos of the present. A politician who, although not above going negative during a campaign, was a class act. Perhaps the last gentleman to work in the Oval Office. Engel's treatment of Desert Storm is perhaps a bit too rushed at the end of the book.

[Jim Gallen · Rating 5 out of 5]

I have read many presidential books and “When The World Seemed New” is one of the best. Its subject is the unique set of challenges and opportunities that confronted George H W. Bush during his presidency. Bush is portrayed as a man in his element, sure of his view of the world and his place in it, prudent, diligent, with a vision of where he wanted to take the United States who guided the U.S. through step by step process to lead it there. Contrary to common perception, Bush and his team entered the White House intending to modify and not merely extend the Reagan foreign policy. Though part of his administration, Bush viewed Reagan as being too cooperative with the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and was determined to toughen the American stand.

President Bush is often remembered for Desert Storm and as the Liberator of Kuwait. Readers of this tome are quickly reminded that this was only the best remembered of many crises with which Bush had to deal during his leading role in the great world drama. As Bush took the helm as Gorbachev was winning the world public relations battle as the forward-looking agent of perestroika. While freedom tested its limits in Eastern Europe, students in Beijing organized protests against the government. The suppression in Tiananmen Square raised congressional calls for sanctions that Bush had to balance against the need to keep the door open for Chinese engagement in the world community. As change took hold in Eastern Europe Bush had to walk the tightrope of offering encouragement to the reformers and giving Gorbachev enough to enable him to keep the right wing out of power but withholding enough to maximize the odds of freedom prevailing. As the Evil Empire receded the victorious allies of World War II had to wrestle with the problem of German unification and its place in or out of NATO. The resolution of that issue was followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its replacement by many republics, including the Russia of Boris Yeltsin. Almost tangentially related to the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Saddam Hussein took the opportunity to invade Kuwait. Outraged by the naked aggression that shock his sensibilities, Bush wove together an international coalition and broad support, or at least acquiescence, for Desert Storm.

I remember the incidents chronicled in this work and have read other books about President Bush but no where have I seen the depth of analysis and character study as in this one. Author Jeffrey A. Engel portrays Bush as a gentleman of the American aristocracy who devoted the time to establishing the personal relationships with leaders that, while not ensuring success, made negotiations easier. Personal demeanor notwithstanding, the velvet glove covered an iron hand that deftly took advantage of American superiority to achieve the goals of the advancement of democracy and freedom accompanied by the maintenance of American power.

These pages introduced me to new insights into the issues of 1989-1993. I remember talk of whether the two Germanies would be re-united but did not appreciate the depth of fear among European states that a unified Germany would resume the practices that led to two world wars. I certainly had not understood Bush’s resolve that America needed to remain a major player in European affairs, with troops on the ground, to keep the Europeans from squabbling as they had in the past. By the end of this book I understood more than ever how necessary the administration of George H. W. Bush was for its time.

“When the World Seemed New” is a fascinating read and a must for anyone with in interest in the end of the Cold War.

[Richard de Villiers · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read plenty of books on foreign policy and history and because of that I have certain expectations. I may learn plenty, I will probably enjoy reading it but I am probably going to have to fight my way to the last page. I only grabbed this book from the pile by my bedside because of the passing of President Bush and having been reminded of its existence when I saw the author on TV. I had pretty low expectations given that I had never heard of the author before this book came out and having read Meacham's wonderful bio of the 41st president. It was almost immediately apparent to me that I had a riveting page turner in my hands. Engel has a great story to tell and he tells it with great aplomb. He gives a positive yet very fair handed assessment of the Bush's foreign policy but delves deep into the story giving us a 360 perspective - he doesn't just stick to the principal.
Things get off to a rocky start - not for Engel but for Bush and his team. While much is made of Bush's team being the ideal for how an administration should set and execute foreign policy - things didn't go so smooth in the beginning. Bush and his team found what James Mann called the Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, the rapprochement with Soviets in general and Gorbachev in particular, misguided and naive. James Baker cleaned house at the State Department in a self-described "hostile takeover." Bush, Scowcroft and Baker didn't trust Gorby and his overtures. The result was a dithering White House that frustrated allies and the Cold War adversary that was eager for talks.
Things were going poorly enough with the Soviets but then Bush also had to contend with the Chinese. Bush was his own cou

[Matthew Henken · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well-written history of an eventful period in recent world history.

The book's thesis is that we were lucky to have Bush the elder at the helm during the period of his presidency, because he was a man of restraint, prudence, and caution. I think that this is right, as far as it goes, but I think it may give Bush too much credit and the American public not enough. Engel writes as if it was Bush's insight that "things are going our way" so we should let them develop rather than try to control them. But it appears from the evidence of his presidency that Bush would have been a hang-back-and-let-things-develop president under any circumstances, so it was really just his good fortune to be president during a time when "riding the stream of history" (Engel's phrase) led to good results, rather than disaster. (It was also the insight of the American electorate that recognized that things were going our way and chose a conservator rather than an innovator after eight years of a crusading president who had given the international system a mighty shove.)

That is the one note on which I would offer as a corrective to Engel. He is obviously a big fan of Bush 41 but it would have been welcome to see him recognize that Bush's caution and desire to follow rather than lead events might have resulted in a failed presidency in a more hostile world or one requiring more leadership from an American president.

[Vic Lauterbach · Rating 4 out of 5]

This study of geopolitics during the period of roughly 1989-1993 is often interesting, but never quite settles on one theme or subject to thoroughly explore. It's part biography of George H.W. Bush, part history of his administration and part study of American foreign policy during the period of glasnost/perestroika through the collapse of the Soviet Union. While it's enjoyable and informative, some sections seem like diversions, such as the extensive one on the ill-fated, Chinese democracy movement and the aftermath of Tiananmin Square. If there is a theme to this book, it's the power of fear - the fear of the unknown. Change, even potentially beneficial change, is always worrisome to political leaders. It's now easy to critique those who optimistically predicted that the end of the Cold War heralded the 'end of history.' It's far more difficult to avoid 'reading history backwards' and applying our knowledge of what actually happened to our criticism of leaders who had to act without knowing the future. The past is always obvious, the future often terrifying. This book was a gift, not one I picked out to read, but I recommend it to those who want to increase their general knowledge of the period. If you desire a deep understanding of any single facet of this period, you need to look elsewhere.

[Clayton Turner · Rating 4 out of 5]

"The world that emerged from the ashes of the Cold War was indeed new. It was not perfect. But neither was it designed to be, at least according to its principal architect. As Bush baldly stated, the goal -- his goal -- was simply to improve upon the past. A world "freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace... a 100 generations have searched for the elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor." Humanity's ills would not be solved within a single generation's lifetime, but civilization could, step by step, continue its path toward a better world. His close friend and national security adviser summed up the administration's diplomatic ethos by offering that "the world could be a better place... but don't get carried away." In perilous times, that is no small vision. Would that other American leaders in Bush's wake had followed his lead, going with rather than against the stream of history, content to ride its current rather than speed recklessly at a faster clip, accomplishing more by changing course less."~ Jeff Engel, When the World Seemed New: George H.W. Bush and the end of the Cold War

[Andrew Sternisha · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a well written narrative history of the foreign policy of George H.W. Bush. Engel offers solid analysis of the complex events in the world during regarding the “fall” of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. He portrays Bush as both indecisive at times, but as a skilled statesman at other times, concluding that Bush was an effective head of state during such a turbulent time.

My criticism of the book is its focus on grand politics, often excluding the normal citizens who actually were the catalyst for the changes.

Overall, this book is an excellent traditional work of history that loses some effectiveness through its top-down, great white man lens.

[Gretchen Hohmeyer · Rating 4 out of 5]

I did not expect to be super into this book, but I'm watching this 24 part documentary on the Cold War on YouTube at the same time and found that this book gave an incredible amount of better detail and clarification on many of the events brushed over in that series. My enjoyment of this book is thus colored by that connected experience, but I think it would still got to the point where I was preferring to listen to this book over the documentary series because of its better detail and, at times, even more interesting description of events. I didn't necessarily plan this cross-pollination, but it made the experience of both way deeper.

[Robert Sparrenberger · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book. A look back at the end
Of the Cold War with insightful analysis along the way. Reading back on these years it’s amazing someone didn’t blow the world up with all that was going on. It seems so
Obvious that Germany would reunite but when the wall
Came down there was no guarantee this would happen. George HW bush did an admirable job navigating these events. He probably doesn’t get the credit he deserves but this book sure points out his personal diplomacy.

Highly recommend this one.

[Mary · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great history of the elder Bush's administration. Fantastically researched and extremely readable, Engel gives an outstanding assessment of the administration's foreign policy---which should have been a model for all of his successors. It covers an important period in 20th century history---from Tiananmen Square to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

My only quibble (and it's minor) would be with the endnotes which are not done with numbers in the text but reference to key phrases on the page. That makes it a little bit harder to track, but it's not an insurmountable difficulty.

[Jim Gulley · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is the story of George H. W. Bush’s presidency, his partnership with Mikhail Gorbachev, and the surprisingly peaceful end to the Cold War. Engel argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Bush was an excellent strategist as defined by having a plan and executing it. His diplomacy put together international coalitions, assuaged rivals, and ushered in the “new world order” of international sanctions backed by American power to address global crises. Engel agreed with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that the Cold War ended when the Soviets supported the Gulf War.

[Jacob Harrison · Rating 5 out of 5]

When the World Seemed New gives insights into the steady hand and leadership of President George Bush, and how he was able to end the Cold War with relative peace. The book details the downfall of communism and the rise of democracy, and explains how the key players in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China made decisions responding to it. Very interesting read, and gives President Bush the credit he deserves.

[Ietrio · Rating 1 out of 5]

A failed novelist naming his sock puppets after real life people and than making his own show. I'm sure it's "based on a true story". But given that many of his puppets are inspired after people still alive, even spirit channeling won't help to tell you how X was looking forward to go to a farm somewhere or how Y was troubled by the idea of whatever.

[Michael Buttner · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perestroika

Tiananmen

Berlin Wall

Autumn of Nations

Panama

German Unification

Gulf War

1991 Russian Coup

This book has it all. It shows that HW was an imperfect but incredibly thoughtful and effective statesman, who oversaw an administration that aptly handled the perils of the end of the Cold War. Objective, super interesting, and well written.

[Sandi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good book to read just now after his death. I have had in interest in history and this book added much to it .He was steady with the world leaders. I love the cover for it may just be my father in it my dad was on that sub that picked him up thanks for that.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found this book fascinating. It illuminated his Presidency even though I lived through it, I learned much more about what really happened. It made me think much higher of this President then I felt at the time.

[Luigib · Rating 5 out of 5]

41 was a totally underrated president. Great read!!!

[Njpb · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very solid bio. Academically informed but readable

[Jeff Lacy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent historiography and commentary

Extremely well written, and a very clear and insightful commentary on the end of the Cold War. President George H. W. Bush, along with his masterful advisors, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Bob Gates, and others negotiated the circumstances of German reunification and NATO’s unification as the Soviet Union dissolved. Bush deserves the accolades and appreciation from this book. It is a great story and I encourage readers to read this book concerning American foreign relations.

See also: Mary Elise Sarotte’s, NOT ONE INCH.