A Common Faith is a series of three lectures by John Dewey in which he seeks to emancipate what he calls “the religious” from particular religions and articulate a “common faith” for democratic society rooted in naturalism and oriented toward the realization of social ideals. While brief and unsystematic, A Common Faith offers both a robust critique of “supernatural religion” and an inventive defense of the religious attitude and its attendant ideals. While Dewey is no friend of traditional religions, he is equally critical of “militant atheism” and hopes to preserve the best of the religious outlook in democratic society.
In the first lecture, Dewey takes pains to make a distinction between religion and “the religious.” A religion (he rejects the notion that one can speak of religion as a substantive idea with content applicable to all religions) posits a particular body of beliefs and practices coupled with some kind of institutional apparatus, while the religious “denotes attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal” (9). More specifically, the religious is a quality of experience, where experience refers to a way one lives in the world, that entails an adjustment in life to the universe, or reality as a whole, which implicates the whole self. Such an adjustment, Dewey maintains, unifies the self in relation to an ideal beyond the self that constitutes who one is and what one values and orients how one acts in the world. While an existential adjustment of this sort is voluntary in the sense that it is not imposed by some external force, it does not depend upon a particular resolve or volition; as an attitude toward life in all its aspects, the religious orients the will without a concomitant self-conscious alteration in the will.
Importantly, Dewey understands the religious in connection with nature, where nature includes not only what actually exists, but also all the possibilities inherent in existence as well. He therefore refers to the religious in connection with “natural piety,” which rests “upon a just sense of nature as the whole of which we are parts,” yet also appreciates that we are parts endowed with intellect and purpose and hence the capacity to actualize the possibilities within nature in accordance with desirable human ideals (23-24). The kind of faith tied to the religious has, then, “a moral and practical import,” and has little to do with assent to a body of propositions on the credit of their supernatural author. Rather, moral faith of this sort posits ideals that should be actualized, not ones which already exist in some transcendent metaphysical realm, and affirms the capacity of cooperative human activity to attain them. Ultimately, Dewey hopes to liberate the idea of the religious and religious values from particular religions, which he thinks merely burden the religious with doctrinal accretions that sap it of its dynamism and vitality. In fact, he claims that religions often inhibit the religious as a quality of experience in individuals’ lives, and that “many persons are so repelled from what exists as a religion by its intellectual and moral implications, that they are not even aware of attitudes in themselves that if they came to fruition would be . . . religious” (9).
In the second lecture, Dewey offers a conception of God in view of his idea of the religious. He observes that there are two ways to define “God”: first, as a particular, transcendent entity, and second, as the unity of ideal ends that inspire in us desire and action (39). Dewey is sympathetic to the second definition and critical of the first for several reasons. For starters, Dewey notes that the idea of God as a transcendent entity entails that God is supernatural and hence outside of nature, and scientific inquiry offers us no reason to affirm the reality of a supernatural realm. When God is identified with the supernatural, and scientific discoveries call into question beliefs connected with the supernatural, God, too, comes into question, and no amount of testimonial “evidence” from mystical experience can verify the existence of God understood in this transcendent way. Beyond this, Dewey worries that when we project human ideals onto God as divine attributes, this lends itself to a certain complacency with respect to the realization of those ideals; God, the believer insists, will take care of us in the end. Rather than identify the ideal with a particular entity outside of nature, Dewey proposes that we use the name “God” to refer to the “active relation between ideal and actual,” or put differently, to those “natural forces and conditions that promote . . . the ideal and that further its realization” (47).
Just because Dewey identifies the divine with ideal ends does not mean that the ideal is “wholly without roots in existence and without support from existence” (44). His conception of God, in other words, does not recapitulate the error involved in the identification of the ideal with a supernatural entity over and above nature. This is because, for Dewey, “the ideal itself has its roots in natural conditions”; it becomes salient when the imagination “idealizes existence,” or discloses possibilities available in view of what is actual (ibid.). We do not need some transcendent metaphysical standard to know what is good and hence the ends we should pursue; the value of social justice as an ideal worth our time and effort is not rooted in the supernatural fact that God is just, for example. Rather, “there are values, goods, actually realized upon a natural basis . . . and out of them we frame our ideal ends” (44-5). These ends, moreover, are no less divorced from empirical reality than the goods on which they are based: “aims, ideals, do not simply exist in ‘mind,’” Dewey explains. “They exist in character, in personality and action” (45). All of this is to say that, for Dewey, the idea of God conveys the union of the ideal and the actual, and the moral faith associated with the religious attitude has this kind of God as its object. Were God to be understood in this way and not as a transcendent entity outside of nature, the naturalistic foundations of the religious would be laid bare, and “religion would then be found to have its natural place in every aspect of human experience that is concerned with estimate of possibilities, with emotional stir by possibilities as yet unrealized, and with all action in behalf of their realization” (53).
In the final lecture, Dewey turns to examine the relationship between the religious attitude properly conceived and human social life. He first notes a radical shift that has taken place in Western Europe since the Renaissance and Reformation in the role religion plays in society. Prior to this shift, “an individual did not join a church,” but “was born and reared in a community whose social unity . . . and traditions were symbolized and celebrated in the rites, cults, and beliefs of a collective religion.” Religion in this earlier era completely permeated the political community and “the influence of its practices extended to all the customs of the community, domestic, economic, and political” (56). Conversely, in the modern period, religious institutions are “special” institutions within a secular community and, parallel to their diminished social role, voluntary associations that individuals can freely join and leave (57). Apart from the fact that secular institutions now fall outside the domain and authority of any church, the interests and values of secular culture outside of the church so powerfully influence the desires and aims of believers as well as non-believers (61). For Dewey, this revolution in the place and function of religion in society is important because it has helped liberate the religious from particular religions based on the supernatural that, inevitably, make a distinction between the sacred and the profane, the spiritual and the secular. The religious attitude, when freed from any one religion, functions independently of the supernatural and hence requires no similar division. Natural social life can therefore be its one and only object.
More specifically, the problem, Dewey insists in a now-familiar refrain, is the connection between religion and the supernatural: any effort to preserve the distinction between the natural and the supernatural with respect to social existence is likely to depreciate natural social life and inculcate the sense that the natural realm stands in opposition to the spiritual, supernatural realm. When goods “actually experienced in the concrete relations” of natural social life are seen as good in relation to “a supernatural and other-worldly locus,” this “[obscures] their real nature and [weakens] their force,” Dewey asserts (66). He advocates that religious attitudes and values should therefore be divorced from their supernatural referent and rendered immanent, applicable to finite social existence. In fact, he calls for “a more intense realization of values” often understood as religious “that inhere in the actual connection” of humans with one another (74). Not only should religious values be rendered immanent, but the zeal with which traditional believers devote themselves to these values should also be cultivated within democratic society. “What would be the consequences upon the values of human association if intrinsic and immanent satisfactions and opportunities were clearly held to and cultivated with the ardor and the devotion that have at times marked historic religions,” Dewey asks rhetorically (66). Perhaps unexpectedly, he even thinks that this shift away from the supernatural toward concrete social relations need not entail the destruction of churches that now exist, but “would rather offer the means for a recovery of vitality.” He believes that “the fund of human values that are prized and that need to be cherished . . . could be celebrated and reinforced” in different ways and with different symbols by various religious institutions. “In that way the churches would indeed become catholic” (76).
Clearly, Dewey finds tremendous value in what he understands as the religious attitude and the kind of faith that accompanies it. He essentially advocates for a civil religion divorced from any reference to the supernatural that would inhibit devoted commitment to social transformation on behalf of citizens. His view is attractive and his conceptions of the religious, God, and the role of the religious attitude in society are creative. At the same time, it is not quite clear that the religious attitude Dewey describes is sufficiently robust to permeate the lives of citizens detached from traditional religions and their rich symbolic structures. Or, at the very least, secular culture would have to develop a persuasive symbolic structure of its own (one that compels more loyalty than the current accouterments of nationalism) to foster a widespread sense of the religious in civil society, and Dewey offers no real clues about what symbols would be most efficacious to this end. One also wonders whether Dewey has not been fair to the traditional religions themselves: his critique of supernatural religion certainly applies to some versions of Protestant Christianity, for example, but not necessarily to all Christian conceptions of the supernatural as it relates to natural social life and its goods. Dewey writes that he “cannot understand how any realization of the democratic ideal as a vital moral and spiritual ideal in human affairs is possible without surrender of the conception of the basic division to which supernatural Christianity is committed” (78). Has he read Thomas Aquinas and his twentieth-century interpreters? In any case, it is equally if not even more unclear whether his critique applies to other religions, like Judaism and Islam, which do not share Christianity’s basic distinction between the supernatural and the natural (or at least, not on the same terms).