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A philosopher as great and at the same time as difficult as Wittgenstein has been the subject of innumerable studies, and universal agreement on how to interpret him cannot be expected. This is true of almost all great thinkers, past and present. That is why we still benefit from studies of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, or Hegel, to mention just a few. New studies and scholarly works on Wittgesntein will continue to appear. [A] reliable brief orientation to his thought is, if not essential, then at least a very useful way to begin a study of his philosophy. -- From the Preface to the Second Edition
- GenresPhilosophy
161 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1962
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About the author
Justus Hartnack
48 books3 followersDanish philosopher, Dr. Phil. and professor at Aarhus University.
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
July 14, 2010
Hartnack offers a good summary of Wittgenstein’s work. What interested me was that Hartnack reminded me of aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought that I don’t like, and that Hartnack discussed connections with other philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein.
What I was reminded that I didn’t like about Wittgenstein is his behaviorism. Hartnack reminds us that Wittgenstein argues that the sentence, “I have a pain.” is not a description of our sensations or inner lives, but rather an acquired pain-behavior, similar to saying “Ow!” While there may be some limited truth to this analysis, it seems to me that to deny systematically the existence of an inner life, a life of subjective sensations and feelings, is to rule out arbitrarily a rich area of investigation, namely that provided by introspection. I realize that this issue is tied up with Wittgenstein’s discussion of the possibility of a “private language” and so I will postpone further discussion until I have had a chance to read more.
Other philosophers who Hartnack discusses as influenced by Wittgenstein include Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, H.L.A. Hart and J.O. Urmson. Ryle shares with Wittgenstein the behaviorism of which I disapprove. Strawson offers a Wittgensteinian criticism of Bertrand Russell’s analysis of “The king of France is bald.” which has some validity but which loses the logical elegance of Russell’s solution. Hart offers a very interesting Wittgensteinian discussion of “defeasibility” in law to show that “He beat her.” is not a description but an ascription of responsibility. Finally, Urmson argues that “good” is a grading label, rather than a description.
Like Wittgenstein, all of the philosophers mentioned argue that language is used much more variously than just for description, which is no doubt true, but which results in denying some of language’s descriptive power.
What I was reminded that I didn’t like about Wittgenstein is his behaviorism. Hartnack reminds us that Wittgenstein argues that the sentence, “I have a pain.” is not a description of our sensations or inner lives, but rather an acquired pain-behavior, similar to saying “Ow!” While there may be some limited truth to this analysis, it seems to me that to deny systematically the existence of an inner life, a life of subjective sensations and feelings, is to rule out arbitrarily a rich area of investigation, namely that provided by introspection. I realize that this issue is tied up with Wittgenstein’s discussion of the possibility of a “private language” and so I will postpone further discussion until I have had a chance to read more.
Other philosophers who Hartnack discusses as influenced by Wittgenstein include Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, H.L.A. Hart and J.O. Urmson. Ryle shares with Wittgenstein the behaviorism of which I disapprove. Strawson offers a Wittgensteinian criticism of Bertrand Russell’s analysis of “The king of France is bald.” which has some validity but which loses the logical elegance of Russell’s solution. Hart offers a very interesting Wittgensteinian discussion of “defeasibility” in law to show that “He beat her.” is not a description but an ascription of responsibility. Finally, Urmson argues that “good” is a grading label, rather than a description.
Like Wittgenstein, all of the philosophers mentioned argue that language is used much more variously than just for description, which is no doubt true, but which results in denying some of language’s descriptive power.
December 9, 2017
Lucid, interesting, well done.
August 16, 2010
Three comments on this book. First, there's value in clarifying words, concepts, and propositions as Wittgenstein and other linguistic philosophers do. Second, footnote 31 quotes Wittgenstein: "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions' but rather in the clarification of propositions." Instead of being a contributor to the body of thought called philosophy, he kicks everyone else out of the club. Is there no room for, clarified, wisdom? As a side note, it would be interesting to know what Wittgenstein means by "doctrine." Third,the subject-matter of this book is so boring I had no motivation to understand it, beyond the preface and the biographical introduction.
May 23, 2018
A surprisingly good book introducing the main thoughts of Wittgenstein. If you disregard the last chapter on contemporary philosophical investigations (or what was contemporary at the time of writing, the early 60s) you have just 100 pages. I am not entirely happy with the Tractatus part, but one thing that is great is that he picks the right quotations. This is the only book I know, that you can read where you should definitely read the footnotes. And you might skip the main text.
January 15, 2019
Hartnack manages to give a clear and precise description of both the young and mature Wittgenstein's philosophy.
The description of Wittgenstein's effect on the modern philosophy goes a bit off track, and lacks the clearness the previous chapters provided.
The description of Wittgenstein's effect on the modern philosophy goes a bit off track, and lacks the clearness the previous chapters provided.
January 19, 2016
Wittgenstein was not a logical positivist, even though the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle greatly admired the Tractatus and considered it when creating their verification principle. In my view, this is the weakest point of LW's personal philosophy. His book marked a death knell for modern philosophy by excluding metaphysical thought. Yet LW himself refused to let go of such ideas.
I am a total monist: I believe in a brain and not a separate mind; a body and not a soul; a physical world and not a spiritual world. For a philosopher to continue to hold onto those extraneous ideas only adds clutter to clear thinking. A true philosopher today needs to be studying neuroscience and the brain. Or any scientific study.
A private language of sensations is, according to Wittgenstein, does not exist. That is, it is a logical impossibility. Inner sensations can never be described adequately. How can we judge the pain of others? How can we judge our own pain? If I get depressed, is that pain? Is embarrassment pain? How do I accurately use the doctor's scale of pain on a 1 to 10 level? Is my memory of pain correct? Questions can go on like that. Then we ask, how did we learn the word "pain"? Are some children mislead about feeling pain?
LW concluded that the utterance "I have a pain" is not used as an assertion about a pain-sensation, nor as an assertion or description of pain-behavior, but as part, even though a part acquired by habit, of the pain-behavior itself.
LW inspired both logical positivism and then the "analytic" philosophy of Cambridge and Oxford. The first by the Tractatus and the second by the Philosophical Investigations. It is the second one that outlasted the first.
Hartnack discusses Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, published in 1949, as being typically Wittgensteinian in that it treats philosophical problems as the consequence of a misunderstanding of the logic of concepts. Ryle speaks of "categories" instead of "language-games." Ryle claims that it is a logical error to explain people's actions in Cartesian terms. It is a "category mistake." That is to say, it is not the kind of mistake that can be corrected by psychology.
Ryle's great expression is "ghost in the machine." We see a machine working and look for the ghost that is making it work. In other words, we see our brain function and look for a mind; we see our body function and look for a soul; we see the world function and look for a spirit. We misunderstand consciousness.
So the idea that we have both a brain and a mind in Wittgenstein's phrase "bewitches our intelligence." We think of the existence of two entities: one internal and one external. For example, in Ryle's illustration, we can say a cricket team has team spirit, but it is not an independently existing entity which caused the actions of the players on the team.
To explain how and why we behave the way we do, we must look to a scientific explanation. Why I do the things that I do has been my number one philosophical question.
Hartnack also mentions Peter Strawson's "On Referring." Strawson also attacks what he believes to be a mistaken conception of meaning. His paper is Wittgensteinian in the sense that it it argues that the meaning of a sentence is not what it refers to, but the rules for its correct use.
Strawson's polemic mostly attacks Russell's paper "On Denoting" in which he speaks the law of excluded middles and makes the statement 'The present king of France is bald.' Russell says the sentence has meaning but is false. There's no present king of France. Strawson rejects that every sentence must be true or false or meaningless. Strawson says the statement is neither true or false. It has no truth-value. It depends on the situation. It is only when the sentence is used to make an assertion is it true or false.
I am a total monist: I believe in a brain and not a separate mind; a body and not a soul; a physical world and not a spiritual world. For a philosopher to continue to hold onto those extraneous ideas only adds clutter to clear thinking. A true philosopher today needs to be studying neuroscience and the brain. Or any scientific study.
A private language of sensations is, according to Wittgenstein, does not exist. That is, it is a logical impossibility. Inner sensations can never be described adequately. How can we judge the pain of others? How can we judge our own pain? If I get depressed, is that pain? Is embarrassment pain? How do I accurately use the doctor's scale of pain on a 1 to 10 level? Is my memory of pain correct? Questions can go on like that. Then we ask, how did we learn the word "pain"? Are some children mislead about feeling pain?
LW concluded that the utterance "I have a pain" is not used as an assertion about a pain-sensation, nor as an assertion or description of pain-behavior, but as part, even though a part acquired by habit, of the pain-behavior itself.
LW inspired both logical positivism and then the "analytic" philosophy of Cambridge and Oxford. The first by the Tractatus and the second by the Philosophical Investigations. It is the second one that outlasted the first.
Hartnack discusses Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, published in 1949, as being typically Wittgensteinian in that it treats philosophical problems as the consequence of a misunderstanding of the logic of concepts. Ryle speaks of "categories" instead of "language-games." Ryle claims that it is a logical error to explain people's actions in Cartesian terms. It is a "category mistake." That is to say, it is not the kind of mistake that can be corrected by psychology.
Ryle's great expression is "ghost in the machine." We see a machine working and look for the ghost that is making it work. In other words, we see our brain function and look for a mind; we see our body function and look for a soul; we see the world function and look for a spirit. We misunderstand consciousness.
So the idea that we have both a brain and a mind in Wittgenstein's phrase "bewitches our intelligence." We think of the existence of two entities: one internal and one external. For example, in Ryle's illustration, we can say a cricket team has team spirit, but it is not an independently existing entity which caused the actions of the players on the team.
To explain how and why we behave the way we do, we must look to a scientific explanation. Why I do the things that I do has been my number one philosophical question.
Hartnack also mentions Peter Strawson's "On Referring." Strawson also attacks what he believes to be a mistaken conception of meaning. His paper is Wittgensteinian in the sense that it it argues that the meaning of a sentence is not what it refers to, but the rules for its correct use.
Strawson's polemic mostly attacks Russell's paper "On Denoting" in which he speaks the law of excluded middles and makes the statement 'The present king of France is bald.' Russell says the sentence has meaning but is false. There's no present king of France. Strawson rejects that every sentence must be true or false or meaningless. Strawson says the statement is neither true or false. It has no truth-value. It depends on the situation. It is only when the sentence is used to make an assertion is it true or false.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews