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Имена-Отца
Тексты настоящего издания ("Символическое, воображаемое реальное" и собственно "Имена-Отца"), далее развиваемые Лаканом в его ставших классическими работах: "Функция и поле языка и речи в психоанализе" и "Четыре основные понятия психоанализа", вводят ключевую проблематику лакановского психоанализа и артикулируют составляющие его триады Символическое-Воображаемое-Реальное как "подлинные Имена-Отца".
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
15 people are currently reading
329 people want to read
About the author
Jacques Lacan
182 books1,218 followersJacques-Marie-Émile Lacan was a French psychoanalyst, psychiatrist, and doctor, who made prominent contributions to the psychoanalytic movement. His yearly seminars, conducted in Paris from 1953 until his death in 1981, were a major influence in the French intellectual milieu of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly among post-structuralist thinkers.
Lacan's ideas centered on Freudian concepts such as the unconscious, the castration complex, the ego, focusing on identifications, and the centrality of language to subjectivity. His work was interdisciplinary, drawing on linguistics, philosophy, mathematics, amongst others. Although a controversial and divisive figure, Lacan is widely read in critical theory, literary studies, and twentieth-century French philosophy, as well as in the living practice of clinical psychoanalysis.
Lacan's ideas centered on Freudian concepts such as the unconscious, the castration complex, the ego, focusing on identifications, and the centrality of language to subjectivity. His work was interdisciplinary, drawing on linguistics, philosophy, mathematics, amongst others. Although a controversial and divisive figure, Lacan is widely read in critical theory, literary studies, and twentieth-century French philosophy, as well as in the living practice of clinical psychoanalysis.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
November 13, 2018
This slim volume contains two texts by Jacques Lacan. Taken by themselves, they are not particularly important or enlightening, so those unfamiliar with Lacan's work would probably be better reading something else. For those who know his work, however, these two pieces offer a fascinating insight into two key moments in Lacan's career.
The first text is "The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real," which Lacan delivered to a select group of colleagues on July 8, 1953, just before his "Rome Report" ("The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis") that would apply structural linguistics to psychoanalysis in such a revolutionary fashion. As Jacques-Alain Miller notes, Lacan's formulation of his three registers was inspired by Claude Lévi-Strauss's essay "The Effectiveness of Symbols" (1949). It should also be remembered that this talk occurs four months before Lacan begins Seminar I.
What is notable about this first text is just how basic it appears compared to Lacan's later work. Lacan seems to have worked out the main dialectic between symbolic and imaginary, and this is mainly what he delineates here. "You spoke to us about the symbolic and the imaginary," complains Serge Leclaire in the discussion afterward. "You didn't talk to us about the real" (p.42). While he is absolutely right, it will take Lacan a few years before he will correct this oversight in a satisfactory way.
The second text is "Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father," which constitutes the first entry in Lacan's eleventh seminar from 1963, which he abandoned upon receiving the news that he had lost his status as a training analyst, a fact he bitches and moans about throughout the whole seminar.
Lacan takes some time to warm up to his theme. He opens with a meditation on anxiety (the theme of Seminar X), and warns about the dangers of psychology. He makes an extraordinary remark about how Hegel's philosophy was a useful political move in undermining religion as a political and social order, but ultimately concludes that "Hegel's dialectic is false" (p.62). Lacan then considers the role of the Church fathers that he uses to converge with Freud's views on religion.
Freud, of course, designates religion as an illusion on the one hand, but is fascinated by his mythical Moses on the other. This leads into the most interesting part of the text, in which Lacan uses the story of Abraham to show how Jewish tradition founds a patriarchal law that self-consciously marks itself as different from one established by blood or biology (covenant), an act that is tied by Lacan to the father's name.
"El Shaddai is the one who chooses, who promises, and who creates through his name a certain alliance that is transmissable in only one way: by the paternal berakah [blessing]." (85)
The Old Testament God is often wrathful, indulging his own jouissance, but Lacan seems to want to explore how, particularly in the case of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, he actually negates his own jouissance in order to make room for a desire that founds the Hebraic law:
"Here we see a sharp divide between God's jouissance and what, in this tradition, is presented as His desire. The point is to diminish the importance of biological origin. This is the key to the mystery, in which can be seen the Judaic tradition's aversion to what we see everywhere else. The Hebrew tradition hates the practice of metaphysical/sexual rites which, during festivals, unite the community with God's jouissance. It highlights, on the contrary, the gap separating desire from jouissance." (p.88)
So why are the "names" of the father, rather than just a singular designation as it originally appeared in Seminar III? Lacan doesn't have a chance to explain fully, but hints that it stems from the fact that Abraham's god Ha Shem (meaning "The Name") is not yet a universal god. There are other tribes with other Elohim, and that means there are other names that may inscribe a paternal law.
While the first text is mostly valuable from a historical point of view, this second piece, this brief introduction to Lacan's aborted seminar, gives a sense that something important was lost. The extended commentary on Abraham, the covenant, paternal law, and jouissance promises so much, only to remain unfulfilled because of political circumstances. Thankfully, Lacan did resume his teaching the next year with the brilliant Seminar XI, but one can only wonder how much more enlightening that work would have been if it had been preceded by a full consideration of the Names-of-the-Father.
The first text is "The Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real," which Lacan delivered to a select group of colleagues on July 8, 1953, just before his "Rome Report" ("The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis") that would apply structural linguistics to psychoanalysis in such a revolutionary fashion. As Jacques-Alain Miller notes, Lacan's formulation of his three registers was inspired by Claude Lévi-Strauss's essay "The Effectiveness of Symbols" (1949). It should also be remembered that this talk occurs four months before Lacan begins Seminar I.
What is notable about this first text is just how basic it appears compared to Lacan's later work. Lacan seems to have worked out the main dialectic between symbolic and imaginary, and this is mainly what he delineates here. "You spoke to us about the symbolic and the imaginary," complains Serge Leclaire in the discussion afterward. "You didn't talk to us about the real" (p.42). While he is absolutely right, it will take Lacan a few years before he will correct this oversight in a satisfactory way.
The second text is "Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father," which constitutes the first entry in Lacan's eleventh seminar from 1963, which he abandoned upon receiving the news that he had lost his status as a training analyst, a fact he bitches and moans about throughout the whole seminar.
Lacan takes some time to warm up to his theme. He opens with a meditation on anxiety (the theme of Seminar X), and warns about the dangers of psychology. He makes an extraordinary remark about how Hegel's philosophy was a useful political move in undermining religion as a political and social order, but ultimately concludes that "Hegel's dialectic is false" (p.62). Lacan then considers the role of the Church fathers that he uses to converge with Freud's views on religion.
Freud, of course, designates religion as an illusion on the one hand, but is fascinated by his mythical Moses on the other. This leads into the most interesting part of the text, in which Lacan uses the story of Abraham to show how Jewish tradition founds a patriarchal law that self-consciously marks itself as different from one established by blood or biology (covenant), an act that is tied by Lacan to the father's name.
"El Shaddai is the one who chooses, who promises, and who creates through his name a certain alliance that is transmissable in only one way: by the paternal berakah [blessing]." (85)
The Old Testament God is often wrathful, indulging his own jouissance, but Lacan seems to want to explore how, particularly in the case of Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, he actually negates his own jouissance in order to make room for a desire that founds the Hebraic law:
"Here we see a sharp divide between God's jouissance and what, in this tradition, is presented as His desire. The point is to diminish the importance of biological origin. This is the key to the mystery, in which can be seen the Judaic tradition's aversion to what we see everywhere else. The Hebrew tradition hates the practice of metaphysical/sexual rites which, during festivals, unite the community with God's jouissance. It highlights, on the contrary, the gap separating desire from jouissance." (p.88)
So why are the "names" of the father, rather than just a singular designation as it originally appeared in Seminar III? Lacan doesn't have a chance to explain fully, but hints that it stems from the fact that Abraham's god Ha Shem (meaning "The Name") is not yet a universal god. There are other tribes with other Elohim, and that means there are other names that may inscribe a paternal law.
While the first text is mostly valuable from a historical point of view, this second piece, this brief introduction to Lacan's aborted seminar, gives a sense that something important was lost. The extended commentary on Abraham, the covenant, paternal law, and jouissance promises so much, only to remain unfulfilled because of political circumstances. Thankfully, Lacan did resume his teaching the next year with the brilliant Seminar XI, but one can only wonder how much more enlightening that work would have been if it had been preceded by a full consideration of the Names-of-the-Father.
August 10, 2018
O primeiro texto deste pequeno livro é uma jóia para a clínica psicanalítica. Um texto acessível e elucidativo. O que já não se pode dizer do segundo, cheio de passagens, incógnitas e não ditos. No mínimo complexo.
December 9, 2020
NameS because the void of the Real (where gods Be) can be stopped up with any old Capital Phi, provided it appears to complete the paternal metaphor. As the previous lessons on the petit a qua Ür-cause taught, all origins--from the species to the self--are mythological structures. The Names, most archaic yet enduringly repeated, are the foundling's fervent prayer for an answer, rebounding as echoes misrecognized as divine nomination.
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September 3, 2019 Lacan'ın kuramının temellerinden biri olan, Türkçeye imgesel-simgesel ve gerçek olarak çevrilen düzlemleri anlamaya ancak sezgisel olarak yaklaşabiliyorum fakat tam olarak kavrayamıyorum. Babanın Adları da yine kafa karıştırıcı bir okuma oldu o yüzden.
January 10, 2020
"Agalma, öznenin, arzusunun hedeflediğini sandığı ve nesneyi arzusunun nedeni ile karıştırmayı son raddesine kadar götürdüğü nesnedir. Alkibiades'in çılğınlığı budur. Sokrates'in ona yaptığı gönderme buradan kaynaklanır: Ruhunla meşgul ol [Alkibiades, 132c,] yani bunun anlamı: Bil ki senin ardından koştuğun, Platon'un daha sonra ruhunu dönüştüreceği şeyden, yani imgenden başka bir şey değil. Bu nesnenin hedef olarak değil ölümün nedeni olarak işlev gördüğünü anla, onun yasını tut. O zaman kendi arzunun yollarını tanıyacaksın. Zira, ben, hiçbir şey bilmeyen Sokrates'in bildiği tek şey, Eros'un işlevidir." (s. 75)
August 16, 2017
If one can imagine a thinker as prescient, eloquent, or incisive as Lacan, I challenge you to find them. In 1963, on the wrong end of the Société Française de Psychanalyse, one of his most groundbreaking seminars, “On the Names-of-the-Father,” was interrupted by his demotion from the position of didacticien.
At the beginning of the seminar, one can hear Lacan’s frustration as his analysand-like confession of disgrace is conveyed to his students.
Lacan’s longtime editor, Jacques Alain-Miller, would write of the seminar:
Drawing a stark distinction between psychology as a tool of maintaining the status quo and psychoanalysis as, among other things, a tool to elucidate the subject and resolve symptomatic behavior, Lacan writes:
One can only imagine, then, after giving us a section like this, what was lost in Lacan’s “keeping close to the chest” after this psychoanalytic dust-up. Lacan takes aim not just at the psychoanalytic establishment, which he had great reason to resent, but also positivist thinking more broadly. For Lacan, intelligence is not to be quantified and translated into a condition of capital investment.
“Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father” is Lacan at his most honest, clear, and compulsively readable. Those worried for the status of his Seminar after 1963, the story has a happy ending. Lacan began his teaching again in January 1964 at the École Normale Supérieure with The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.
At the beginning of the seminar, one can hear Lacan’s frustration as his analysand-like confession of disgrace is conveyed to his students.
Lacan’s longtime editor, Jacques Alain-Miller, would write of the seminar:
Having concluded from his tribulations that “psychoanalytic discourse” had not authorized him to lift, as he had intended, the veil Freud had cast over the true mainspring of psychoanalysis, and that he had been struck down for his sacrilegious act, he signaled, in a word to the wise, in particular in the ironic title that he gave to a later Seminar, Les non-dupes errent, that he would keep close to his chest truths that were too tempestuous.
Drawing a stark distinction between psychology as a tool of maintaining the status quo and psychoanalysis as, among other things, a tool to elucidate the subject and resolve symptomatic behavior, Lacan writes:
In the positivist perspective, intelligence is but one affect among others, based on the hypothesis of intelligibility. This justifies a psychology of Tarot card readers, which is concocted in places that are supposedly freest from this kind of claptrap: endowed university chairs. [To positivists,] affect, conversely, is thus merely an obscure form of intelligence.What escapes people who study such teachings is the obscurantism to which they are subjected. We know what it leads to: to the ever more intentional undertakings of a technocracy; to the psychological standardization of subjects who are seeking jobs; and to acceptance of the established boundaries of society as it currently exists, head bent forward under the weighty standard of the psychologist.
I say that the meaning of Freud’s discovery is radically opposed to that.
One can only imagine, then, after giving us a section like this, what was lost in Lacan’s “keeping close to the chest” after this psychoanalytic dust-up. Lacan takes aim not just at the psychoanalytic establishment, which he had great reason to resent, but also positivist thinking more broadly. For Lacan, intelligence is not to be quantified and translated into a condition of capital investment.
“Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father” is Lacan at his most honest, clear, and compulsively readable. Those worried for the status of his Seminar after 1963, the story has a happy ending. Lacan began his teaching again in January 1964 at the École Normale Supérieure with The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.
November 3, 2013
Lacan is hard, even impenetrable. I had hoped for more on the father generally, but the lecture is overshadowed by his dismissal and so many points are set up but development deferred and cancelled.
November 8, 2022
"Ele acredita desejar porque se vê como desejado e não vê que o que o Outro quer lhe arrancar é o olhar"
August 15, 2018
Non si può realmente consigliare un libro di L. Si può essere soltanto mossi da curiosità e da una buona dose di pazienza, oltre che da amore per il mistero.
Le parole di Lacan evocano, non spiegano. C'è qualcosa, ma quel qualcosa è avvolto da rumore, non è mai pienamente decifrato, giunge sempre di traverso. L. parla, aggiunge, torna indietro, disorienta, lascia appeso.
Questo testa rappresenta una toccata e fuga da quelle che sono le basi del suo insegnamento. Tutto il suo sistema si basa da una profonda conoscenza di Freud, nel quale riconosce tre strati a fondamento del suo pensiero: l'immaginario, il simbolico e il reale. L'immaginario è la costruzione allucinata che ci facciamo della realtà, che noi formiamo attraverso i simboli. I simboli, però, se ben analizzati, formano il simbolico, cioè le strutture alla base del nostro essere umani. Infine, il reale è ciò che sfugge alla nostra capacità linguistica.
Per tale motivo, il desiderio si confronta sempre con il reale: si desidera il soddisfacimento del proprio bisogno e allo stesso tempo quel vuoto che ci viene dall'Altro, quell'assenza dell'Altro che ci porta a riconoscere la nostra mancanza (e la mancanza dell'Altro). Desiderare è essere desiderati, è un vuoto che rimbalza tra il Sé e l'Altro.
La religione è il tentativo di dare senso a qualsiasi affioramento del Reale: per questo, L. vede nel trionfo della scienza il trionfo della religione. La prima, occupandosi del Reale, permette alla seconda di spiegarlo, visto che il reale porta sempre con sé un'angoscia che va alleviata. La religione ha come fine ciò.
Le parole di Lacan evocano, non spiegano. C'è qualcosa, ma quel qualcosa è avvolto da rumore, non è mai pienamente decifrato, giunge sempre di traverso. L. parla, aggiunge, torna indietro, disorienta, lascia appeso.
Questo testa rappresenta una toccata e fuga da quelle che sono le basi del suo insegnamento. Tutto il suo sistema si basa da una profonda conoscenza di Freud, nel quale riconosce tre strati a fondamento del suo pensiero: l'immaginario, il simbolico e il reale. L'immaginario è la costruzione allucinata che ci facciamo della realtà, che noi formiamo attraverso i simboli. I simboli, però, se ben analizzati, formano il simbolico, cioè le strutture alla base del nostro essere umani. Infine, il reale è ciò che sfugge alla nostra capacità linguistica.
Per tale motivo, il desiderio si confronta sempre con il reale: si desidera il soddisfacimento del proprio bisogno e allo stesso tempo quel vuoto che ci viene dall'Altro, quell'assenza dell'Altro che ci porta a riconoscere la nostra mancanza (e la mancanza dell'Altro). Desiderare è essere desiderati, è un vuoto che rimbalza tra il Sé e l'Altro.
La religione è il tentativo di dare senso a qualsiasi affioramento del Reale: per questo, L. vede nel trionfo della scienza il trionfo della religione. La prima, occupandosi del Reale, permette alla seconda di spiegarlo, visto che il reale porta sempre con sé un'angoscia che va alleviata. La religione ha come fine ciò.
April 28, 2017
Interesting book. Nothing mind blowing. I've read a fair amount of Lacan and found that he's a peacock. His reading of Hegel is absolutely erroneous, too. I don't blame Lacan for that - the right-wing Hegelian interpretation was popular in France at Lacan's time.
December 2, 2017
a swan song
January 19, 2020
Umduğumu bulamadım. Neymiş imgesel, simgesel ve gerçek anlamaya çalıştım ama Lacan üzerine yazılmış kitapları Lacan okumaya tercih edeceğim galiba. Gerçi bu kitabın Lacan'ın konferansta söylediklerinin yazıya dökülmüş hali olduğunu unutmamak gerekiyor. "Daha önce anlattığım," "bir sonraki kitabımda anlatacağım," şeklinde başka konferanslara ve metinlere yapılan atıflar nedeniyle benim gibi mevzunun öncesini bilmeyenlere pek faydalı bir kitap değil.
March 10, 2022
"When it is no longer here, we have the object incarnated in its duration, separated from itself, and which, owing to this very fact, can be in some sense always present for you, always here, always at your disposal."
—p31
—p31
June 2, 2017
не се чете!
July 25, 2018
Çeviri ve düzenleme daha iyi olabilirmiş.
September 25, 2018
Czytając Lacana, nie warto zaczynać od Lacana. Trudne, niejasne, zaciemnione. Pozycja bardziej dla kolekcjonerów.
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April 12, 2019Totalmente hipnótico y siempre complicado.
November 30, 2020
Tanrı'yı sorgulayan bir başyapıt.
August 4, 2025
"I miei Scritti non li ho scritti perchè vengano capiti, ma perchè vengano letti".
Diocane Lacan sei il primo che vengo a prendere quando mi ammazzo.
Diocane Lacan sei il primo che vengo a prendere quando mi ammazzo.
April 6, 2007
POSITIVISMO, DIALÉCTICA Y ANGUSTIA
En la perspectiva positivista, la inteligencia no es más que un afecto entre otros y se funda en la hipótesis de la inteligibilidad. Eso justifica esa psicología de echadores de cartas que puede desarrollarse en los lugares aparentemente más independientes, desde la cumbre de las cátedras universitarias. Inversamente, el afecto no es entonces más que inteligencia oscura. Escapa a quien recibe esta enseñanza el efecto de oscurantismo que sufre. Sabemos dónde desemboca este efecto: en los proyectos cada vez más intencionales de una tecnocracia, en el examen psicológico de los sujetos que buscan empleos, en la entrada en los marcos de la sociedad existente, con la cabeza gacha bajo el patrón del psicólogo. Digo que el sentido del descubrimiento de Freud está respecto de esto en una oposición radical (...) Cuando se examina la dialéctica hegeliana, se la reduce en el fondo a raíces lógicas, como mostró el propio Hegel, y precisamente al déficit intrínseco de la lógica de la predicación; a saber: lo universal, si se lo examina bien -y esto no escapó al logicismo contemporáneo-, solo se funda en la agregación, mientras que lo particular, único que encuentra allí existencia, aparece como contingente. Toda la dialéctica hegeliana apunta a colmar esta falla y mostrar en una prodigiosa transmutación cómo lo universal puede llegar a particularizarse (...) Sin embargo, sea cual fuere el prestigio de la dialéctica hegeliana (sean cuales fueren sus efectos, que entraron en el mundo vía Marx completando así lo que Hegel significaba, a saber, la subversión de un orden político y social fundado en la Iglesia), sea cual fuere su éxito, sea cual fuere el valor de lo que sostiene en las incidencias políticas de su realización, la dialéctica hegeliana es falsa. La contradicen tanto el testimonio de las ciencias de la naturaleza como el progreso histórico de la ciencia fundamental, a saber, las matemáticas. Como percibió el contemporáneo del sistema de Hegel -que era entonces el Sistema a secas- como proclamó, indicó Kierkegaard, la angustia es el signo o el testimonio de una hiancia existencial (...) y la doctrina freudiana ofrece su esclarecimiento. La estructura de la relación de la angustia con el deseo, la doble hiancia del sujeto con el objeto que cae de él (...) ahí está la falla que no nos permite tratar el deseo en la inmanencia lógica de la mera violencia como dimensión para forzar los atolladeros de la lógica.
Freud nos conduce al corazón de eso en lo que se funda lo que era para él la ilusión. Él lo llamaba, según la modalidad de su época -que es la de una coartada-, la religión (...) yo lo llamo Iglesia. Freud avanza con las luces de la razón sobre ese mismo campo donde, contra la revolución hegeliana, la Iglesia se mantiene intacta y con todo el brillo que le pueden ver.
JACQUES LACAN, De los Nombres del Padre. Ed. Paidós, 2005.
En la perspectiva positivista, la inteligencia no es más que un afecto entre otros y se funda en la hipótesis de la inteligibilidad. Eso justifica esa psicología de echadores de cartas que puede desarrollarse en los lugares aparentemente más independientes, desde la cumbre de las cátedras universitarias. Inversamente, el afecto no es entonces más que inteligencia oscura. Escapa a quien recibe esta enseñanza el efecto de oscurantismo que sufre. Sabemos dónde desemboca este efecto: en los proyectos cada vez más intencionales de una tecnocracia, en el examen psicológico de los sujetos que buscan empleos, en la entrada en los marcos de la sociedad existente, con la cabeza gacha bajo el patrón del psicólogo. Digo que el sentido del descubrimiento de Freud está respecto de esto en una oposición radical (...) Cuando se examina la dialéctica hegeliana, se la reduce en el fondo a raíces lógicas, como mostró el propio Hegel, y precisamente al déficit intrínseco de la lógica de la predicación; a saber: lo universal, si se lo examina bien -y esto no escapó al logicismo contemporáneo-, solo se funda en la agregación, mientras que lo particular, único que encuentra allí existencia, aparece como contingente. Toda la dialéctica hegeliana apunta a colmar esta falla y mostrar en una prodigiosa transmutación cómo lo universal puede llegar a particularizarse (...) Sin embargo, sea cual fuere el prestigio de la dialéctica hegeliana (sean cuales fueren sus efectos, que entraron en el mundo vía Marx completando así lo que Hegel significaba, a saber, la subversión de un orden político y social fundado en la Iglesia), sea cual fuere su éxito, sea cual fuere el valor de lo que sostiene en las incidencias políticas de su realización, la dialéctica hegeliana es falsa. La contradicen tanto el testimonio de las ciencias de la naturaleza como el progreso histórico de la ciencia fundamental, a saber, las matemáticas. Como percibió el contemporáneo del sistema de Hegel -que era entonces el Sistema a secas- como proclamó, indicó Kierkegaard, la angustia es el signo o el testimonio de una hiancia existencial (...) y la doctrina freudiana ofrece su esclarecimiento. La estructura de la relación de la angustia con el deseo, la doble hiancia del sujeto con el objeto que cae de él (...) ahí está la falla que no nos permite tratar el deseo en la inmanencia lógica de la mera violencia como dimensión para forzar los atolladeros de la lógica.
Freud nos conduce al corazón de eso en lo que se funda lo que era para él la ilusión. Él lo llamaba, según la modalidad de su época -que es la de una coartada-, la religión (...) yo lo llamo Iglesia. Freud avanza con las luces de la razón sobre ese mismo campo donde, contra la revolución hegeliana, la Iglesia se mantiene intacta y con todo el brillo que le pueden ver.
JACQUES LACAN, De los Nombres del Padre. Ed. Paidós, 2005.
December 19, 2024
" [...] quando o neurótico chega à experiência analítica [...] ele não vem ao analista para dizer ninharias e banalidades. [...] é seu próprio sentido que ele vem mais ou menos procurar. Algo paira misticamente sobre a pessoa daquele que o escuta"
June 18, 2017
Сега разбирам защо горкият Лакан никога не е пожлеал тази лекция да бъде публикувана. Това се случва чак след смъртта му и това има своите логически основи. Човекът просто е виждал как засяга цялото поле на психоанализата, отваря го като рана и не я затваря след това, може би напротив, само сипва сол в нея. Еднствено става добре ясно какво има предвид под триадата въображаемо, символично и реално, въпреки че дори това не експлицира. Все пак мислещият човек може да изведе всъщност казаното иззад воала на обърканото му сложноумнословие. Става ясно, че цялата психичност според него е предопределена от реализацията на реалното, чрез въображаемото в символичното, посредством "имената на бащата" или иначе казано, закона. (но това не се разбира пряко в процеса на четене, а впоследствие)
едно изречение изказано в 100 страници почти Кантова реч. Лакан.
едно изречение изказано в 100 страници почти Кантова реч. Лакан.
October 26, 2016
yani sofistlere iyi retorik ustaları diyorlar da bu adamların da onlardan aşağı kalır yanları yok. tehlikeli kıvraklık.
November 20, 2016
Coś w tym jest, choć trochę obscurantisme terrorisme, cytując Foucault tłumaczącego się z niejasności przed Searlem.
January 25, 2018
İhtiyaç duyulan bazı ana parçaları, Hegelci diyalektik, Kierkegaard - Freud vakaları (fare, kurt .. ) olarak sıralayabilirim.
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