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Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective
Bas C. van Fraassen presents an original exploration of how we represent the world. Science represents natural phenomena by means of theories, as well as in many concrete ways by such means as pictures, graphs, table-top models, and computer simulations. Scientific Representation begins with an inquiry into the nature of representation in general, drawing on such diverse sources as Plato's dialogues, the development of perspectival drawing in the Renaissance, and the geometric styles of modelling in modern physics. Starting with Mach's and Poincaré's analyses of measurement and the "problem of coordination," van Fraassen then presents a view of measurement outcomes as representations. With respect to the theories of contemporary science he defends an empiricist structuralist version of the "picture theory" of science, through an inquiry into the paradoxes that came to light in twentieth-century philosophies of science. Van Fraassen concludes with an analysis of the complex
relationship between appearance and reality in the scientific world-picture.
relationship between appearance and reality in the scientific world-picture.
422 pages, Hardcover
First published August 14, 2008
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About the author
Bas C. Van Fraassen
21 books36 followersBastiaan Cornelis van Fraassen is a Dutch-American philosopher noted for his seminal contributions to philosophy of science. He is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University and the McCosh Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Princeton University.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
October 10, 2013
As always, van Fraassen is thorough, thoughtful, and technical. This is not a book for the weak of spirit, even among professional philosophers. It covers an enormous amount of material both in metaphysics and philosophy of science, but also in the history of science. For what my opinion is worth, I think that a major part of van Fraassen's appeal is his serious engagement with the historical content of science and philosophy, and his ability to deputize important shifts in that material into his arguments. (It is also a reason that the scholars in the social studies of science I spend time around really ought to read him, because he does justice to the historical science while working on a number of important projects in the history and in the epistemology.)
Scientific Representation updates a number of the points advanced in the Scientific Image, but very little of the content from the Scientific Image is substantially changed. It is for this reason that it is probably best for readers of van Fraassen's work to read the Scientific Image first, to understand where his empiricism comes from. Scientific Representation paints more of a picture of how constructive empiricism (van Fraassen's general philosophy of science) approaches a number of important particular issues in the philosophy of science, like how to talk about "completeness" in physics, and some of the so-called "superempirical" virtues used to assess theories. He also deals effectively and thoughtfully with the notion of objectivity.
As a treatment of these issues, apart from its role as an illustration of constructive empiricsm, the book is a huge success. Readers may not know what sort of conceptual apparatus they're wandering into when they come into van Fraassen's account for the first time, but they'll likely be impressed by how effectively it handles a lot of complex tasks. Certainly, Bas's views have more working parts and peculiar angles on arguments than most views in philosophy of science (and I take that, generally, as one of the things that makes him so appealing) and for those who are more familiar with his work, he does offer some nice opportunities to illustrate those angles, like how he handles some of the more subtle alternatives proposed by modern scientific realists.
There are a few stylistically interesting things about van Fraassen's writing, for those who are interested. The first is that he doesn't really address his interlocutors that directly. He paints positions, often very clearly and concisely, but sometimes he blends positions together and it is hard to tell who he is responding to. In some cases, it seems that he may not be offering a response to anyone in particular at all. (Though, those who know the writing method used by the California-based philosophers of science know that this is unlikely; I only have a passing familiarity with those writers' groups, but they're very active and engaging, and contributed a great deal to the content of the book.) Another is that he moves in and out of the discussions modern quantum physics and enlightenment philosophy in a way which is very challenging to the reader; it seems to be a part of how van Fraassen carves up intellectual history, but it does make it very difficult to read sometimes, and can require substantive rereading.
Overall, the book is excellent. My major complaint is that there are some areas that I wish he had the opportunity to meander on longer. (There's a short discussion of supervenience as it is used in the metaphysics of mind that, for my own purposes, I would've been interested to hear van Fraassen talk about.) But usually this is an indicator that a book has been successful, especially if there is no feeling that there was something substantive missing from the account. I do wish that van Fraassen was willing to put forward more in the way of positive cases, as he demolishes a lot of pretty substantive ideas, but he does leave us with an account of representation that fits well with the view of scientific explanation and theorizing offered elsewhere in his body of work.
This is my favorite book that van Fraassen has written so far, I think, in large part because the style of the early chapters helps to ease the reader in more slowly to the eventual breakneck pace of the intellectual history that he tends to set up. It's very easy to get whiplash as you move around the examples, but this book does a particularly good job of pacing itself in the early chapters so as to allow the reader time to adjust. You do eventually wind up at that pace, and there are times where it is difficult, but (by-and-large) it is much more manageable than some of his other discussion.
Scientific Representation updates a number of the points advanced in the Scientific Image, but very little of the content from the Scientific Image is substantially changed. It is for this reason that it is probably best for readers of van Fraassen's work to read the Scientific Image first, to understand where his empiricism comes from. Scientific Representation paints more of a picture of how constructive empiricism (van Fraassen's general philosophy of science) approaches a number of important particular issues in the philosophy of science, like how to talk about "completeness" in physics, and some of the so-called "superempirical" virtues used to assess theories. He also deals effectively and thoughtfully with the notion of objectivity.
As a treatment of these issues, apart from its role as an illustration of constructive empiricsm, the book is a huge success. Readers may not know what sort of conceptual apparatus they're wandering into when they come into van Fraassen's account for the first time, but they'll likely be impressed by how effectively it handles a lot of complex tasks. Certainly, Bas's views have more working parts and peculiar angles on arguments than most views in philosophy of science (and I take that, generally, as one of the things that makes him so appealing) and for those who are more familiar with his work, he does offer some nice opportunities to illustrate those angles, like how he handles some of the more subtle alternatives proposed by modern scientific realists.
There are a few stylistically interesting things about van Fraassen's writing, for those who are interested. The first is that he doesn't really address his interlocutors that directly. He paints positions, often very clearly and concisely, but sometimes he blends positions together and it is hard to tell who he is responding to. In some cases, it seems that he may not be offering a response to anyone in particular at all. (Though, those who know the writing method used by the California-based philosophers of science know that this is unlikely; I only have a passing familiarity with those writers' groups, but they're very active and engaging, and contributed a great deal to the content of the book.) Another is that he moves in and out of the discussions modern quantum physics and enlightenment philosophy in a way which is very challenging to the reader; it seems to be a part of how van Fraassen carves up intellectual history, but it does make it very difficult to read sometimes, and can require substantive rereading.
Overall, the book is excellent. My major complaint is that there are some areas that I wish he had the opportunity to meander on longer. (There's a short discussion of supervenience as it is used in the metaphysics of mind that, for my own purposes, I would've been interested to hear van Fraassen talk about.) But usually this is an indicator that a book has been successful, especially if there is no feeling that there was something substantive missing from the account. I do wish that van Fraassen was willing to put forward more in the way of positive cases, as he demolishes a lot of pretty substantive ideas, but he does leave us with an account of representation that fits well with the view of scientific explanation and theorizing offered elsewhere in his body of work.
This is my favorite book that van Fraassen has written so far, I think, in large part because the style of the early chapters helps to ease the reader in more slowly to the eventual breakneck pace of the intellectual history that he tends to set up. It's very easy to get whiplash as you move around the examples, but this book does a particularly good job of pacing itself in the early chapters so as to allow the reader time to adjust. You do eventually wind up at that pace, and there are times where it is difficult, but (by-and-large) it is much more manageable than some of his other discussion.
January 4, 2014
Dit is een goed, stevig onderbouwd boek. Van Fraassen weet zijn empiricist structuralism helder neer te zetten en geeft veel treffende definities en problematiseringen van noties als fenomenen, verschijningen, experiment en perspectief. Geschikt voor mensen die al wel eea in de (wetenschaps)filosofie hebben gelezen. Het enige nadeel is dat de meest technische aspecten van het boek worden verheldert door pittige voorbeelden uit de kwantummechanica, iets waar ik zelf niet bepaald in thuis ben. Voor beta's zou dit boek waarschijnlijk vijf sterren waard zijn, voor mij als alpha vier. Voor mensen met interesse in wetenschapsfilosofie is dit boek een klassieker in wording, dus altijd aan te raden. Niet geschikt voor beginnende filosofielezers.
April 13, 2012
Un livre important, qui raffine grandement les idées de The Scientific Image, mais malheureusement très mal écrit. Malgré tout, il mérite le détour, même si pour l'apprécier il faut le lire plus d'une fois.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews