This little book (158 small pages of large print) manages to abbreviate Heidegger like no other source I have come across. If a reader comes naively to Heidegger, she could leave with a sense of everything from his neologisms to his place in the history of philosophy. In fact, I am sure I am able to abbreviate even further, in a way not possible for me before: Heidegger sees the accepted originators of Western Philosophy-Plato and Aristotle with a big bump from Descartes-as bringing a need for analysis and conceptualization to our thinking about the world. In other words, they brought a need to segmentize our perceptions into graspable units that allowed scrutiny, categorization and documentation. That led to great advances in dealing with the world-what are the units that make up a stone, how to categorize different trees-but it left behind the IS. It left behind the more basic question of what is BEING; not the question of what makes up the units we see and manipulate, but what does it mean to BE. The pre-Socratics seemed to show some concern and awe before BEING, but by the time the language of thought reaches Heidegger, it has become an instrument for use in grasping the world-science as the ideal-with no path for even questioning the status of BEING. Heidegger therefore feels the need to bend the language that has come down to him in a way that at least hints at the fundamental question of what it means to BE. Thus we find the strange-hyphenated wordings of 'Being and Time', attempting to recapture some very primitive meaning before the metaphysicians solidified words into hard, usable concepts. As Heidegger moves on from this early attempt to awaken our acknowledgement of BEING, human language seems too frail to combat the increasing instrumentalization of our time-the dominance of science and technology-and only certain forms of poetry deforms language adequately to even hint at the question of BEING. What my contraction leaves out are the quickly sketched details which leaves a reader with a sense and perhaps an appreciation of Heidegger's endeavor.
Steiner mentions certain similarities to Wittgenstein and this is patently the case. If for Heidegger, metaphysics, and it's sedimentation into our worldview, has left us with no way to ask the basic questions, for early Wittgenstein the logical basis of language, whose description he brought to ultimate realization in the Tractatus, is incapable of doing anything but sizing up the world. It can ask no questions about value or meaning, about what makes the world worthwhile. It can only get the job done, allow propositions that allow us to dig into the world, move the bricks, build our house, do science. What is left for Wittgenstein, if one reads the biographies I have-see Ray Monk-a lot of muted anguish, and, more importantly, a recourse to the ordinary. Follow the words of everyday language and see the company they keep. After the logician, he becomes the ordinary language philosopher. He, like Heidegger, saw poetry as a kind of last resort-he famously read poetry to a conference of astonished logical positivists, who thought they were bringing in the master logician. Instead he was attempting to show all they could not manage, and, most of all, what was important to him. However, he could never have thought, like Heidegger increasingly came to do, that Being somehow dwelt within language. Language for later Wittgenstein is the backbone of social interaction, providing traditions for meeting up and deciding on a method of action. Nothing very holy in language, but perhaps poetry is the most comforting.
Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger fell back onto the ordinary as a way to escape the metaphysicians. The German peasant tending his fields and animals had a respectful attachment to the earth that the alienated, inauthentic city folk lacked. Wittgenstein would have had some respect for this form of living the ordinary, and, in fact, attempted it in a small way that failed, but he could never have views it in any way as'authentic'. That was beyond the scope of language to proclaim. The theme of his later years was to look and describe; somewhat like Becket, what else is there to do.
Addendum: Almost as soon as I finished this bit of writing a few weeks ago, I realized I would need to return to it to correct, or at least adjust, the summary. For I ended with a comparison of Heidegger and Wittgenstein in their relationship to the ordinary (and I will return to this term later), and failed to make the point that the basic Heideggerian premise is a submersion in the ordinary. Mankind is thrown into the world to such an extent that it is impossible to separate them. In fact, the meaning of Dasein, Heidegger's main terminological contribution, means in some way both 'human' and 'world'. If for the Western metaphysical tradition, there is an opposition between body and mind, that becomes irrelevant for Heidegger, and perhaps 'hand' becomes the appropriate anatomical feature The human hand and the tools it uses to construct his world are indissolubly bonded. Humankind can become more abstract at its peril-the peril of becoming a metaphysician. Steiner, while not ignoring this aspect of Heidegger, makes not enough of it for my taste: it just isn't what awes him about Heidegger.
I did not lay much foundation for my use of the phrase 'the ordinary' in my initial statements. That is because it is just what it sounds like: the regular, old everyday way we relate to the world, or more precisely, the language we use to describe the world in everyday situations. The ordinary language philosophers came to see language usage as the only arbitral of the real, their finding no other construct that could take its place. Many people believe that Wittgenstein fits this description, even if not officially in this camp. The philosopher who most obviously put the the terminology 'the ordinary' in discussion was Stanley Cavell in "In Quest of the Ordinary" and "The Claims of Reason". So if Wittgenstein fell back into the ordinary at the end of his discourses, Heidegger started out from there with absolute conviction.