The Machinery of Crisis examines for the first time the important role of crisis management in the making of U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon-Kissinger years. Notorious for their tight grip on the machinery of U.S. foreign policy, the book offers a critical account of the manner in which the president and his national security advisor dominated the structures and processes of foreign policy making. By drawing on a wealth of previously classified documents, Siniver reveals the story of the Washington Special Action Group, which managed foreign policy crises in the Nixon administration. In this thoroughly researched account of the performance of Nixon, Kissinger and the Washington Special Actions group in four international crises, Siniver provides a fresh analysis of the important relationship between individuals and the advisory system in the making of U.S. foreign policy during international crisis.
Wonk fodder: more about the machine than about the crisis. Admittedly useful in that someone needed to compile the information for posterity/ease of access. Although the length of a PHD, it reads like an A- undergraduate paper. As in: the language is rigid, the conclusions are obvious*, and the paper spends great lengths over-defining mundane argumentative building blocks.
* It's true that Nixon and Kissinger did not rely on a system that they themselves had set up. It's also true that the system was effective when it was used. Neither point is particularly insightful. Somewhat insightful, however, is the conclusion that sudden catastrophe forces self-purported great men to rely on bureaucratic machines. To state the obvious, this point has bearing beyond the book's scope.