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Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin
This is the first detached and authoritative American attempt to review Soviet-Western relations in historical perspective. Its uniquely qualified author, a diplomat and historian who represented this country as our Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George F. Kennan believes like Thucydides that the history of the past is our best source of guidance for the present. Mr. Kennan’s narrative takes the reader through three decades of the most profound violence and change, tracing diplomatic relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union from the Russian Revolution of 1917 to the end of World War II. At every stage of the story Mr. Kennan points up the successive dilemmas, sometimes leading to tragedy, which grew out of ignorance and mutual distrust. From the deposition of the Russian Tsar in 1917 to the illusions and errors of 1945, one confrontation after another has expanded from misunderstanding to hostility.
The Allied intervention in Russia, into which we muddled ourselves in 1918 while our gaze was fixed on winning the first World War in Europe; the Russian fixation on their domestic revolution at the expense of waging the war against Germany; the conflicting and short-sighted aims of the Western statesmen at the Versailles conference in 1919; the incredible Western stuffiness (the only word for it) which drove a renascent Germany into Russia’s arms at Rapallo in 1922; Stalin’s bottomless mistrust, not only of foreign statesmen, but of his own most intimate colleagues in Moscow, which hurled Russia into the bloody purges of 1934-1938; the Russian cupidity in China; the fantastic yet grimly tragic story of events leading up to the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939, and the cynical piracy which Hitler and Stalin practised on each other thereafter; and the unquenchable innocence governing the actions of Roosevelt and the Western military leaders during World War II and culminating in Yalta — all of these episodes serve Mr. Kennan as the raw material for lessons for the present day.
As he takes us with him on this dangerous dramatic path of frustration and misunderstanding, Mr. Kennan pauses to illuminate the hazards attendant upon all summit meetings; to speculate on the perennial fantasy inherent in Western notions about China; to question the extent to which world events can be controlled from any central point, whether it be Moscow or Washington; to comment on the havoc raised by the conduct of two World Wars with the objective of unconditional surrender; to etch brilliant portraits of such figures as Woodrow Wilson, Rathenau, Lenin, Curzon, Chicherin, Stalin, Molotov, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Roosevelt and those others who on both sides have been entrusted with our destinies for the last forty-five years. The result is a narrative which the publishers are proud to present as a world-significant contribution to history. It will be read with fascination and with profit by both the specialist and the intelligent general reader—and it is urgently needed at a time when the Soviet historians are fabricating their interpretations of these very years in a way that is deeply discreditable to the free world.
The Allied intervention in Russia, into which we muddled ourselves in 1918 while our gaze was fixed on winning the first World War in Europe; the Russian fixation on their domestic revolution at the expense of waging the war against Germany; the conflicting and short-sighted aims of the Western statesmen at the Versailles conference in 1919; the incredible Western stuffiness (the only word for it) which drove a renascent Germany into Russia’s arms at Rapallo in 1922; Stalin’s bottomless mistrust, not only of foreign statesmen, but of his own most intimate colleagues in Moscow, which hurled Russia into the bloody purges of 1934-1938; the Russian cupidity in China; the fantastic yet grimly tragic story of events leading up to the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939, and the cynical piracy which Hitler and Stalin practised on each other thereafter; and the unquenchable innocence governing the actions of Roosevelt and the Western military leaders during World War II and culminating in Yalta — all of these episodes serve Mr. Kennan as the raw material for lessons for the present day.
As he takes us with him on this dangerous dramatic path of frustration and misunderstanding, Mr. Kennan pauses to illuminate the hazards attendant upon all summit meetings; to speculate on the perennial fantasy inherent in Western notions about China; to question the extent to which world events can be controlled from any central point, whether it be Moscow or Washington; to comment on the havoc raised by the conduct of two World Wars with the objective of unconditional surrender; to etch brilliant portraits of such figures as Woodrow Wilson, Rathenau, Lenin, Curzon, Chicherin, Stalin, Molotov, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Roosevelt and those others who on both sides have been entrusted with our destinies for the last forty-five years. The result is a narrative which the publishers are proud to present as a world-significant contribution to history. It will be read with fascination and with profit by both the specialist and the intelligent general reader—and it is urgently needed at a time when the Soviet historians are fabricating their interpretations of these very years in a way that is deeply discreditable to the free world.
411 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1960
24 people are currently reading
554 people want to read
About the author
George F. Kennan
127 books118 followersFrom Wikipedia:
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American advisor, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers.
In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His "Long Telegram" from Moscow in 1946, and the subsequent 1947 article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundational texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration's new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, most notably the Marshall Plan.
Shortly after the diploma had been enshrined as official U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the policies that he had seemingly helped launch. By mid-1948, he was convinced that the situation in Western Europe had improved to the point where negotiations could be initiated with Moscow. The suggestion did not resonate within the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence was increasingly marginalized—particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. As U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more aggressive and militaristic tone, Kennan bemoaned what he called a misinterpretation of his thinking.
In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State, except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia, and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
February 22, 2020
Surprisingly unbiased for 1950. In it Kennan offers stimulating analysis of the intent of the Soviet political system from WWI to after WWII. Rather than simply describe the historical political situations, he proffers advice and insight into where the West went wrong in negotiations and it's inability to see what concessions made during the Second World War would lead after it's end. Being written from a series of lectures, the writing flows easily and it's never dry. Contrary to other reviews, my copy does have a bibliography.
I don't know why I was so excited to come home after a long day at work and read this, but I sure was.
I don't know why I was so excited to come home after a long day at work and read this, but I sure was.
September 19, 2010
Kennan was the foremost American authority on Russian history and culture. As a college student, he traveled in Russia during the Civil war there and was later posted in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, serving Ambassador Averell Harriman. His view of the USSR and "containment" were rejected by hardliners in the Truman administration after June 1950, but history has mostly vindicated Kennan's opinions on the Soviet Union. He was instrumental in creating counter-propaganda for the U.S. government after Korea and objected to the Vietnam War on realist grounds. He was the rare bureaucrat who had no peers when it concerned Russia.
August 2, 2009
One of the architects of the cold war, a book I read in the Robert Strauz-Hupe's great course in international politics. He once referred to a Russian census but said that the numbers could not be relied on. I rather naively asked how a national census could be wrong, thinking it was not so difficult to count people and census takers had a lot of experience with this. He looked at me rather sternly and then recalled that Stalin did not like the numbers in a census in the 1930's and as a result had 19 members of their census bureau shot. He then concluded that after that, "No one will ever know how many Russians there are."
June 30, 2008
I first read Kennan's book as an undergrad at the University of Virginia, and then used it in a course on the history of Soviet foreign policy which I was a T.A. for at Stanford. Essential, and written by an elegant writer, which made it easier for college students. Also worked in the Long Telegram, X article, etc.
August 12, 2025
Reading George F. Kennan’s Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin is like sitting through the most eloquent roast session in history—except instead of a smoky comedy club, we’re in a mahogany-paneled study, and the guy doing the roasting is a seasoned diplomat who’s seen these two clowns play their geopolitical slapstick live.
Kennan treats Lenin like the overachieving valedictorian who uses his brain not to cure cancer, but to start a fire in the chemistry lab just to prove it can be done. Sure, he had organisational brilliance and could sell Marxism like it was the latest miracle diet, but that same laser focus left him incapable of compromise. Lenin’s foreign policy was revolutionary evangelism on steroids—half messiah complex, half “let’s make the neighbours miserable for fun.” The man could not meet another country without mentally drawing up a five-year plan for its destruction.
Then comes Stalin, and Kennan’s patience evaporates. If Lenin was the revolutionary preacher, Stalin was the mob boss who took over the parish and turned it into a front for extortion. He inherited Lenin’s ideological furniture, bolted it to the floor, and then ran the whole joint like a paranoid casino—rigged tables, armed guards, and a constant fear that the house was about to be robbed. Foreign policy under Stalin wasn’t diplomacy; it was psychological warfare with a side of casual treachery.
Kennan doesn’t let the West off easy either. Britain, France, the US—they all play the part of the gullible mark in a con movie. Sometimes they overestimated Soviet weakness, sometimes they underestimated Soviet cunning, and sometimes they seemed to think that if they just invited Moscow to enough polite luncheons, the Bolsheviks might forget about overthrowing the global order. Spoiler: they didn’t.
Kennan’s style is all quiet dissection—no frothy moral outrage, just the slow, methodical removal of illusions until you’re left staring at the bare mechanics of Bolshevik foreign policy: ideology fused with insecurity, welded into a war machine. He doesn’t bother psychoanalyzing Lenin or Stalin; he just points out, with surgical calm, how their actions were predictable if you understood that both men treated diplomacy as a delaying tactic between bouts of subversion.
If Robert Service sometimes tries to humanise them and Richard Pipes paints them as Bond villains, Kennan just shrugs and says, “They’re predators. Act accordingly.” It’s the kind of pragmatic cynicism that comes from decades of watching Western leaders hope for the best and then act surprised when they get punched in the diplomatic teeth.
The roasting here isn’t loud—it’s slow-burn. Lenin is exposed as the revolutionary purist who mistook stubbornness for strategy, Stalin as the paranoid tactician whose every foreign move was rooted in fear of both enemies and friends. Both managed to turn the Soviet Union into a fortress-state, walled in by mistrust, while selling that paranoia to the population as patriotism.
By the end, Kennan has quietly dismantled any lingering romanticism about the early Soviet state. Lenin’s internationalism was a Trojan horse; Stalin’s diplomacy was a prison warden’s rulebook. Together, they perfected a foreign policy that was equal parts missionary zeal, mobster muscle, and bad-faith poker—played with a deck they’d already marked.
And that, Kennan suggests without ever quite saying it, is why the West kept losing at this game: they never realised they weren’t playing chess with a grandmaster. They were playing three-card monte with a guy who would happily flip the table if he started to lose.
Kennan treats Lenin like the overachieving valedictorian who uses his brain not to cure cancer, but to start a fire in the chemistry lab just to prove it can be done. Sure, he had organisational brilliance and could sell Marxism like it was the latest miracle diet, but that same laser focus left him incapable of compromise. Lenin’s foreign policy was revolutionary evangelism on steroids—half messiah complex, half “let’s make the neighbours miserable for fun.” The man could not meet another country without mentally drawing up a five-year plan for its destruction.
Then comes Stalin, and Kennan’s patience evaporates. If Lenin was the revolutionary preacher, Stalin was the mob boss who took over the parish and turned it into a front for extortion. He inherited Lenin’s ideological furniture, bolted it to the floor, and then ran the whole joint like a paranoid casino—rigged tables, armed guards, and a constant fear that the house was about to be robbed. Foreign policy under Stalin wasn’t diplomacy; it was psychological warfare with a side of casual treachery.
Kennan doesn’t let the West off easy either. Britain, France, the US—they all play the part of the gullible mark in a con movie. Sometimes they overestimated Soviet weakness, sometimes they underestimated Soviet cunning, and sometimes they seemed to think that if they just invited Moscow to enough polite luncheons, the Bolsheviks might forget about overthrowing the global order. Spoiler: they didn’t.
Kennan’s style is all quiet dissection—no frothy moral outrage, just the slow, methodical removal of illusions until you’re left staring at the bare mechanics of Bolshevik foreign policy: ideology fused with insecurity, welded into a war machine. He doesn’t bother psychoanalyzing Lenin or Stalin; he just points out, with surgical calm, how their actions were predictable if you understood that both men treated diplomacy as a delaying tactic between bouts of subversion.
If Robert Service sometimes tries to humanise them and Richard Pipes paints them as Bond villains, Kennan just shrugs and says, “They’re predators. Act accordingly.” It’s the kind of pragmatic cynicism that comes from decades of watching Western leaders hope for the best and then act surprised when they get punched in the diplomatic teeth.
The roasting here isn’t loud—it’s slow-burn. Lenin is exposed as the revolutionary purist who mistook stubbornness for strategy, Stalin as the paranoid tactician whose every foreign move was rooted in fear of both enemies and friends. Both managed to turn the Soviet Union into a fortress-state, walled in by mistrust, while selling that paranoia to the population as patriotism.
By the end, Kennan has quietly dismantled any lingering romanticism about the early Soviet state. Lenin’s internationalism was a Trojan horse; Stalin’s diplomacy was a prison warden’s rulebook. Together, they perfected a foreign policy that was equal parts missionary zeal, mobster muscle, and bad-faith poker—played with a deck they’d already marked.
And that, Kennan suggests without ever quite saying it, is why the West kept losing at this game: they never realised they weren’t playing chess with a grandmaster. They were playing three-card monte with a guy who would happily flip the table if he started to lose.
June 27, 2019
As an analysis of the Soviet-Western relationship between 1917 and just after Stalin's death, I think that this book is pretty good. Kennan doesn't glorify Western diplomatic efforts and overly demonize the Soviets, and gives justification of why in many instances they each were exceptionally foolish or miscalculating in their dealings with each other. Kennan is a Western writer, of course, and his writings do exhibit a little bias in favor of the Western governments and do spend some time discussing the implicit flaws of Marxist-Leninism. But the vast majority of the work is generally egalitarian in discussing both sides of the relationship, and for showing just how complicated and surreal actions undertaken by both sides were, and I especially liked the attention to detail that he devotes in examining the reasons behind actions undertaken, which are often bizarrely rooted in mixtures of ideology, tradition, realism, and ignorance. The writing is not overly technical, but not overly simplistic, and while Kennan is occasionally prone to inserting personal opinions or theories, they are generally not followed up on and more often than not serve as a way to end off sections than as a precursor to sections explaining his own views. Kennan's style is generally enjoyable and demonstrates the qualifications and research he put into this book as a comprehensive study of the relationship described. Overall, it was an enjoyable read and thought-provoking insofar as how diplomacy underwent radical shifts in the early 20th century and how it continues to function today.
March 27, 2024
Approached this warily as i am old enough to remember the venerable Mr. Kennan pontificating about Russian matters in the 80s (and i wasn't always crazy about his views). However, patiently perusing this account left me impressed with his measured views. The whole thing is heavily colored by the era he wrote it in (50s), but that's ok. Pretty strong Lenin good / Stalin bad vibe, but .... evenly assessed. I found the section interesting wherein he frequently lambastes the brits and americans for having a rosy or careless perspective on Soviet menaces - during ww II i mean. I have had the idea that ... well... we had to do it- the poor russians were fighting and suffering so much, we had to more or less give them the store. He acknowledges some degree of justice in this (slow to launch 2nd front) but mostly debunks it - pointing out how Russia was once middle and future only out for themselves in a bitter zero sum game and that we should have been much harder than we were. He leads to me belive it would not have effected their views / actions at all (!). Learned lots of little anecdotes, for example how at one late point in 45 Stalin casually asks - does the us really want Russia to intervene in China / Japan ... wouldn't we rather finish them off ourselves. And he (Stalin) seems to know we'll say yes, yes we need you and that will open up his grabbing and demands more fluidly.
April 6, 2018
This book, taken from a series of lectures Kennan presented between 1957 and 1960, covers Soviet foreign policy from the Bolshevik revolution to the conclusion of World War II. As the title suggests, it is primarily concerned with Soviet relations with the west - Germany, Britain, France, and the USA - but also necessarily covers issues relating to China and Japan.
The first few chapters cover the formative years of the Soviet Union. Again, we're talking about foreign relations here, not about internal events or the revolution itself. Kennan covers this ground in much more detail in his books Russia Leaves the War and The Decision to Intervene. I highly recommend both these titles to readers interested in the early years of the Bolshevik regime.
Having read extensively on WWII and the period between the wars, the terrain presented was not new to me. Where I'd picked it up piecemeal, Kennan puts it all together and connects events for me that I had not connected, or connected them in ways that weren't obvious to me before.
Kennan is a master of this subject matter. He presents the material in clear language with just the right amount of background and context to make his points clear and easily understood. There are a few end notes and a short index, but no bibliography.
The first few chapters cover the formative years of the Soviet Union. Again, we're talking about foreign relations here, not about internal events or the revolution itself. Kennan covers this ground in much more detail in his books Russia Leaves the War and The Decision to Intervene. I highly recommend both these titles to readers interested in the early years of the Bolshevik regime.
Having read extensively on WWII and the period between the wars, the terrain presented was not new to me. Where I'd picked it up piecemeal, Kennan puts it all together and connects events for me that I had not connected, or connected them in ways that weren't obvious to me before.
Kennan is a master of this subject matter. He presents the material in clear language with just the right amount of background and context to make his points clear and easily understood. There are a few end notes and a short index, but no bibliography.
February 13, 2022
This book took me a very long time to read, since I'm not accustomed to reading history. I can't very well formulate a criticism of it either, given that my experience with history is limited to classrooms that only very briefly touched on this subject. That being said, I knew as I trudged through it that it would be well worth it and I found myself more and more engaged as I kept on with it (I found some of the earlier chapters a bit boring). Kennan has put a great deal of insight about international affairs in general into the very small text of this book.
Wherever you see yourself on the political spectrum I think this is a worthwhile read and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested. The author seems to have an understanding of politics concerned more with a geopolitical chessboard than anything ideological. I'm strongly considering finding and reading some other books that Kennan wrote, because he frankly Went Off with this one.
Wherever you see yourself on the political spectrum I think this is a worthwhile read and I would highly recommend it to anyone interested. The author seems to have an understanding of politics concerned more with a geopolitical chessboard than anything ideological. I'm strongly considering finding and reading some other books that Kennan wrote, because he frankly Went Off with this one.
December 16, 2018
a classic
June 28, 2019
Rapallo
December 16, 2024
It was interesting to read Kennan's take on the development of the USSR after reading Lenin.
September 10, 2014
This book is based on George Kennan's 1950s Harvard and Oxford lecture notes. He a leading authority on Russian history and policy. He is also the father of the US Soviet Cold War containment strategy, a two time Pulitzer prize winner, and highly involved in crafting the Marshall Plan as well as the Truman Doctrine. His book on Lenin and Stalin is a classic and well worth reading by people interested in Russian history and current Ukraine policy options.
Want to read
September 12, 2010(*Note to self. Copy from A.)
August 4, 2015
A must read if you're at all interested in 20th century history, and nowhere near as dry and dusty as you might anticipate.
October 10, 2021
The best cold war era coverage of the US mind and attitudes toward Lenin, etc. from Archangelsk onward. A must read in the bilateral history: more important than Acheson, et al.
sudah-punya-tapi-belum-dibaca
November 5, 2009buku lama di pameran buku
300-399-social-science
March 28, 2019327.47
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews