Okay, so this is absurdly difficult. Parts of it I couldn’t understand, not even a little bit. I don’t really have enough Freud and Neo-Freudian psychology to follow him down those particular rabbit-holes. He’s the second author I’ve read who has said that women’s bodies are like penises – and I’ve not the slightest notion of what that is supposed to mean. I’ve never thought any woman I’ve ever seen has looked like a penis – not even if I’ve squinted. And I think this is a very good thing for women, by the way.
The last couple of chapters focus on Saussure and poetry, and I didn’t follow a lot of that either and couldn’t quite work out what it meant in relation to the rest of the book. I’m sure it is obvious, but just not to me.
All that said, when he is clear, or perhaps when he talks about something I can understand, he says the sorts of things that make my brain explode. This guy is seriously, seriously clever. And he sees patterns in so many diverse theories that at times it just makes me gasp in wonder.
I’ve become particularly interested in Mauss’s The Gift. I read it a little while ago, but haven’t reviewed it because I really wanted to reread it and underline bits. The book, Debt, the first 5000 years is based on that too. The very short version is that gifts look like they are given with no strings attached – often as an expression of unrestrained generosity. However, Mauss was able to show that gift giving is a complicated system of exchange and that it ties people into systems of obligation. That is, gift giving is both an economic and a symbolic form of exchange. Now, Marx is interested in economic exchange. He says that commodities have both a use value and an exchange value and while they need to have both, he is mostly interested in their exchange value – given this is the value that determines capitalism as a mode of production.
Now, in linguistics words enter into a kind of mode of exchange too. And like commodities, language also has a deep structure and a surface structure – what Saussure referred to as langue and parole – sort of formal grammar and informal speech acts. And these structure language in similar ways to how use and exchange value structure economic activity, as a system of differences.
I did warn you, this book gets very difficult very quickly. All the same, Marx sees economic exchange as being based on a form of exploitation linked to the production of surplus value. The short version of this is that the capitalist buys from the labourer their labour power – that is, the capitalist only pays the worker enough for the worker to reproduce their labour. But the labourer is able to produce for the capitalist more than it cost to reproduce his own labour. And that excess is surplus labour – all of which goes to the capitalist and a portion of which ends up as profit. If the worker was not afflicted with ‘false consciousness’ they would realise that they don’t owe the capitalist anything, and rather, that the capitalist owes them, since they, vampire like, live off the surplus labour of the worker. But Mauss’s work on the gift points more to the importance of symbolic exchange – and helps to explain why the worker might not see this particular exchange as being as one-sided as Marx did. In fact, Baudrillard points out that by giving the worker a job the capitalist is understood as forestalling the death of the worker. Symbolically, the debt the worker owes the capitalist is impossible for them to repay. I’d never thought of this before, but I do think this is something worth thinking about – I think it says something very profound about social relations.
And Saussure’s work on linguistics also points to symbolic exchange being important too. Here the symbolic exchange that matters for Baudrillard is that related to Freud’s death drive. Death is often represented as the ultimate rejection of the system – and so the system does virtually everything in its power to either eliminate death or to remove it from view.
I found this bit of the book particularly interesting. He talks about how old people are disrespected by our society – but that they are still kept alive, even to the point of being sustained in their agony where virtually the only outcome of their continued ‘living’ will be more suffering due to their postponed death. This is then presented as if it was some sort of victory over death. He also points out that we must be one of the few societies that have ever existed that is so fastidious is hiding death away. So much so that families often don’t even see the death of their ‘loved ones’. But he also says that workers refusing to follow health and safety regulations or doing things that might kill them, both of which seem absurd, might in fact be the only form of revolt available to them to stop their lives becoming what capitalism ultimately wants from them. That is, for their ‘lives’ to be an accounting and to have the same ‘value’ the capitalist ultimately assigns to it.
This book left me a bit dizzy. That said, there are bits of it that just shine and shine. He discussion of the revulsion we feel at hearing of a culture where an animal has been hanged, for instance, and how we think this is because we are more humane, but that he then explains this really shows our culture’s near total contempt for animals, is seriously interesting. His discussion of the ideal models of the body for medicine, religion, economics and the sign (the corpse, the animal, the robot and the mannequin) is also too clever. His point is that all of these ideal forms are anything but ‘human’.
I haven’t scratched the surface in this review – and I’m not the person to scratch the surface about this book either. Few books make me feel more stupid. He is playing at the far edge of theories, many of which I only know from hearsay. There were times when I got the distinct impression he was taking the piss – but even then I wasn’t sure if I might have grabbed hold of the wrong end of the stick firmly and in both hands.
The bits of this, like his discussion of binaries and how they cancel each other, that I understood a little bit, were seriously interesting, but just enough above my head for me to be unsure what to fully make of them. Other than to feel I’d watched a master at work. Nietzsche says somewhere that no one every says ‘I didn’t like it, it was too far above me’ – well, this was too far above me too, but the bits I could understand I liked very much and convinced me that the bits I couldn’t understand were probably just as good.