The Defence and Fall of Singapore

by Brian P. Farrell

Shortly after midnight on 8 December 1941, two divisions of crack troops of the Imperial Japanese Army began a seaborne invasion of southern Thailand and northern Malaya. Their assault developed into a full-blown advance towards Singapore, the main defensive position of the British Empire in the Far East. The defending British, Indian, Australian and Malayan forces were outmanoeuvred on the ground, overwhelmed in the air and scattered on the sea. By the end of January 1942, British Empire forces were driven back onto the island of Singapore Itself, cut off from further outside help. When the Japanese stormed the island with an an-out assault, the defenders were quickly pushed back into a corner from which there was no escape. Singapore s defenders finally capitulated on 15 February, to prevent the wholesale pillage of the city itself. Their rapid and total defeat was nothing less than military humiliation and political disaster. Based on the most extensive use yet of primary documents in Britain, Japan, Australia and Singapore, Brian Farrell provides the fullest picture of how and why Singapore fell and its real significance to the outcome of the Second World War."

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History

896 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2005

About the author

Brian P. Farrell is Professor of Military History at the National University of Singapore.

Reviews

[Jur · Rating 4 out of 5]

presents the case very well, but gets repetitive and would have been better if shorter.

1. British Empire based strategy on defense of Singapore, but never committed the resources to put plans into practice. The target of moving over a major battle fleet within short span of time also quickly became an empty promise. The Empire's elite knew this but didn't dare reveal, because that would have lost them the trust of the colonies and especially Australia.

2. Then when war breaks out, it becomes even harder to build up in East Asia. Troops even get withdrawn to Mediterranean Theatre. Slow strengthening of defenses. As Japanese attack becomes imminent. Troops are shuttled back, but planning is poor. Airforce too far forward, which in turn spreads infantry force too thin. Even idiotic plan of spoiling attack into Thailand.

3. Force Z arrives just in time, but is nothing like a major battle fleet. It's immediate loss is futile, while air cover (which was the reason for forward positioning of air bases and accompanying infantry) is bungled.

4. British forward forces pressed back by Japanese aggressive attacks. Japanese are weaker, but conciously take the risk of keeping up the pressure. British units gradually unravel. Defensive lines nearer Singapore also broken through, mostly because no strategic guidance and cooperation of divisions.

5. Empire retreats in confusion to island of Singapore, where reinforcements have arrived. Empire still outnumbers the Japanese, but still no higher level co-ordination and distrust between senior command and Australian sub commanders reaches bottom level. So when Japanese attack, there is no effective answer to a breakthrough and Japanese achieve remarkable victory.

British lost the conflict on all levels: political, strategical and tactical. The politicians made promises they knew they could not keep (nothing new there), but even then the collapse of the defense was much worse than necessary. Empire forces defeated by lack of coherent strategy resulting in dispersal of forces, lack of higher level co-ordination, mutual distrust, insufficient training in local circumstances, low quality of training for modern war in general.

Japanese succeeded despite being a smaller force along tenuous supply lines. Made the right decisions about nature of warfare in Malaya despite not having previous experience in jungle terrain (contrary to the myth of Japanese being natural jungle fighters) and about keeping pressure on British forces. Also the troops and leadership had battle experience and good morale. This meant they were better able to deal with battlefield fluctuations than their untried and amateur opponents.

Loss of Singapore shattered the illusion that Great Britain could effectively defend East Asian Empire, which meant that fro then on the dominions looked to U.S. for help and the nationalist movements worked towards independence.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very detailed book about the Fall of Malaya.

The first section is pretty dry and tends to be a little repetitive but it gets more readable after that.

It was sort of infuriating to read about how incompetent the the British were here, and how much more effective the Japanese were. Knowing the outcome of the campaign was like knowing the worst Boxed Set spoilers ever - only this ending results in thousands killed and tortured.

I also didn't realise how much of a contribution the Indian troops made. Imagine how crap that would be - being taken from your country, by a second country, to a third country to fight against a fourth country!

I would've liked to learn a bit more about the conditions of the POWs after the surrender but I guess that's for a different book.

Overall, fairly interesting but a massive slog to get through (I read four other books in the time it took me to finish this).

[Wai Zin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Prior WW2, British propaganda made really big deal about Fortress Singapore. But Imperial Japanese Army overrun Malaya and captured the vaunted fortresses within two months.

Except in a few engagements, British empire forces were always outfought and outgeneralled by IJA.

Why were British performed so miserably?

In this book author try to answer that question. Author analysed the British defense policy and pointed out why it didn't work. Also he tells us about how British, Indian and Australian units were repeatedly crumpled under relentless Japanese driving charge. He mostly placed the blame on political leaderships.

It was compelling read.

[David Warner · Rating 5 out of 5]

The fall of Singapore to the Japanese in February 1942 was the most seismic defeat in the history of the British empire, and the apogee of that empire's decline, after which there was no possibility of recovery or any alternative to withdrawal and decolonialisation. Singapore was not the end of Empire, but it was the point at which the Empire's ending became all but inevitable, and in this fine and detailed analysis Brian P. Farrell explains why.
The 'Singapore strategy' developed by Britain after the Great War was simple. In order to protect British imperial interests in the Far East and provide a strategic defence for Australia and New Zealand, a naval base would be constructed at Singapore which would host an eastern fleet sufficient to deter any attack, or, if attacked, would provide both a potent force of defence and control of South East Asian seas so that Imperial reinforcements could be quickly deployed. Singapore was thus to be the lynchpin of Britain's Far East strategy and was to be defended at all cost.
However, from the beginning this strategy was undermined by the simple fact that post-war Britain could not afford either a separate eastern fleet or to build a naval base large enough to harbour any strategic fleet deployed, so rather than Singapore being the permanent base of Britain's far eastern imperial defence, hosting a sufficiently powerful fleet to deter attack upon it or any other British interests, it instead became a forward base to be reinforced with a fleet either as a preemptive deterrent, or, if war had already broken out, as soon as possible thereafter, with the caveat that Singapore would be responsible for its own defence until such reinforcements arrived. The problem was that due to treaty obligations and financial restraints there was no such main fleet that could be dispatched, and even if forces could be sent to Singapore as the strategy demanded, none could be expected until ninety days after war broke out, which after 1939 soon grew to six months because of the Royal Navy's two primary commitments to home waters and the eastern Mediterranean, regarded as necessary for home and Indian defence and supply after 1940. The 'Singapore strategy' was, therefore, actually a gigantic bluff, and 'Main Fleet to Singapore' a chimera, there being no main fleet and no naval base to harbour one, as events after the Japanese attack comprehensively proved. The 'Singapore strategy' became a shibboleth and totem of Imperial policy, unquestioned though impracticable, and incapable of being put into operation in wartime once Britain was engaged in a European conflict, but it set the framework for all the tactical and operational decisions made by GHQ Far East and Malaya Command before and after the Japanese attack in December 1941 and, as Farrell argues, thereby provides the underlying reason why defeat turned into disaster.
It was the strategy that the Naval Base must be held which determined the tactical plan Malaya Command developed for its defence, which was in two parts, providing, one, for the defence of the island itself, principally through the use of shore batteries to the south against direct assault, and, two, for the defeat of any attack down the Malayan peninsula by either interdicting an invasion in the north or through Thailand on the beaches, or fighting a main battle in northern Malaya and then falling back in good order to provide time for a fleet and reinforcements to arrive. So, Malaya Command had both to split its forces not only between the north and Singapore, but also between the peninsular shores and the Thai border, and to provide defence for forward air bases which were located not on the basis of the ability to protect them but for RAF operational requirements, even though there were insufficient aircraft either to interdict an invasion at sea or provide air support for the land forces. This meant that the army was too stretched in the north and, if a bridgehead was established by an invader, it would need to withdraw from local contacts in order to coalesce to fight a main battle in northern Malaya, while continuing to hold the air bases, a task for which it was unprepared.
To provide for this, Malaya Command developed three plans. The first, and most aggressive, was Operation Matador, which entailed crossing into neutral Thailand before an invasion could land, which, as Farrell explains was never diplomatically, politically, or operationally practicable. The second was to move to The Ledge, a geographically favourable position, running south-west from Patani and below Singora, the most likely site of an amphibious assault, forcing the invader to fight a main battle against a defended line soon after coming ashore, and, the third, failing that should the Japanese move inland too fast, was to fight a main battle to the west at Jitra. But, whatever the case, the plan to defend Singapore was dependent upon fighting a main battle in the north, holding a defensive line, and falling back as a force to further defensive positions if required, thus buying time for reinforcements.
However, as with all plans, none of these survived contact with the enemy. Even if Matador had been possible, by the time Japanese invasion transports were sighted it was too late to implement, and yet, unfathomably, Brooke-Popham, C-in-C Far East, failed to cancel it until after the Japanese had come ashore with the result that formations of III Indian Corps were still making preparations to move into Thailand when they should have been digging in for a main battle, which meant that with the Japanese moving so fast, the British were unable to give battle at The Ledge, were overrun in parts of the east, causing the premature evacuation by the RAF of air bases to their rear that the army was tasked with defending, and leading to an ill prepared and poorly fought battle at Jitra where defeat led to the retreat of the corps but not in good order to defensive positions which were not yet ready. In truth, the failure at Jitra marked the defeat of the 'Singapore strategy' since the whole plan relied upon holding the Japanese in northern Malaya, which was now impossible, and after that it was no longer a question of defending the Naval Base but of delaying the Japanese as much as possible, and yet, no plan was drawn up to adapt to the changed situation. Singapore was lost in the north in a series of encounter battles where the Japanese tactics of fast movement, incursions into and behind British lines, and flanking movement - the 'driving charge'- led to the defeat of III Indian Corps in detail and its unstoppable retreat down the peninsula before a better led and more skilled enemy, which was fighting situational battles rather than trying to make the military situation meet an obsolete plan with a too rigid doctrine suitable for Flanders in 1918 but not Malaya 1941, and where the speed of the invasion made it impossible for the defenders to fight the main battle with artillery for which they had trained and in which they would have the advantage. Unfortunately, Malaya Command was unprepared for a contingency in which the Japanese failed to fight the battle the British wanted.
But, even if Percival as GOC Malaya had brought the Japanese invaders to battle and forced them into positional fighting, would he have been able to hold the enemy long enough in the north to allow reinforcements to change the balance of forces in his favour? His priority was to defend the Naval Base, but to what purpose if there was no main fleet available? In the days before war broke out, Churchill had dispatched a token Force Z in an attempt to deter the Japanese and reassure allies, but this had been destroyed on 10 December when HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk, and there were no other capital ships that could easily be sent, while, with the Japanese also attacking in Sumatra, Borneo, and Java, as well as the Philippines and Hong Kong, what sense was there in sending reinforcements to fight a battle already lost in order to defend a naval base that would not be used for a fleet that did not exist? As it was, while I Australian Corps, originally tasked to Singapore, was diverted elsewhere, Percival was provided with 18th Division, but rather than this force being readied as a reinforcement for III Indian Corps, it was fed in piecemeal into the battle to replace losses in Heath's two defeated Indian divisions.
What the defeat in northern Malaya did lead to was the despatch of Wavell to Singapore as supreme commander of a new allied ABDA command with orders to defend Singapore as part of a Malay barrier running across from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, however, Wavell then made two decisions which brought disaster closer, one, was not to replace Percival with another, more aggressive general committed to his Imperial strategy, such as Pownall, and, second, was to order Malaya Command to fight a main battle in northern Johore. The result of these was that Wavell ordered a general who did not believe in his plan and wanted to fight a retreat back to Singapore to fight a main battle with 8th Australian Division in the lead, while also preparing for a defence on Singapore island itself. If Percival committed the forces necessary to fight the main battle, having already had his two Indian divisions smashed, then he risked opening Singapore to the enemy and turning a retreat into a rout. Wavell was still trying, despite the changed situation, to fight the battle the strategy and Whitehall demanded, but Percival was by now more concerned with keeping his command together and retaining it as a single fighting force, even if defeated and forced back to Singapore island. The outcome was predictable, with the Japanese again advancing at speed and the Australians and British and Indian forces again being defeated in local encounter battles by inferior sized but better quality forces, and then retreating to Singapore. Once Indian III Corps had been routed in the north, Singapore was lost, and Malaya Command was reduced to fighting a retreat whereby even if local brigade strength forces attacked, their commanders were always looking over their shoulder at how best they could retreat, so even when local victories were achieved they were not exploited because either commanders were too cautious or because flanking formations had already pulled back.
Farrell tells the story of the defeat in Johore, the ineffectual defence of Singapore by a defeated army and increasingly defeatist commanders, and the surrender in clear prose, but his focus upon the tactical and operational failures of the British in Malaya remains related to the faulty and impractical strategy within which the campaign was fought, how that strategy meant defeat was unavoidable, how the poor execution of a poor plan led to disaster, and how, in a constant iteration, British commanders always sought to make the situation fit the plan, pursuing an unworkable strategy by trying to make the Japanese fight a battle that suited British doctrine and not the fast moving situation. In the end, what this meant was that a defeat was turned into disaster as the wrong type of army fought the wrong sort of battle in the wrong situation and wrong geography to fit a plan that would not work in defence of a strategy already lost once the Japanese had successfully landed in Thailand and northern Malaya on 8 December 1942, and this book is an excellent exposition of how this came about.

[James Jacob · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some excellent analysis I had not considered but skirts over a few key moments. The sinking of the battleships takes a page and (a minor point) but there’s no mention of Patrick Heenan.

[GrabAsia · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is different from the many others on the fall of Singapore. At every stage it explains the gap between Britains global strategy & its capabilities - Britain could not defend its global empire, but refused to admit this & kept making unrealistic plans, such as trying to defend Singapore when it clearly could not. Britain also assumed Japan would not dare to attack the Allies, and even if they were foolish enough to do so, were not capable to inflict lasting damage. This belief pervaded through the entire civilian and military leadership & filtered downwards. There was also no strong leadership - the civilians refused to disrupt life by preparations for war and the military kept ordering retreats to keep forces intact for “later”. When later came they surrendered anyway. There are of course exceptions, but not enough to have made a difference.

The authors book brings this out v clearly. He also describes the battles in a friendlier way for a general reader like me - so we can follow the general outline of what’s going on rather than the details of individual units.

It's a long book (400+ pg) and so some of us may hesitate to pick it up, but DO. Its worth it.

[Cpen · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice book that assesses the fall of Singapore from the perspective of British imperial defence rather than simply playing Arthur Percival as a scapegoat. The defeat was a failure of overall defence policy that even the war hero Winston Churchill was partly accountable for.

One of the thoughts after reading this book is, despite the military failure, how successful is the powerless defence of Malaya and Singapore prompted the participation of United States in the Pacific War, which was one of the important motives of British holding Singapore?

Judging from the viewpoint of imperial defence, if the holding of Malaya and Singapore was indispensable in securing support from the United States and dominions in Europe and Pacific, which help to protect/recover British interests, was it a success given British incapability of maintaining strong military presence in all of her territory?

Furthermore, what was the role of the colonised people in the war efforts and how did the racial/national snobbery influenced the preparation and outcome of the war?

[Mark Green · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book which really explains the disaster

[Gin · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extremely detailed look into the battle for Malaya, including the policy decisions that were made back in London that predated the battle, but which would come to have lasting and fatal consequences for the colony.

I also concur with the other reviewers - the book was a bit of a slog to get through, and could definitely have been made shorter. The first few chapters were definitely harder to get through but you will be rewarded when he gets into the invasion proper. I think what would have made it infinitely more readable is if there were sections within the chapters, because each chapter was hardly broken up, which made for difficult reading especially in the first few chapters. I think my understanding would have been heightened if Farrell added sections, as I was trying to keep track half the time what policy he is referring to, the reasons for them, how they would come to affect the strategy for Singapore and Malaya.

Also, for a book on the Malayan campaign, it was severely lacking in maps. There is some at the end but the paucity of them severely hampered my experience reading the book. One needs to be familiar with the places he mention to appreciate how the fighting unfolded. Being Singaporean, I had no trouble with the places and roads mentioned when he came to Singapore, and somewhat familiar with the Malayan geography. But for someone reading this in the UK or Argentina, they may be utterly clueless, or at the very least would need Google Maps open. I found it helpful to have Mark Stille’s Battle of Malaya (Osprey Campaign series) alongside this book. What Farrell lacks in maps, Stille’s made up for it. Farrell’s book has depth, but Stille’s summarised narrative provided a better appreciation of the events that unfolded.

All in all, this is an important and indispensable book to understanding why Singapore fell. But it will take quite a bit from one to get through it and appreciate the details within.