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1962: The War that Wasn't
On 20 October 1962, high in the Himalayas, on the banks of the fast-flowing Nam Ka Chu, over 400 Indian soldiers were massacred, and the valley was overrun by soldiers of China's People's Liberation Army. Over the course of the next month, nearly 4,000 soldiers were killed on both sides, and the Indian army experienced its worst defeat ever. The conflict (war was never formally declared) ended because China announced a unilateral ceasefire on 21 November and halted its hitherto unhindered advance across NEFA and Ladakh. To add to India's lasting shame, neither Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru nor the Indian army was even aware that the 'war' had ended until they heard the announcement on the radio - despite the Indian embassy having been given the information two days earlier.
This conflict continues to be one of our least understood episodes. Many books have been written on the events of the time, usually by those who were involved in some way, anxious to provide justification for their actions. These accounts have succeeded only in muddying the picture further. What is clear is that 1962 was an unmitigated disaster. The terrain on which most of the battles were fought (or not fought) was remote and inaccessible; the troops were sorely underequipped, lacking even warm clothing; and the men and officers who tried to make a stand were repeatedly let down by their political and military superiors. Time and again, in Nam Ka Chu, Bum-la, Tawang, Se-la, Thembang, Bomdila - all in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA in the Eastern Sector - and in Ladakh and Chusul in the Western Sector, our forces were mismanaged, misdirected or left to fend for themselves. If the Chinese army hadn't decided to stop its victorious campaign, the damage would have been far worse.
In this definitive account of the conflict, based on dozens of interviews with soldiers and numerous others who had a firsthand view of what actually happened in 1962, Shiv Kunal Verma takes us on an uncomfortable journey through one of the most disastrous episodes of independent India's history.
This conflict continues to be one of our least understood episodes. Many books have been written on the events of the time, usually by those who were involved in some way, anxious to provide justification for their actions. These accounts have succeeded only in muddying the picture further. What is clear is that 1962 was an unmitigated disaster. The terrain on which most of the battles were fought (or not fought) was remote and inaccessible; the troops were sorely underequipped, lacking even warm clothing; and the men and officers who tried to make a stand were repeatedly let down by their political and military superiors. Time and again, in Nam Ka Chu, Bum-la, Tawang, Se-la, Thembang, Bomdila - all in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA in the Eastern Sector - and in Ladakh and Chusul in the Western Sector, our forces were mismanaged, misdirected or left to fend for themselves. If the Chinese army hadn't decided to stop its victorious campaign, the damage would have been far worse.
In this definitive account of the conflict, based on dozens of interviews with soldiers and numerous others who had a firsthand view of what actually happened in 1962, Shiv Kunal Verma takes us on an uncomfortable journey through one of the most disastrous episodes of independent India's history.
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First published January 8, 2016
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March 19, 2016
This is a most painful read for any Indian. The Author has brutally and comprehensively shown how the Indian military leadership failed its troops and country and allowed the Chinese to intrude into India without much of a fight. In battle after battle, poor tactics, ill preparedness, poor leadership and lack of professionalism allowed the Chinese a near walkover. Where the soldier fought he gave as good as he got, otherwise the Chinese ruthlessness and better tactics just led to massacres. The most painful part is the sorry fighting in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA (now Arunachal). Reputations were destroyed with lives, but the most guilty never did answer to the Nation. Recommended reading
February 1, 2020
The humiliating defeat inflicted on the Indian army in its 1962 war with China was a turning point in the country's military history. The nation was in high spirits when the army could thwart the incursion of tribal lashkars (religious fighters) into Kashmir immediately after independence in 1947. The irregular forces stood no chance before the trained soldiers who had proved their fighting mettle at various battlegrounds spread over three continents. This perhaps would have made them a bit complacent against the threats facing the country. It is true that the regular Pakistani troops could not support the lashkars openly in the face of international public opinion. Even if they did, Indian army's victory was still sure, probably delayed by a few more weeks. This is because the Pakistani army was a mirror image of the Indian one at that time, raised and trained by the same authority and sharing the same strategies and battle plans. China was different. Not only was the country shrouded in mystery, but its troops had a grueling experience of fighting internal and external enemies for at least three decades at the time of birth of the People's Republic in 1949. Moreover it was led by the crusading spirit of Maoism while India was wallowing in an illusory Gandhian idealism and the enervating ideology of nonviolence (ahimsa). At the time of establishment of the Chinese republic, it did not share its borders with India. But Mao Zedong systematically planned and executed the annexation of Tibet and Xinjiang which had nominal Chinese overlordship before the British arrived on the scene. China always disputed the sanctity of the McMahon Line that delineated Tibetan boundary with India. Border clashes escalated into serious incidents and in 1962 and all-out war erupted between the two nations. This book is a definitive account of this struggle and the factors that ensured the defeat of India. Shiv Kunal Verma is a filmmaker and military historian who was born into an army family. He has worked with all three arms of the Indian armed forces over the last 25 years. Verma has had a ringside view of matters military and his film on the National Defence Academy – The Standard Bearers – is considered a classic.
Verma narrates the carefully choreographed Chinese manoeuvres with which they crawled in to India’s doorsteps. Nehru's policy was flawed with its emphasis on his personal grandstanding and moralising sermons. While China stepped in to annex Tibet, India looked the other way and contended itself with sending mild diplomatic protests to Beijing about respecting Tibetan autonomy and settling the issue in a nonviolent manner. Verma says that the Chinese could not believe their luck at this tepid response from India. Thus the Chinese forces arrived at the very gates of India and suddenly the Himalayas ceased to be an impenetrable barrier. Nehru's towering personal ambitions also played a corrosive role. It is to be doubted that Nehru eagerly longed for a Peace Nobel. His unwillingness to take up controversial though pretty useful national issues, meaningless pursuit for building up a non-aligned movement and the backstabbing in the Indus Waters Treaty in which he conceded to Pakistan almost eighty per cent of the waters all point to his craving for the Nobel. With this in mind, he cultivated the image of ‘a man of peace’. In 1954, the Panchsheel Agreement was signed with China on which ‘eternal peace and friendship’ was guaranteed – on paper. No reciprocal concessions were granted to India even though she recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet. This was actually a disaster for India, but its PR machinery trumpeted it as a triumph for Nehru. Even though it may sound ironic with hindsight, Nehru’s victory was in fact a disaster for the nation.
Another crucial factor Verma identifies as contributing to the background of India's poor preparedness was Nehru’s apathy to his own military. Nehru veered away from building military power often exhibiting an inane reluctance to engage with the men in uniform. When the first Commander-in-Chief visited him as prime minister, he rubbished the General’s suggestion of framing a national defence policy. Nehru retorted that he wanted to scrap the army (!) and that his policy was ahimsa (p.24). Fear of a military coup also provided a subconscious context in his systematic effort to downgrade the status and influence of the army. It was only after his death that Shastri, his successor as prime minister, equated the soldier to the farmer in contributing to rebuild the nation. Nehru's decisions were arbitrary with little or no military logic that effectively sealed the fate of the army. Even as late as 1959, defence minister V K Krishna Menon rejected talks of a war with China and declare that in the unlikely event of there being one, he was quite capable of fighting it himself on a diplomatic level. The belligerent Menon could effectively browbeat the senior officers and appointed his yes-men to all vital positions.
Was China justified in claiming parts of Ladakh and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) as their own? Varma strongly refutes this argument, but drops clues that the boundary condition was not unambiguously settled when the British left India. Tibet and Xinjiang were two states that figured prominently in the ‘Great Game’ between Russia and Britain for supremacy in Central Asia. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian convention stipulated that both the British and Russians acknowledge Chinese supremacy over Tibet and that neither side could sign an independent treaty with Tibet. In 1911, the ruling Qing dynasty was toppled in a revolution and Chinese power was eclipsed in Tibet with the ousting of the royal emissary. The Dalai Lama declared independence in 1913. The British exploited this situation by holding the Simla Convention in 1914 with Tibet’s representatives. The McMahon Line was established as a result of the deliberations of this convention. A Chinese delegate attended the meet, but China later refused to ratify the treaty. Some amount of bribing and arm-twisting also went in in the negotiation process, in a way favourable to the British, and eventually to India. Tawang was handed over to India at a price of 5000 Lee Enfield rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition sold to the Tibetan army. Under the cover of Japanese invasion during the Second World War in 1944, Tibet occupied Tawang. They were later evicted by the Indian army. If we look back on this past, it does not point to the veracity of Chinese claims since Tibet was never a part of China culturally. Their claim on the province is simply a product imperialist aspiration like what Britain did to India.
No patriotic Indian who reads the shamefully inept and visionless conduct of the war would fail to squirm at the callousness with which the political and military leadership sold India out to the Chinese. Several factors were pointed out as the reasons for the fiasco. Superiority of Chinese numbers and weaponry, the shortages faced by Indian troops on all fronts ranging from clothing to ration to ammunition were some of them. But this fails to convince an objective reasoner. The author claims that a decade-plus of peacetime unrealistic training against dummy enemy in exercises and camps had dimmed the warlike instincts of the army. If this assertion is true, we must seriously sit up and take notice of the fact that our army is virtually idle for half a century after 1971! The bitter military rout of 1962 finally opened Nehru's eyes. None of his non-aligned friends had come to India's rescue. A helpless Nehru sought arms and equipment from the US and UK. Verma notes that the latter part of the war was fought with American weaponry, especially the superb 7.62 mm self-loading rifles sourced from NATO after the outbreak of hostilities on October 20, 1962.
You should not be misled by the lengthy evaluation you see above. This book is a torture for the reader on account of its minute description of moves and actions on the warfront. More than half of the text is filled with finer nuances of fighting on the frontlines that is reminiscent of military textbooks taught to cadets in military academies because the terminology is understandable only to them. Ordinary readers who cannot distinguish between a company, platoon, brigade and regiment are still stranded at the point where they started the book. The book is unreasonably huge with 400 pages of narrative printed in very small typeface.
This book is recommended only for enthusiasts of military history.
Verma narrates the carefully choreographed Chinese manoeuvres with which they crawled in to India’s doorsteps. Nehru's policy was flawed with its emphasis on his personal grandstanding and moralising sermons. While China stepped in to annex Tibet, India looked the other way and contended itself with sending mild diplomatic protests to Beijing about respecting Tibetan autonomy and settling the issue in a nonviolent manner. Verma says that the Chinese could not believe their luck at this tepid response from India. Thus the Chinese forces arrived at the very gates of India and suddenly the Himalayas ceased to be an impenetrable barrier. Nehru's towering personal ambitions also played a corrosive role. It is to be doubted that Nehru eagerly longed for a Peace Nobel. His unwillingness to take up controversial though pretty useful national issues, meaningless pursuit for building up a non-aligned movement and the backstabbing in the Indus Waters Treaty in which he conceded to Pakistan almost eighty per cent of the waters all point to his craving for the Nobel. With this in mind, he cultivated the image of ‘a man of peace’. In 1954, the Panchsheel Agreement was signed with China on which ‘eternal peace and friendship’ was guaranteed – on paper. No reciprocal concessions were granted to India even though she recognised China's suzerainty over Tibet. This was actually a disaster for India, but its PR machinery trumpeted it as a triumph for Nehru. Even though it may sound ironic with hindsight, Nehru’s victory was in fact a disaster for the nation.
Another crucial factor Verma identifies as contributing to the background of India's poor preparedness was Nehru’s apathy to his own military. Nehru veered away from building military power often exhibiting an inane reluctance to engage with the men in uniform. When the first Commander-in-Chief visited him as prime minister, he rubbished the General’s suggestion of framing a national defence policy. Nehru retorted that he wanted to scrap the army (!) and that his policy was ahimsa (p.24). Fear of a military coup also provided a subconscious context in his systematic effort to downgrade the status and influence of the army. It was only after his death that Shastri, his successor as prime minister, equated the soldier to the farmer in contributing to rebuild the nation. Nehru's decisions were arbitrary with little or no military logic that effectively sealed the fate of the army. Even as late as 1959, defence minister V K Krishna Menon rejected talks of a war with China and declare that in the unlikely event of there being one, he was quite capable of fighting it himself on a diplomatic level. The belligerent Menon could effectively browbeat the senior officers and appointed his yes-men to all vital positions.
Was China justified in claiming parts of Ladakh and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) as their own? Varma strongly refutes this argument, but drops clues that the boundary condition was not unambiguously settled when the British left India. Tibet and Xinjiang were two states that figured prominently in the ‘Great Game’ between Russia and Britain for supremacy in Central Asia. In 1907, an Anglo-Russian convention stipulated that both the British and Russians acknowledge Chinese supremacy over Tibet and that neither side could sign an independent treaty with Tibet. In 1911, the ruling Qing dynasty was toppled in a revolution and Chinese power was eclipsed in Tibet with the ousting of the royal emissary. The Dalai Lama declared independence in 1913. The British exploited this situation by holding the Simla Convention in 1914 with Tibet’s representatives. The McMahon Line was established as a result of the deliberations of this convention. A Chinese delegate attended the meet, but China later refused to ratify the treaty. Some amount of bribing and arm-twisting also went in in the negotiation process, in a way favourable to the British, and eventually to India. Tawang was handed over to India at a price of 5000 Lee Enfield rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition sold to the Tibetan army. Under the cover of Japanese invasion during the Second World War in 1944, Tibet occupied Tawang. They were later evicted by the Indian army. If we look back on this past, it does not point to the veracity of Chinese claims since Tibet was never a part of China culturally. Their claim on the province is simply a product imperialist aspiration like what Britain did to India.
No patriotic Indian who reads the shamefully inept and visionless conduct of the war would fail to squirm at the callousness with which the political and military leadership sold India out to the Chinese. Several factors were pointed out as the reasons for the fiasco. Superiority of Chinese numbers and weaponry, the shortages faced by Indian troops on all fronts ranging from clothing to ration to ammunition were some of them. But this fails to convince an objective reasoner. The author claims that a decade-plus of peacetime unrealistic training against dummy enemy in exercises and camps had dimmed the warlike instincts of the army. If this assertion is true, we must seriously sit up and take notice of the fact that our army is virtually idle for half a century after 1971! The bitter military rout of 1962 finally opened Nehru's eyes. None of his non-aligned friends had come to India's rescue. A helpless Nehru sought arms and equipment from the US and UK. Verma notes that the latter part of the war was fought with American weaponry, especially the superb 7.62 mm self-loading rifles sourced from NATO after the outbreak of hostilities on October 20, 1962.
You should not be misled by the lengthy evaluation you see above. This book is a torture for the reader on account of its minute description of moves and actions on the warfront. More than half of the text is filled with finer nuances of fighting on the frontlines that is reminiscent of military textbooks taught to cadets in military academies because the terminology is understandable only to them. Ordinary readers who cannot distinguish between a company, platoon, brigade and regiment are still stranded at the point where they started the book. The book is unreasonably huge with 400 pages of narrative printed in very small typeface.
This book is recommended only for enthusiasts of military history.
April 15, 2020
The narration and contents of the book are exhaustive. This book clearly outlines the "Peace/Nobel Loving Prime Minister" and his shortsight in identifying the threat from Chinese PLA. Though the Iron Man of India predicted this before his death, nothing was done.
With ample time at preparing an army, the country leadership just wasted the time and even thought of disbanding the Army. To add to the vows, the Army and Airforce leadership just crumbled to the pressure of Chinese PLA. They all just played onto their hands. The Chinese just occupied Aksai Chin area without even the Indian leadership being aware of such an act.
The other side to the visionary PM.
With ample time at preparing an army, the country leadership just wasted the time and even thought of disbanding the Army. To add to the vows, the Army and Airforce leadership just crumbled to the pressure of Chinese PLA. They all just played onto their hands. The Chinese just occupied Aksai Chin area without even the Indian leadership being aware of such an act.
The other side to the visionary PM.
June 1, 2022
3.5/5 Decent book but a little one-sided for my taste. The descriptions of fights and military campaigns are so detailed I would only recommend this book for the enthusiasts of military history and not the general public.
October 8, 2018
This is an outstanding book. It is very well researched and is brutally honest about the details that led to India's darkest moment after independence. The book provides an overall context to the border dispute between India and China by retracing the past details, covering the disputes between all the stakeholders that have been involved at some point of time or the other in history, India, the British Raj, China, Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and so on.
The author has done a magnificent job in detailing the condition of the Indian and the Chinese armies prior to the eventual war. Indian leadership, both political and military ones were in the worst possible state prior to 1962 and much of it was because of the troika of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon, and Lieutenant General Brij Mohan Kaul. It is particularly interesting as well as disturbing to note Nehru's attitude towards the armed forces.
Nehru, unlike Bose and Patel, veered away from building military power. Although, when cornered, he was not averse to using it — as in the case of Kashmir in 1947-48 and then Goa in 1961 — for the most part, he talked disarmament, non-alignment and Panchsheel... when the first Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, General Sir Rob Lockhart, went to Nehru with a formal defence paper that needed a policy directive from the prime minister, Nehru had exclaimed: ‘Rubbish! Total rubbish! We don’t need a defence policy. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. As far as I am concerned you can scrap the army — the police are good enough to meet our security needs.’ ...Nehru had to eat his words by the end of October 1947 itself when the tribal hordes invaded Kashmir.
Nehru was never comfortable with the armed forces. …his political indoctrination had … instilled in him a desire to downgrade India’s officer cadre rather than tap their leadership potential and assimilate them into the machinery of government. This in turn created a vacuum in the decision-making chain, into which the civil servants stepped. …taking important military decisions that they were not equipped to handle.
The cruel joke that Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Menon played on one of the most decorated officers of the Indian Army, General Thimayya who was the Army Chief prior to the war is really disturbing to read and this extract from the book which appeared in an article of the Hindustan Times gives an idea about the whole story. (https://www.hindustantimes.com/books/...)
With General Thimayya's retirement in 1961, the most efficient officers of the army were either forced out or ignored. Loyalty to the trio of Nehru/Menon/Kaul began to determine the leadership positions in the army which undermined our military like never before. The Chinese on the other hand played Nehru perfectly. Efficient political and military leadership under Chairman Mao ensured that the Chinese were always one step ahead of India.
Ultimately by the time Indians realised that a military conflict with China was inevitable, it was too late. The much hyped forward policy of the Indian leadership blew up spectacularly in the aftermath of the Chinese invasion. Completely compromised Indian military leadership, the generals at the top completely lost their nerve and totally let down the brave soldiers who were out there at the front and it all resulted in the most humiliating defeat for India in an armed conflict post 1947.
The book concludes by a thorough analysis of the war and the reasons for the defeat. Overall, the book is quite depressing to read if you are an Indian. It is hard to read through the pain and the suffering faced by our soldiers thanks to incompetent leadership at all levels. However, this book must be read by all to know the extent to which the leadership let us down in 1962 in the war that truly wasn't.
The author has done a magnificent job in detailing the condition of the Indian and the Chinese armies prior to the eventual war. Indian leadership, both political and military ones were in the worst possible state prior to 1962 and much of it was because of the troika of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon, and Lieutenant General Brij Mohan Kaul. It is particularly interesting as well as disturbing to note Nehru's attitude towards the armed forces.
Nehru, unlike Bose and Patel, veered away from building military power. Although, when cornered, he was not averse to using it — as in the case of Kashmir in 1947-48 and then Goa in 1961 — for the most part, he talked disarmament, non-alignment and Panchsheel... when the first Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, General Sir Rob Lockhart, went to Nehru with a formal defence paper that needed a policy directive from the prime minister, Nehru had exclaimed: ‘Rubbish! Total rubbish! We don’t need a defence policy. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. As far as I am concerned you can scrap the army — the police are good enough to meet our security needs.’ ...Nehru had to eat his words by the end of October 1947 itself when the tribal hordes invaded Kashmir.
Nehru was never comfortable with the armed forces. …his political indoctrination had … instilled in him a desire to downgrade India’s officer cadre rather than tap their leadership potential and assimilate them into the machinery of government. This in turn created a vacuum in the decision-making chain, into which the civil servants stepped. …taking important military decisions that they were not equipped to handle.
The cruel joke that Prime Minister Nehru and Defence Minister Menon played on one of the most decorated officers of the Indian Army, General Thimayya who was the Army Chief prior to the war is really disturbing to read and this extract from the book which appeared in an article of the Hindustan Times gives an idea about the whole story. (https://www.hindustantimes.com/books/...)
With General Thimayya's retirement in 1961, the most efficient officers of the army were either forced out or ignored. Loyalty to the trio of Nehru/Menon/Kaul began to determine the leadership positions in the army which undermined our military like never before. The Chinese on the other hand played Nehru perfectly. Efficient political and military leadership under Chairman Mao ensured that the Chinese were always one step ahead of India.
Ultimately by the time Indians realised that a military conflict with China was inevitable, it was too late. The much hyped forward policy of the Indian leadership blew up spectacularly in the aftermath of the Chinese invasion. Completely compromised Indian military leadership, the generals at the top completely lost their nerve and totally let down the brave soldiers who were out there at the front and it all resulted in the most humiliating defeat for India in an armed conflict post 1947.
The book concludes by a thorough analysis of the war and the reasons for the defeat. Overall, the book is quite depressing to read if you are an Indian. It is hard to read through the pain and the suffering faced by our soldiers thanks to incompetent leadership at all levels. However, this book must be read by all to know the extent to which the leadership let us down in 1962 in the war that truly wasn't.
August 26, 2018
Thoroughly researched and presented the 1962 war and situations leading to it in great detail. Except for Ramachandra Guha, no other historian shows Nehru in positive light. One theme specifically comes out, he was more of an idealist than someone who can handle reality and the politics which are part of ruling a democracy like India.
There are accounts which mention how Nehru preserved democracy for independent India, while that holds true, he definitely had insecurities about India becoming a militia. This also greatly explains his weakening the army and also his idealism is responsible for ignoring warnings about possible Chinese expansions from the army generals and even Patel himself before his death. While he can be given benefit of doubt that he never actually believed China would attack India, that clearly is not an evolutionary stable strategy, his not preparing for that challenge shows naivety and for that a leader can never be vindicated for his choices.
A damning account of all the events of war and a catastrophic failure in early stages of independence but we have come a long way from there and are a much better nation in terms of awareness and preparation against external threats.
There are accounts which mention how Nehru preserved democracy for independent India, while that holds true, he definitely had insecurities about India becoming a militia. This also greatly explains his weakening the army and also his idealism is responsible for ignoring warnings about possible Chinese expansions from the army generals and even Patel himself before his death. While he can be given benefit of doubt that he never actually believed China would attack India, that clearly is not an evolutionary stable strategy, his not preparing for that challenge shows naivety and for that a leader can never be vindicated for his choices.
A damning account of all the events of war and a catastrophic failure in early stages of independence but we have come a long way from there and are a much better nation in terms of awareness and preparation against external threats.
September 12, 2022
Saga of superhuman bravery by few and cowardice by many (PM , DEF MIN, Generals)who let down their own tps on grnd
January 24, 2021
Many Indians of my generation grew up on tales of the 1962 war with China. We were told that the Chinese betrayed our friendship. As time went by, I realized that we were also betrayed by our leaders.
This book sets the record straight. The book dives into the period of 1949-1950 when the Chinese annexed Sinkiang and Tibet. Shiv Kunal Verma has devoted space to describing some of the negotiations that took place in the 1920’s. He described how the Americans pressured the English to place Tibet under Chinese suzerainty.
The strategic approach that the Chinese have adopted comes through . Mr. Verma explains the reasons why the Chinese occupied Sinkiang and Tibet. He also points out that the world was recovering from World War II in 1949-50. The Chinese preyed on this to annex these two territories.
This seems to be a standard Chinese approach. Today, when the world is distracted by Covid-19, they have embarked on another round of expansionary moves.
There is a clear expose of Nehru’s failings as a leader – at least, in this aspect. The Non-Aligned Strategy was a disaster. He also points out that Nehru was suspicious of a strong Armed Forces, leading him to reduce investment here. Nothing has changed.
Finally, he ignored warnings from people like Sardar Patel and Gen. Thimmaiah. He appointed Gen. Kaul in his place, a man who was clearly incompetent for the task at hand.
India’s poor strategic planning on the battle field comes through. It is a tale of sorry leadership and valiant troops.
The Chinese, he mentions, were surprised by India’s collapse. It was a failure of leadership.
I can sense the anguish that flowed through him when he wrote the book, even though the tone was even-tempered. He has left us to learn, and to infer what we should learn. Know yourself, your terrain, your enemy. Plan, think strategically, execute. Have a plan B. Be unrelenting.
The Chinese propaganda machine was effective and smarter than ours. I was surprised to learn that they sent out radio announcements in Hindi, and often interfered with our radio signals. Our people, by contrast, did not even know where Tibet was.
This is a brilliant book. It is a sorry tale of how we were let down by poor leadership.
It is a tale well told. Have we learned the lessons of 1962? I wonder.
This book sets the record straight. The book dives into the period of 1949-1950 when the Chinese annexed Sinkiang and Tibet. Shiv Kunal Verma has devoted space to describing some of the negotiations that took place in the 1920’s. He described how the Americans pressured the English to place Tibet under Chinese suzerainty.
The strategic approach that the Chinese have adopted comes through . Mr. Verma explains the reasons why the Chinese occupied Sinkiang and Tibet. He also points out that the world was recovering from World War II in 1949-50. The Chinese preyed on this to annex these two territories.
This seems to be a standard Chinese approach. Today, when the world is distracted by Covid-19, they have embarked on another round of expansionary moves.
There is a clear expose of Nehru’s failings as a leader – at least, in this aspect. The Non-Aligned Strategy was a disaster. He also points out that Nehru was suspicious of a strong Armed Forces, leading him to reduce investment here. Nothing has changed.
Finally, he ignored warnings from people like Sardar Patel and Gen. Thimmaiah. He appointed Gen. Kaul in his place, a man who was clearly incompetent for the task at hand.
India’s poor strategic planning on the battle field comes through. It is a tale of sorry leadership and valiant troops.
The Chinese, he mentions, were surprised by India’s collapse. It was a failure of leadership.
I can sense the anguish that flowed through him when he wrote the book, even though the tone was even-tempered. He has left us to learn, and to infer what we should learn. Know yourself, your terrain, your enemy. Plan, think strategically, execute. Have a plan B. Be unrelenting.
The Chinese propaganda machine was effective and smarter than ours. I was surprised to learn that they sent out radio announcements in Hindi, and often interfered with our radio signals. Our people, by contrast, did not even know where Tibet was.
This is a brilliant book. It is a sorry tale of how we were let down by poor leadership.
It is a tale well told. Have we learned the lessons of 1962? I wonder.
January 13, 2018
A brutal (for Indians) and honest account of the 1962 Sino-Indian ‘war’.
Behind the scenes (parts 1 and 2):
The book opens up by describing the inner workings of the political and military machinations of a post-colonial India. The insecurity in Nehru’s mind of the possibility of a military coup replacing a democracy in India (like in Pakistan) led to unnecessary interference in military ranks - the heads of military who questioned the political leadership (Thimmayya and Thorat) were replaced by loyalists who served the ministers rather than the country (especially Kaul and Thapar to some extent) along with dilution of resources dedicated to equip the army for battles. But this did not stop him from committing the ill-equipped army to guard the border, a decision that led to one of the biggest debacles of modern India.
The author in the second part delves into the historical relationship between India, Tibet and China. He describes the borders and its mapping in great detail making it a very educative read.
War scenes (parts 3 and 4):
This is the most heartbreaking section for a casual reader. The author is brutally honest in exposing the shortcomings of Indian army leadership during war, its incapability in high altitude warfare (due to lack of equipment, winter clothes and training) and its underestimation of Chinese intent and strategies.
The author stresses multiple times that mano-a-mano, the Indian soldier was extremely capable but it was the military generals who were an inefficient bunch and let their own units down. This lack of effective decision making led to abandoning of defensive posts so as to occupy ‘safer’ posts inland and scattering of the forces in multiple directions meant the Chinese could massacre them piecemeal. Apart from a few defensive victories here and there, the campaign at all locations was an unprecedented disaster.
Every word in this section of the book is a must read as it fills you with respect and sympathy for all the soldiers who fought the battles from unfamiliar and ever changing scenarios. The descriptions are detailed and the narration is fantastic.
This is a must have book on every Indian’s shelf.
Behind the scenes (parts 1 and 2):
The book opens up by describing the inner workings of the political and military machinations of a post-colonial India. The insecurity in Nehru’s mind of the possibility of a military coup replacing a democracy in India (like in Pakistan) led to unnecessary interference in military ranks - the heads of military who questioned the political leadership (Thimmayya and Thorat) were replaced by loyalists who served the ministers rather than the country (especially Kaul and Thapar to some extent) along with dilution of resources dedicated to equip the army for battles. But this did not stop him from committing the ill-equipped army to guard the border, a decision that led to one of the biggest debacles of modern India.
The author in the second part delves into the historical relationship between India, Tibet and China. He describes the borders and its mapping in great detail making it a very educative read.
War scenes (parts 3 and 4):
This is the most heartbreaking section for a casual reader. The author is brutally honest in exposing the shortcomings of Indian army leadership during war, its incapability in high altitude warfare (due to lack of equipment, winter clothes and training) and its underestimation of Chinese intent and strategies.
The author stresses multiple times that mano-a-mano, the Indian soldier was extremely capable but it was the military generals who were an inefficient bunch and let their own units down. This lack of effective decision making led to abandoning of defensive posts so as to occupy ‘safer’ posts inland and scattering of the forces in multiple directions meant the Chinese could massacre them piecemeal. Apart from a few defensive victories here and there, the campaign at all locations was an unprecedented disaster.
Every word in this section of the book is a must read as it fills you with respect and sympathy for all the soldiers who fought the battles from unfamiliar and ever changing scenarios. The descriptions are detailed and the narration is fantastic.
This is a must have book on every Indian’s shelf.
November 2, 2017
Wrongs of past should not be the reason behind Wars in future. What happened in '62 was mistakes of past and a repeat of same citing '62 as reason is one thing two big boys of Asia should avoid.
With detailed history of past undisclosed treaties,writer explained Indo-Tibet-China border issue with huge clarity. Sacrifice of our soldiers is irreplaceable and even deaths on other side is not a happy story. Thanks to Shiv Verma for taking us through this journey.
Must Read.
With detailed history of past undisclosed treaties,writer explained Indo-Tibet-China border issue with huge clarity. Sacrifice of our soldiers is irreplaceable and even deaths on other side is not a happy story. Thanks to Shiv Verma for taking us through this journey.
Must Read.
August 2, 2020
In the late autumn of 1962, buoyed by the relative ease with which he had taken over Sinkiang and Tibet, Mao Zedong decided that it was finally time to start chipping away at the northern frontier of India. He sent his battle-hardened army over the Himalayan watershed and during the next four weeks in what remains the most shameful period in the history of the Indian Armed Forces; the Hans decimated India's defences and arrived at the foothills overlooking the plains of Assam.
By the third week of November, the 7th Infantry Division and its three Brigades had melted away. In Walong and Ladakh, two more Brigades had collapsed. Having occupied the Kameng hills, the plains of Assam now lay defenceless before the advancing Chinese Army. The Prime Minister announced on All India Radio that the people of Assam were now at the mercy of the Hans. Civilian and Security Forces alike dashed over to the south bank of the Brahmaputra. The mighty river was the only defence still standing. The political leadership and the generals had betrayed the nation and left the very people they swore to defend fending for themselves.
Mao, having accomplished the strategic objectives he set out to achieve, announced a ceasefire effective from the midnight of 21st of November 1962. As the guns fell silent, both sides went about writing their version of the events. The Chinese employed their propagandists to pin the blame on India and Nehru's Forward Policy.
On the other side, Nehru, who had engrossed himself in singing the glories of Panchseel even as the Hans went about occupying Aksai Chin, now tried to portray his failure as a betrayal by the Chinese. The Generals, spared of any accountability for their failures, focused on writing their memoirs, pinning the blame on all and sundry except for themselves.
What transpired in the late autumn of '62 remains a dark blot on independent India's history. A nation betrayed by their political masters who went about gratifying their Himalayan egos with the lofty ideals of Panchsheel and Non-Alignment instead of defending the lands the people entrusted them to protect. A General staff that abandoned the men who looked up to them for support and leadership left them to be cannon fodder for the bloodthirsty Hans. Where the men escaped the invaders, the cotton shirts and the flimsy blankets that were their defence against the bitter cold of the Himalayas delivered the coup de grâce .
The 1962 war was definitely a war that never was. It was a systematic failure of political and military leadership, leading to a continuous series of withdrawals every time the Chinese appeared. The author has, with the precision of a surgeon's knife, done a masterful job of dissecting the events that led to the shameful debacle of 1962
Today, the Han has again reverted to his expansionist ways and is looking to deliver a '62 like a knock-out punch to India in Ladakh. At this juncture, it is vital to read and internalise the lessons of this book to prevent a redux of 1962.
By the third week of November, the 7th Infantry Division and its three Brigades had melted away. In Walong and Ladakh, two more Brigades had collapsed. Having occupied the Kameng hills, the plains of Assam now lay defenceless before the advancing Chinese Army. The Prime Minister announced on All India Radio that the people of Assam were now at the mercy of the Hans. Civilian and Security Forces alike dashed over to the south bank of the Brahmaputra. The mighty river was the only defence still standing. The political leadership and the generals had betrayed the nation and left the very people they swore to defend fending for themselves.
Mao, having accomplished the strategic objectives he set out to achieve, announced a ceasefire effective from the midnight of 21st of November 1962. As the guns fell silent, both sides went about writing their version of the events. The Chinese employed their propagandists to pin the blame on India and Nehru's Forward Policy.
On the other side, Nehru, who had engrossed himself in singing the glories of Panchseel even as the Hans went about occupying Aksai Chin, now tried to portray his failure as a betrayal by the Chinese. The Generals, spared of any accountability for their failures, focused on writing their memoirs, pinning the blame on all and sundry except for themselves.
What transpired in the late autumn of '62 remains a dark blot on independent India's history. A nation betrayed by their political masters who went about gratifying their Himalayan egos with the lofty ideals of Panchsheel and Non-Alignment instead of defending the lands the people entrusted them to protect. A General staff that abandoned the men who looked up to them for support and leadership left them to be cannon fodder for the bloodthirsty Hans. Where the men escaped the invaders, the cotton shirts and the flimsy blankets that were their defence against the bitter cold of the Himalayas delivered the coup de grâce .
The 1962 war was definitely a war that never was. It was a systematic failure of political and military leadership, leading to a continuous series of withdrawals every time the Chinese appeared. The author has, with the precision of a surgeon's knife, done a masterful job of dissecting the events that led to the shameful debacle of 1962
Today, the Han has again reverted to his expansionist ways and is looking to deliver a '62 like a knock-out punch to India in Ladakh. At this juncture, it is vital to read and internalise the lessons of this book to prevent a redux of 1962.
December 8, 2020
I'll be talking about "1962 The War, That Wasn't" by Shiv Kunal Verma. This is according to me the most chilling account of the Indo-China War of 1962, which clearly points out the failures of the senior leadership of our army. The author is extremely critical of the way the battle plans were drawn which resulted into hundreds of futile deaths of Indian soldiers.
The book further adds to the frustration as it reveals that our Prime Minister wasn't even aware (until they read the newspapers) of the fact that the war had ended despite being informed about it. The accounts of the Indian soldiers and what they went through is horrific and the tales are uncomfortable to read. The soldiers weren't properly equipped or trained and never stood a chance against the Chinese forces.
Our history isn't always glorious and this book is the proof of it with the countless lives lost and a war lost, over the incompetence of our political and military leadership. Shiv Kunal Verma is a brilliant writer who has depicted one of India's most crippling military failures after she gained Independence.
-Anshula
(@thebookishlawyer) IG
The book further adds to the frustration as it reveals that our Prime Minister wasn't even aware (until they read the newspapers) of the fact that the war had ended despite being informed about it. The accounts of the Indian soldiers and what they went through is horrific and the tales are uncomfortable to read. The soldiers weren't properly equipped or trained and never stood a chance against the Chinese forces.
Our history isn't always glorious and this book is the proof of it with the countless lives lost and a war lost, over the incompetence of our political and military leadership. Shiv Kunal Verma is a brilliant writer who has depicted one of India's most crippling military failures after she gained Independence.
-Anshula
(@thebookishlawyer) IG
June 23, 2023
Definitive account of the 1962 war. Too much information for a normal reader.
October 2, 2018
Very detailed update from author
October 22, 2020
Very painful at times. I now know pretty much everything I need to know about the India-China border.
One of the things that stood out to me, a major reason for the unbelievable disarray of the High Command and perhaps something that colored the entire post independence period, was the distrust Nehru (and by extension, a bunch of other politicians/freedom-fighters of that age) had in the military.
While a part of this may be ascribable just to "We don't need a military" Nehru naivety, there seem to be 2 reasons that partially explain why he may have turned out the way he did.
Firstly, apparently, the Indian Military was not something that was created as new entity post 1947. Instead, it was a re-branding of an existing body of force, maintained and operated by the British in India for British purposes. For eg, the main force in the East, the Assam Rifles (which was something more than Police, but less than the Army) was created a century before independence to safeguard tea plantations in Assam owned by British individuals. Similary, some of the regular army units fought for the British in World War II in places like Burma and Korea, for eg.
In the 30 years of Ahimsa and Swaraj struggle, our freedom fighters stressed on boycotting the (then British) government bodies. For example, the movement had inspired Shastri to quit his 10th standard (government) schooling 3 months before completion. The difference between the people at the top in the political sphere and the military sphere could not have been more starker.
The second part of the puzzle is that the post World War II period was a time when military coup's were totally in. (Looking at the Wikipedia listing, there seem to have been like 4-5 attempts every year across the world - out of which at least 2 seemed to have succeeded every year). It was quite jarring to realize that this was even a failure mode, back then.
One of the things that stood out to me, a major reason for the unbelievable disarray of the High Command and perhaps something that colored the entire post independence period, was the distrust Nehru (and by extension, a bunch of other politicians/freedom-fighters of that age) had in the military.
While a part of this may be ascribable just to "We don't need a military" Nehru naivety, there seem to be 2 reasons that partially explain why he may have turned out the way he did.
Firstly, apparently, the Indian Military was not something that was created as new entity post 1947. Instead, it was a re-branding of an existing body of force, maintained and operated by the British in India for British purposes. For eg, the main force in the East, the Assam Rifles (which was something more than Police, but less than the Army) was created a century before independence to safeguard tea plantations in Assam owned by British individuals. Similary, some of the regular army units fought for the British in World War II in places like Burma and Korea, for eg.
In the 30 years of Ahimsa and Swaraj struggle, our freedom fighters stressed on boycotting the (then British) government bodies. For example, the movement had inspired Shastri to quit his 10th standard (government) schooling 3 months before completion. The difference between the people at the top in the political sphere and the military sphere could not have been more starker.
The second part of the puzzle is that the post World War II period was a time when military coup's were totally in. (Looking at the Wikipedia listing, there seem to have been like 4-5 attempts every year across the world - out of which at least 2 seemed to have succeeded every year). It was quite jarring to realize that this was even a failure mode, back then.
February 23, 2019
Shiv Kunal Verma’s “1962 The War That Wasn’t” is an exceptionally good book that take the reader through the history of Indo-China border issues, the geographical nature of this border, the political perspective and finally, with great details, how the war unfolded. This is probably one of those rare books that talks about the war in so much details and is actually not written by someone who was actually part of the war. Because, persons involved in a war and writing their narrative generally tend to defend their own position, and in the process present a skewed view of the war.
The author starts the book with a powerful line – “for my father, Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma, and his generation that paid the price”. This line summarized the tone of book and the nature of 1962 war. A war does not happen suddenly. There is a long history that ultimately culminates to a flash point. And once the war begin, men simply do not vanish suddenly. There will be battles fought by platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and even divisions. Death does not come so easily. Even to die, soldiers have to fight hard.
Shiv Kunal Verma presents a brilliant historical perspective to the war. Talks about Dogras, Tibet, China, British, Assam Rifles, Dalai Lama and many other factors. Very focus is also given on the political and military leadership of India from 1947 to 1962. This was a very important phase as Indian leaders failed to read the intentions coming from China. Even annexation of Tibet was not given the importance it deserved at that time.
Mindset, skills and decision making abilities of Jawahar Lal Nehru (PM), Bijji Kaul (Senior Army Officer), Mullik (IB Chief), KK Menon (Defence Minister) and various other key persons involved in running the war are explained in details. What is impressive the mostly unbiased stance taken by the author. Another area that is covered in great length is the geography of NEFA. I have never read a war book that talked so much about this specific aspect. And finally, the amount of details he provides about various India Army divisions that were involved in the war, how they were all neutralized by the Chinese and incompetence of Military leadership is explained in detail.
Forward Policy, Nam Ka Chu, Bum-La, Se-La, Tawang, break contact, communication line, MMG, mortars, retreat, defensive setup, 9 Punjab, 2 Rajput, 1 Sikh, 4 Garhwal Rifles, 4 Sikh LI, Assam Rifles and so on. These terms will be etched in your memory for a really long time.
This is a long book and needs some time to complete. But it is so well written that you would want to read as much as possible in every single sitting. On the flip side, the amount is print space given to historical context and geographical descriptions is really high. This may confuse the reader, especially if you are like me reading this book on Kindle where maps are not clearly visible.
Overall, a really brilliant book and something every Indian should know about 1962 war. Read this first. Period.
PS: One more reason why I personally like a book is when it helps me find another great book. Shiv Kunal Verma refers to another book call “Defeat to Victory” which is about the World War II when Indian soldiers fought with the British to evict Japanese from Burma. I have already bought this book now 🙂
The author starts the book with a powerful line – “for my father, Major General Ashok Kalyan Verma, and his generation that paid the price”. This line summarized the tone of book and the nature of 1962 war. A war does not happen suddenly. There is a long history that ultimately culminates to a flash point. And once the war begin, men simply do not vanish suddenly. There will be battles fought by platoons, companies, battalions, brigades and even divisions. Death does not come so easily. Even to die, soldiers have to fight hard.
Shiv Kunal Verma presents a brilliant historical perspective to the war. Talks about Dogras, Tibet, China, British, Assam Rifles, Dalai Lama and many other factors. Very focus is also given on the political and military leadership of India from 1947 to 1962. This was a very important phase as Indian leaders failed to read the intentions coming from China. Even annexation of Tibet was not given the importance it deserved at that time.
Mindset, skills and decision making abilities of Jawahar Lal Nehru (PM), Bijji Kaul (Senior Army Officer), Mullik (IB Chief), KK Menon (Defence Minister) and various other key persons involved in running the war are explained in details. What is impressive the mostly unbiased stance taken by the author. Another area that is covered in great length is the geography of NEFA. I have never read a war book that talked so much about this specific aspect. And finally, the amount of details he provides about various India Army divisions that were involved in the war, how they were all neutralized by the Chinese and incompetence of Military leadership is explained in detail.
Forward Policy, Nam Ka Chu, Bum-La, Se-La, Tawang, break contact, communication line, MMG, mortars, retreat, defensive setup, 9 Punjab, 2 Rajput, 1 Sikh, 4 Garhwal Rifles, 4 Sikh LI, Assam Rifles and so on. These terms will be etched in your memory for a really long time.
This is a long book and needs some time to complete. But it is so well written that you would want to read as much as possible in every single sitting. On the flip side, the amount is print space given to historical context and geographical descriptions is really high. This may confuse the reader, especially if you are like me reading this book on Kindle where maps are not clearly visible.
Overall, a really brilliant book and something every Indian should know about 1962 war. Read this first. Period.
PS: One more reason why I personally like a book is when it helps me find another great book. Shiv Kunal Verma refers to another book call “Defeat to Victory” which is about the World War II when Indian soldiers fought with the British to evict Japanese from Burma. I have already bought this book now 🙂
October 18, 2016
The author is a filmmaker and a military historian, true to his credentials, the book starts with a filmesque introduction describing the lost war scenes , and survival of an Indian soldier despite an AK 47 shelled into him with help from a Chinese nurse, who spoke fluent Hindi.
The title is picked up from the statement of Pran Thapar, the Army general in 1961-62, when he says "it truly was a war that wasn't", because, officially neither China nor India ever declared war, and Chinese officials express surprise when Indians keep referring to it as one.
This book is an immaculately researched, covers minute details of the war, related background, and thought-process that went on in the decision making, tracing the history of the borders with Tibet, Sinkiang. The author, given his family background in the military, has been able to get such kind of details which anyone else couldn't have. It borrows heavily from his father Ashok Kalyan Verma's book, diary, memoirs,notes references, who happened to be a captain in 1962, having seen the war place from close.
Up until I read this book, I had a hazy picture of how Nehru might have been responsible for this debacle. But, having read this, I can definitely say, it's the Nehru-Menon-Kaul trio that was responsible. (PM-DM-GOC)
The book traces the decision-making, makes very logical arguments and only then places the blame on the callous attitude of Nehru towards the army, his ineptitude in geopolitics, his turning away from the realpolitik for the want of his image of being the Afro-Asian leader of peace, his non-violent rhetoric, his insecurities with Army generals, and his favoritism in Army recruitment along with his defence minister V.K Menon for rendering Army rudderless and headless after COAS K.S Thimmayya and S.P.P Thorat were sidelined and ultimately culminating in a humiliating defeat.
For a general reader with interest in military history this book is a fine read, otherwise, one can skip the chapters which trace the history of the borders of Tibet with India and China, how Chinese employed the distortion of history on trivial details. And in a chapter or two, where the army was being mobilized it gets a bit heavy with lots of name droppings of Army leadership, soldiers, frontier posts, etc.
The book leaves us feeling hurt at the unavenged war and the Chinese betrayal, makes us realize how much India missed Sardar Patel after his death as he had predicted the Chinese betrayal way back in 1950 in a letter to Nehru and dies exactly after 38 days of writing his letter, probably that was his parting gift for India which our leadership didn't take, as it resulted in a national disaster which could have been avoided, a national disaster in which over 2,000 Indian soldiers died in the month-long armed hostilities which began October 21, 1962, with a massive two-pronged offensive by the People’s Liberation Army in Ladakh and Arunachal. Over 4,000 were taken prisoners of war, and an entire division of over 15,000 ill-equipped, ill-trained soldiers was routed in the face of the massive Chinese onslaught.
This leaves us with a thought that hopefully our leadership wouldn't do another of such mistake in the future.
The title is picked up from the statement of Pran Thapar, the Army general in 1961-62, when he says "it truly was a war that wasn't", because, officially neither China nor India ever declared war, and Chinese officials express surprise when Indians keep referring to it as one.
This book is an immaculately researched, covers minute details of the war, related background, and thought-process that went on in the decision making, tracing the history of the borders with Tibet, Sinkiang. The author, given his family background in the military, has been able to get such kind of details which anyone else couldn't have. It borrows heavily from his father Ashok Kalyan Verma's book, diary, memoirs,notes references, who happened to be a captain in 1962, having seen the war place from close.
Up until I read this book, I had a hazy picture of how Nehru might have been responsible for this debacle. But, having read this, I can definitely say, it's the Nehru-Menon-Kaul trio that was responsible. (PM-DM-GOC)
The book traces the decision-making, makes very logical arguments and only then places the blame on the callous attitude of Nehru towards the army, his ineptitude in geopolitics, his turning away from the realpolitik for the want of his image of being the Afro-Asian leader of peace, his non-violent rhetoric, his insecurities with Army generals, and his favoritism in Army recruitment along with his defence minister V.K Menon for rendering Army rudderless and headless after COAS K.S Thimmayya and S.P.P Thorat were sidelined and ultimately culminating in a humiliating defeat.
For a general reader with interest in military history this book is a fine read, otherwise, one can skip the chapters which trace the history of the borders of Tibet with India and China, how Chinese employed the distortion of history on trivial details. And in a chapter or two, where the army was being mobilized it gets a bit heavy with lots of name droppings of Army leadership, soldiers, frontier posts, etc.
The book leaves us feeling hurt at the unavenged war and the Chinese betrayal, makes us realize how much India missed Sardar Patel after his death as he had predicted the Chinese betrayal way back in 1950 in a letter to Nehru and dies exactly after 38 days of writing his letter, probably that was his parting gift for India which our leadership didn't take, as it resulted in a national disaster which could have been avoided, a national disaster in which over 2,000 Indian soldiers died in the month-long armed hostilities which began October 21, 1962, with a massive two-pronged offensive by the People’s Liberation Army in Ladakh and Arunachal. Over 4,000 were taken prisoners of war, and an entire division of over 15,000 ill-equipped, ill-trained soldiers was routed in the face of the massive Chinese onslaught.
This leaves us with a thought that hopefully our leadership wouldn't do another of such mistake in the future.
October 9, 2022
I have always wanted to know more about 1962 Indo-China War. I wanted to know about the geopolitical factors which led to the war as well as the reasons which caused such a humiliation to us.
Shiv Kunal Verma's retelling of the war, it's causes and aftermath is a touching and poignant tale of immense bravery as well as shameful cowardice. It tells the story of supreme loyalty and sacrifice of Indian army officers (junior and mid-level ranks) and men as well as that of incompetence of senior army officers who had been placed at the helm of affairs by a political class who didn't know anything about war.
Shiv Kunal Verma is meticulous in his detailing of war fought across two theaters. His description of the battles (and events) of Nam-Ka-Chu, Rezang-La, Tawang, Se-La, Lohit Valley etc. is detailed and brings them to life. More than once I had tears in my eyes reading of the valour and sacrifice of our men (colonels and their men), felt anguished at their lack of clothing, equipment and other required support to fight a high altitude battle, seethed with anger as I read of the sheet incompetence and cowardice of senior army officers (brigadiers and above) and of a nonchalant political class, especially Nehru who weakened the top command of Indian Army fearing a military coup (a not unfounded fear going by experience of newly independent Afro-Asian countries) and the opposition which clamored for war without knowing what it costs or even means.
I just hope that we don't repeat the follies of the past. The dragon still sits at our doorstep and if the events of last two years have taught us anything it is that we can't be complacent against our enemies. We need to learn from history and this book does just that.
Shiv Kunal Verma's retelling of the war, it's causes and aftermath is a touching and poignant tale of immense bravery as well as shameful cowardice. It tells the story of supreme loyalty and sacrifice of Indian army officers (junior and mid-level ranks) and men as well as that of incompetence of senior army officers who had been placed at the helm of affairs by a political class who didn't know anything about war.
Shiv Kunal Verma is meticulous in his detailing of war fought across two theaters. His description of the battles (and events) of Nam-Ka-Chu, Rezang-La, Tawang, Se-La, Lohit Valley etc. is detailed and brings them to life. More than once I had tears in my eyes reading of the valour and sacrifice of our men (colonels and their men), felt anguished at their lack of clothing, equipment and other required support to fight a high altitude battle, seethed with anger as I read of the sheet incompetence and cowardice of senior army officers (brigadiers and above) and of a nonchalant political class, especially Nehru who weakened the top command of Indian Army fearing a military coup (a not unfounded fear going by experience of newly independent Afro-Asian countries) and the opposition which clamored for war without knowing what it costs or even means.
I just hope that we don't repeat the follies of the past. The dragon still sits at our doorstep and if the events of last two years have taught us anything it is that we can't be complacent against our enemies. We need to learn from history and this book does just that.
August 3, 2018
The book is a must-read for any Indian history enthusiast looking to know more about the "war" of 1962.
The author starts with an anecdote to set the tone of the rest of the book. And the tone is macabre; one of impending and inevitable doom. The author then lucidly details the historical nature of relations between India and Tibet, and then between India and China. He describes the political situation at home and in Beijing, to help us understand why this was more than a struggle for "some land". Political reasons why this was never officially declared a war, but a "border conflict" by the Indian government; "A war that wasn't".
"1962" reads better than a previous book I read on India's Wars by Arjun Subramaniam because it is narrative in nature. While narration could lead to some loss of objectivity, the benefits are far more. Reading through, one can form a clear mental picture of events as they unfolded in that fateful period of India's military history.
The book is a comprehensive account of the "war", taking excerpts from both Indian and Chinese official and unofficial sources. Both the duly criticized for their exaggeration or lauded for their credibility.
The dearth of maps is again painfully evident, as I had to google a lot of locations and their relative positioning to get an idea of the troop deployments on either side.
To sum up, despite a shortage of maps, the book is an amazing and informative read: A lesson for the generations to come about the horrors of war and worse - Political interference in the armed forces in the time of war.
The author starts with an anecdote to set the tone of the rest of the book. And the tone is macabre; one of impending and inevitable doom. The author then lucidly details the historical nature of relations between India and Tibet, and then between India and China. He describes the political situation at home and in Beijing, to help us understand why this was more than a struggle for "some land". Political reasons why this was never officially declared a war, but a "border conflict" by the Indian government; "A war that wasn't".
"1962" reads better than a previous book I read on India's Wars by Arjun Subramaniam because it is narrative in nature. While narration could lead to some loss of objectivity, the benefits are far more. Reading through, one can form a clear mental picture of events as they unfolded in that fateful period of India's military history.
The book is a comprehensive account of the "war", taking excerpts from both Indian and Chinese official and unofficial sources. Both the duly criticized for their exaggeration or lauded for their credibility.
The dearth of maps is again painfully evident, as I had to google a lot of locations and their relative positioning to get an idea of the troop deployments on either side.
To sum up, despite a shortage of maps, the book is an amazing and informative read: A lesson for the generations to come about the horrors of war and worse - Political interference in the armed forces in the time of war.
April 29, 2018
A clinical, heart-breaking analysis of the most tragic debacles in Indian military history. The book is elaborate, indeed, very elaborate. It is not easy to read, because Verma does not treat the subject superficially, but narrates in detail. The terrain, the geo-political aspects, the various tribes and peoples that inhabited the region under discussion, the complex interactions between the Nations in the region, the soldiers who fought the war, the deceit, the little skirmishes, the bloody battles, the heart-breaking manner in which the political and military leaders dealt with the war, are all dealt with in detail. Many many people who fought, each his own war, are mentioned, by name and rank, right from the NCO to the Generals. This is a book that every Indian from every walk of life should read, for it shows the enormous price of choosing sycophancy over merit.
The book contains so much detail, that some casual readers may find it daunting.
The book contains so much detail, that some casual readers may find it daunting.
January 27, 2017
The Analysis of Great Debacle
Brilliant - is the word to describe the book. It takes you on three fronts - One in NEFA , second in Ladakh, the third the most important one - Delhi. Despite brilliance of our soldiers - Delhi front failed miserably which lead to greatest army debacle in Post independance area.
Book reconfirms old adage : Wars are won mentally first & then on battleground
Brilliant - is the word to describe the book. It takes you on three fronts - One in NEFA , second in Ladakh, the third the most important one - Delhi. Despite brilliance of our soldiers - Delhi front failed miserably which lead to greatest army debacle in Post independance area.
Book reconfirms old adage : Wars are won mentally first & then on battleground
August 10, 2018
1962- The war that wasn’t is a detailed account of the one of the most important events in the history of our country. Superbly written and brutally honest – the narrative reveals the real secrets of Sino – Indian war. Although there are so many facts and data points which a reader should understand to get a feel of the real situation; but still this one definitely warrants a read as this is the real story of the Indo – China conflict which should be known by every Indian.
July 30, 2018
Brilliant read. Well researched. The author engrosses the reader with great story telling. How leadership, bad communication, and bad planning can bring disastrous consequences is a learning for all. Last but not the least, armed forces need to be kept away from politics. Learning from history and correcting the future by taking good decision today is one big takeaway from this book.
July 14, 2017
Must read
I had read Himalayan Blunder and was looking for another book on 1962 Indo China war. This book was on expected lines of Himalayan Blunder. But this book as it is written many years later after action took place. This book is critical of Brigadier Dalvi as well.
I had read Himalayan Blunder and was looking for another book on 1962 Indo China war. This book was on expected lines of Himalayan Blunder. But this book as it is written many years later after action took place. This book is critical of Brigadier Dalvi as well.
November 30, 2017
Every Minute Details about Sino Indian War
If you want to study about the Indian Chinese War, this is the best reference guide. Every minute details, political decisions, incidents at border, chinese policy, stand of Nehru etc., are well described in this book. Great Job!
If you want to study about the Indian Chinese War, this is the best reference guide. Every minute details, political decisions, incidents at border, chinese policy, stand of Nehru etc., are well described in this book. Great Job!
April 11, 2018
Fantastic book with very detailed accounts of operation. Clearly it gives a fair view of what actually happened and who were to be blamed for the debacle. Must read if you want to know about Indo China relationship.
May 4, 2023
An eye-opening account of the events which transpired into one of the biggest combined political and military failure at the highest level. The result was a cold defeat at the hands of our 'northern neighbours'. Lessons must be drawn out and learnt by generations to come.
July 25, 2016
Brilliant insights into history of Tibet, Bhutan, NEFA, Ladakh, British and everything i.e. wrong in the Indo-China relationship
May 20, 2017
A strong critique of failing political leadership and weak general-level command, but also somewhat longwinded and clumsily narrated.
July 26, 2017
I heard this on audio, so following the maps was not possible. An amazing book detailing on the machinations leading to the 1962 Sino Indian conflict and the conflict itself.
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