" More than half a century after the advent of the nuclear age, is the world approaching a tipping point that will unleash an epidemic of nuclear proliferation? Today many of the building blocks of a nuclear arsenal—scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, software, design information—are more readily available than ever before. The nuclear pretensions of so-called rogue states and terrorist organizations are much discussed. But how firm is the resolve of those countries that historically have chosen to forswear nuclear weapons? A combination of changes in the international environment could set off a domino effect, with countries scrambling to develop nuclear weapons so as not to be left behind—or to develop nuclear ""hedge"" capacities that would allow them to build nuclear arsenals relatively quickly, if necessary. Th e Nuclear Tipping Point e xamines the factors, both domestic and transnational, that shape nuclear policy. The authors, distinguished scholars and foreign policy practitioners with extensive government experience, develop a framework for understanding why certain countries may originally have decided to renounce nuclear weapons—and pinpoint some more recent country-specific factors that could give them cause to reconsider. Case studies of eight long-term stalwarts of the nonproliferation regime—Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Taiwan—flesh out this framework and show how even these countries might be pushed over the edge of a nuclear tipping point. The authors offer prescriptions that would both prevent such countries from reconsidering their nuclear option and avert proliferation by others. The stakes are enormous and success is far from assured. To keep the tipping point beyond reach, the authors argue, the international community will have to act with unity, imagination, and strength, and Washington's leadership will be essential. Contributors include Leon Feurth, George Washington University; Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center; Thomas W. Lippman, Middle East Institute; Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Derek J. Mitchell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jonathan D. Pollack, U.S. Naval War College; Walter B. Slocombe, Caplin and Drysdale; and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Center for Strategic and International Studies. "
I will say, upon getting this book I was VERY excited to read it. One of my thesis ideas for graduate school was going to be a multivariate analysis of what caused states to pursue nuclear power. One of the prime areas I was going to look at was security and presence of nuclear armed rivals. So this book dove-tailed nicely. However, I was largely disappointed. It is still a fascinating read, I felt the title was misleading it would be more appropriately titled 'The Nuclear Tipping Point: When would States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices'. A subtle difference, but important. Really, the individual chapters were very informative, and I felt the analysis on the subject was spot on. The only real flaw I can find with the book is that the chapters were written in a vacuum. For instance, the South Korea chapter made some bold claims about if South Korea obtained nukes, that it would jeopardize their relationship with Japan. I find that to be a bold claim. Especially since most of the factors cited as for South Korea rethinking their nuclear choices were the same as Japan. So it's impossible to cite South Korea as getting nukes without at least thinking Japan would be in the same boat. It's like the authors of the chapter didnt talk to one another. Which is alright, I just assumed that if you're participating in a project with another expert, you should really take that extra step. Overall, an easy, informative read that I'm gald is on my bookshelf for citation purposes. *One side note. I really didnt write a thing in the margin of this book! I barely highlighted anything too! Strange for me.