The Human Rights Act (HRA) of the UK, enacted in 1998, provoked particular interest amongst scholars. Unlike systems of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial supremacy, it promised a new, 'balanced' model for the protection of rights, which conferred courts with a limited power of review over legislation. Under this new model, rights-based decision-making was expected to be balanced amongst courts and legislatures, rather than lopsided in favour of either. Indian courts, on the other hand, have always been constitutionally entrusted with the power to strike down primary legislation enacted by the Union and state legislatures.
This book examines the promise of the new model against its performance in practice by comparing judicial review under the HRA to an exemplar of the old model of judicial review, the Indian Constitution. It argues that although the HRA fosters a more balanced allocation of powers between legislatures and courts than the Indian Constitution, it does so for a novel reason. Balanced constitutionalism is not achieved through the legislative rejection of judicial decision-making about rights. Instead, the nature of the remedy under the HRA enables British courts to assert their genuine interpretations of rights in situations in which Indian courts find it difficult to do so.
This book covers the comparison of the provisions of the constitution of both the countries and features have been discussed at length for a better understanding of the reader. If you are doing any kind of study in which you need to dwell into the comparison then you can pick this book. The manner in which the cases have been discussed in this book requires that you should be aware of those cases beforehand.
Well- researched. A must read for those who want to know about how the judicial system works in India and the United Kingdom. Since I have studied Indian Constitutional law in detail, I loved the part where the author explains how at times political will dominates over the Constitution.