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Selected Writings of Pierre Hadot, The: Philosophy as Practice
This collection of writings from Pierre Hadot (1992-2010) presents, for the first time, previously unreleased and in some cases untranslated materials from one of the world's most prominent classical philosophers and historians of thought. As a passionate proponent of philosophy as a 'way of life' (most powerfully communicated in the life of Socrates), Pierre Hadot rejuvenated interest in the ancient philosophers and developed a philosophy based on their work which is peculiarly contemporary. His radical recasting of philosophy in the West was both provocative and substantial. Indeed, Michel Foucault cites Pierre Hadot as a major influence on his work. This beautifully written, lucid collection of writings will not only be of interest to historians, classicists and philosophers but also those interested in nourishing, as Pierre Hadot himself might have put it, a 'spiritual life'.
- GenresPhilosophyEssays
320 pages, Paperback
Published June 25, 2020
About the author
Pierre Hadot
48 books342 followersPierre Hadot (né à Paris, le 21 février 1922 - mort à Orsay, le 25 avril 2010) est un philosophe, historien et philologue français, spécialiste de l'antiquité, profond connaisseur de la période hellénistique et en particulier du néoplatonisme et de Plotin. Pierre Hadot est l'auteur d'une œuvre développée notamment autour de la notion d'exercice spirituel et de philosophie comme manière de vivre.
Spécialiste de Plotin et du stoïcisme, en particulier de Marc-Aurèle, il est un de ceux qui ont accompagné le retour à la philosophie antique, considérée comme pratique, manière de vivre et exercice spirituel. Ses livres, très agréables à lire et d'une très grande érudition, manifestent constamment un rapport avec l'existence, l'expérience, voire la poésie, la littérature et le mysticisme.
Spécialiste de Plotin et du stoïcisme, en particulier de Marc-Aurèle, il est un de ceux qui ont accompagné le retour à la philosophie antique, considérée comme pratique, manière de vivre et exercice spirituel. Ses livres, très agréables à lire et d'une très grande érudition, manifestent constamment un rapport avec l'existence, l'expérience, voire la poésie, la littérature et le mysticisme.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
March 24, 2021
Another exceptional book by Pierre Hadot. For me, after having read The Inner Citadel many times and after having read Philosophy as a Way of Life a couple of times, there wasn't much in terms of new things I learned. But, the last two chapters, wherein he maps out how early Greek philosophy (paganism) morphed into Christianity - were amazing. Any remaining allegiance I had to Christianity was effectively buried after reading the chapter "The End of Paganism."
All the good about Christianity (and in particular, the Mormon flavor), has stemmed from pre-Socratic, and then Hellenistic philosophy. Many of the debates between Judaism and Christianity and then later between Catholicism and Protestantism, over centuries, has been played out between the 2nd and 9th centuries. Hadot does an excellent job summarizing how paganism was largely infused into Christianity and then later capitalized by the Roman / Byzantine state.
I am confident that Stoicism is a perfect solution to leading a rational, moral life in the 21st century, without the baggage, overhead, mysticism and dishonesty perpetuated by many religions today and over the past 2000 years. In Stoicism today, we are seeing a resurgence of a rational philosophy where the end goal and result is a moral life - the "fruit" in Christian terms. All the culture wars which we have fought for decades, are rendered irrelevant. Stoicism cuts through all that and provides a framework for the individual and community to come together in a respectful relationship.
If you have access to this book, it will give you more insight into Hadot's other amazing works, but the value of this book, in my opinion is in the last two chapters.
All the good about Christianity (and in particular, the Mormon flavor), has stemmed from pre-Socratic, and then Hellenistic philosophy. Many of the debates between Judaism and Christianity and then later between Catholicism and Protestantism, over centuries, has been played out between the 2nd and 9th centuries. Hadot does an excellent job summarizing how paganism was largely infused into Christianity and then later capitalized by the Roman / Byzantine state.
I am confident that Stoicism is a perfect solution to leading a rational, moral life in the 21st century, without the baggage, overhead, mysticism and dishonesty perpetuated by many religions today and over the past 2000 years. In Stoicism today, we are seeing a resurgence of a rational philosophy where the end goal and result is a moral life - the "fruit" in Christian terms. All the culture wars which we have fought for decades, are rendered irrelevant. Stoicism cuts through all that and provides a framework for the individual and community to come together in a respectful relationship.
If you have access to this book, it will give you more insight into Hadot's other amazing works, but the value of this book, in my opinion is in the last two chapters.
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June 12, 2020Philosophy as Practice
Philosophy should be the way of life, not only they way of thinking
We have a distorted view on philosophy due to Middle Ages
With the Middle Ages, we witness a total separation of the spiritual exercises and philosophy
Ancient philosophy was a way of life
Ancient philosophy system was a lifestyles in the first place
In Antiquity, the philosopher is, before all else, a man having a certain lifestyle
The philosophical school imposed a way of life on its members that engaged the whole of one’s existence
The sage will be the individual capable of living on two planes: perfectly inserted into everyday life and yet plunged into the cosmos
Famous ancient philosophers practiced their philosophy
To an old man, who told him that he attended lessons on virtue, Plato responded: ‘and when will you begin to live virtuously?’
The philosophical school is a medical clinic,’ as Epictetus said
Stoics clearly distinguished philosophical discourse from philosophy itself
The only way to truly understand philosophy is through exercising it
Exercises are efficient
They are organized in a system
The first stage of spiritual progress was the practice of ‘political’ virtues
After this one could rise to a movement of detachment from the body
Finally, one can achieve happiness
They allow to avoid anxiety through focus on the the right moment
It is a disastrous mistake to let oneself be disturbed by the global representation of one’s whole life
Circumscribe the present’: this is ultimately to liberate the imagination from worries
The more our contemplation is developed, the more our happiness grows
There is a great variety of exercises to choose from
Learning how to read ancient philosophical texts is one of the most crucial spiritual exercises
There are the exercise that consist in disciplining our active impulses, feelings and desires
Philosophy should be the way of life, not only they way of thinking
We have a distorted view on philosophy due to Middle Ages
With the Middle Ages, we witness a total separation of the spiritual exercises and philosophy
Ancient philosophy was a way of life
Ancient philosophy system was a lifestyles in the first place
In Antiquity, the philosopher is, before all else, a man having a certain lifestyle
The philosophical school imposed a way of life on its members that engaged the whole of one’s existence
The sage will be the individual capable of living on two planes: perfectly inserted into everyday life and yet plunged into the cosmos
Famous ancient philosophers practiced their philosophy
To an old man, who told him that he attended lessons on virtue, Plato responded: ‘and when will you begin to live virtuously?’
The philosophical school is a medical clinic,’ as Epictetus said
Stoics clearly distinguished philosophical discourse from philosophy itself
The only way to truly understand philosophy is through exercising it
Exercises are efficient
They are organized in a system
The first stage of spiritual progress was the practice of ‘political’ virtues
After this one could rise to a movement of detachment from the body
Finally, one can achieve happiness
They allow to avoid anxiety through focus on the the right moment
It is a disastrous mistake to let oneself be disturbed by the global representation of one’s whole life
Circumscribe the present’: this is ultimately to liberate the imagination from worries
The more our contemplation is developed, the more our happiness grows
There is a great variety of exercises to choose from
Learning how to read ancient philosophical texts is one of the most crucial spiritual exercises
There are the exercise that consist in disciplining our active impulses, feelings and desires
November 12, 2021
Hadot's fundamental point is right-on so he can be forgiven some amount of repetition in this collection: philosophy in antiquity was a way of life, closer to monastic orders than its current academic incarnation. Hadot traces a through-line behind such disparate schools as Stoics, Platonists, Aristotelians, and Epicureans, demonstrating that each demands not intellectual assent but lifestyle change, maaaaan. These philosophers are not just trying to get the definition of justice exactly right; they're providing a lived demonstration of how to live. Hadot recontextualizes some interesting features of ancient thought in light of this perspective, including the role of the sage as exemplar, whether we should consider Marcus Aurelius a pessimist or not, and the centrality of orality/human conversation to the practice of philosophy. This approach certainly informs the question of Plato's unwritten doctrines, and Hadot does comment here on the Tübingen School to note some convergences and divergences with his own thought.
In some ways it's hard to read these pieces with fresh eyes, because Hadot has carried the day culturally, if not academically. The vast numbers of laypeople discussing Stoicism online are the fruits of Hadot's labors. One must grant the vitality of the interpretation, perhaps begrudgingly so, in the sometimes strange adaptations of ancient solutions to modern problems by techbro lifehackers and self-helpers. I'm not sure Hadot would want to acknowledge some of his monstrous offspring, but we don't control the fates of our children, as is amply demonstrated in the genealogies Hadot offers here of the cross-pollination between early Christianity and pagan philosophy: sometimes your kid brings home a weirdo for Thanksgiving.
The weaknesses of this volume are shared with its subject: it's hard to write a book delivering an argument that books can't teach you what you need to learn. Hadot urges us to consider philosophy as a living practice of spiritual exercises for the transformation of the self, but reading that exhortation isn't a self-executing script. Further, his ideas are often sketched broadly, while other scholars have taken up his call and produced much more fruitful research into these matters. I will rate this one based on my pleasure in reading it, not on the persuasiveness of the ideas or the depth of influence. Understand that its rating on those latter factors would be much higher. If I had read this earlier in life, there's no doubt the impact would have been immense. As it stands, I disagreed with little but learned little new. But if you're new to the subject, this is a great place to start.
In some ways it's hard to read these pieces with fresh eyes, because Hadot has carried the day culturally, if not academically. The vast numbers of laypeople discussing Stoicism online are the fruits of Hadot's labors. One must grant the vitality of the interpretation, perhaps begrudgingly so, in the sometimes strange adaptations of ancient solutions to modern problems by techbro lifehackers and self-helpers. I'm not sure Hadot would want to acknowledge some of his monstrous offspring, but we don't control the fates of our children, as is amply demonstrated in the genealogies Hadot offers here of the cross-pollination between early Christianity and pagan philosophy: sometimes your kid brings home a weirdo for Thanksgiving.
The weaknesses of this volume are shared with its subject: it's hard to write a book delivering an argument that books can't teach you what you need to learn. Hadot urges us to consider philosophy as a living practice of spiritual exercises for the transformation of the self, but reading that exhortation isn't a self-executing script. Further, his ideas are often sketched broadly, while other scholars have taken up his call and produced much more fruitful research into these matters. I will rate this one based on my pleasure in reading it, not on the persuasiveness of the ideas or the depth of influence. Understand that its rating on those latter factors would be much higher. If I had read this earlier in life, there's no doubt the impact would have been immense. As it stands, I disagreed with little but learned little new. But if you're new to the subject, this is a great place to start.
April 14, 2026
'I gradually came to observe that it was always necessary to explain the text in light of the living context in which it was born: that is to say, the concrete conditions of life of the philosophical school, in the institutional sense of the word. In antiquity, the priority of the school was never to disseminate a theoretical abstract knowledge, as we do in our modern universities. Above all else, it aimed to form the [disciples'] minds in a method and a knowledge of how to speak and how to debate.
In one way or another, philosophical writings were always echoes of an oral teaching. Moreover, for the ancient philosophers, a word, phrase, or argument was not primarily intended to inform the reader or listener, but rather to produce a certain psychical effect on them, always pedagogically considering their capacities. In this discourse, the propositional element was not the most important one... one could say that ancient philosophical discourse aimed at forming rather than informing students.
Ancient philosophy was more a pedagogical and intellectual exercise than a systematic construction. Furthermore... at least since Socrates and Plato, philosophy also presented itself as a therapeutics. All the ancient philosophical schools, each in its own way, offer a critique of the habitual condition of human beings, a state of suffering, disorder, and unawareness, and a method to cure them from this state. 'The philosophical school is a medical clinic,' as Epictetus said.
This therapy is situated, above all, in the discourse of the master which has the effect of an incantation, a sting, a violent shock which upsets the interlocutor, as is said of Socrates' discourse in Plato's Symposium. Nevertheless, to be cured, it is not sufficient to be moved. One must really will to transform one's life. In all philosophical schools, the teacher is thus a director of conscience.' (34-5)
'It is in the work of Aristotle that we find the most elaborated ancient theory on the relationship between the three disciplines [of philosophy, rhetoric, and dialectic].
First of all, what are the common points between rhetoric and dialectic? They both suppose an initial situation marked by conflict: that is, a situation where two contradictory responses can be given to a theoretical, juridical, or political question (or problem). However, rhetoric and dialectic are not interested in the response as such. They are only concerned with the means which will allow an adversary, a judge, or the people to accept one of the two.
What counts, therefore, is not so much the theme of the discussion, but rather the interlocutor himself, who must be persuaded. In order to conduct the listener to a given conviction, one must start from those things of which the listener is already convinced; that is to say, one must start either from his own opinions or, more generally, from opinions that are universally accepted, common and natural notions, admitted by everyone.
This point, for Aristotle, is what radically distinguishes rhetoric and dialectic from the sciences such as mathematics, for example. The latter have, indeed, their own principles and techniques which are only understood by specialists, and they are applied to one specific domain of reality.
Rhetoric and dialectic, on the contrary, are "common" and universal. They do not have any specific and determinate domain of reality on which they focus; rather, they can be applied to any subject of discussion, and they start from principles which are accessible to all. They do not bring knowledge concerning any specific issue. They seek only to persuade the interlocutor of what he already knows. This is why they are both able to prove the positions "pro" and "contra".
This does not in any way deprive them of logical rigor. From the moment that one admits a certain point of departure, the necessary chain of syllogisms will inexorably lead to the conclusion. The syllogistic reasoning is the same in science and dialectic. It is solely the principles which differ between them: in each science, its own specific principles, in rhetoric and dialectic, common notions. Furthermore, rhetoric and dialectic are not concerned with the conclusion in itself, but rather with the means that lead to the conclusion.
Despite this fundamental kinship, rhetoric and dialectic are different from one another... Dialectic is the art of discussing; that is to say, it formulates the rules of the dialectic joust, in which an attacker argues against the thesis of an adversary in order to oblige the latter, through skillful questions, to necessarily admit the thesis which contradicts his own. "To interrogate", this is the task of the attacker; to construct a syllogism, starting from the premises (questions posed to the adversary) which will lead (if he concedes the truth of these premises) to a conclusion which involves the contradictory proposition to the adversary's thesis. The attacker himself does not have a thesis. However, he is capable of arguing in such a way that he who defends a thesis will be inexorably constrained to contradict his own thesis. [c.f. Nagarjuna's MMK]
One recognizes here the Socratic situation. As Aristotle says: "Socrates asked questions, he did not provide answers, since he confessed to know nothing." Not only does dialectic teach one how to ask questions. It also teaches how to respond; that is to say, it teaches one how to defend a thesis against the traps of the questioner. The respondent defends a thesis, but only for the sake of the exercise; he must be able to defend the thesis and the thesis that contradicts it. He thus only appears as if he knew.
This game of questions and answers and its tortuous itineraries, which often puts off the readers of Plato's dialogues, cannot be found in rhetoric. The latter uses continuous discourse; that is, an exposition which is not interrupted and structured in questions and answers. This was the method of the sophists. The listener who must be persuaded does not participate in the argumentation, as was the case in dialectic... In rhetoric, the discourse is developed with no obstacles, starting from the positions that the listener is supposed to accept.
Moreover, dialectic is more universal than rhetoric. The former treats all possible subjects, and does so in the most universal way, without the intervention of concrete data. On the contrary, rhetoric takes as subjects, above all, concrete problems (Did this man commit murder? Should we go to war?). What is at stake for rhetoric is the kind of problems that the ancients called "civil" or "political" which are, by definition, contingent... There will always be a close link between rhetoric and ethical and political problems. This opposition between the generality of dialectic and the particularity of rhetoric corresponds to the opposition between thesis and hypothesis. As Boethius will say:
"Dialectic is only concerned with the "thesis". The thesis is a problem without any concrete or particular circumstances. Rhetoric concerns itself with discussing hypothesis, which is to say, discussing problems which presuppose a multiplicity of concrete circumstances (Who? What? Where? When? Why? How? By what means?)."
For Aristotle, there is a fundamental opposition between philosophy and these two techniques of rhetoric and dialectic. In effect, this position reflects the novelty of his conception of philosophy, compared to that of Plato... [because] dialectic... for him means philosophy.' (133-6)
In one way or another, philosophical writings were always echoes of an oral teaching. Moreover, for the ancient philosophers, a word, phrase, or argument was not primarily intended to inform the reader or listener, but rather to produce a certain psychical effect on them, always pedagogically considering their capacities. In this discourse, the propositional element was not the most important one... one could say that ancient philosophical discourse aimed at forming rather than informing students.
Ancient philosophy was more a pedagogical and intellectual exercise than a systematic construction. Furthermore... at least since Socrates and Plato, philosophy also presented itself as a therapeutics. All the ancient philosophical schools, each in its own way, offer a critique of the habitual condition of human beings, a state of suffering, disorder, and unawareness, and a method to cure them from this state. 'The philosophical school is a medical clinic,' as Epictetus said.
This therapy is situated, above all, in the discourse of the master which has the effect of an incantation, a sting, a violent shock which upsets the interlocutor, as is said of Socrates' discourse in Plato's Symposium. Nevertheless, to be cured, it is not sufficient to be moved. One must really will to transform one's life. In all philosophical schools, the teacher is thus a director of conscience.' (34-5)
'It is in the work of Aristotle that we find the most elaborated ancient theory on the relationship between the three disciplines [of philosophy, rhetoric, and dialectic].
First of all, what are the common points between rhetoric and dialectic? They both suppose an initial situation marked by conflict: that is, a situation where two contradictory responses can be given to a theoretical, juridical, or political question (or problem). However, rhetoric and dialectic are not interested in the response as such. They are only concerned with the means which will allow an adversary, a judge, or the people to accept one of the two.
What counts, therefore, is not so much the theme of the discussion, but rather the interlocutor himself, who must be persuaded. In order to conduct the listener to a given conviction, one must start from those things of which the listener is already convinced; that is to say, one must start either from his own opinions or, more generally, from opinions that are universally accepted, common and natural notions, admitted by everyone.
This point, for Aristotle, is what radically distinguishes rhetoric and dialectic from the sciences such as mathematics, for example. The latter have, indeed, their own principles and techniques which are only understood by specialists, and they are applied to one specific domain of reality.
Rhetoric and dialectic, on the contrary, are "common" and universal. They do not have any specific and determinate domain of reality on which they focus; rather, they can be applied to any subject of discussion, and they start from principles which are accessible to all. They do not bring knowledge concerning any specific issue. They seek only to persuade the interlocutor of what he already knows. This is why they are both able to prove the positions "pro" and "contra".
This does not in any way deprive them of logical rigor. From the moment that one admits a certain point of departure, the necessary chain of syllogisms will inexorably lead to the conclusion. The syllogistic reasoning is the same in science and dialectic. It is solely the principles which differ between them: in each science, its own specific principles, in rhetoric and dialectic, common notions. Furthermore, rhetoric and dialectic are not concerned with the conclusion in itself, but rather with the means that lead to the conclusion.
Despite this fundamental kinship, rhetoric and dialectic are different from one another... Dialectic is the art of discussing; that is to say, it formulates the rules of the dialectic joust, in which an attacker argues against the thesis of an adversary in order to oblige the latter, through skillful questions, to necessarily admit the thesis which contradicts his own. "To interrogate", this is the task of the attacker; to construct a syllogism, starting from the premises (questions posed to the adversary) which will lead (if he concedes the truth of these premises) to a conclusion which involves the contradictory proposition to the adversary's thesis. The attacker himself does not have a thesis. However, he is capable of arguing in such a way that he who defends a thesis will be inexorably constrained to contradict his own thesis. [c.f. Nagarjuna's MMK]
One recognizes here the Socratic situation. As Aristotle says: "Socrates asked questions, he did not provide answers, since he confessed to know nothing." Not only does dialectic teach one how to ask questions. It also teaches how to respond; that is to say, it teaches one how to defend a thesis against the traps of the questioner. The respondent defends a thesis, but only for the sake of the exercise; he must be able to defend the thesis and the thesis that contradicts it. He thus only appears as if he knew.
This game of questions and answers and its tortuous itineraries, which often puts off the readers of Plato's dialogues, cannot be found in rhetoric. The latter uses continuous discourse; that is, an exposition which is not interrupted and structured in questions and answers. This was the method of the sophists. The listener who must be persuaded does not participate in the argumentation, as was the case in dialectic... In rhetoric, the discourse is developed with no obstacles, starting from the positions that the listener is supposed to accept.
Moreover, dialectic is more universal than rhetoric. The former treats all possible subjects, and does so in the most universal way, without the intervention of concrete data. On the contrary, rhetoric takes as subjects, above all, concrete problems (Did this man commit murder? Should we go to war?). What is at stake for rhetoric is the kind of problems that the ancients called "civil" or "political" which are, by definition, contingent... There will always be a close link between rhetoric and ethical and political problems. This opposition between the generality of dialectic and the particularity of rhetoric corresponds to the opposition between thesis and hypothesis. As Boethius will say:
"Dialectic is only concerned with the "thesis". The thesis is a problem without any concrete or particular circumstances. Rhetoric concerns itself with discussing hypothesis, which is to say, discussing problems which presuppose a multiplicity of concrete circumstances (Who? What? Where? When? Why? How? By what means?)."
For Aristotle, there is a fundamental opposition between philosophy and these two techniques of rhetoric and dialectic. In effect, this position reflects the novelty of his conception of philosophy, compared to that of Plato... [because] dialectic... for him means philosophy.' (133-6)
February 4, 2023
Perfect book. Hadot is one of the best scholars of religious and philosophical history of antiquity, making ancient thought applicable to modern life.
August 4, 2025
This really opened my eyes to the goals of ancient philosophy and their understanding of wisdom. Hadot isn't satisfied with some general idea of "spiritual exercises" for philosophers, but gives the specifics of what this looked like, and in so doing, gives a new perspective on the ancient world.
April 9, 2023
too theoretical for me
written for people who are in philosophy for 10+ years
I gave up somewhere at 25ish%
very academic writing style
written for people who are in philosophy for 10+ years
I gave up somewhere at 25ish%
very academic writing style
February 14, 2025
Would have been a more engaging book if it was half the length. Hard to make for a very interesting read when the historical evidence of the protagonist is so relatively sparse.
July 17, 2025
Pierre Hadot colega e influencia directa para Michel Foucault en el College De France
February 15, 2026
Pierre Hadot is a favorite and this collection did not disappoint.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews