The critical treatise traditionally attributed to Longinus, On the Sublime [Περὶ ὕψους], has, since its recovery in the Renaissance, long occupied a place of honor in the republic of humane letters as a vital spur to excellence of style during the nascent period of the emerging field of aesthetic theory. Modern philological research establishes that its author probably wrote in the first century and could not have been the famed third-century literary critic whom we know as Longinus, after all. Why this ancient teaching matters to us today when descriptivism is all the rage and anyone secretly harboring a prescriptivist tendency stands as if under an ill-boding star: implicit in everything Longinus says is the notion of an external objective standard, the very antithesis of Nietzschean perspectivism. One wonders, indeed, whether any genuine valor and sublimity can prosper or even merely subsist on the barren ground offered by a post-classical, post-Christian era, just as it would be preposterous to suppose anyone capable anymore of composing a serious tragedy.
The edition of Longinus to which the present review is devoted is the excellent reprint of the original Greek text and English translation by W. Rhys Roberts, a facsimile of the Cambridge University press version originally published in 1907. Besides the text itself, Roberts provides a fairly thorough introduction on the question of authorship (pp. 1-23), worth reading for incidental remarks on the nature of the text even if one doesn’t care very much about the question itself; and a nicely written review of its contents and character (pp. 23-37). This recensionist regrettably is in no position to speak on the quality of the English translation – it reads very smoothly as English prose, though the diction in the poetic verses quoted often comes across as stilted to a modern ear. Only the most diligent among us will want more than to glance at the appendices. Appendix A (pp. 163-185) deals with textual matters and critical notes (necessary for a text in a rather poor state of preservation); Appendix B (pp. 186-211) on linguistic matters enters into a meticulous and minute analysis of its grammar and vocabulary with a bearing upon the question of authorship; Appendix C (pp. 211-246) on properly literary matters contains a helpful chronological table of the few dozen authors mentioned by Longinus along with a separate paragraph or two on each, devoting special attention to Caecilius on whose work this treatise is based, to Moses, alluded to in ix.9 (whether this could be an interpolation), and lastly to the historical Longinus himself; finally Appendix D (pp. 247-261) consists in a very thorough bibliography of the primary and secondary literature up to 1907 and in a handful of remarks on previous translations into European languages (briefly discusses English critics such as Burke, Macaulay, Pope but has nothing on the Germans Lessing, Baumgarten, Schiller, Kant).
Now on to Longinus himself (whoever he may have been). How to state his cause? Roberts sums it up thus, ‘His subject is elevation [ὕψος] of style, and this, he holds, depends ultimately on elevation of character’ (p. 11). In Longinus’ own words,
As I am writing to you, my good friend, who are well versed in literary studies, I feel almost absolved from the necessity of premising at any length that sublimity is a certain distinction and excellence in expression, and that it is from no other source than this that the greatest poets and writers have derived their eminence and gained an immortality of renown. The effect of elevated language upon an audience is not persuasion but transport [ἔϰστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερϕυᾶ]. (i,3-4, p. 43)
Another locus classicus would be the following, in view of which Roberts imputes to him ‘decided Roman affinities’ (p. 12):
Sublimity is the echo of a great soul [ὕψος μεγαλοϕροσύνης ἀπήχημα] (ix, 2, p. 61)
Chapters viii-xl outline what Longinus sees as the five principal sources of the sublime, two having to do with character (hence innate), and three matters of art, that is to say, technical in nature (thus, potentially acquirable). The first, and by far the most crucial, is grandeur of thought, nobility of character, elevation of thought, about which Longinus tells us,
First, then, it is absolutely necessary to indicate the source of this elevation, namely, that the truly eloquent must be free from low and ignoble thoughts. For it is not possible that men with mean and servile ideas and aims prevailing throughout their lives should produce anything that is admirable and worthy of immortality. (ix, 3, p. 61)
What fact, then, was before the eyes of those superhuman writers who, aiming at everything that was highest in composition, contemned an all-pervading accuracy? This besides many other things, that Nature has appointed us men to be no base or ignoble animals; but when she ushers us into life and into the vast universe as into some great assembly, to be as it were spectators of the mighty whole and the keenest aspirants for honor, forthwith she implants in our souls the unconquerable love of whatever is elevated and more divine than we. Wherefore not even the entire universe suffices for the thought and contemplation within the reach of the human mind, but our imaginations often pass beyond the bounds of space, and if we survey our life on every side and see how much more it everywhere abounds in what is striking, and great, and beautiful, we shall soon discern the purpose of our birth. (xxxv, 2-3, pp. 133-135)
Now as regards the manifestations of the sublime in literature, in which grandeur is never, as it sometimes is in nature, found apart from utility and advantage, it is fitting to observe at once that, though writers of this magnitude are far removed from faultlessness, they none the less all rise above what is mortal; that all other qualities prove their possessors to be men, but sublimity raises them near the majesty of God; and that, while immunity from errors relieves from censure, it is grandeur that excites admiration. (xxxvi, 1, pp. 135-137)
Another way (beyond anything we have mentioned) leads to the sublime. And what, and what manner of way, may that be? It is the imitation and emulation of previous great poets and writers. And let this, my dear friend, be an aim to which we steadfastly apply ourselves. For many men are carried away by the spirit of others as if inspired, just as it is related of the Pythian priestess when she approaches the tripod, where there is a rift in the ground which (they say) exhales divine vapor. By heavenly power thus communicated she is impregnated and straightway delivers oracles in virtue of the afflatus. Similarly from the great natures of the men of old there are borne in upon the souls of those who emulate them (as from sacred caves) what we may describe as effluences, so that even those who seem little likely to be possessed are thereby inspired and succumb to the spell of the others’ greatness. (xii, 2, p. 81)
As an aside, precisely this interpersonal radiance of divine grace is what the communion of the saints is all about, which Protestants to a man excise at it were from the Apostles’ creed, the symbol of the early church (its last clause: ‘I believe in the Holy Spirit, the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. Amen.’).
For Longinus, the second source of the sublime is vehement and inspired passion, but he has little to say on the subject as he wishes to reserve it for another occasion. The third and fourth sources are figures of speech and noble phrasing or diction, to which Longinus attributes far greater efficacy than we probably would:
By a sort of natural law, figures bring support to the sublime, and on their part derive support in turn from it in a wonderful degree. (xvii, 1, p. 95)
The fifth and last source of sublimity is elevation in arrangement of words, about which too the following:
In regard to this, having already in two treatises sufficiently stated such results as our inquiry could compass, we will add, for the purpose of our present undertaking, only what is absolutely essential, namely the fact that harmonious arrangement is not only a natural source of persuasion and pleasure among men but also a wonderful instrument of lofty utterance and of passion. (xxxix, 1, p. 143)
The final chapter xliv takes up what Longinus considers to be the causes of the decline of eloquence in his age. Liberty suffered after the conquest of the Greek city-states by the Romans and by his time, presumably in the first century AD, most men were given over to lesser pursuits than politics:
For the love of money (a disease from which we all suffer sorely) and the love of pleasure make us their thralls, or rather, as one may say, drown us body and soul in the depths, the love of riches being a malady which makes men petty, and the love of pleasure one that makes them most ignoble. (pp. 157-159)
W. Rhys Roberts takes it for granted that there is no common ground between Longinus’ conception of the sublime, as sketched here, and that of eighteenth-century aesthetics, which in the main determines how we understand the term today. Alexander Baumgarten (1750/1758) equates the sublime, das Erhabene = magnitudo aesthetica. To draw out what such a magnitude could mean, let us turn to Kant’s ripe theory of the sublime. In an 1764 essay, he spells out the difference between beauty and the sublime: in contrast to the beautiful, an aesthetic judgment of which always rests upon the perception of a finite, bounded object, the sublime is based upon the feeling of nature as impressively large, i.e. virtually infinite, eliciting in us a contrary reflection on concepts of reason within ourselves [Vernunftbegriffe]. The following fine passage from the close of the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft helps demarcate the realm of the sublime:
Zwei Dinge erfüllen das Gemüt mit immer neuer und zunehmenden Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, je öfter und anhaltender sich das Nachdenken damit beschäftigt: Der bestirnte Himmel über mir, und das moralische Gesetz in mir. Beide darf ich nicht als in Dunkelheiten verhüllt, oder im Überschwänglichen, außer meinem Gesichtskreise, suchen und bloß vermuten; ich sehe sie vor mir und verknüpfe sie unmittelbar mit dem Bewußtsein meiner Existenz. Das erste fängt von dem Platze an, dem ich in der aüßern Sinnenwelt einnehme, und erweitert die Verknüpfung, darin ich stehe, ins Unabsehlich-Große mit Welten über Welten und Systemen von Systemen, überdem noch in grenzenlose Zeiten ihrer periodischen Bewegung, deren Anfang und Fortdauer. Das zweite fängt von meinem unsichtbaren Selbst, meiner Persönlichkeit, an, und stellt mich in einer Welt dar, die wahre Unendlichkeit hat, aber nur dem Verstande spürbar ist, und mit welcher (dadurch aber auch zugleich mit allen jenen sichtbaren Welten) ich mich nicht, wie dort, in bloß zufälliger, sondern allgemeiner und notwendiger Verknüpfung erkenne. Der erstere Anblick einer zahllosen Weltenmenge vernichtet gleichsam meine Wichtigkeit, als eines tierischen Geschöpfs, das die Materie, daraus es ward, dem Planeten (einem bloßem Punkt im Weltall) wieder zurückgeben muß, nachdem es eine kurze Zeit (man weiß nicht wie) mit Lebenskraft versehen gewesen. Der zweite erhebt dagegen meinen Wert, als einer Intelligenz, unendlich, durch meine Persönlichkeit, in welcher das moralische Gesetz mir einer von der Tierheit und selbst von der ganzen Sinnenwelt unabhängiges Leben offenbart, wenigstens so viel sich aus der zweckmäßigen Bestimmung meines Daseins durch dieses Gesetz, welche nicht auf Bedingungen und Grenzen dieses Lebens eingeschränkt ist, sondern ins Unendliche geht, abnehmen läßt. (AA, pp. 161-163)
But for Kant’s completely worked-out views, we must turn to §§23-29 in the Kritik der Urteilskraft. There, we learn that the sublime is not given in intuition [Anschauung] but in the aesthetic effect [Wirkung] of nature, leading the imagination [Einbildungskraft] to infer a supersensory substrate and releasing thereby the sense of the sublime [des Erhabenen] = mathematical sublime. Another and for our purposes more essential type of Kantian sublime is the dynamical = recognition of the autonomy of the subject, with respect to which nature becomes demoted to but a ‘Macht, die über uns keine Gewalt hat’. Schiller in ‘Über das Erhabene’ (1793) expounds a theory of the moral sublime which is to be aligned with Kant’s dynamical sublime.
To connect Longinus’ sublime to modern ideas, let us begin with two elementary points: first, the Greeks would not have known our distinction between the natural and the supernatural; second, the positive valuation of the infinite dates to post-classical times. From passages quoted above, it should be clear, however, that what Kant and Schiller seek to elaborate is a conceptual articulation of the same feeling of elevation Longinus senses in himself, pre-theoretically as it were. For his motive force is the attractive power of that which is high, which he opens himself to without being overly concerned with niceties such as whether it be natural or supernatural, or literally infinite. To draw such artful conceptual distinctions is the preserve of a later age of man. Here is the reason for Longinus’ immense prestige among the classically educated of Kant and Schiller’s time; for they recognized in themselves a kinship with him. Does the same hold true today?
What else can we say? It would surely prove most rewarding to trace the sublime in scripture (inherent throughout, but especially magnificent in Isaiah). Indeed, the prophets show themselves quite innovative in rhetorical use of language and word-play so as to convey their message in graphic terms, as we – those of us poorly equipped in Hebrew – can learn from good scriptural commentaries, a manner of proceeding of which Longinus could, on his principles, only highly approve. In what may come as a surprise to the modern reader, in a remarkable display of his largemindedness and catholicity, Longinus cites the Pentateuch, freely as is his habit:
Similarly, the legislator of the Jews, no ordinary man, having formed and expressed a worthy conception of the might of the Godhead, writes at the very beginning of his Laws, ‘God said’ – what? ‘Let there be light, and there was light; let there be land, and there was land’. (ix, 9, p. 65)
Conclusion: W. Rhys Roberts isn’t really right that Longinus’ sublime has nothing to do with ours – he’s too unphilosophical anyway for his judgment to count as the last word, though it goes without saying that he makes for a superlative classical philologist, far surpassing what anyone in our day could aspire to.